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Abstract 
Understanding why the Western Allies failed to penetrate the western border of Germany 
in the fall of 1944 is a longer and more involved story than most histories of the topic imply.   
Allied performance in the European Theater of Operations during World War II is directly linked 
to their performance in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations (MTO) and before that, in the 
North African theater.  This study focuses on how the Western Allies conducted campaigns – 
how they ran combined headquarters in order to plan and supervise joint, theater-level 
operations, and how those activities changed over time as the key leaders involved gained 
combat experience.   
After looking at the efforts of the Allied over this longer window of time, a new 
conclusion about why the pursuit phase of Overlord failed to penetrate the Westwall becomes 
clear.  LTG J. C. H. Lee’s Communication’s Zone (COMZ) was unprepared to fulfill the 
logistical requirements of the Allied fall campaign in France in 1944, contributing directly to 
disappointment over the outcome of the campaign.  For those who expected two years of combat 
experience to result in more effective performance in subsequent action, the failure was surely 
surprising.  This study examines why COMZ could not manage the theater’s logistics and 
distribution system, and how Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) failed 
to correct this shortcoming as it sought to synchronize joint operations with logistical 
requirements and the limitations they imposed.   
By contrasting the operational methods used by the United States (U.S.) and United 
Kingdom (U.K). and by looking at how Torch and Overlord unfolded, this study reaches three 
conclusions.  First, COMZ was woefully unprepared to execute its combat mission in August 
1944, and its failures lengthened the war considerably.  Second, this failure was directly linked to 
the U.S. Army’s inability to integrate lessons learned at European Theater of Operations, U.S. 
Army (ETOUSA).  Third, the work demonstrates how critical the integration of maneuver and 
sustainment is at the operational level of war and how U.S. doctrine and practice predating the 
war made this difficult to recognize.  Finally, successful command at the theater and operational 
level relies upon consensus and cooperation, unlike the more directive nature of tactical control.    
COMZ and SHAEF were not prepared to fulfil their roles in August and September 
because the U.S. experience in World War One and the doctrine that emerged from that 
experience resulted in the adoption of a model for theater command that was eventually rejected 
in 1944.  Although useful lessons were gained during Torch and implemented at Allied Force 
Headquarters (AFHQ), ETOUSA and Lee’s Service of Supply (SOS) did not integrate them.  
Those lessons were obscured when key personalities rotated or the org chart changed -- it took 
time for AFHQ, North African Theater of Operations, U.S. Army (NATOUSA), and the 
functional components to gel.  ETOUSA and SOS faced different challenges, were busy with 
Bolero, and suffered through personnel turnover and restrictions of their own.  A final round of 
reorganization swept through the U.K. over the winter of 1943 and 1944 when much of the 
command team relocated from the MTO to London.  These organizational changes left in 
question who exactly was in charge of the various aspects of the sustainment mission during 
Overlord.  Lee proved less effective than his peers when it came to producing results that were 
valued by the operational commands, and SHAEF and the army groups gradually poached 
ownership of planning and integrating logistical support from SOS/COMZ as a result.  Lee held 
on to running the communications zone in France, but then he did not properly prepare for the 
mission.  By the time SHAEF realized COMZ did not know how to do its job, it was too late to 
save the fall campaign.   
Just how bad things had gotten by October and November was masked by poor 
recordkeeping during the pursuit, confusion over what was really happening within the 
subordinate commands, and a narrative advanced by Eisenhower in January 1945 designed to 
paint a more flattering picture of recent events.  Eisenhower manipulated facts in a report 
submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in order to justify his decisions in France, dismiss any 
reported “mistakes” made during the fall, and ensure he retained personal control over the three 
army groups rather than reappointing a subordinate overall ground commander.  In the process, 
Eisenhower initiated the cover-up that would make it so difficult to establish why the pursuit 
broke down. 
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Abstract 
Understanding why the Western Allies failed to penetrate the western border of Germany 
in the fall of 1944 is a longer and more involved story than most histories of the topic imply.   
Allied performance in the European Theater of Operations during World War II is directly linked 
to their performance in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations (MTO) and before that, in the 
North African theater.  This study focuses on how the Western Allies conducted campaigns – 
how they ran combined headquarters in order to plan and supervise joint, theater-level 
operations, and how those activities changed over time as the key leaders involved gained 
combat experience.   
After looking at the efforts of the Allied over this longer window of time, a new 
conclusion about why the pursuit phase of Overlord failed to penetrate the Westwall becomes 
clear.  LTG J. C. H. Lee’s Communication’s Zone (COMZ) was unprepared to fulfill the 
logistical requirements of the Allied fall campaign in France in 1944, contributing directly to 
disappointment over the outcome of the campaign.  For those who expected two years of combat 
experience to result in more effective performance in subsequent action, the failure was surely 
surprising.  This study examines why COMZ could not manage the theater’s logistics and 
distribution system, and how Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) failed 
to correct this shortcoming as it sought to synchronize joint operations with logistical 
requirements and the limitations they imposed.   
By contrasting the operational methods used by the United States (U.S.) and United 
Kingdom (U.K). and by looking at how Torch and Overlord unfolded, this study reaches three 
conclusions.  First, COMZ was woefully unprepared to execute its combat mission in August 
1944, and its failures lengthened the war considerably.  Second, this failure was directly linked to 
the U.S. Army’s inability to integrate lessons learned at European Theater of Operations, U.S. 
Army (ETOUSA).  Third, the work demonstrates how critical the integration of maneuver and 
sustainment is at the operational level of war and how U.S. doctrine and practice predating the 
war made this difficult to recognize.  Finally, successful command at the theater and operational 
level relies upon consensus and cooperation, unlike the more directive nature of tactical control.    
COMZ and SHAEF were not prepared to fulfil their roles in August and September 
because the U.S. experience in World War One and the doctrine that emerged from that 
experience resulted in the adoption of a model for theater command that was eventually rejected 
in 1944.  Although useful lessons were gained during Torch and implemented at Allied Force 
Headquarters (AFHQ), ETOUSA and Lee’s Service of Supply (SOS) did not integrate them.  
Those lessons were obscured when key personalities rotated or the org chart changed -- it took 
time for AFHQ, North African Theater of Operations, U.S. Army (NATOUSA), and the 
functional components to gel.  ETOUSA and SOS faced different challenges, were busy with 
Bolero, and suffered through personnel turnover and restrictions of their own.  A final round of 
reorganization swept through the U.K. over the winter of 1943 and 1944 when much of the 
command team relocated from the MTO to London.  These organizational changes left in 
question who exactly was in charge of the various aspects of the sustainment mission during 
Overlord.  Lee proved less effective than his peers when it came to producing results that were 
valued by the operational commands, and SHAEF and the army groups gradually poached 
ownership of planning and integrating logistical support from SOS/COMZ as a result.  Lee held 
on to running the communications zone in France, but then he did not properly prepare for the 
mission.  By the time SHAEF realized COMZ did not know how to do its job, it was too late to 
save the fall campaign.   
Just how bad things had gotten by October and November was masked by poor 
recordkeeping during the pursuit, confusion over what was really happening within the 
subordinate commands, and a narrative advanced by Eisenhower in January 1945 designed to 
paint a more flattering picture of recent events.  Eisenhower manipulated facts in a report 
submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in order to justify his decisions in France, dismiss any 
reported “mistakes” made during the fall, and ensure he retained personal control over the three 
army groups rather than reappointing a subordinate overall ground commander.  In the process, 
Eisenhower initiated the cover-up that would make it so difficult to establish why the pursuit 
broke down. 
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Preface 
When Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), under the command 
of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, took control of the ground campaign in France in early 
September 1944, the organization was fatally compromised by the unpreparedness of LTG John 
Cliff H. Lee’s European Theater of Operations U.S. Army (ETOUSA) and Communications 
Zone Command (COMZ).  COMZ could not provide effective logistical support during the 
pursuit across France, and by the time SHAEF recognized the fact that Lee could not fulfil his 
promises and stepped in to fix it, it was too late to restore mobility in the face of a revived 
German Army.  Eisenhower dissipated his strength during the four weeks between 25 August 
and 25 September, trying to sustain three separate thrusts, each designed to achieve an 
operational objective, and in the process accomplishing none of them.  Disagreement among his 
senior advisors about the logistical viability of his preferred scheme of maneuver led Eisenhower 
to endorse the risk associated with this move.  The Allied pursuit faltered when COMZ could not 
deliver enough fuel to keep all of the divisions in the vanguard moving regularly and COMZ 
then contributed to the failure to quickly restore mobility in the face of local knots of resistance 
by not supplying enough fuel and ammunition to blast the enemy out of its hasty defensive 
positions.  In hindsight the Allies were remarkably close to achieving decisive results in 
September, and they only failed to pull off Eisenhower’s gamble by the slimmest of margins.  
Had any of the main Allied attacks advanced as little as fifty additional miles before the arrival 
of bad weather and the recovery of the German Army stabilized the front, the impact on the war 
would have been significant.   Opening Antwerp in mid-September offered the “silver bullet” 
solution to Allied transportation difficulties.  The dual envelopment of the Ruhr or penetration 
into the Saar would have caused major production problems that would have in turn retarded the 
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German bid to regenerate its ability to launch counter offensives by mid-December.  It is 
unrealistic to claim that the Western Allies could have ended the war before Christmas 1944, but 
German resistance would have suffered a major blow had Eisenhower accomplished any one of 
his three major operational objectives in September.  But because SHAEF did not accurately 
match its goals to its logistical means, and because COMZ failed to live up to the optimistic 
projections upon which that decision-making rested, the Allied pursuit fell far short of its true 
potential to harm German resistance. 
 The fact that SHAEF and COMZ could not execute such fundamental tasks at such a late 
stage of the war and two and three months after the initial landings in Normandy seems counter-
intuitive.  After gaining almost two years of practical experience fighting side by side in North 
Africa and in the Mediterranean, it would be logical to assume, the Western Allies and U.S. 
Army could have done better managing the campaign during the critical weeks of the pursuit 
across France.  This study seeks to explain why COMZ could not manage the theater logistics 
system during its first three months in charge and why SHAEF failed to detect and address this 
shortfall before it resulted in a crisis.  It is a story about how difficult it is for large organizations 
to change their behavior while engaged in a massive undertaking and the importance of 
personalities and relationships in even the largest enterprises.      
 Background and Definitions 
The critical organizational deficiencies that SHAEF and COMZ still had in fall 1944 
were an extension of how the management of the war had been handled for years.  The way the 
Western Allies divided responsibility for the higher-level management of the war and how the 
U.S. Army was affected by it were crucial matters.  At its heart was the employment of a joint-
combined headquarters, a novel organization to both the U.S. and U.K. militaries in 1942.  The 
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British had been employing joint regional commands since the beginning of the war, but figuring 
out how to integrate Americans into this structure was another thing entirely.  The existence of a 
joint combined headquarters called into question what U.S. doctrine dictated was the role of 
Army theater headquarters.  The relationship among the various national and service commands 
continued to evolve during the war based on the experience gained from North Africa, Italy, and 
other expeditionary campaigns conducted between 1942 and 1944.  The U.S. Army 
simultaneously wrestled with defining the relationship between general or coordinating staff 
sections and their technical or special staff associates, a battle that played out differently in each 
theater and echelon of command from the War Office to army level.  Uncertainty about how to 
structure headquarters and how to supervise staff sections was compounded by the need to 
master the operational level of war and the art of campaigning, which were heavily dependent 
upon the synchronization of large-scale maneuver and theater logistics.  Finally, both the U.K. 
and U.S. militaries were confronted by operational shortcomings in Africa and Italy, triggering a 
search for ways to increase competency and effectiveness in their formations.  This in turn called 
into question what it took to learn, and the best way to improve performance on the battle field.     
 Joint-Combined Headquarters and U.S. Army Theater Commands        
SHAEF was a joint and combined operational headquarters.  This means that it was 
charged with synchronizing the activities of air, land, and sea components (joint) with a staff 
comprised of a mix of U.S. and U.K. officers (combined).   Taken in isolation, neither concept 
was new, especially within the British military tradition.  But the elevation of the importance of 
air power since World War One and the desire to integrate national forces from the tactical to 
strategic level to a degree that had never been tried before made joint-combined operational 
headquarters a largely uncharted territory in 1942.  British and U.S. doctrine acknowledged the 
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important of joint integration but offered no details on how to do so.  Even more noticeable by its 
absence was any guidance on how to do so in concert with a close ally and on what impact a 
joint-combined headquarters would have on older systems of exercising command and control at 
the theater level.  When the Allies decided in July 1942 to launch Operation Torch, one of the 
first and most difficult associated tasks was to build what would become the Allied Forces 
Headquarters (AFHQ) to plan and run the campaign.  A British model for a theater command 
already existed and was applied to Torch; unlike the U.S., the U.K. had already established an 
independent air force, resulting in three component commands under the AFHQ umbrella.  Who 
exactly would exercise the function changed over time, but AFHQ was served by subordinate air, 
land, and sea components responsible for planning and coordinating all activities within their 
respective domains. 
U.S. doctrine called for a similar, and perhaps redundant, command structure to act as the 
overarching Army headquarters for each active theater.  Its major components included the 
ground force, the air force, and the logistics force (called the service of supply, or SOS).  As 
written in doctrine, this was both an operational and administrative organization, but the creation 
of joint-combined headquarters to direct operations quickly reduced the scope of ETOUSA and 
North Africa Theater of Operations, U.S. Army (NATOUSA) to administrative and logistical 
matters.  Exactly what this U.S. organization was responsible for within a context where a joint-
combined, overall ground, and rear area commander operated was a fundamental question that 
dogged the U.S. Army from February 1943 through November 1944.   
NATOUSA and ETOUSA existed primarily to synchronize logistical support to U.S. 
units in the theater, but the exact boundaries of this mission changed whenever any of the key 
players in the equation rotated out.  ETOUSA cycled through five commanders (with 
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Eisenhower filling this role on two separate occasions) between the summer of 1942 and January 
1944.  The ground component commander for AFHQ was initially General Kenneth Anderson, 
1st Army, and then General Harold Alexander, 18th Army Group, both British officers.  MG 
Everett Hughes was the deputy commander of NATOUSA and the commander of the 
Communications Zone (COMZ), and BG Tom Larkin was his primary subordinate, who served 
as the SOS commander of NATOUSA.  Finally, MG (later LTG) Humfrey Gale was the Chief 
Administrative Officer (CAO) at AFHQ, a British logistician with almost thirty years of 
experience in his field.  All of these men had strong personalities and firm beliefs about how the 
logistical structure should be organized and run.  The accumulation of varied operational 
experience in the Mediterranean and constantly rotating personnel combined to prevent the 
emergence of consensus on the best way to accomplish this role.  The complexity of this issue 
goes a long way towards explaining why Lee’s command was so unprepared to execute its duty 
in August 1944.     
What made matters even worse was a final wrinkle that applied uniquely to ETOUSA.  
When Eisenhower returned to London in January 1944, he decided ETOUSA was redundant, 
reassigning the few officers who still worked there to either SHAEF or Lee’s SOS.  But rather 
than eliminating that command echelon altogether, Eisenhower retained the organization while 
pushing its administrative duties down to Lee’s SOS.  Because people were uncomfortable with 
Lee issuing orders to 8th Air Force and Bradley’s 1st Army and 1st Army Group, Eisenhower 
retained his title as ETOUSA commander, appointing Lee the deputy and LTG W. Bedell Smith 
the chief of staff.  The practical result was that the general and special staff at SOS now also 
assumed responsibilities as the theater (ETOUSA) coordinating and advisory staff.  The last 
piece of the puzzle needed to follow this story was the fact that Lee’s SOS changed its name to 
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COMZ once it assumed control of the theater rear area in France.  COMZ was equal to and 
analogous to Bradley’s 12th Army Group in that both organizations had complete authority 
within their assigned battlespace, and could only be directed by ETOUSA or SHAEF.  The 
evolving relationship among SHAEF, 21st and 12th Army Groups, and COMZ in August to 
October sets the stage for the second half of this study.     
 General and Special Staff Sections  
Large staffs in the U.S. and U.K. militaries were typically divided into two general 
categories -- the coordinating or general staff, and the special or advisory staff.  Of particular 
importance to this work is the technical, service-oriented portion of that special staff, such as the 
quartermaster, ordnance, transportation, signal, and engineer sections.  These special advisors 
were added to the general staff during the nineteenth century when Western militaries realized 
they needed trained professionals to look after the bureaucratic requirements of the force.  They 
were generally broken down in the combat arms branches and the support-oriented technical 
services.  These were the organizations that ensured their community was armed with the right 
equipment, had the right array of component units and headquarters, and were trained and 
educated to fully exploit the potential of their unique function on the battlefield.  Coordinating or 
general staffs existed to help synchronize these branches and services on behalf of the 
commander during active operations, at least in theory putting one deputy chief of staff each in 
charge of personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, and planning.  Expansion of the size and 
role of the general staff was a logistical step designed to reduce the number of agencies the 
commander had to manage personally, but it also carried the risk of creating a messy division of 
roles and responsibilities, with the potential for both gaps and overlapping coverage.  It also 
demanded that the deputy chief of staff have the personality and experience needed to lead and 
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manage his peers from the branches and services assigned to the special staff.  The British Army 
had largely worked through the bureaucratic and organizational challenges presented by this dual 
system of control by early 1943, while the U.S. Army was just getting started.  The fact that Lee 
had wrestled supervisory control over the ETOUSA special staff without ensuring that his 
general staff was ready to take on that responsibility was a major source of the problems at 
COMZ during the fall campaign.  
    
 Defining the Operational Level of War 
  Defining the operational level of war can be tricky, and explaining how a staff goes 
about planning and conducting a campaign is even harder.  What is even more problematic is the 
fact that U.S. and U.K. doctrine, education, and practice during World War Two did not 
acknowledge the existence of such a concept at all.  The concept of an operational level of war 
emerged from the increased size and scope of warfare that had developed by the end of the 
Napoleonic Wars.  The potential of armies that applied an operational approach to campaigns, 
even without explicitly calling it “operational,” was on full display during the Wars of German 
Unification and during the last two years of the American Civil War.  Called into question by the 
lack of movement on the Western Front during World War One, the concept of maneuver 
warfare remained valid on the Eastern Front and on secondary fronts throughout World War 
One.   It returned with a vengeance in 1939.   
The idea of stringing together a series of battles and small engagements, linked to 
movement that damaged the enemy’s ability to turn natural resources into deployable military 
power, reemerged dramatically during the second half of the Napoleonic Wars.  Armies had 
grown to such a size, operating on several fronts or even theaters, that it was impossible to knock 
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an opponent out of the contest with one battle followed up by an aggressive pursuit.  By 1914 the 
industrial powers of Europe had nearly infinite capacity to regenerate military power in the field, 
no matter how horrific the monthly casualty rate and extravagant the expenditure of ammunition.  
In order for a set of engagements to produce any meaningful result, the high command needed to 
combine a series of blows in a logical sequence and for just the right duration.  In theaters where 
the concentration of manpower did not preclude breakthroughs and offered the hope of a return 
to mobility, one attacked in order to break open the front.  In the tactical realm one moved to 
create the opportunity for a favorable attack, but at the operational level one attacked with the 
hope of regaining mobility.   
If successful in restoring mobility to operations, deciding where to move next was 
critically important.  Those targets, or objectives, generally fell into one of two categories – those 
that reduced the enemy’s ability to resist over a longer time frame, and those that extend the 
operational reach of the friendly force while preserving its combat power from wastage.1  
Conducting an operational campaign was risky business, one that combined the science of 
movement and consumption rates with the art of predicting the intentions and capabilities of the 
enemy relative to one’s own.  The commander risked harm to his own force while seeking to 
disproportionately hurt the enemy.  Movement and combat contributed to the wastage of both 
sides; long advances or retreats might actually do more harm to the army than the fighting itself 
did, a concept captured in the modern U.S. Army’s definition of culmination or the culminating 
 
1 Objectives meant to reduce enemy resistance might be industrial centers, major recruiting regions, areas dedicated 
to extracting natural resources, or places where military and political activities were coordinated.  Objectives that 
extended the reach of friendly forces included concentrations of road and rail lines, ports, clusters of bridges over 
major rivers, agricultural areas rich in forage, and shelter in harsh weather.  Threatening either of these types of 
objectives might also induce the enemy to fight at a disadvantage to try to retain them.   
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point.2  Just having the ability to protect large, mobile forces deep into the enemy rear and keep 
them resupplied there became a major advantage to the nation that possessed such a capability.   
The British experience in the North African desert from 1940 to 1942 had given them a head 
start over the U.S. Army in recognizing the value of such a skill set and the practical matter of 
keeping the men and vehicles engaged in such activity functional.  By December 1942 
Montgomery and his 8th Army were well on their way in learning how to blend combat, 
movement, and sustainment over great distances in an austere environment in order to punish his 
opponent, and the criticality of one commander and one headquarters to synchronize this 
activity.   
 A critical component of warfare at the operational level is providing logistical support to 
friendly forces.  In the context of this study, operational logistics is the management of two 
related activities: a large-scale requisition system and the transportation network required to 
move supplies up to the combat zone.  Theater logisticians had to figure out what the combat and 
support units needed and then determine where all of those supplies were located, either already 
in theater, already on their way, or somewhere back in the industrial pipeline.  The last step was 
to figure out the best way to move a lot of different items up to the user as quickly and efficiently 
as possible, and then ensure those orders were actually executed.  A difficult task under perfect 
conditions, this challenge was complicated by trying to work from information that was out of 
date and at least partially incorrect, the need to rely on insufficient communications equipment, 
 
2 The 2018 edition of U.S. Army Doctrine Publications (ADP) 1-02 Terms and Military Symbols defines the 
culminating point as a point “at which a force no longer has the capability to continue its form of operations, offense 
or defense.  JP 3.0 Operations (2017) expands the definition to include: “In the offense, the point at which 
continuing the attack is no longer possible and the force must consider reverting to a defensive posture or attempting 
an operational pause.”  Culmination happens when the attacking force can no longer dislodge the enemy, and it is 
the result of two linked developments: the enemy becomes too strong to dislodge or the friendly force outruns its 
source of supply and reinforcement.   
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all while trying to stay ahead of priorities that changed quickly and often.  On top of this, the 
enemy could upend everything at a moment’s notice by taking a unanticipated action.  Mastery 
of the operational art of war brought with it the realization that supply and transportation 
requirements largely drove the selection and sequencing of maneuver objectives.  The inherent 
flexibility of motorized units could trump operational restraints, but only for a very short time; 
eventually the material bill associated with massed, mechanized warfare would have to be paid.  
And the longer one ignored the physical limitations of the distribution network in the pursuit of 
tactical gains, the greater the eventual cost of reconciliation.   
 It is easier to outline an intellectual framework for designing campaign plans in the 2000s 
than it was for an Allied staff officer from 1942 to 1945.  The doctrinal language to help discuss 
the issue did not even exist, and the capstone manuals written to guide officers serving on the 
most senior-level staffs had almost nothing of value to help novices understand the basics or how 
to approach an operational problem.3  Of the five key manuals written to address these topics, 
only the British Manual of Movement (War) was of much practical use to the novice.    Experts 
did not need doctrine; he already understood the topic.  But the authors of U.S. capstone 
doctrine, and the British FSR Vol III Operations -- Higher Formations, seemed not to realize 
who their intended audience was and how to reach them effectively.  In the case of U.S. doctrine, 
it is probably more accurate to say that there were ambiguity, contradiction, and a lack of 
practical examples and helpful techniques because the authors really had not mastered the 
subject, nor had the U.S. Army reached a consensus on how they wanted to run a theater and 
conduct operational campaigns.  By the summer of 1944 the British Army in Normandy thought 
 
3 Modern U.S. Army doctrine contains nine elements of operational design: end state and condition, center of 
gravity, decisive points, lines of operation and effort, operational reach, basing, tempo, phasing and transitions, 
culmination, and risk.  The ideas behind operational reach and culmination both speak directly to the need to 
integrate the maneuver and logistics elements of the staff.   
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about ground combat from an operational perspective, but without the benefit of any doctrinal 
“code” with which to introduce the concepts to their American counterparts.  This was an 
intellectual blind spot for the U.S. Army that contributed directly to the failure to set clear 
priorities and pairing of logistical support that emerged after the crossing of the Seine.     
     
 A Bit of Wisdom from Michael Howard 
   Different countries approached extracting lessons in different ways between 1942 and 
late 1944, and how well they succeeded in using these lessons in the Allied campaign in France 
merits study.  The conclusion is that every senior Allied headquarters learned how to manage 
campaigns better as a result of the lessons process; but this learning was uneven across the 
various Allied organizations.  In the case of Lee’s SOS/COMZ the pace of learning was too slow 
to avoid mistakes foreseeable to others and eliminate gaps in capabilities that were noted and 
fixed elsewhere in the Allied camp.   This leads to an examination of the factors that inhibited 
SOS learning before August 1944, contrasted with alternative experiences at SHAEF, 12th and 
21st Army Group, and similar headquarters serving in North Africa.  Figuring out why COMZ 
learned slower than others and why SHAEF still had a few critical blind spots as late as October 
1944 is a difficult task for several reasons.  It is hard to judge how well an organization learned 
and improved relative to its peers because the very topic forces one to guess about how its 
members might have done better.  The risk of such speculation is the perhaps mistaken 
conclusion that corrective change was possible with the same cast of characters facing the same 
competing demands on their attention and that the successful adoption of one fix would not have 
exposed another point of failure somewhere further down the line.  At the heart of this issue is a 
fundamental question about how large bureaucratic organizations learn in the middle of 
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executing complex tasks and whether the idea of preemptive adaptation over longer time 
horizons, rather than just reacting in the moment, is even a realistic expectation.   
 Sir Michael Howard wrestled for much of his career with trying to temper the unrealistic 
expectations that generalized lessons could be extracted from the study of military history.  In a 
lecture given in 1961 Howard warned that extracting an accurate understanding of any historical 
event was difficult, but he also conceded that it was one of the best ways for military officers 
serving during peacetime to prepare for war.4  Howard also approved of the fact that the official 
histories of the Second World War being produced by the War Office were “histories ‘proper’, 
and not contributions to a national myth.”5  But he also warned that military men not trained as 
historians were likely to make a mistake of applying their own education, experience, and 
knowledge, perspectives not available to the subjects under study, as a part of the evaluation of 
their performance.6  It requires a delicate balance to use current thought and practice to gain 
insights without slipping over into having unrealistic expectations of historical figures.  Howard 
acknowledged that professionals had no choice but to use history to better understand their trade, 
but he warned them to study topics in width, depth, and context to avoid the dangers of 
oversimplification.  It would also help them resist the urge to extract observations related to a 
very specific event as general rules that could be applied everywhere.  One of Howard’s most 
striking statements during this lecture was the admission that military men needed to study 
history because “…the complex problem of running an army at all is liable to occupy his mind 
 
4 Sir Michael Howard, The Use and Abuse of Military History,” Lecture to RUSI, London, 18 October 1961, 
reprinted in The RUSI Journal, Vol. 138, No. 1, 26-30, 27, 28-29.   
5 Ibid, 27.   
6 Ibid, 27.  Howard cited Hans Delbrück for this insight.  The exact phrasing was that the professional “transfers 
phenomena from contemporary practice to the past, without taking adequate account of the difference in 
circumstances.”  Howard used the example of applying the theories of Jomini and Mahan to evaluate the 
performance of commanders that lived before these works were written.   
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and skill so completely that it is very easy to forget what it is being run for.”7  It is a succinct 
summary of exactly what happened to Lee’s SOS during their two years in the U.K.  Howard 
noted why military men might not deeply understand the fundamentals of their profession at the 
start of a war but must learn them during the first months of active combat.  “These unfortunate 
men may,” he said, “…take too long to adjust themselves to reality, through a lack of hard 
preliminary thinking about what war would really be like….”8 
 Twenty years later, Howard’s thinking had evidently changed; he was not so sure that 
any lessons could be extracted from history.9  Admittedly he was talking about the study of 
history, not the analysis of recent combat experience by its practitioners, but the two processes 
were so similar as to give one pause.  The fact that Howard was uncomfortable offering any 
lessons on the Allied effort in Italy in 1943 to 1945, a campaign in which he had personally 
participated as a young officer, is illuminating.  At the heart of the issue, in Howard’s mind, was 
the difference between “lessons” and the value to be gained from good historical inquiry, with 
lessons implying some applicability to a wide range of conditions, similar to principles or rules 
of thumb.  It is exactly these nuances that are crucial to understanding what happened to U.S. 
forces in France in 1944.  Did Allied senior leaders have access to an operational and 
organizational framework that might have helped them manage the breakout phase of Overlord?  
Was it possible to extract “lessons” from the experience in North Africa and the Mediterranean 
and integrate them among the headquarters personnel preparing for the invasion of France?  
Howard did not directly address whether military organizations could learn while in combat, but 
his lecture in 1982 made it clear that he believed it would be a very difficult process with a 
 
7 Ibid, 28.   
8 Ibid, 29. 
9 Sir Michael Howard, “The Lessons of History,” Lecture at Oxford, 6 March 1981, reprinted in The History 
Teacher, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Aug., 1982), 489-501. 
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number of predictable and enticing traps to mislead the unwary.  Creating “alternative scenarios 
of the past” was less helpful than trying to master the “structure of beliefs that determined action 
and perhaps made some actions more likely than others.”10  If this sounds like an outright 
rejection of a “lessons learned” process in the midst of war, one must remember that Howard 
was talking about history, not operations, but the points of similarly are close enough to ensure 
one proceeds with caution.  Extracting the right lessons and using them to retrain large 
organizations in the early stages of a war is a process that is extraordinarily difficult to get right.  
It is also deceptively easy to move from the simple conclusion that COMZ, ETOUSA, and 
SHAEF would have benefited from copying a few techniques from 12th and 21st Army Group, 
NATOUSA, and AFHQ to making unrealistic claims about what results those changes might 
have produced and that their adoption was viable in the first place.   
 
 The Search for Lessons Learned 
Despite the warning offered by Michael Howard of the difficulty, if not futility, of trying 
to extract lessons from military operations, the U.S. and U.K. militaries put a lot of effort into 
this activity during World War Two.  Few would argue that both the U.S. and British armies 
learned how to better prepare their forces for combat as a result of practical experience gained in 
Africa.  Observations culled from the fighting in Tunisia led to changes in the way both armies 
trained and educated officers and soldiers.  It is also safe to say that simple, tactical tasks were 
easier to evaluate and modify than the complex processes overseen by large headquarters, but 
both countries tried to identify and fix problems at every echelon of the chain of command and 
functional areas.  The British Army in particular had an ingrained habit of collecting and 
 
10 Ibid, 494. 
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publishing high-level lessons learned reports intended to share operational experience across 
theater boundaries.  The 8th Army and 18th Army Group provided copies of their campaign 
assessments to COSSAC, British Home Forces Command, ETOUSA, and 21st Army Group 
throughout 1943, with the obvious aim of helping these organizations prepare for the conditions 
they were likely to face in France during Roundup/Overlord.  Leaving aside questions about how 
comprehensive and accurate those lessons were and how well they could be transferred to 
organizations that had generally not seen combat firsthand, the British put considerable effort 
into the process.     
Since an examination of the efficacy of the lessons-learned process forms an essential 
part of this study, it might be helpful examine one contemporary model created to help U.S. 
military planners think through the steps necessary to introduce a fully-realized function or 
capability into one of the services.   In the 1980s, the U.S. Army came to use a heuristic to help 
force designers to think through what is required to turn some desired capability into a fielded 
and resilient component of the military force.  Not every component of the model is a 
prerequisite for eventual success, and not each aspect is equal to the others, but in general the 
more of these items the force addresses, the higher the probably that the new idea will translate 
into a concrete advantage on the battlefield.  The seven components of this mental model are: 
doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel, and facilities.  This is a 
contemporary thinking aid that was not available to the British and U.S. armies during the 
Second World War, but it can help guide our thinking about the comprehensiveness of Allied 
efforts to improve their capabilities based on the feedback coming from active combat theaters.  
If performance out in the field did not match expectations, fixing the problem required that the 
military organization consider how these seven factors might be contributing to the issue.  The 
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obstacle might be fixable by addressing one aspect of the heuristic, a couple, or all seven.  The 
standard was not a perfect solution in all seven areas, but that it worked well enough to 
outperform the enemy while preserving the force from unreasonable wear and tear.  The real 
value of this model is the insight it provides about the wide range of possible underlying causes 
that can contribute to any disappointing performance, and the multiple levers that can be used to 
fix the poor performance. 
 
 Group Decision Making 
This study draws heavily on studies, theory, and models designed to predict and explain 
group decision making taken from the field of political science.  It is helpful to understand the 
basic assertions of two models that frame the comparative analysis of the various Allied 
headquarters engaged in Torch and Overlord, and to explicitly state that the case studies 
examined here offer relevant material for refinement of these theories.  Those two theories are 
the organizational politics model and the bureaucratic politics model. 
The organizational process model (OPM) traces its roots back to studies from the 1950s 
and 60s that examined how the nature of bureaucracies impacted the formulation of foreign 
policy, culminating in the landmark work by Graham Allison Essence of Decision, which was 
first published in 1971.11  This model was later subsumed or folded into the bureaucratic politics 
 
11 Richard M. Cyert and James G. March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, 1963).  
James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations (New York, John Wiley, 1958).  Richard C. Snyder, H.W. 
Bruck, and Burton Sapin, Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics, Foreign Policy 
Analysis Project Series 3 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954).  James N. Rosenau, “Pre-Theories and 
Theories of Foreign Policy,” in Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, ed. R. Barry Farrell 
(Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1966).  Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban 
Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971). 
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model, but has important distinctions that should be considered on their own merit.12  OPM is 
useful because it explains how the very structure of decision-making bodies limits the options 
offered to leaders to solve their problems and then subtly alters implementation of directives 
issued by higher authorities.   
Problems are typically ‘factored’ or split into different segments and parceled out 
to subunits with specific roles and missions that deal with only a particular aspect 
of the problem.  Coordination by top leaders is sporadic, and subunits attempt to 
deal with their problems in isolation from other subunits, devising solutions and 
then implementing them in a relatively independent manner.13  
 
 The result is a series of loosely synchronized activities, many of which have almost no 
direct bearing on the problem they were designed to solve.   
In this model, organizations function according to standing operating procedures (SOPs) 
or an approach to all activity based on implicit and explicit understanding of its core mission, 
routine procedures, internal organization of personnel, and formal and informal relationships 
with organizations around it.  These SOPs color how the organization perceives problems and 
opportunities, the options leaders believe realistically possible that might influence the 
environment, and even the manner in which directives will be carried out.  The important aspect 
of the theory for our purposes is the subtle brake on innovation this creates.  Unchecked, 
collective assumptions about the “right” way to conduct business closes off options and distorts 
initiatives to ensure new activity better conforms to past practices and goals.  Thus SHAEF, their 
three subordinate army group headquarters, and ETOUSA/COMZ were in some ways blinded by 
 
12 David A. Welch, “The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms: Retrospect and Prospect,” 
International Security 17, No. 2 (Fall 1992): 112-146.  In practice is it difficult to separate exactly why large 
organizations made the choices they did, a distinction that lies at the heart of the difference between the two 
theories.  Most historical case studies illustrated that important decisions tended to revolve around motives 
explained by both theories. 
13 Greg Cashman, What Causes War? An Introduction to Theories of International Conflict, 2nd Edition (Lanham, 
MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2014), 128 
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their self-image and established routines.  Lee’s COMZ in particular was unable to see itself and 
its environment creatively and react to changing circumstances appropriately, causing friction 
with the more intuitive, flexible, and combat-hardened organizations around it. 
The second framework, the bureaucratic politics model, takes the core components of 
OPM one step further, positing that the sub-elements within large bureaucratic organizations are 
not only radically different from one another in how they operate and the end goals they pursue, 
but actively compete with one another to protect their turf.  In some cases, preserving the power 
and resources at the disposal of the organization is at least as important as reaching a group 
consensus on how to solve critical policy problems.14  If OPM attributes interdepartmental 
friction to the cold logic of structure, BPM adds the irrational elements of human emotion and 
ego.  Sub-components of government resist some initiatives not because they fear they will be 
ineffective, but merely because they might reduce their own power.  They fight the selection of 
these activities, and then wage a guerrilla campaign to undermine their effective implementation.  
Loyalty to the sub-group interferes with the ability to step back and examine complex problems 
dispassionately and holistically.  A necessary component of the theory is the idea that 
organizations develop their own climate and even culture, driven by the strong personalities and 
shared experiences that shaped them.15  Bureaucratic battles over authority revolve around the 
survival of the fittest and most skillful infighters.  The desire to accumulate power for its own 
sake can distract leaders from finding an optimal solution for the larger group.  The impact of 
strong personalities at each senior headquarters in the Allied chain of command and the role they 
 
14 Sam Huntington, “Strategic Planning and the Political Process,” Foreign Affairs 38 (1960): 285-99.  Roger 
Hilsman, To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy (New York, 
Doubleday, 1967).  Cashman, 132-133. 
15 Climate refers to the short-term group dynamics accepted as the norm within an organization, while culture is 
considered a longer-term and more broadly held set of shared norms.  These norms can mute the individuality of 
some members, if not completely overwhelm the strongest characters. 
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played in the pursuit across France is well documented in the existing historical record, but this 
study amplifies how key positions were developed, why some won and others lost, and restores 
the voice of the logistics community within the debate.   
 
 Relevant Historical Material 
There is probably no topic that has received more attention from British and American 
military historians than Allied performance in North Africa and France.   Key works can be 
grouped into two major categories:  books that put operational logistics and logisticians at the 
center of the story, and those in which the U.S. and U.K. campaigns are seen through a focus on 
Allied interoperability and on the function of senior-level headquarters. 
The role of operational and strategic logistics has featured prominently in memoirs, 
official histories, biographies, and campaign studies beginning immediately after the end of the 
war.  Global Logistics and Strategy by Robert Coakley and Richard Leighton and Logistical 
Support of the Armies by Roland G. Ruppenthal remain to this day the most thorough and 
detailed studies of the U.S. approach to logistics at the operational and strategic levels.  It is 
surprising how many subsequently published works ignore the data and carefully recorded 
sequence of events captured by Ruppenthal.  A French historian, Nicolas Aubin, has updated the 
maps, tables, and pictures scattered throughout Ruppenthal and several of the volumes of the 
Technical Services series along with his own assessment of the campaign in Liberty Roads: The 
American Logistics in France and Germany, 1944-45.16   It is a beautifully put together book 
that consolidates and logically sequences a large amount of information, but it suffers from poor 
 
16 Nicolas Aubin, Liberty Roads: The American Logistics in France and Germany, 1944-45 (Paris: Histoire and 
Collections, 2014).   
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translation from French to English.  Aubin generally repeats Ruppenthal’s conclusions about 
what went wrong with logistics and why, but he also emphasizes the gaps in U.S. doctrine about 
how to organize and run administrative support in a theater and integrate those activities into a 
joint campaign plan.  Aubin also coins the term “operational logistics” to help describe the 
shortfall in capability he identified at COMZ and SHAEF.  Aubin uses the term operational 
logistics to describe the part of the distribution chain that linked tactical units with ports, a 
capability based primarily on cargo planes and heavy trucks moving along improved roads.  The 
ability to coordinate operational logistics was critical during the pursuit phase because rail 
service tended to be knocked out as a result of bombing, combat, and German sabotage.  Because 
Aubin relied almost exclusively on “Green Book” sources covering the ETO, he does not explore 
the overlap in the difficulties experienced in both North Africa and France.17  Nor does Aubin 
address the differences in the techniques used to control the staff at 21st Army Group, COMZ, 
and SHAEF and in the outcomes those methods produced.  Regardless, it is an excellent source 
that summarizes almost a dozen other volumes while outlining the most likely contributing 
factors to the command and control and logistical problems that bedeviled the Allies in 1944 in 
the ETO. 
A better known, if less comprehensive, reinterpretation of SHAEF’s performance 
managing sustainment is included in one of the chapters of Martin van Creveld’s Supplying War: 
Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton.18  Van Creveld relied on secondary sources rather than 
doing his own archival research, and he concluded that the U.S. Army was spoiled, demanded 
too many supplies, and could not advance under the ridiculous weight of those supplies once the 
 
17 “Green Books” refers to the U.S. Army in World War II series published by the U.S. Army Center of Military 
History.  
18 Martin Van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1977).   
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material was delivered.  However, if SHAEF had done a better job marshalling its trucks and 
controlling what was loaded onto them, the Allies might have jumped the Rhine in September 
1944.19  Van Creveld was correct that COMZ could have pressed more truck companies into 
service and built up additional companies faster than they eventually did.  Creveld accepted the 
accusations leveled by Bradley and Moses that COMZ wasted hauling capacity by moving 
supplies that had not been asked for, but he did not examine why this was the case and what 
changes would have been required to fix the problem.     
Steve R. Waddell dove into the topic in greater detail in U.S. Army Logistics: The 
Normandy Campaign, 1944.20  Waddell’s conclusions are convincing, but they are limited by 
their exclusion of any comparative evaluation of the experience within 21st Army Group or of 
what was learned about logistics in North Africa.  Like every serious student of the topic, 
Waddell was immediately struck by the inefficiency and bureaucratic infighting triggered by 
giving too many headquarters some formal role in the management of theater logistics during 
Overlord.  The book gives equal space to the preparation phase, the stalemate in the bocage, and 
the breakout and pursuit that eventually drove the collapse of the Allied logistical system just 
short of the Westwall.  Waddell concludes that COMZ could have put in a better performance, 
but that it was hampered by its poor relations with other headquarters and a general indifference 
to logistics among senior officers of the U.S. Army, a charge first leveled by MG Henry Aurand 
in November 1944.  COMZ was also stuck using what they knew to be unrealistic planning 
figures in their interaction with the ASF and were further constrained by an inflexible logistics 
plan.  This accusation is probably correct, but also something entirely within COMZ’s ability to 
 
19 Martin van Creveld, Logistics in War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1977), 214-215, 226-230.  
20 Steve R. Waddell, U.S. Army Logistics: The Normandy Campaign, 1944 (New York: Praeger, 1994).   
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fix internally.  COMZ’s challenges were amplified by the exceptionally poor supply discipline of 
the U.S. Army at the tactical level, a charge with which General Gale heartedly agreed.  Waddell 
mistakenly argues that the Allied logisticians did not anticipate the rate of advance after Cobra, 
placing too much faith in the projected rate of advance used to guide the campaign planners.  
Planners used these phase lines to guide the framework of how the rear area would be expanded 
and developed, but they also understood how quickly modern armies could advance during a 
pursuit.  Ross had been trying to ensure that ETOUSA had adequate trucks to sustain a rapid 
pursuit across France since July 1943.  Waddell approaches his topic exclusively from the 
perspective of sustainment, and his conclusions are framed by the arguments among the different 
echelons about the best way to manage logistics.  This approach ignores the importance of 
integrating maneuver plans with the limitations and requirements imposed by matters concerning 
supply, and by extension, the organizational structure and staff procedures needed to do so.     
D. K. R. Crosswell’s Beetle: The Life of General Walter Bedell Smith allocates many 
pages to the organizational structure of the high command within the ETO and the resulting 
bureaucratic infighting among themselves, and benefits from tracing these developments from 
North Africa, to Italy, and finally to France.21  An examination of theater logistics is also a 
cornerstone of Crosswell’s approach, and he attributes the breakdown in October to three bad 
decisions made during the first month after the breakout.  According to Crosswell, Eisenhower 
made three choices that his logisticians could not overcome: abandoning the original plan to use 
all of 3rd Army to quickly liberate the ports in Brittany on 3 August, deciding to charge across 
the Seine soon after 19 August (before rail service was restored and dumps were moved up to the 
 
21 D. K. R. Crosswell, Beetle: The Life of General Walter Bedell Smith (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 
2010). 
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front), and prioritizing Market Garden over continuing to focus on aerial resupply and clearing 
the approaches to Antwerp on 10 September.22  Crosswell argues that this happened because 
American generals prioritized operations over logistics and that the command and control 
structure from SHAEF down to the numbered armies was faulty.23  Once again repeating the 
accusations of MG Henry S. Aurand (an ordnance officer who was the base section commander 
for Normandy during the last six months of the war in Europe), Crosswell concludes that 
Eisenhower made these mistakes largely because he tried to do too much himself.  Crosswell 
thinks Eisenhower had two possible solutions – he could have delegated oversight of both U.S. 
army groups and COMZ to a senior U.S. commander (Bradley was the likely candidate) or he 
could have appointed an overall ground commander, which Montgomery agreed with 
wholeheartedly (as long as it was him).24   
Further research suggests two of Crosswell’s three irreparable mistakes were less harmful 
than he suggests.  Rapidly capturing a port or two in Brittany in early August would not have 
solved the transportation problem that stopped the U.S. Army less than a hundred miles from the 
Westwall at the end of August and continued to slow its recovery as late as early November.  
Second, letting the enemy escape by halting along the Seine and awaiting the repair of rail lines 
was unrealistic; planners at SHAEF had been working on how to maintain the momentum of a 
breakout without stopping at Paris since mid-June.  The 21st Army Group would go on to prove it 
was possible to do so with moderate changes to the ground scheme of maneuver and support 
plan.  But Crosswell is correct when he emphasizes the importance of a cluster of decisions made 
around 10 September.  It was here that Eisenhower missed his opportunity to either open 
 
22 Crosswell, 708. 
23 Crosswell, 736. 
24 Crosswell, 760-762.  The issue of appointing a ground commander (other than Eisenhower) emerged again, if less 
violently, after the Battle of the Bulge.   
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Antwerp and thus solve the shortage of transportation or else fully support one critical thrust in 
order to achieve his most important operational objective before the pursuit ran out of steam.  
Crosswell is unique in noting the potential offered by aerial resupply and the opportunity cost of 
its “diversion” to Market Garden, coming down strongly against the airborne operation. 
There are two additional biographies of senior logisticians that attempt to illuminate how 
the U.S. Army dealt with strategic and operational logistics and its search for the right command 
structure to manage their execution.  Hank H. Cox published The General Who Wore Six Stars: 
The Inside Story of John C. H. Lee in 2018.25  It is hard to believe that this is the only published 
biography of LTG Lee, a man with vast authority and power who played an important role in the 
ETO from 1942 to 1945.  Cox presents a balanced and more sympathetic appraisal of Lee’s 
personality and performance, which is no mean feat, but his limited range of sources leaves the 
reader unconvinced that Lee was just misunderstood and unfairly maligned by his fellow officers 
and historians.   
John K. Ohl covered the other significant administrative commander within the U.S. 
Army chain of command in Supplying the Troops: General Somervell and American Logistics in 
World War II.26  Somervell’s primary battlefield was in Washington, D.C. and Ohl focuses the 
book accordingly.  Ohl pays attention to the importance of relationships, noting how Somervell’s 
abrasive and forceful personality interfered with winning his logical argument that grand strategy 
must take into consideration the limitations imposed by logistics.  A second priority on 
Somervell’s list, the consolidation and rationalization of upper echelons of the chain of command 
of the U.S. Army, also caused a lot of friction with the War Department and his peers at the 
 
25 Hank H. Cox, The General Who Wore Six Stars: The Inside Story of John C. H. Lee (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 2018).   
26 John K. Ohl, Supplying the Troops: General Somervell and American Logistics in World War II (DeKalb, 
Illinois: Northern Illinois Press, 1994).  
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Army Ground Forces and Army Air Forces.   Seen as a naked power grab and as empire building 
by some in Washington, Somervell’s efforts to win control over the technical services and 
branches and establish a supervisory position over the War Department G-1 and G-4 met harsh 
resistance.  Somervell believed in these two reforms, and he played an instrumental role in trying 
to ensure that they were followed at ETOUSA and NATOUSA as well.  To fully understand 
what was happening in the argument over structure occurring between the first two U.S. Army 
theater commands and their SOS subordinate headquarters, it is important to realize that they 
were merely reflections of a similar battle being waged by Somervell in Washington.  
Somervell’s approach was predicated on what the community of senior logisticians thought they 
had learned from their experience in World War One – that the senior logistician within any 
organization needed complete control over all planning and synchronization functions.  
Furthermore, this control needed to lie in the hands of a commander, not a staff officer.  To this 
end, the principal logistician had to be a commander, have direct supervisory authority over 
technical service sections, and ensure that the senior G-1 and G-4 answered to him.  Somervell 
also pushed the idea that the SOS/COMZ commander in a theater needed to be a peer of the 
combat zone commander and had to have dual responsibilities to two superiors – Somervell at 
the ASF, and the overall U.S. Army theater commander for operational priorities.     
 A second group of books that provide important background to this study are those 
focused on the inner workings of SHAEF and its subordinate commands and those examining in 
detail the evolving relationship between the U.S. and U.K. leaders in the MTO and ETO.  Forest 
C. Pogue’s volume in the official history, The Supreme Command, is especially helpful because 
he outlines the background of various staff officers assigned to SHAEF and the procedures used 
xlvii 
 
to run the headquarters.27  Pogue was both a professional historian and an eyewitness to the 
events about which he wrote, and his unvarnished notes from the interviews he conducted in 
1946 and 1947 remain available.  Any examination of the big decisions made by SHAEF starts 
with The Supreme Command.  A second useful if somewhat oblique approach is offered by Rick 
Atkinson in his Liberation Trilogy, in which An Army at Dawn also benefits from being one of 
the few comprehensive reexaminations of the Torch campaign.28  In this volume, Atkinson 
manages to keep the theme of the growth and development of the U.S. Army at the center of the 
story, convincingly demonstrating just how much its senior leaders needed to learn before 
moving on to tougher fights.  
Two recent books are representative of a flood of material dedicated to the evolution of 
the Anglo-American alliance and to the combined formulation and execution of strategy and 
operational plans.  Edward E. Gordon and David Ramsay’s Divided on D-Day: How Conflicts 
and Rivalries Jeopardized the Allied Victory at Normandy relies exclusively on secondary 
sources but still manages to offer new insights on the major arguments within the Anglo-
American alliance.29  When arguments arose, the opposing positions never divided neatly along 
national lines but were influenced more so by the staff position, command echelon, and historical 
perspectives of the parent services.  The book is highly critical of several decisions made by 
SHAEF and clearly illustrates the personal and professional animosity that eventually developed 
between Montgomery and a group of British officers led by Admiral Ramsay.  Those two themes 
are even more effectively supported in Eisenhower’s Armies: the American-British Alliance 
 
27 Forest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1954).  
28 Rick Atkinson, An Army at Dawn: The War in North Africa, 1942-1943 (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 2002). 
29  Edward E. Gordon and David Ramsay, Divided on D-Day: How Conflicts and Rivalries Jeopardized the Allied 
Victory at Normandy (Amherst, New York: Prometheus, 2017).  
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During World War II by Niall Barr.30  Barr traces the evolution of the working relationship 
established between U.S. and U.K. military organizations from the earliest days of informal 
coordination in 1940 through the end of the war in Europe.  The book doesn’t provide much new 
insight about the wisdom of the major decisions taken in the Mediterranean and European 
theaters, but does provide a bit more procedural detail on exactly how they happened.  One of the 
major arguments Barr successfully defends is the way in which Montgomery’s behavior in 1943 
and 1944 turned almost every senior British senior officer against him by October.  Montgomery 
often provided Eisenhower good advice during the first four months of Overlord, but his 
personality and past behavior triggered an instinctual resistance from anyone who had worked 
beside him for any length of time.  Barr is invaluable in helping the reader recognize how the 
techniques used to exercise joint-combined command and control changed over time and to see 
the sometimes-ugly human failings that got in the way of better decision-making.   
 
 What is New 
Having examined some of the work that provides an essential background and point of 
departure, this study reaches three novel conclusions.  First, COMZ was woefully unprepared to 
assume responsibility for theater logistics in August 1944, which led to mistakes that were both 
avoidable and damaging to the potential outcome of the pursuit.  Second, learning occurred at a 
very different rate among various Allied senior headquarters, a fact that largely explains the 
disparity in performance between COMZ, its peers, and SHAEF.  Third, major campaign 
decisions taken by AFHQ and SHAEF always involved a compromise between the competing 
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perspectives of the sustainment and maneuver communities, and to examine any of these 
decisions without a full appreciation of how the two communities interacted with one another 
leads to misleading conclusions.  Allied freedom of action between 1942 and 1944 was restricted 
by three interrelated and constantly evolving frameworks: how to plan and run a campaign, how 
to synchronize theater-level logistics, and how to create a joint-combined theater headquarters 
that accounted for the preferences driven by both U.S. and U.K. organizational cultures.  Any 
significant reappraisal of Allied decision-making in France during the latter stages of Overlord 
must account for the influence of each of these intertwined variables.  British and American 
conclusions about theater-level warfare were very different in mid-1942, and they were still far 
from perfectly aligned by late 1944.  The view within the U.S. Army about the best way to run a 
theater, and the various headquarters needed to do so, never coalesced into a consensus in the 
ETO.  Contributing to this disagreement was the fact that the U.S. Army started the war with a 
concept for managing theater logistics that was at its heart a rejection of what had been tried in 
World War One and not a system that had been validated under combat conditions.  The U.S. 
model hoped to insulate the fighting commander from worrying about the administrative support 
of his forces by assigning responsibility for the rear area, and coordination with industrial base 
back in the United States, to a separate and equal Service of Supply (SOS) command.  The 
combat and communications zones would be supervised by an Army theater command tasked 
with synchronizing their interaction.  This approach was never going to work with the British, 
who had rejected a similar setup in 1916 as unworkable.   
 The Allies culminated short of the Westwall in September 1944 because COMZ was 
unprepared to execute its war-time mission when it assumed responsibility for the 
communications zone in early August.  Asked to support mechanized formations conducting 
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mobile operations while hampered by a seriously damaged transportation network, COMZ 
demonstrated that they had not adequately prepared for the mission.  Lee’s command was unable 
to manage the massive fleet of trucks at its disposal to deliver the supplies essential to 
maintaining the momentum of the attack.  COMZ was also unable to convince SHAEF to 
prioritize the use of its C47 fleet for aerial resupply at the expense of preparing for airborne 
operations.  COMZ had sufficient resources at its disposal to sustain the advance, but they were 
not prepared to manage the technical staff processes required to do so. 
 The fact that COMZ stumbled out of the gate in France would have been more 
understandable if the command had not been given repeated access to MG Everett Hughes’ 
COMZ in the North African Theater of Operations U.S. Army (NATOUSA), which stood up in 
February 1943.  Torch proved difficult to plan and lead for AFHQ, and the leaders and 
organizations involved learned much from the experience.  Lee visited NATOUSA repeatedly 
himself, and he also sent delegations from his command on several trips to extract applicable 
lessons, but SOS ETOUSA never seemed to grasp how it needed to change to better prepare for 
combat.  Of the five major commands operating in France in August 1944, Lee’s COMZ was by 
far the least experienced and the least prepared to execute its essential functions in combat.31  
Lee’s SOS, like the Army Service Forces in general, failed to learn and restructure itself 
appropriately based on the experiences of Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ) and its functional 
components.  This study helps explain why other rookie senior headquarters, to include SHAEF, 
21st AG, and FUSAG, managed to avoid this fate. 
 
31 Those commands were SHAEF, 21st AG, 1st U.S. AG (FUSAG) or 12th AG, 6th AG, and COMZ.  As will be 
explained in chapter three and four, ETOUSA was largely synonymous with COMZ by January 1944, although 
ETOUSA had some measure of additional authority because Eisenhower was its commander.   
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 The final novel insight revealed by this study is the interconnected nature of the various 
echelons of a chain of command for a theater can restrict the freedom of action of any one 
agency, even the one that is notionally in charge.  Campaigns demand that some headquarters 
synchronize a logistical distribution system by selecting and sequencing maneuver objectives in 
a transparent and predictable staff process.  Any attempt to bifurcate responsibility over the 
sustainment and maneuver functions runs the risk of ordering advances that are logistically 
impossible to accomplish, or in the building of logistical systems oriented on efficiency rather 
than on effectiveness in achieving the goals of the campaign.  The needs of the fighters and the 
sustainers are equal in the long run, but both must be focused on achieving operational 
objectives.  They must be supervised in this process by a senior headquarters equipped with 
adequate knowledge to make informed recommendations to the commander.  In August 1944 
COMZ was still a garrison command, one that was largely disengaged from planning and 
managing theater-level logistics in France.  SHAEF had progressively taken over planning and 
integrating sustainment with combat operations between March and June, but it had not yet 
realized that COMZ was also unprepared to manage and synchronize the technical staff sections 
and service troops that would fall under their control in August.  By mid-September it had 
become obvious to SHAEF that COMZ could not fulfill its promises and could not manage the 
theater distribution system, driving LTG Gale, SHAEF’s Chief Administrative Officer (CAO), to 
assume that function at his level.  This realization emerged simultaneously with the battle 
between Eisenhower and Montgomery over control for the direction of the ground campaign.  
Misled by Montgomery, Bradley, and Lee, Eisenhower allowed secondary attacks to proceed 
while postponing the opening of Antwerp.  At the most critical stage of the Overlord campaign, 
no one headquarters had the accurate information needed to help Eisenhower make an informed 
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choice, nor did SHAEF have a functional process to bring all of its subordinates together and 
hammer out a consensus in the face of that shortfall.  In early September, everyone was 
responsible for integrating maneuver and logistics, and therefore no one was in charge.   
   
 Why COMZ and SHAEF Were Not Ready By August 1944 
If one agrees with the assertion that COMZ was not ready to do its job in combat in 
August 1944, and that SHAEF still had a few gaps in the full range of capabilities it needed to 
have, the next logical question that leaps to mind is why this was the case.  These shortfalls are 
especially puzzling when one considers that the Allies had almost twenty months of combat 
experience in the Mediterranean to draw upon by this stage.   
One of the most significant obstacles to effective learning within the sustainment 
community of the U.S. Army in 1942 was their collective reaction to the experience of MG 
James Harbord’s SOS in France in 1918.  During the Great War the U.S. Army never learned 
how to successfully manage a communications zone or how to balance the needs of the combat 
and sustainment portions of the expeditionary force.  This issue was never formally resolved 
after the war, but the Harbord/Hagood School managed to ensure that their preferred solution 
was the one captured in the education system and doctrine on logistics.32  Officers who 
graduated from the U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff School and from its War College 
during the 1930s were pre-disposed (as a result of these two educational experiences) to accept 
Harbord’s school of thought, which claimed that the senior logistics commander needed a 
 
32 Johnson Hagood was a colonel during World War One, where he served as commander of the advanced sections 
(ADSEC) of the Line of Communications of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) and then the chief of staff of 
the SOS under Harbord.  After the war he returned to the Coastal Artillery where he held a series of commands until 
his retirement in 1936. 
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measure of autonomy from the general in charge of the theater.  The solution that had been 
proposed in 1918 was to give the SOS commander two superiors.  He would answer to both 
Washington, D.C. (either to the Chief of Staff or to the Secretary of War) and to the theater 
commander.  Although rejected at the time, this was the initial approach adopted by the U.S. 
Army upon entry into World War Two.  One of the many dangers of such a construct was the 
suggestion that a combat zone or overall theater commander could ignore the logistical aspects of 
their campaigns, counting on the SOS commander to provide exactly what was needed at the 
right time and place.  U.S. doctrine covering these issues also offered little on exactly how the 
competing priorities of the combat and communications zone commanders would be adjudicated 
between the theater command and the War Department.  Nevertheless, this was the intellectual 
starting point for how key leaders in the U.S. Army thought about theater command and control 
and sustainment at the beginning of the war, two issues with which almost no serving officer had 
any personal experience.   
It was fine to enter the war with less than perfect doctrine; that tends to be the norm.  It 
was far more damaging when the U.S. Army failed to learn from the experience of others, and 
then from its own campaigns, both in North Africa and in the Pacific.  The British military had 
exceptionally well-developed concepts for how to run a theater and how to coordinate the 
activities of all three services by late 1942.  They also generally understood how to launch and 
sustain expeditionary campaigns, and they were making steady progress in figuring out how to 
support mobile warfare in an austere environment as a result of the Desert War.  AFHQ, 
ETOUSA, and NATOUSA benefitted from exposure to their British partners, learning how to 
operate joint-combined headquarters, plan and conduct campaigns, and run theater sustainment 
networks in concert with the needs of the fighting generals.  Both the British and American 
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headquarters participating in the North African campaign generated summaries of their lessons 
learned, wrote provisional unit histories, and shared emerging techniques for organizing and 
running large staff sections.  But the U.S. focus tended to fall at the lower, tactical level, and 
fixate on combat tasks rather than on large-scale organizational and logistical issues.  The U.K. 
took a different approach and collected lessons at the army and army group level, but these 
documents seemed to gain little purchase with Somervell’s ASF or Lee’s SOS.  The Americans 
seemed resistant to any fundamental revision of U.S. doctrine, and Lee never fundamentally 
reorganized or reoriented the SOS staff prior to its departure from the U.K.  SOS seemed 
resistant to the idea of integrating the operational experiences of their peers fighting in Africa 
and Italy.  COSSAC, ETOUSA, 21st AG, and FUSAG were far from perfect in their efforts to 
prepare for operating conditions that they would face in France, but they were far enough along 
to survive the transition to new commanders in early 1944 and their introduction into combat 
between June and August.  SOS seemed unique in its inability to adequately prepare itself to 
function under combat conditions prior to leaving the U.K. 
One of the reasons it was so hard to figure out how to run a theater was the fact that two 
major variables shaping the problem changed continually from the summer of 1942 to the 
summer of 1944.  Theater command and control was a shared responsibility of the joint-
combined, U.S. theater, and national ground and logistics commands, with superiors in London 
and Washington playing a powerful role as well.  Each time something fundamental changed 
within one of these organizations, such as the rotation of a commander, it could impact all other 
actors.  The process began with AFHQ, which had to grow into its job.  When the command was 
created in August 1942 no one knew how a combined-joint operational headquarters was 
supposed to work, and it took until May 1943 for its structure, area of responsibilities, and 
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governing processes to iron themselves out.  This evolution was complicated by numerous 
changes to the way its subordinate commands were organized, the introduction of NATOUSA in 
February 1943, and the merger between AFHQ and portions of the British Middle Eastern 
Command, all while fighting the Axis in a tough campaign.  COSSAC and ETOUSA watched 
this flurry of adjustments and tried to keep pace while confronting organizational challenges of 
their own.  Similar disruption was created when a new team of commanders and staff officers 
arrived from the Mediterranean at the end of 1943 to take up their positions for Overlord.  Many 
of the key players remained the same, but some were new, or had been away from Eisenhower, 
Smith, and Gale for almost a year.  In many ways, SHAEF and some of its subordinates were 
still adjusting to the new structure and personalities introduced in January and February 1944 
well into the pursuit phase of Overlord.   
While AFHQ learned how to manage and sustain a joint campaign, ETOUSA was trying 
to reconcile the role U.S. doctrine assigned to a theater command with reality in the U.K. in 
1943.  LTG Jacob Devers played the key role in the battle to determine exactly what ETOUSA 
was for, and what authority it had over its air and logistics components relative to their “other” 
bosses back at AAF and ASF.  By mid-summer 1943 ETOUSA was focused almost exclusively 
on preparing for Roundup, which generated increasing levels of friction with Lee and his staff at 
SOS.  Devers’ eventual solution was to stand up a small First U.S. Army Group (FUSAG) staff 
team, transfer much of the operational planning burden to them, and direct them to work with the 
British to prepare for Overlord.  Left largely undisturbed by operational concerns, the SOS staff 
continued to execute Bolero, leaving the technical details associated with Roundup to special 
staff at ETOUSA.  Although officially answerable to Lee, the senior and experienced officers in 
charge of these sections were largely left to their own devices.  This inattention was odd because 
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the battle for control over the special staff sections assigned to ETOUSA had consumed much of 
Lee’s attention since June 1942.  Lee eventually won control over the technical service sections 
only to largely abrogate his responsibility to coordinate their activities.   As a result of the 
logistical breakdown in September 1944, SHAEF informally revoked that authority in October, 
taking over the supervision of a few key sections themselves.  The failure of the SOS and then 
COMZ staff to exercise the function that Somervell and Lee had fought so hard to consolidate 
under the senior theater logistician remains one of the most puzzling developments in the history 
of ETOUSA, and the most harmful to SHAEF in August through October 1944. 
SOS suffered from two disadvantages that made it difficult for them to adequately 
prepare for the role and conditions they would face in France.  First, and most importantly, it is 
very difficult to prepare for a future mission while simultaneously executing a very challenging 
one in the present.  For most of its history, SOS found themselves taxed pulling off Torch and 
then Bolero; there was very little organizational energy left over for Roundup/Overlord.  Second, 
Lee seemed to have a personal blind spot for the operational big picture, and he lacked both the 
ability to envision how combat would challenge the COMZ and the wisdom to prepare it 
accordingly.  He certainly tried to do both, and encouraged his subordinates to do the same, but 
Lee always seemed to find a reason to delegate oversight of operational planning to someone 
else.  By the spring of 1944, responsibility for planning and synchronizing support to the U.S. 
combat formations had been outsourced to SHAEF, FUSAG, ADSEC, and FECZ.  Technically 
these last two formations were components of SOS/COMZ, but in reality, they received almost 
no support or oversight from Lee, and had better ties with the combat staffs than their higher 
headquarters.   
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When COMZ took over in August, it was responsible for a much-reduced scope of duties 
than had been contemplated a year earlier.  All that remained was the management of the theater 
rear area -- running the requisition and distribution system and coordinating with ASF for 
support to the theater.  But within days of taking over COMZ demonstrated that they could not 
handle this mission.  Having anticipated the importance of trucks and cargo aircraft during the 
early stages of a pursuit, SHAEF and COMZ could not maximize the potential they offered, and 
Lee’s team wasted much of the hauling capacity that was available delivering thousands of tons 
of supplies no one had asked for and contributed very little to maintaining pressure on the 
Germans.  Between 25 August and 11 September, the U.S. Army had to periodically stop 
moving and await the delivery of fuel, giving Hitler just enough time to man the Westwall.  
COMZ’s dysfunctional requisition process and ineffective supervision of Ross’ OCOT directly 
contributed to the breakdown of the Allied offensive.  SHAEF’s mistake was recognizing this 
shortfall too late to avert the crisis and doing too little to convince Eisenhower to make 
fundamental organizational changes when suspicions first arose among the senior logisticians on 
the staff.  SHAEF also shared in the blame for the breakdown of the pursuit because they had not 
rigorously tested the procedures they directed AEAF to put in place, through Combined Air 
Transport Operations Room (CATOR), to synchronize large-scale aerial resupply.  SHAEF 
understood this capability would be important during the pursuit but did not validate that theater 
procedures worked before trying to implement them in mid-August.            
COMZ and, to a lesser extent, SHAEF failed the first major tests of the sustainment 
system in August and September despite having a number of major advantages working in their 
favor.  Gale and Montgomery had both advanced to senior rank in an army that now had 
extensive experience in expeditionary campaigns where the competing demands of logistics and 
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maneuver had to be carefully balanced.  Gale had built a structure for controlling theater logistics 
with which he was comfortable while at AFHQ, but he was unable to accurately gauge COMZ’s 
capabilities and to help them with their problems over the summer because of a lack of open 
communications between himself and the key players in the command.  By September Gale 
realized that COMZ had major internal problems and appealed repeatedly to Smith and 
Eisenhower to authorize a major shakeup.   In early October Eisenhower quietly allowed Gale to 
assume de facto control over the special staff at ETOUSA and to take over several functions 
COMZ had recently dropped, but it was too late to save the fall campaign.  Besides working 
more closely with Gale, Lee could have benefitted from learning and selectively copying a 
number of the healthy staff techniques frequently used at 21st AG that helped to integrate combat 
activity and support at the operational level.  Montgomery had a system that not only worked 
during the stalemate in Normandy but was equally effective in the period after the breakout but 
before the restoration of rail service into central Belgium.  There was a real give and take in the 
British system; sometimes the needs of the sustainment command took precedence, and other 
times logisticians were asked to accept a lot of risk in order to help accomplish a critical 
maneuver objective.  Regardless which function was prioritized in the short term, Montgomery 
had a deliberate process equipped with accurate information with which to make his decisions.  
Many of these techniques were successfully taught to 12th Army Group between May and July, 
but they were not passed along to COMZ.      
It is easy to list the major reasons why SHAEF and COMZ struggled with logistical 
support in the fall of 1944 after the fact, but these factors were far from obvious at the time, and 
they grew more difficult to identify after the war ended.  What exactly happened during the 
preparation for and execution of Overlord was deliberately skewed in a report Eisenhower 
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submitted to the Combined Chiefs in January 1945.  The Supreme Commander’s perspective was 
perpetuated by Lee and a few other confidants who served in the ETO in order to protect both 
their own and Eisenhower’s reputations.  Eisenhower had learned from the mild rebuke he 
received from Marshall and Somervell during their visit to Algiers in January 1943, and he 
decided to get in front of criticism that he knew had bubbled up from Montgomery to Brook and 
on to the CCS, just as soon as the German counteroffensive in the Ardennes had been contained.  
The main purpose of his interim report in January was to prevent the CCS directing he appoint 
an overall ground commander, other than himself, presumably Montgomery if the British had 
their way.  In the process, Eisenhower had to distort exactly what had caused the pursuit to run 
out of steam in September and October.  Eisenhower’s version of events presented in the January 
report went on to influence the USFET General Board’s reports on logistics and theater 
command and control; those documents could not be allowed to contradict his earlier statements.  
Eisenhower’s classified report, internal unit and section histories written in 1944 and 1945, and 
the General Board reports went on to heavily influence the ETO volumes of the official history 
of the U.S. Army in World War II.  Most of the inaccuracies contained in these sources were not 
part of a deep conspiracy designed to hide the truth but in most cases a bit of well-intentioned 
self-delusion and smoothing over of painful details that then entered the historical record.  Once 
responsibility for the individual volumes of the official history was handed out to over a dozen 
authors, it was even more difficult to reassemble a more comprehensive understanding of the 
whole.  Eyewitnesses knew there had been problems in Europe with the command structure and 
logistical support to the armies, but no one person could get a handle on the full scope.   
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 The Structure of this Study 
This study will attempt to demonstrate how COMZ failed and exactly why this happened 
in the following manner.  Chapter One shows the link between the U.S. Army’s experience in 
France in World War One and the resulting post-war doctrine that attempted to bifurcate control 
of logistics and combat into separate commands supervised by a theater command and the War 
Department.  It also examines how U.S. and U.K. capstone doctrine did and did not anticipate 
and prepare officers to manage expeditionary campaigns in World War Two.  It concludes with a 
summary of the lessons extracted from major amphibious and expeditionary operations 
conducted by both partners in both of the recent global wars.  Chapter Two focuses on Torch, 
including the preparation for the invasion, the evolving approach to commanding the theater, and 
the efforts of both the United States and the United Kingdom to learn from the experience and 
share that information with unengaged organizations.  The chapter also demonstrates the fact that 
the changing nature of the follow-on amphibious assaults probably diluted the lessons about 
theater logistics and transportation that were so clear after Torch.  Chapter Three traces the way 
command relationships changed within ETOUSA and its pre-cursor commands between the 
summer of 1942 and the end of the war, and it treats the various ideas presented by eyewitnesses 
about what was wrong with that structure and how it might have been improved.  Chapter Four 
goes into additional detail on how Lee’s SOS and Ross’ OCOT worked in the U.K.  This 
includes their involvement in ETOUSA’s struggle to assemble a troop basis and write scopes of 
work for the major projects (PROCO) that would have to be completed in Normandy, documents 
that could survive the scrutiny of a War Department that was realizing it did not have the 
manpower or material to give everyone all they asked for.  Chapter Four ends with an overview 
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of the problems internal and external observers reported to exist at SOS that spring on the eve of 
Overlord. 
Chapter Five digs into the systems established at SHAEF by Gale to plan logistical 
support and integrate those activities with the needs of the fighting forces.  The second half of 
the chapter examines how well that decision-making mechanism worked in France, reexamining 
the big half-a-dozen recommended adjustments to the campaign from July to October.  Chapter 
Six examines how COMZ and its subordinates attempted to control logistics on the continent and 
offers a list of organizational and procedural problems that directly contributed to the collapse in 
support over the course of the pursuit.  Chapter Seven focuses on failures of execution, 
examining how SHAEF and COMZ failed to adequately manage its fleet of trucks and cargo 
planes, and what it would have taken to fix the fuel delivery problem.  The chapter ends by 
contrasting the struggles of COMZ with the healthy sustainment and maneuver integration 
process at 21st Army Group.  This section shows the way in which Montgomery, aided by Gale 
and the logisticians at SHAEF, managed to avoid most of the mistakes that crippled 12th Army 
Group in the last week of August and the first two weeks of September.  Many of these 
techniques could have been implemented at COMZ before the invasion, and would have required 
no additional resources.  COMZ failed to learn between August 1942 and August 1944, from 
Gale and his team at SHAEF, from 21st Army Group, and from NATOUSA, with devastating 
effects on the fall campaign. 
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Chapter 1 - U.S. and British Baggage 
A critical analysis of the U.S. Army during its first year of combat in World War Two 
quickly shows that it was woefully unprepared for theater-level expeditionary operations.  When 
it came time to plan Operation Torch in detail in the summer of 1942, the Americans at Allied 
Force Headquarters (AFHQ) in London and the planning team within the War Department in 
Washington, D.C. quickly proved themselves unable to plan an amphibious operation that was 
intended to rapidly transition into a major ground campaign.  The U.S. Army struggled to fill out 
an effective joint-combined operational headquarters; conduct collaborative planning with their 
superior and subordinate organizations; and equip, mount, and transport a balanced air-ground 
force capable of sustained operations in a distant theater of war.  These facts were all the more 
surprising when one considers the qualified success of expeditionary warfare in France in 1917-
1918 and the examples available from 1939 to late 1941.  Given these examples from its own 
comparatively recent past, why was the U.S. Army so unprepared in 1942 to execute the tasks 
assigned to an operational and strategic military headquarters?  Even more disturbingly, after 
another eighteen months of operational experience, why was LTG John C. H. Lee’s 
Communication Zone (COMZ) so unprepared to perform its duties in France in early August 
1944? 
This chapter begins to answer that question by examining foundational thinking of both 
the U.S. and U.K. militaries and the consensus that framed their approaches to operational 
planning and theater-level warfare.  The story begins with the U.S. Army’s institutional reaction 
to its experiences in World War One and how those conclusions were codified into its capstone 
doctrine.  By 1942 this doctrine was showing its age.  It was either too vague or too internally 
conflicted to offer much help to inexperienced field grade officers operating at the army, theater, 
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and joint-combined level for the first times in their careers.  This opening chapter draws a link 
between the U.S. assessment of the command and control and sustainment lessons from World 
War One, problems with Allied capstone doctrine that failed to identify and confront generalities 
and inconsistencies in theater command and logistics, and the reception and integration of new 
operational experience between 1939 and late 1942.   It tracks the ways power came to be 
centralized in Washington at the expense of theater commanders and the ways doctrine captured 
the preference for an overly drastic division of labor between maneuver and logistics efforts.  It 
also exposes the absence of any U.S. concept of how to wage modern operational warfare as a 
joint-combined team.  Because of their long tradition of expeditionary warfare and their radically 
different approach to capturing doctrine, the British military was in better shape in early 1942, 
and well positioned to help the U.S. Army function in combat. 
The chapter exposes two problems with the U.S. Army during its first two years in World 
War Two.  First, it began the war with an imprecise vision of how theater-level command and 
control should work and no real idea of how to integrate maneuver and sustainment and then 
manage the communications zone necessary to make the plan work.  Second, and more 
problematically, it proved resistant to integrating successful practices used by the British and 
integrating refined U.S. methods into new versions of key manuals as the war progressed.  There 
were preconceived notions of how theater sustainment should work in which senior logisticians 
were so thoroughly indoctrinated that those ideas delayed their recognition of the need to adapt 
and innovate.  This problem was reinforced by a second tendency to formally divide 
responsibility between the combat and sustainment functions to such a degree that coordination 
and cooperation were extremely difficult.  These two waves emerged and collided in August 
1944, preventing the Allies from breaching the Siegfried Line during the pursuit across France.  
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The fact that Lee’s COMZ did not know how to do its job in August 1944 and that effective 
communication had broken down among SHAEF, the COMZ, and 12th AG was only 
understandable if one appreciated the role played by historical experience and doctrine in 
slowing the evolution of the U.S. Army during World War Two. 
Entering a new war with misconceptions about what would work, and thus with vague or 
outdated doctrine, was not unique to the U.S. Army.  It tends to be the norm, and professional 
armies understand that this will be the case and aim to adapt to the new realities as quickly as 
possible.1  Starting the war with the least irrelevant or counterproductive doctrine is one realistic 
goal, and adapting faster than the enemy is a second.  The U.S. Army inadvertently altered some 
of the useful lessons picked up near the end of the Great War and failed to thoroughly analyze 
some developments to draw useful conclusions, incorporating these vague, contradictory, or 
invalidated ideas into capstone doctrine extant in 1942.  Some lessons were retained in doctrine, 
but insights, never properly analyzed and captured, were lost.  Some lessons and their 
implications were lost to the U.S. Army when bureaucratic changes or budget constraints 
eliminated the ability to disseminate them to new officers and organizations. 
Despite demonstrating the ability to learn very quickly in combat, the U.S. Army seemed 
exceptionally resistant to institutional learning and reform.  Doctrine, professional education, 
training methodologies, and some War Department processes seemed to be frozen in amber.  
Units working in active combat theaters quickly identified the gaps, adjusted, and tended to be 
 
1 Michael Howard, “The Use and Abuse of Military History” (lecture, RUSI, London, October 18, 1961), 5.  
Howard notes how difficult it is to figure out what happened and why in the last war and then successfully utilize 
these insights in the future, after so many other conditions had changed in the intervening years.  When General 
David Perkins was the Combined Arms Center commander from 2011 to 2014, he repeatedly warned audiences that 
contemporary doctrine was going to get a lot of things wrong and that one of the most important skills an officer 
needed was the ability to recognize the disconnect between what was written, what they were seeing in the field, and 
how to reconcile the two.  
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working at a high level in a matter of months.  But because the institutional Army refused to 
prioritize reconciling doctrine to the reality experienced in combat, each new unit and staff 
officer had to go through this journey of self-discovery on their own.  Not only did doctrine and 
professional education not accelerate this process; in some cases, it hindered rapid adaptation and 
preparation for units not yet in combat.2   
As we will see, this is exactly what happened to Lee’s SOS and ETOUSA, and to a lesser 
extent, SHAEF and General Omar Bradley’s 12th Army Group.3  The difference in the levels of 
competence demonstrated by the major headquarters that supervised the breakout across France 
was striking, and it went a long way to explain both the friction among the headquarters and the 
collapse of the U.S. logistics system.  ETOUSA and the SOS could not learn by doing; they were 
not in combat for the first two years of their existence and had no ground partner that was.4  This 
made it imperative that they succeed in a much harder task – to learn from the experiences of 
others.  In order to learn new skills, they first had to disown mistaken conclusions from the Great 
War, move beyond the limitations of contemporary doctrine, and integrate the successful 
techniques emerging from the Mediterranean.   
This chapter lays out in some detail the concepts that governed theater-level operations in 
the U.S. Army by late 1942.  These were the pitfalls that ETOUSA and its SOS needed to move 
beyond in order to become effective by the summer of 1944.  It seeks to explain how the official 
 
2 Williamson Murray and Alan R. Millet, Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (1998, repr., Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 313-314; 322-325. 
3 Howard, “The Use and Abuse of Military History”, 5.  Howard acknowledged how the requirements associated 
with day to day business during garrison or peace-time duties might completely overwhelm an organization’s ability 
to prepare for war.  In chapter three and four we will see how this was the case in ETOUSA and its SOS.  This was 
not the case for their counterparts in SHAEF and the various armies and army groups that would direct operations in 
France.  A core group of the men that would man these formations spent most of 1943 fighting in North Africa and 
Italy. 
4 Chapter three and four will explain why the mission in the U.K. was insufficient to adequately prepare the COMZ 
for success in combat. 
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U.S. Army position on what was learned in France created problems reflected in interwar 
doctrine.  It examines what doctrine had to say about theater-level command and control, 
campaign planning, and the synchronization of combat and sustainment – the principal 
responsibilities of ETOUSA and the SOS under U.S. doctrine.  Because the U.S. Army did not 
prioritize overhauling its capstone doctrine during the war, it was much more difficult for 
organizations and individuals that had not served in combat to hit the ground running in a new 
campaign.  Finally, the chapter examines what the British and U.S. Army had learned, and not 
learned yet, from large-scale joint operations, overseas expeditions, and amphibious assaults that 
had occurred between 1939 and late 1942.  It attempts to explain how the U.S. Army thought 
about campaigns and theater command and control and to demonstrate the differences between 
the American perspective and that of the British military.  This theme will be expanded in the 
next chapter, which examines how the two militaries reacted to active operations in North Africa 
and Italy, and the gulf that developed among senior headquarters within the U.S. Army with and 
without combat experience. 
The first section of this chapter begins the process of demonstrating the linkage between 
historical experience and the doctrine that emerges from its study; institutions willing to 
critically examine their own performance tend to write good doctrine and then adapt that doctrine 
quickly and effectively when confronted by new circumstances.  The section examines the 
strained relationship between the AEF commander, General Pershing, and the third war-time 
chief of staff of the U.S. Army, General Peyton C. March, which inadvertently resulted in a shift 
of power from the theater commander to Washington, D.C. during the interwar period.  This shift 
would hinder the efforts of ETOUSA in 1942 and 1943, and it was one of the major obstacles 
that ETOUSA and SHAEF would have to overcome to successfully invade France.  A second 
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harmful outcome of the AEF experience was the conviction among professional logisticians that 
maneuver commanders could not be trusted to balance the needs of the combat forces with those 
of the communications zone.  The post-war institutional preference was to formally divide the 
combat and sustainment missions, their synchronization being supervised by an unbiased theater 
commander or even by the War Department back in the capital.  Lessons from the Great War 
bounced through U.S. doctrine, professional education, and offices, solving some problems, 
creating new ones, and eliminating or undermining organizational and procedural changes 
implemented during the last war that were considered effective at the time.  This first section 
illustrates that the US Army never learned how to conduct theater-level warfare during the Great 
War and had not made much progress in fixing the problem by 1942. In some cases, it was even 
harder to do so. 
The second section of this chapter examines Allied capstone doctrine published before 
and during the war.  British doctrine tended to be short and seemed to be aimed at high-level 
officials, offering very little guidance on technique or methodology for inexperienced officers.  
Senior-level U.S. doctrine was handicapped by unfinished business from the Great War.  The 
authors struggled to rise above an approach to theater warfare centered on tactics and combat.   
Although more comprehensive than its British counterpart U.S. doctrine still lacked enough 
details to help inexperienced staff members in identifying and tackling critical tasks and to 
prioritize and synchronize interconnected efforts.  Perhaps the most concerning feature of Allied 
doctrine was its resistance to meaningful refinement as the war progressed. 
Finally, the last portion of this chapter presents an overview of relevant Allied experience 
and the prevailing lessons gleaned from amphibious and expeditionary operations in the nearly 
three decades preceding Torch.  Real-world experience offered a bridge to more open-minded 
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and effective thinking about expeditionary warfare.  For the U.S. Army this was a long and 
painful process, complicated and hindered by their doctrine and institutional preferences on how 
to organize senior headquarters.  Lessons learned from operations in the three decades prior to 
1942 reinforced some allied misconceptions, but in general these historical examples offered 
valuable insights into which tasks were critical to successful expeditionary warfare.  Luckily for 
the chances of Allied success in the ETO, the British experience resulted in a more mature and 
balanced approach to theater operations, in which commanders were expected to control two or 
three services and to integrate strategic and operational logistics for the conduct of far-reaching 
campaigns.  This model would allow the Americans to lean on and learn from the British while 
they aspired to develop an effective alternative approach of their own.  
 
 The U.S. Army in the Long Shadow of the Great War 
The AEF experience in the Great War produced two powerful reactions in the United 
States Army that would redefine the relationship between the chief of staff and theater 
commanders and would change the prevailing opinion of the best way to sustain combat forces.  
Answers to these unresolved issues were institutionalized throughout the 1920s and formed the 
initial American consensus on the best way to run a theater of war in early 1942.  Fixing the 
imbalance between the authority of the center, on one hand, and the freedom of choice within the 
theater, on the other, as well as figuring out how to effectively run a continental line of 
communications that was synchronized with operational maneuver were the two critical tasks 
facing the U.S. Army before it could fight its way back into France in World War II.  The nature 
and scope of the disagreement over the proper relationship between Washington, D.C. and a 
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theater commander, and the frustration over the level of coordination between sustainment and 
combat forces is the subject of this section of the chapter.   
The formal division of duties between the last Army chief of staff serving during World 
War I, General March, and the commander of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF), General 
John J. Pershing, was ill-defined and resulted in increasing friction between the two men during 
the last six months of the war.  Second, a lack of resources and a troubled relationship with the 
GHQ left the Service of Supply (SOS) for the AEF struggling to accomplish its mission.  The 
theater staff located at Chaumont directly contributed to this dilemma, first through neglect and 
then with a series of decisions that prioritized short-term combat requirements at the expense of 
the long-term sustainability of the U.S. force in France.  Both sources of friction contributed to 
postwar solutions that moved the needle too far in the opposite direction, producing unintended 
consequences that the U.S. Army would have to grapple with during the first two years of World 
War Two.5   
 The disagreement over the authorities and duties of the U.S. Army Chief of Staff and 
those of the commander of the AEF developed over the last eight months of the war.  Pershing 
enjoyed unimpeded power and autonomy during his first year in command, having been given a 
blank check by Secretary of War Newton D. Baker and President Wilson and by the first two 
war-time chiefs of staff. 6  This changed when March was released from his position as 
Pershing’s chief of artillery to become the U.S. Army chief of staff in January 1918.  By law the 
chief of staff was the most senior officer in the U.S Army, responsible for raising, training, 
 
5 Robert K. Merton, “The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action” American Sociological Review 
1, no. 6 (December 1936): 894-904.  Merton would classify the difference between what Pershing and Harbord 
hoped to change as a result of their wartime experiences and the unbalanced relationship between the War 
Department and ETOUSA in the summer of 1942 as a backfire or perverse result. 
6 Brian Neumann, “A Question of Authority: Reassessing the March-Pershing "Feud" in the First World War” 
Journal of Military History 73, no. 4 (October 2009): 1119. 
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equipping, and deploying an army, and then for commanding the elements of that army in the 
field, as directed by the civilian chain of command.7  There was a loophole in the authorities 
granted to the “Commanding General of the Army” that underwrote Baker’s personal 
preferences and resulted in Pershing’s primacy during the first year of the war.8  Baker wanted 
March to focus on the training, equipping, and deploying forces while leaving their overseas 
employment to Pershing.9  It was a division of labor that was logical, and its simplicity fit the 
fact that there was only one active theater.  In general, both men respected these informal 
boundaries and tried to maintain a positive working relationship, and March made significant 
progress in reorganizing the War Department and accelerating the deployment of a large 
American army to France.  But eventually friction did develop between the two men, both 
Pershing and March straying beyond the informal boundaries of their positions as established by 
Secretary Baker.   
 Pershing and March disagreed over four important issues during the last eight months of 
the war: control over promotions to general officer, shifting officers back and forth between the 
AEF and the War Department, control over the SOS in France, and responsibility for planning 
the U.S. force structure goals for the anticipated 1919 campaign. The exact details of each debate 
are relatively unimportant here, except for those concerning the SOS issue, which we will 
address in detail below.  What mattered was that the written scope of duties for the two positions 
left room for misunderstanding because of the apparent overlap in responsibilities and the habits 
 
7 Neumann, 1123. 
8 Ibid, 1123.  The President could reassign certain functions of the chief of staff to other officers; see footnote 17 and 
18. 
9 Ibid, 1124.  Incidentally, this is the current division of labor between the service chiefs and the functional and 
geographic combatant commanders.  The responsibility of prioritizing and integrating the operational commands 
against one another has been shifted to the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.  Secretary Baker 
was ahead of his time in seeing the need for two distinct nodes of power within the War Department.  Of course, his 
solution would not have been so elegant had there been additional active theaters. 
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that developed between the War Department and the AEF during the first year of the war.  
March’s brash personality and a general mistrust of the War Department among the AEF staff 
tended to escalate relatively minor problems into a series of dramatic confrontations.10  Viewed 
dispassionately, Pershing and the AEF tended to be in the wrong on each issue, taking too 
narrow a view and ignoring the needs of the Army as a whole – something they had gotten away 
with for entirely too long to fix quickly or easily.  In hindsight, historians have leveled the charge 
that Pershing and his staff did not understand how to run a theater of war and that they did not 
know how to employ the SOS they had created.  Nor, critics say, did they maintain a healthy 
balance between the needs of the combat units and the service troops supporting them.11  
Regardless, Pershing and his SOS commander and most trusted subordinate, MG James Harbord, 
emerged from the debates of 1918 with a strong desire to prevent future “meddling” by 
Washington in the affairs of a theater commander.  Pershing and Harbord found themselves in a 
position to enact that plan when they became the chief and deputy chief of staff of the U.S. Army 
in 1921.  
 A second major outcome of the Great War, and one interrelated with the friction between 
the War Department and the AEF during the last six months of the war, was the conclusion that 
the relationship between the SOS and the GHQ at Chaumont was dysfunctional.  Reports of 
problems in the SOS during the first half of 1918 reached Washington and caused enough 
concern that Secretary Baker, General March, and Edward House, a close political advisor to the 
President, began to develop alternative schemes for running the organization.  After a bit of 
brainstorming, March and Baker offered to send MG George W. Goethals to take over the SOS.  
 
10 Neumann, 1127. 
11 David D. Dworak, “Victory’s Foundation: U.S. Logistical Support of the Allied Mediterranean Campaign, 1942-
1945” (PhD diss. Syracuse University, 2011), 27. 
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Goethals was an experienced and respected officer serving in a position that was in effect the 
War Department G-4.  Under this plan, Goethals would become Pershing’s military peer and 
equal, collaborating and coordinating with him, but answering to the War Department. March 
explained the offer as an attempt to relieve Pershing from the burden of diplomatic engagements 
with the civilian governments of Great Britain and France, which would allow him to focus on 
combat operations, but Pershing predictably focused on the fact that he would lose authority over 
his logistical support structure.  Pershing replied to the Chief of Staff in July that he would 
welcome Goethals as a new commander for the SOS as long as the command remained 
subordinate to him, but he made clear that an autonomous SOS that needed to please two bosses 
was a recipe for disaster.12  Goethals would be responsible for providing logistical support to 
Pershing, but running the communication zone in such a manner as to please March, and the two 
priorities would inevitability result in friction from time to time.  While trying to win his 
argument with Washington, Pershing also took steps to appoint one of his most trusted and 
experienced subordinates, General James Harbord, as the commanding general of the SOS.  
Pershing realized that this impetus for change coming from outside the theater was motivated by 
various failures in the SOS, and to hold off that push he would have to fix the problems himself, 
and quickly. 
 Harbord was the right man for the job, but after six months of herculean effort he 
concluded that the shortcomings of the U.S. SOS could only be fixed with a massive influx of 
resources and increased authority relative to the GHQ at Chaumont.  By November 1918 
Harbord was calling for a reorganization that was just short of an endorsement of the original 
recommendation presented by House, March, and Baker.  Harbord started his stint as the SOS 
 
12 Neumann, 1132. 
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commander enjoying the full confidence of Pershing, and with a deep understanding for how the 
man thought and operated.  He also had extensive authority over all activity in the SOS from 
ports to regulating stations and had Pershing’s permission to directly engage the War Department 
without prior coordination with GHQ.13  Shortly after taking over at the beginning of August, 
Harbord discovered two major problems confronting his command: low morale among the 
officers and men, and a significant mismatch between requirements and resources to get the job 
done.  Addressing the morale issue was relatively easy; Harbord decided that the best solution 
was to get out and tour the command, discovering problems, fixing as many as he could on the 
spot, and showing his men that he cared about their challenges.  The French government 
provided a small train that Harbord used as a mobile headquarters, manned by a small portion of 
his staff and outfitted with telegraph and telephone capabilities that allowed him to remain in 
frequent communication with his staff at Tours and the GHQ at Chaumont.14     
 Unfortunately, after Harbord had done all he could in moderately improving unit morale, 
the fundamental issue facing the SOS remained: a manpower shortage compounded by 
insufficient ships and rolling stock.  Harbord also discovered that these shortfalls were 
exacerbated by questionable decision-making going on at GHQ.  The cause of the problem had 
started in May; under pressure from the French, and in reaction to the Ludendorff Offensive, the 
United States had agreed to frontload new combat divisions at the expense of service troops.15  
In May and June the U.S. shipped 420,000 men more than the initially planned allocation for 
those two months, but it did so at the cost of cutting back the proper ratio of service to combat 
 
13 Brian F. Neumann, “Pershing’s Right Hand: General James G. Harbord and the American Expeditionary Forces in 
the First World War” (PhD diss., Texas A&M, 2006), 360, 370, 373.  Harbord had served as the AEF chief of staff 
and commanded a brigade and division in combat.      
14 Neumann, “Pershing’s Right Hand,” 374. 
15 Neumann, “Pershing’s Right Hand,” 384.   
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troops from 25 to 12% of the force.16  The GHQ compounded SOS shortages by culling able-
bodied men from service units three times during the summer of 1918 to use as emergency 
infantry replacements.  By 1 October 1918 the SOS was short 80,000 men, or 22% of its 
authorized strength.  Service troops comprised only 23% of the total American force in theater 
rather than the 25% goal established by the War Department or the 33% threshold judged 
necessary by Harbord.17  On 1 November 1918 the SOS had only 1,100 of the 4,000 officers 
authorized for the command.18  The activation of the 1st U.S. Army in August had generated an 
additional drain on service troops from the SOS and contributed to the dire situation in 
November.   
Harbord used the authority of his position and his relationship with Pershing to engage 
the commander directly about the damage caused by raiding the SOS to meet needs at the front.  
But on three separate occasions in August and September the GHQ, endorsed by Pershing, 
responded to Harbord’s complaints by reiterating that the needs of the combat units had to take 
priority over the long-term health of the line of communications.19  As a result, the drain on 
service troops, transportation assets, and infantry replacements continued.  Pershing and the 
GHQ found it extremely difficult to protect the SOS while using the U.S. Army to maintain 
pressures on a steadily collapsing German Army.  Pershing and his staff knew they were making 
it extremely difficult for Harbord and the SOS to accomplish their mission, but they were 
banking on solving the problem by breaking the German Army and ending the war before the 
SOS collapsed. 
 
16 Dworak, 34. 
17 Neumann, 384-385.   
18 Dworak, 37.   
19 Ibid, 388.   
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 Manpower shortages were only half of the equation causing the SOS fits in the final 
months of the war.  The U.S. lacked enough cargo ships to supply an AEF any larger than its 
current 40 divisions, and the French and British refused to reallocate transport to pick up the 
shortfall.  This decision was probably a blessing in disguise, because Harbord did not have the 
men to unload any additional cargo and then shift the supplies to the east.  The SOS 
transportation problem was driven by the fact that the American railway service in France was 
collapsing by early November, operating at 73% of the engines and 32% of the cars needed to 
support 40 divisions at the front.20  Motor transport could not pick up the slack; despite the fact 
that the AEF received 51,554 trucks from the United States during the war, post-conflict analysis 
determined that this number represented about half of the trucks required for the mission.21  The 
U.S. campaign plan for 1919 called for an additional twenty divisions at the front, yet without  a 
plan  to overcome the service unit, merchant marine, and rolling stock shortfalls crippling 
American logistics.  Had the war required a spring campaign in 1919, it would have been a 
struggle for the U.S. Army to maintain the force already assembled; increasing the Army by 
another 20 to 40 divisions was virtually impossible.22 
This imminent collapse of U.S. logistics in the fall of 1918 triggered a last round of 
debate over the best way to organize the SOS.  In October Harbord started a relatively minor 
initiative to transfer authority over the corps regulating stations from the AEF G-4 to his 
 
20 Ibid, 395.   
21 Grant T. Weller, “ ‘Come Hell, High Water or Nazis’: The U.S. Army Quartermaster Corps Develops and 
Implements The First Motorized Logistics System, 1919-1945” (PhD diss., Temple University, 2007), 48-49. 
22 There was considerable debate among Baker, March, and Pershing as to what the U.S. combat strength goal in 
1919 was to be.  Foch told Baker in September that he needed no additional U.S. divisions to defeat Germany.  
Baker and March planned on sending twenty more combat divisions to France by the spring of 1919, and Pershing 
had asked for (and was still assuming he would receive) 40.  See Neumann, “Pershing’s Right Hand,” 394-395 and 
Neumann, “A Question of Authority,” 1135.  Washington was working on a plan to reinforce France with twenty 
divisions while Harbord and Pershing believed they had to move and sustain 40 new divisions.  That is why Baker 
and March did not completely agree with the AEF’s concerns over shipping, rail assets, and the number of service 
troops. 
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command, a step that provoked a disproportionate reaction by GHQ.  Driven by Harbord’s 
suggestion to reexamine the authorities allocated to the SOS, combined with emerging cracks 
becoming apparent across the entire line of communications, the new AEF G-4, BG George 
Moseley, proposed a drastic counterproposal.  Moseley suggested that responsibility for 
coordinating and integrating logistics should shift from the SOS to the GHQ and fall under his 
supervision.23  Harbord and his chief of staff, COL Johnson Hagood, then counter-escalated with 
an equally dramatic alternative.  They thought that the AEF G-1 and G-4 should move from 
Chaumont to Tours and fall under SOS control, consolidating all aspects of sustainment under 
Harbord.  The SOS would own supply from the port to the trenches, including all the 
transportation assets involved in the process, and it would retain control over the bureau chiefs 
while gaining control over the regulating officers.  Harbord would coordinate only with the GHQ 
chief of staff for operations to integrate sustainment with combat operations, and both men 
would answer only to Pershing.24  The conflicting concepts for reorganization could not be 
resolved among Harbord, Moseley, the AEF chief of staff, and the G-3.  On 3 November 
Pershing, fully consumed by the final U.S. offensive around Sedan, agreed to shelve the issue 
based upon the recommendation of Moseley and LeRoy Eltinge, the AEF deputy chief of staff.25  
Moseley agreed that the system in place had worked well enough and that other ways to improve 
the performance of the SOS were probably easier to implement.  Since combat operations ended 
seven days later, the debate was never resolved and would continue to periodically distract the 
U.S. Army for the next four decades. 
 
23 Neumann, “Pershing’s Right Hand,” 403-407.   
24 Ibid, 401-402. 
25 Ibid, 407. 
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 Pershing and Harbord would outlast the competition, reach positions of power that 
allowed them to institutionalize their preferred solutions, and win the battle of the narrative.  
Pershing was appointed the Army Chief of Staff in 1921, and he directed Harbord to join him as 
his deputy.  During their short time together in Washington, they reorganized the War 
Department to fit their preferences and address their frustrations from the Great War.  Authority 
was formally centralized in the position of the chief of staff, but Pershing envisioned that, upon 
the outbreak of war, the chief of staff would take to the field as the commander of the Army in 
the primary theater, his deputy taking up his administrative duties in Washington, D.C.26  
Pershing did not address what would happen if there was more than one ground theater or the 
possibility of a Presidential directive for the chief of staff to remain in the capital.  It was ironic 
that after being frustrated as a theater commander by the “interference” of a strong chief of staff 
in the United States, Pershing built a system that perpetuated that dynamic for at least some of 
his counterparts in World War II. 
 Harbord retained a strong influence over the War Department through his published 
memoirs and frequent engagement as a civilian businessman.  These informal engagements with 
rising stars in the sustainment community ensured that it was Harbord’s vision of a properly 
organized and functioning SOS that survived the war, entered doctrine, and dominated the ASF.   
Stratton cited “Harboard [sic] and Hagood” in his 4 June 1944 rebuttal to the proposed 
reorganization of ETOUSA.  GHQ, Stratton said, attempted to exert “…an excessive amount of 
supervision, interference and authority without, at the same time, sharing in the responsibility for 
the final outcome which still rested on the shoulders of the CG COMZ.”27  While the logistics 
 
26 Neuman, “A Question of Authority,” 1140. 
27 Letter, Stratton to Lord, 4 Jun 44.  RG 498, UD 578, Box 3857, ADM 238 – Organization, NARA II. 
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community took Harbord’s conclusions to heart, the rest of the Army tried to forget about life 
above the division level as quickly as they could.  Leave logistics to the logisticians.  When MG 
Karl Truesdell visited SOS headquarters in November 1943 while in position as the CG of Fort 
Leavenworth, he acknowledged that the Army had missed the boat twenty years earlier, turning 
CGSC into “just an infantry division course.”28  His recent experiences had convinced him that 
Leavenworth needed to evolve and address the gap where ASF, AAF, and AGF efforts were 
synchronized and integrated with the Navy and allies.  The focus of his trip to the United 
Kingdom was the Air Force and SOS, because they were what was new and different when 
compared with the American experience in World War One.   
 Lee paid a visit to Harbord in New York in May 1942 before leaving for London to 
assume the SOS command; Lee claimed that it was Harbord who convinced him that he needed a 
train-mounted mobile headquarters to better accomplish his mission.29  Lee asked for authorities 
basically the same as those laid out in the Hagood Board report.  Both parties agreed that the 
bureau chiefs, service troops, and theater sustainment staff (G-1 and G-4) should answer 
exclusively to the SOS commander, who in turn was equal to the director of operations.   Lee 
would have to reconcile the one difference between Somervell’s and Harbord’s approach to 
control over theater logistics: Somervell favored the Goethals proposal while Harbord still 
considered it important that the SOS command answer solely to the theater commander.                                              
 Anyone serving in the SOS or working logistics in the combat divisions and corps 
witnessed the shortfalls of the existing system, knew that something fundamental needed to 
 
28 SOS C&S Notes, 1 Nov 43.  RG 498, UD 578, Box 3882, ADM 455, NARA II.  Truesdell had served as a signal 
officer at the division and corps level during WWI, commanded an infantry regiment, brigade, and division and the 
VI Corps from 1937 to 1941, and had served in a half-dozen assignments at CGSC and the Army War College and 
on the WD General Staff.  He was the commandant of CGSC from March 1942 to November 1945.   
29 Lee, Service Reminiscences, 83. 
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change, and were aware of proposed alternatives advanced by the War Department, Harbord, and 
Moseley.  Unfortunately for the U.S. Army, many of the critical lessons generated by the AEF 
and its SOS were quickly forgotten, ignored, or undermined by a lack of funds in the postwar 
Army.  Transportation – especially motorized transportation –was one of the least mature aspects 
of U.S. logistics in 1918.  Synchronizing the flow of supplies from one mode of transportation to 
another proved to be a blind spot in the AEF that was not addressed until the last months of the 
war.  Examining the problem immediately after the war, COL Mark Ireland of the Motor 
Transportation Corps acknowledged that the U.S. Army lacked even a language to describe the 
critical functions of transportation, let alone the doctrine and professional education venues in 
which to deliver it.30  To address this gap, the Motor Transportation Corps formed a three-man 
board on 31 July 1919 and directed it to revise existing regulations and recommend changes to 
maximize uniformity.31  The two overarching themes of the report were the need for centralized 
control of all motor transport by qualified technical experts and the criticality of effective 
maintenance throughout MTC organizations.          
 The development of a Motor Transportation Corps and independent Transportation 
Service, all synchronized under the control of the SOS commander, was a progressive step for 
the U.S. Army in France.  But the National Defense Act of 1920 drove the Army to eliminate the 
MTC and to downgrade transportation to a subordinate division under the Quartermaster 
Service.32  Various leaders realized this was a mistake, but conflicting Army priorities made it 
impossible to fix.33  In a lecture delivered to the Quartermaster School in 1927, BG F.H. Pope, 
 
30 Weller, 57-58.   
31 Weller, 59.  The board included COL Ireland and added COL Edgar Stayer and COL William Winters. 
32 Richard Killblane, “70 Years of the Transportation Corps,” United States Army Transportation Corps, 
http://www.transportation.army.mil/history/ (accessed 11 February 2019). 
33 With shrinking budgets, the traditional branches and services dug to retain as many units and staff positions as 
possible.   
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the director of the motor transport section within the AEF, was still espousing the advantages 
afforded by a central transportation agency, independent of the Quartermaster Service and 
empowered to synchronize rail, water, and motor assets.34 
 Once additional resources appeared on the near horizon, the U.S. Army returned to the 
idea of forming an independent transportation organization.  In 1938 three students at the Army 
War College were directed to outline the resources and authorities necessary to establish a Motor 
Transport Service under the framework of the Protective Mobilization Plan.  These three field-
grade officers, representing the Air Corps, Coastal Artillery, and Infantry, produced a textbook 
example of the right way to develop a new organization with logically associated duties and 
responsibilities.  In a five-part briefing, the team of Ryan, Homer, and Beetie evaluated the 
lessons and developments from the U.S. experience in France, the harm caused by the 1920 
reorganization, more recent international experiences with motorized transport, the failures of the 
current American system, and a solution.  Without an advocate for all motorized transportation, 
the U.S. had fielded a vast array of non-standardized carriers and prime movers across the 
branches and services, and the Quartermaster Corps seemed to prioritize generalists within its 
ranks rather than trying to develop specialized sub-groupings of officers and NCOs.35  The 
solution was simple – reactivate the Motorized Transportation Corps that had been formed in 
July 1918 and centralize the procurement, organization, and repair of trucks under their control.  
The MTC proposed in this report was a much more comprehensive and powerful organization, 
when it came to centralized control of motorized assets, than the solution adopted in July 1942.  
The proposal envisioned taking the procurement and repair functions from the Ordnance Corps 
 
34 Weller, 67. 
35 Weller, 81. 
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and the training and organizational function from the Quartermaster Corps and transferring all of 
them to the MTC. This new service would have selected its own equipment, organized its own 
units and trained their constituent personnel, controlled their employment in combat, and 
overseen the purchase, distribution, and installation of repair parts across the fleet. 
 The Ryan-Homer-Beetie report was hardly revolutionary – it basically assumed that the 
U.S. Army was headed in the right direction by the spring of 1919 and just needed to follow 
through to formalize the structure that had been created in France.  In September 1939, their 
report was handed off to a second team of lieutenant colonels, this time two infantrymen and an 
adjutant general in the War Department, who quickly endorsed the first report and its 
conclusions.  Almost a year later another, more powerful, endorsement for a separate motor 
transportation authority circulated through the War Department.  BG R.H. Jordan retired from 
his position as the head of the Transportation Division within the Quartermaster Corps on 18 
July 1940 and offered a summary of his experiences and recommendations before he left.  In that 
report he recommended that the Quartermaster Corps (QMC) form a fourth division to join the 
supply, transportation, and construction divisions – a new motorized transportation bureau.36  
With increased funding and manpower for defense overall, surely it was time for the Army to 
address a need that had become obvious in July 1918. 
 In March 1942 the Army activated the Transportation Division within the War 
Department SO, adding a separate Transportation Corps on 31 July 1942.  Specific authorities 
for the management of motorized transport remained divided among the Ordnance, 
Quartermaster, and new Transportation Corps.  Despite successful developments in France in 
1918, and despite numerous well-written reports between 1938 and 1940, the U.S. Army had 
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decided against centralizing motorized transport under one powerful organization.  As a result, 
there was no agency with sufficient resources, focus, and influence to equip the U.S. Army with 
a suitable wheeled transporter fleet backed up by adequate maintenance units and stocks of repair 
parts.  Doctrine and education covering motorized units, the integration of all methods of 
transportation, and detailed command and control of transportation within a sustainment and 
theater context remained vague, because no one organization was given a mandate to develop 
them.   
What might seem to be a minor issue in the global distribution system developed by the 
U.S. Army during World War Two was disproportionately important under some circumstances.  
There were short but critical windows during some campaigns when motor transport provided 
the preponderance of logistical support to mobile forces.  This tended to be the case when 
mechanized forces penetrated deep inland, moving hundreds of miles away from the closest 
working ports.  This relatively unimpeded movement after a breakthrough was the payoff, the 
reward, for all the energy, resources, and lives traded to achieve a breakthrough, and it needed to 
be continued for as long as possible.  Rail infrastructure tended to get destroyed during the 
opening moves of the campaign, requiring a lot of time and resources to fix.  Therefore, the 
burden for sustaining advancing forces fell heavily upon motor transport during the key stages of 
the pursuit.  The more efficiently trucks could fuel the advance, the more numerous the 
operational advantages that could be secured before the return of equilibrium between the two 
forces.   
The cycle described above played out in August and September 1944 across central 
France.  Allied logisticians were innovative and relentless, but the motor transport resources 
available to the U.S. Army were insufficient to achieve the operational objectives established for 
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the pursuit by SHAEF.  Various leaders were concerned about the quantity and capacity of the 
motorized transport projected to support Overlord well before the crisis that summer; an overall 
shortage of repair parts and service troops in the U.S. Army was recognized in 1942, problems 
with the composition of the U.S. truck fleet and number of truck companies available in France 
were recognized in the summer of 1943, and the expectation of a transportation crisis projected 
for D+90 was common in SHAEF by April 1944.  As strange as it may seem, two years had been 
too little time to solve some of these problems; only the activation of a powerful MTC or TC in 
the 1930s would have offered the best chance of anticipating and solving these challenges.  
 It is not the purpose of this study to examine in great detail the lessons drawn by 
Americans from World War One, or to study the inner workings of the U.S. military bureaucracy 
between the two wars.  What is clear, however, is that “lessons” cut both ways – sometimes the 
correct conclusions were reached but could be acted upon.  Knowing you messed something up 
is not the same as knowing how to fix it, and solutions to one problem are just as likely to create 
new, unanticipated ones.  Large bureaucracies are inherently resistant to change, and their 
component elements fight to retain turf for a variety of reasons.  The result in the U.S. Army 
leading up to American participation in World War Two was inconsistent messaging among 
branches and services and between the War Department and overseas commands that resulted in 
inconsistent doctrine, education, and opinions among senior leaders about the best way to 
organize and operate.  By 1942 the U.S. Army had shifted the balance of power to the center at 
the expense of theater commanders, bifurcated control over combat and sustainment functions 
while emasculating any potential synchronizing agent, and consistently postponed needed reform 
in the motor transportation field.  Each of these problems would be reflected in U.S. doctrine and 
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present concrete barriers to operational success in North Africa and France that the Allied joint-
combined headquarters would have to identify and overcome.   
    
 Allied Doctrine for the Organization of Theaters and Large Units 
 This uncertainty about how to run a theater of war becomes apparent in any examination 
of Allied military doctrine aimed at the highest echelons of the Army as it existed in 1942, 
especially when it came to explaining exactly how to synchronize combat and sustainment 
operations.   By examining capstone manuals published between 1942 and 1944, one can reach 
three main conclusions.  First, Allied doctrine was too vague.  U.S doctrine imperfectly 
described a process that had not been mastered in the modern era – managing a communications 
zone and integrating maneuver and sustainment.  The idea most prevalent at the end of the Great 
War was embraced more than two decades later, namely, to preserve the resources and 
independence of the logistician by walling him off from the combat commander.  Unfortunately 
for the reader, no U.S. doctrine outlined exactly how to manage this large command or who 
would integrate their efforts with those of the combat command, and how exactly to go about 
that task.  Second, British capstone doctrine was too imprecise and non-descriptive to bridge the 
gap, even though their long tradition of independent joint command and expeditionary warfare 
resulted in a better appreciation of the nature of the problem.  Finally, mid-war rewrites of FM 
100-10 and FM 100-5 did not convey the effective techniques that had emerged in the 
Mediterranean and Pacific theaters.  The 1942 version of FM 100-15 was not updated at all 
during the war.  In fact, U.S. doctrine actually made the problem of adaptation at the operational 
level harder; it did not accelerate the maturation of inexperienced staffs into effective teams or 
help them rapidly assimilate operational experience.   
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Upon U.S. entry into World War Two, western military doctrine was a flawed tool with 
which to try to achieve unity of effort.  First, there were two unique sets of doctrine: U.S. and 
British.  Second, each country maintained two to five manuals that together constituted official 
guidance on warfare above the corps level.  To make matters worse, this canon was updated 
periodically on different timelines, and thus it was internally inconsistent.  U.S. capstone 
doctrine consisted of three manuals, all in theory equal in importance, which needed to be 
understood as a body.  FM 100-5 was mainly a tactical manual that covered operations, with 
emphasis at the division and below.  FM 100-10 covered sustainment at the tactical, army, and 
theater level.  FM 100-15 covered operations from army to theater level.  The British used a 
similar division with two volumes given to the field service regulations and a stand-alone 
document to address administration and logistics (Manual of Movement, War).  It is safe to 
assume that combat arms officers paid a bit more attention to the tactical operations manual 
while technical service officers spent a bit more time with FM 100-10 or the Manual of 
Movement.  
Officers assigned to operational units in the middle of a massive war probably did not 
have a lot of free time to dig through manuals.  Doctrine might be remembered from their last 
school experiences, either at the Command and General Staff College or the Army War College 
for the Americans, or at the service staff colleges and Imperial Defense College for the British.37  
Most of the flag officers serving in the U.S. Army during the war had attended CGSC in the 
1930s.38  Young field grade officers were potentially familiar with the version of these manuals 
 
37 Peter J. Schifferle, America’s School for War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010), 53-61.  Schifferle 
argues that FM 100-5, FM 100-15 (titled A Manual for Commanders of Large Units until 1942), and the Staff 
Officers’ Field Manual were the most widely used manuals at Leavenworth.    
38 Ruppenthal, Vol. 1, 1-10.  Ruppenthal provides thumbnail biographies for most of the key flag-officer 
logisticians, including dates for their attendance at CGSC and the AWC.  The majority completed both schools in 
the 1930s. 
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completed after the start of World War Two in Europe, but Eisenhower, Smith, and Bradley most 
likely remembered the editions they had used for reference while at Leavenworth.  It is unlikely 
that individuals were carrying a copy of these manuals in their personal gear, but one assumes 
that each major headquarters had access to most of the key documents and perhaps even to their 
latest editions.  Commanders and primary staff officers perhaps did not have a lot of time to 
search through doctrine looking for good ideas, but field-grade officers did, and, since they were 
short on experience in running theater-level operations, one hopes they turned to doctrine 
looking for possible solutions.  But this instinct would only be rewarded if the doctrine was any 
good.  
U.S. and British doctrine did not help the novice think through how to plan a ground 
campaign – it was of almost no help in selecting and sequencing a series of objectives to 
maintain friendly freedom of maneuver while defeating enemy forces.39  British operational 
doctrine effectively emphasized the need to reach the theater first and then sustain forces once 
ashore, but it offered little insight on how maneuver and logistics interacted with one another.  It 
was of little practical value to the AFHQ team trying to plan and then control Torch. 
The most logical place for American staff officers serving at the army group, 
communications zone, or theater level to look for clues as to what was important and how to do 
their job would have been FM 100-15, Field Service Regulations, Larger Units.  Inexperienced 
readers would have found it informative when it came to the “what” of managing a theater 
command, but they would have been frustrated by its lack of details or examples of various 
 
39 Using “defeat” over “destroy” is deliberate here.  U.S. doctrine written during World War II focused on 
destroying enemy formations, while German and Soviet practice demonstrated that deep maneuver might eliminate 
the combat potential of dozens of divisions by isolating them from their supplies and ability to coordinate with 
forces outside the pocket.  “Defeat” renders enemy forces incapable of influencing friendly freedom of maneuver 
and eventually leads to their destruction when they either surrender or abandon almost all their heavy equipment in 
order to escape encirclement.     
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approaches to “how.”  The 1942 version of the manual was about 100 pages long and included 
sections applicable from the corps to the national strategic staffs of the Army.  The first chapter, 
which was titled “High Command,” focused on the role of the theater commander.  A theater 
commander had two primary responsibilities: first, to coordinate the efforts of air, land, and sea 
power within his assigned geographical area, and, second, to synchronize combat operations with 
administrative (logistical) support.40  Persistent throughout U.S. doctrine and unit organization 
was the criticality of allowing tactical combat commanders to focus on defeating the enemy – not 
on worrying about supplies, replacements, and control of rear areas.  Armies and army groups 
operated in the combat zone, and administration happened in the communications zone.  Yes, 
there was a gray area where the two overlapped and the tactical commander had both 
responsibility and authority to coordinate the two, but in general it was the theater commander 
and his staff who synchronized their interaction.  One of the key tasks of the theater command 
was to establish the boundary between the combat and communications zone and move it as 
appropriate.41  The mission of the theater commander was handed down by the President or the 
War Department (or implied from a standing war plan), and it would “usually be general in 
character and leave great discretion to the theater commander.”42  If the commander did not write 
the campaign plan himself, those who did so, presumably officers at the War Department, were 
expected to consult with him.  The theater commander should remain focused primarily on 
preparing for future events, might find it helpful to further divide his theater based on the 
geography or mission, and would retain the ability to intervene at the decisive point if he 
 
40 War Department, FM 100-15, Larger Units (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1942), 4-7.  
The manual was updated again in June 1950.   
41 Ibid, 5, paragraph 12. 
42 Ibid, 6. 
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maintained a mobile reserve.43 In other words, the commander had a lot of autonomy.  He was 
likely to face complex problems in conquering time, distance, and sticky chains of authority; but 
he should not be looking to D.C. for answers.  
The most frustrating chapter for the inexperienced staff leader had to be the second one, 
which covered campaign plans.  It was obvious that the selection of individual objectives, 
sequencing when to tackle them, and the alignment of resources to make success possible lay at 
the heart of the staff officer’s job, but the manual offered no clues about how to go about this 
task.  Nor did it offer any concrete suggestions about the division of labor between the 
commander and his staff, and how the staff might help the commander do those tasks that only 
he could accomplish, based on his superior experience and access to external agencies.  But the 
shortcomings of this chapter of FM 100-15 were partially explained by the fact that the U.S. 
Army did not yet recognize or define the operational level of war as a distinct activity designed 
to link tactical actions with strategic effects.  Eventually practitioners would learn that operations 
tended to revolve around the linkage between long distance movements, fighting numerous 
battles, and the logistical support needed to sustain both activities.  Since the U.S. Army had 
little practical experience sequencing these types of events during World War One, it seems 
reasonable that post-war doctrine did not cover the subject in any detail.     
FM 100-15 stated that the object of war was to “impose the will of one country upon 
another.  The accomplishment of this objective normally requires the decisive defeat or 
destruction of the hostile armed forces” while never addressing how corps and armies might go 
about that task.44  U.S. doctrine advised that campaign plans designed to eliminate the enemy 
 
43 Ibid, 6-7. 
44 Ibid, 12. 
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military needed to concentrate friendly forces in a decisive direction ready to exploit success or 
deal with surprise and setbacks.  Picking concrete objectives was the hard part, and a critical task 
for the commander.  The range of air power made this even harder; with great range came a 
multiplication of possible objectives.  But whatever the commander decided to do, he had to do it 
decisively, massing against each objective sequentially to ensure the mission’s success.  
Objectives were generally of two kinds: one set placed the enemy at a positional disadvantage, 
particularly by threatening his lines of communication, and another set took a deeper, long-range 
approach aimed at industry, raw materials, and the effective functioning of the enemy nation 
through its economic and political organs.45 Air superiority was critical and was a prerequisite to 
effective ground maneuver; early moves in the ground campaign should avoid enemy strength 
and rather “advance towards some locality containing the essentials of his national life and thus 
force the enemy to move to its defense….”46  This was good advice and demonstrated a level of 
sophistication when it came to higher-level tactical warfare and how to achieve operational 
objectives.   
But at least two things were missing or problematic in this guidance about planning a 
campaign.  First, the commander maneuvered to destroy the enemy in tactical battle – not to 
destroy its ability to regenerate itself.  It is telling that as late as the summer of 1942 U.S. 
doctrine still had not integrated the reality of the large industrial state’s almost limitless ability to 
regenerate personnel and equipment.  Some leaders in the Allied camp began to realize that 
panzer divisions and fighter groups were just manifestations of the heads of a hydra; effective 
campaign plans would try to avoid attritional combat while destroying the enemy’s ability to 
 
45 Ibid, 12. 
46 Ibid, 13.  Practical experience would demonstrate this was effective in an air campaign as well.  The best way to 
destroy the fighter arm of the Luftwaffe was to force them to defend industrial targets in the homeland round the 
clock for weeks on end.   
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regenerate combat power.  Also missing from this chapter was any mention of the limitations 
that time, terrain, and logistics impose upon the commander’s freedom of action.  Some 
objectives existed only to extend the operational reach of friendly forces, but they could be as 
important as, or even more important than, an objective that dislocates an enemy army.47  
Modern U.S. doctrine suggests that the size and reach of friendly forces bounds the number of 
objectives that can be simultaneously pursued.  This informs how frequently, both in time and 
distance, the command should schedule an operational pause in order to avoid culmination.48  
Without these parameters, the theater-level staff would struggle to construct a framework 
necessary to build a realistic campaign plan.  An experienced leader might find the guidance on 
campaign planning in the FSR sufficient, but it would not give much insight to a younger officer 
who had no relevant operational experience.   
Two other chapters of the manual would have been helpful to the newly assigned 
operational-level staff officer, but also contained noticeable gaps.  The chapter titled “Strategic 
Maneuver” included offensive and defensive ways to defeat an enemy force, but it held nothing 
about how to project and sustain large forces across great distances.  Examples of the various 
forms of offensive warfare were provided, but objectives were always directly linked to 
destroying enemy ground formations.  The authors offered no insights or suggestions about what 
to do with freedom of movement beyond falling on the enemy’s flank or rear.  FM 100-15 did 
not present an evaluation of the role that ports, airfields, rail and road nexus points, and avenues 
through imposing terrain played in presenting and blocking options for both armies.  Tactical 
 
47 The port of Cherbourg in the Overlord plan is a perfect example.  Cherbourg was important because it would 
allow the Allies to sustain another ten to twenty divisions on the continent.  Some leaders at SHAEF recognized 
Antwerp as a second critical objective that would extend Allied operational reach over the Rhine.   
48 FM 3-0: Operations (Washington, D.C: Department of the Army, 2008), 6-6 to 6-19.  Also see the 2017 version 
of FM 3-0, chapter one.      
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battles seemed divorced from the logistical underpinnings necessary to continue to fight them, 
and the manual did not address how to exploit the short-term advantages a victory might provide.  
The American vision of land warfare lacked any appreciation for the role and value of movement 
while not in contact with enemy forces, and how that movement might present new 
opportunities, to include the possibility of avoiding attritional warfare.         
FM 100-15 had little to offer on operations at the army and army group level.  Evidently 
the army group staff should try to plan further into the future and not try to control current 
operations.  According to the manual, the army group staff should have concerned itself with 
administration and logistics to the least extent possible; the principal logistics requirement of the 
army group was to collect and prioritize requirements and then to provide them to the theater 
commander.  By keeping a reserve, the army group commander retained the ability to influence 
the campaign at decisive points, either by countering major enemy actions, reinforcing local 
success, or taking a bold initiative.  It could be argued that the U.S. Army had little to say about 
army groups because it had so little practical experience; when FM 100-15 was updated in 1942 
the U.S. Army was still almost two years away from forming its first operational army group.  
The counter to this argument would be the numerous recent historical examples provided by the 
campaigns in Poland, France, and Russia between 1939 and 1942.  It is fair to say that the 
struggle that occurred from the autumn of 1943 to the winter of 1944 to figure out the 
relationships among the First U.S. Army Group and ETOUSA, the COMZ, and the Allied 
combined headquarters would have been immensely simplified if the authors of FM 100-15 had 
been able to include a bit more substantive material.  
The last chapter of great interest at the theater or joint level was the one devoted to air 
operations.  It was so surprisingly balanced a treatment of air power that one may wonder if the 
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senior leaders of the Army Air Force completely agreed with what it said.  The chapter remained 
consistent with the emphasis on air superiority seen throughout the entire document and 
suggested that bombardment aircraft employed against existing enemy aircraft, and the factories 
that produced them, was the best method to achieve it.49  The best way to defend against enemy 
air power was to destroy its means to regenerate.  But air power also provided air defense and 
close air support, and a tactical air force (unit) could not afford to specialize in one mission set at 
the expense of the other two.50  The manual was perfectly clear about who owned operational 
control of air power assigned to a theater – the theater commander.47 Transport aviation was 
mentioned as a powerful tool, both to deliver paratroopers and gliders behind the enemy, and to 
move critical supplies to the front.  The second section of the chapter tackled “air operations 
beyond the sphere of action of surface forces” and introduced subtle discontinuities with earlier 
entries in the air chapter and with FM 100-15 at large.  These striking-force missions would be 
directed by the commander of field forces or the theater commander and would consider enemy 
industrial capacity as a complex system.  Careful study might reveal vulnerable points in the oil, 
power, or aircraft industry at various nodes – production, distribution, and storage.51  The senior 
commander selected the sector on which to focus and air experts picked the individual targets.   
It was best if the sector selected was both vital and vulnerable, or necessary to his war effort, but 
also quickly degraded by air attack.52  Regardless, analysis, attack, and assessment “may extend 
over a considerable period of time” and would necessitate a deliberate process to repeatedly 
gauge progress.  These five short paragraphs demonstrated a solid appreciation of the difference 
between tactics and operational art among air power thinkers in the U.S. Army.   
 
49 Ibid, 77-78.   
50 Ibid, 75, 76. 
51 Ibid, 78. 
52 Ibid, 79. 
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Luckily there was a second set of doctrinal references available to the enterprising staff 
officer that might help with warfare on the operational end of the spectrum.  British officers 
serving in a senior Allied headquarters would have been familiar with Field Service Regulations 
Volume 3, Operations – Higher Formations.  The British military published an updated version 
of the manual in January 1942; senior field-grade and flag officers were more likely to have seen 
the 1935 version.  It was a short document that shared many of the weaknesses of the American 
FM 100-15, but it also pointed out some helpful nuances of warfare in the modern industrial age.  
Like its U.S. counterpart, Higher Formations emphasized that warfare was a joint endeavor, but 
it also emphasized the primacy of policy over military preferences while pointing out that 
military action reinforced by economic, financial, and diplomatic actions tended to produce the 
best results.53  It went one step further in pointing out that in the British experience naval power 
tended to be decisive and that the Army would quite possibly play a supporting role to both the 
Navy and the Air Force. The Army might spend most of the war seizing or securing bases to 
allow the Navy and Air Force to strike and defeat the enemy.54  The British Army had learned its 
lesson from World War One: warfare was bigger than purely military subjects; senior leaders 
needed to inform civilian debate and to understand and influence industrial production and the 
utilization of the limited reserves of manpower.  The manual then pointed out that practical 
experience of war in the first half of the twentieth century suggested a couple of other 
conclusions.  Modern armies were mass armies, composed of conscripted citizens who learned, 
thought, and felt differently about military life than did their long-service professional officers 
and NCOs.  Commanders were reminded to lead them appropriately.  British doctrine advised 
 
53The War Office, Field Service Regulations Vol 3, Operations – Higher Formations (London: His Majesty’s 
Stationery Office, 1942), 2-3, 8-9. 
54 Ibid, 3. 
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military leaders to maintain an open mind and develop a broad set of interests, especially when it 
came to technical developments that might influence warfare.55 Like its American counterpart, 
British doctrine acknowledged the fused nature of air and ground operations and the importance 
of assigning missions but leaving the details of planning and control to subordinate commanders.  
It seems as if personal knowledge of and practical experience in managing the Empire were so 
widespread that Higher Formations took for granted the audience’s familiarity with mechanisms 
for coordinating the three services at the theater level and for synchronizing policy and military 
action.   
This manual offered what seems to be a self-evident statement, but upon reflection 
provided a brilliant framing mechanism for officers to use when thinking about warfare, and one 
that may have explained the different approaches to managing theater-level campaigns between 
the two allies.  It helped the British officer concentrate on the ancillary tasks necessary to make 
decisive battle a possibility, a subject ignored by U.S. operational doctrine.  An overseas 
expedition would be the normal role of a British force in war, and therefore warfare was about 
mobilization, movement to ports, mounting ships, and then conducting either an opposed landing 
or administrative debarkation.56  Operating away from the industrial base of Great Britain, 
armies had to establish and secure overseas bases and lines of communication before trying to 
maneuver against the enemy.  The details associated with establishing and running a base and 
lines of communication were contained in Manual of Movement (War), but at least the task and a 
word on where to learn more were mentioned in Higher Formations.  The fact that British 
doctrine spelled this sequence out while U.S. doctrine ignored it is striking.  This framework 
 
55 Ibid, 8-9. 
56 Ibid, 12. 
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required that British military leaders pay as much attention to deploying and sustaining the army 
overseas as to engaging in the fight itself.  Giving equal billing to getting the Army to the fight, 
typically after a very long voyage at sea, seems perfectly logical considering the history of the 
British Army since the wars of Louis XIV.  But the U.S. Army (and Marine Corps) had similar 
historical experiences, balancing ground campaigns in North America with expeditions to 
Mexico, Cuba, Central America, the Philippines, and France in 1917.  Based on the challenges 
the U.S. Army faced in mounting Torch, explicit references in doctrine might have helped to 
ensure that some organization was focused on figuring out the details associated with mounting 
and sustaining an overseas campaign before a crisis developed. 
Higher Command included a short chapter on how to go about preparing for a new 
campaign but this portion of the manual contained even fewer helpful insights than did its U.S. 
counterpart.  Both countries agreed that information on the environment and on one’s enemy was 
the critical prerequisite to building a campaign plan.  Again, because it would be an overseas 
expedition “the difficulty of this task and likelihood of success will be largely dependent upon 
preliminary arrangements and on the selection and preparation of a base or bases and lines of 
communication.”57  British doctrine did not dwell upon the issue, but preparing a campaign was 
different from conducting a battle.  The campaign included all the steps necessary to establish a 
military force close to the enemy, including a robust and well-defended base that could fuel and 
sustain extensive maneuver and battle.  It might be necessary to fight in the air and on the sea 
just to reach the enemy, and then to fight in all three domains to get ashore.  Drawing attention to 
the need to fight your way into the theater was powerful because it put movement, logistics, and 
joint integration on a par with the ground campaign.  FSR Vol. 3 gave no better advice for the 
 
57 Ibid, 11. 
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ground campaign itself than did FM 100-15.  Commanders maneuvered to put the enemy into an 
unfavorable position prior to initiating battle, forcing the enemy to fight on poor terrain or 
outnumbered; battle destroyed enemy formations and broke their will to resist.  By implication, 
the enemy would react to threats to their own line of supply, line of retreat, or other critical 
points, but the manual leaves it to the reader to imagine what these points might be.  Finally, the 
manual ignored the recuperative power of industrial armies and offered no means of pushing the 
enemy back and wearing down his strength beyond positional warfare.  Absent was any sort of 
overview of what could be learned from the joint and land-centric combat of the first eighteen 
months of World War Two in Europe and Africa and the implications for commanders and their 
staff at the highest levels.  British doctrine presented a more complete picture of everything that 
fell to the military to plan and execute, but it offered nothing about how to select and sequence a 
set of objectives.              
Higher Organizations clearly described the responsibilities of the theater-level staff and 
their relationship with both the combat armies and the organizations running the communications 
zone.  It offered useful context for an experienced commander wrestling with building a 
campaign plan, but it lacked the detail that less experienced leaders would probably find useful.  
It was too tactical and too narrowly focused on enemy forces.  It ignored the fact that some 
worthwhile objectives might have nothing to do with enemy forces.  Finally, the manual painted 
too harmonious a picture of interaction between the ground community and the air power 
enthusiasts.  By June 1944 the officers in SHAEF would have moved well beyond the 
generalities offered by either manual; Higher Formations was probably the less relevant of the 
two manuals aimed at senior-level commanders and their staffs.    
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FM 100-5 Operations was probably the most widely read manual among the U.S. 
professional officer corps, but it was also the least relevant to the challenges of serving at the 
theater and joint level.  The manual was a core element of the professional education provided at 
Leavenworth, and it introduced majors to an environment beyond the single service or branch 
that had dominated the first phase of their careers.  Covering combined arms operations at the 
regiment, division, and corps levels, 100-5 was the first document that might have integrated and 
sequenced close combat with all of the preliminary and supporting activities necessary to get to 
that point and then succeed.  But the manual completely ignored the interplay between logistics 
and maneuver, referring readers to FM 100-10 for guidance on support of forces in the field. 
FM 100-5 got an overdue update in 1939, but this edition was savaged by the field, and 
BG McNair used the resources available at Fort Leavenworth and the Command and General 
Staff College to produce the May 1941 version.58  It was a large volume of some 281 pages, 
focused largely at the division level and below.  A disclaimer at the front advised that 100-5 was 
one of a three-part set that must be studied as a whole; administrative aspects of operations were 
covered by FM 100-10 FSR Administration. The first portion of the manual was helpful because 
it explained the division of missions and tasks among the various branches and services; the 
average field artillery major probably had no idea of the exact division of tasks required to 
maintain and run a military railroad, but FM 100-5 captured the current line of thought. 59  The 
document missed an opportunity to present a more comprehensive vision of operations in the 
 
58 See Chapter Three of Walter E. Kretchik, U.S. Army Doctrine: From the American Revolution to the War on 
Terror (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2011) for the story of FM 100-5’s evolution between the two world 
wars.   
59 War Department, FM 100-5 Field Service Regulations Operations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1941), 15.  There was overlap and confusion within the manual, and with practice in the field.  Who exactly 
was responsible for what in getting a rail line up and running would haunt the U.S. Army from North Africa to 
France. 
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section covering troop movement by rail and air (the 1944 update would add movement by sea).  
But the focus was on administrative organization and control of march elements and not on what 
was necessary to synchronize ground elements arriving in a theater using various means of 
transportation and then to move forward into an attack.  Here was a missed opportunity to talk 
about the lulls between action and inaction and why those lulls occurred.  This would have been 
the perfect place to mention how to keep a regiment or division effective through a grueling 
campaign and to how shortages of material might affect the tactical options available.  But it was 
presented as if long-distance movement occurred in a vacuum, isolated from combat, and as if 
the tactical commander enjoyed almost limitless possibilities constrained only by the terrain and 
the enemy.  The idea that supply shortages might slow or stop a movement, preclude effective air 
and artillery support, or preclude the participation of some elements of the friendly ground force 
was inconceivable to the U.S. Army on the eve of its entry in the war.  Here the first seeds of 
ignoring the criticality of logistics were planted.    
The heart of FM 100-5 was devoted to the offense, the defense, retrograde movements, 
and special operations.  If there was any doubt as to the goal of operations, the manual made 
crystal clear that offensive action decided the outcome of campaigns, and the purpose of attacks 
was to destroy enemy military formations.  Objectives, generally given as easily identified 
terrain features, existed to compel the enemy to fight, preferably at a disadvantage.60  100-5 
repeated 100-15 in advising the commander to “concentrate in a direction where success will 
insure the attainment of the objective” and to use only the minimal force necessary elsewhere.61  
Only at the end of the discussion about attacks against an organized position does the manual 
 
60 Ibid, 97.   
61 Ibid, 97. 
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introduce the concept that battles might last days or even weeks, and that the planning staff must 
consider how to sustain offensive operations in the face of enemy reinforcements, friendly 
casualties and supply shortages, and the limits of human endurance. 
FM 100-5 was republished in June 1944 with minor additions and changes, adding about 
forty pages to the length.  Nothing fundamental changed, suggesting the Army considered the 
earlier version of 100-5 essentially sound and saw little value in a more significant overhaul of 
the document.  The new version added a chapter devoted to air power, and commentary on sea 
movement and amphibious operations was added.  Airborne operations were covered in greater 
detail, and a short chapter was added to address non-divisional armor and tank destroyer units 
and considerations for their employment.   Other additions showed that the Army was learning 
from its combat experience.  First, combat formations lost effectiveness over time as they 
suffered casualties and supply shortages, and this created the need for tactical pauses during 
which replacements and supplies would be integrated and formations retrained.62  Missing was 
any specific guidance on how to avoid or minimize supply shortages, but just the warning that 
combat leaders must consider the implications of a less than perfect logistical situation was a 
dramatic improvement.  Second, it was made clear that it would be dangerous to issue combat 
orders that contained too much detail or tried to project guidance too far into the future.63  Just as 
with the rest of the manual, it was left up to the imagination of the reader what might be a good 
rule of thumb to follow at the regimental, division, and corps levels.  Nervous young 
commanders and staff officers were always left with the question “but how exactly am I to do 
this” as they read the manual.  Examples were short on details: how long you could expect an 
 
62 War Department, FM 100-5 Field Service Regulations Operations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1944), 38.   
63 Ibid, 39-41. 
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engagement to last, what attack frontages a unit might occupy under different conditions, what 
depth one might defend or expect the enemy to defend, and how the ranges of specific weapon 
systems played into these factors.  FM 100-5 made you consider the right things, but without 
practical experience you had no idea which methods worked best to solve the challenges you 
would face in combat.  Sadly, training at the tactical level did not add much clarity because it 
was too hard to replicate and assess the effects of various weapons.  FM 100-5 was probably the 
most widely read official publication among combat leaders in the U.S. Army, but it was largely 
irrelevant above the division level and failed to address fundamental aspects of operations.  It 
clearly reinforced the U.S. tendency to focus on tactics, close combat, the offensive, and enemy 
formations rather than on presenting operations as a wider range of interconnected activities. 
  FM 100-10, In its Many Versions64  
 
The two fields – operations and administration – into which military activity is 
divided are obviously interlocking.  They are separated in Field Service 
Regulations only for convenience of discussion.  It is the function of command to 
unite the strategical or tactical plan and the administrative plan into a harmonious 
whole…. A study of operations of large units in former wars shows that 
frequently failures initially attributed to faulty strategical or tactical plans were in 
reality caused by administrative deficiencies.65  
 
Command at the division, army, and theater levels included the responsibility to merge 
tactical and administrative realities into a harmonious whole.66  But how?  Officers and non-
commissioned officers from the line branches had almost no practical experience with higher-
level logistics and personnel management.  Technical services and branches with one foot in 
 
64 Upon its entry into the war, the U.S. Army used a version first published in December 1940.  Minor changes were 
added on 1 April 42 and 2 June 42.  A new version was published in November 1943.  
65 War Department, FM 100-10 Field Service Regulations Administration (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1943), iii. 
66 Based upon the doctrine within FM 100-10, FM 100-5, and FM 100-15.  Corps were only responsible for 
collecting and forwarding the administrative reports from attached separate battalions, regiments, groups, and 
divisions.  The army group was too new and untested a concept for U.S. doctrine to address yet.     
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each camp, like the engineers, had very little practical operational experience in the field, at least 
until 1943.  Both communities could only hope that written doctrine, supplemented by the 
personal experience of their instructors, might offer helpful suggestions on how to approach 
similar situations once out in the field.  Capstone sustainment doctrine was supposed to offer a 
bridge between the practical experience and limitations of the two communities.  If doctrine and 
education offered no useful starting point and provided no practical tools to assess the 
components and relative merit of various potential actions one hoped would solve a problem, 
then it was not achieving its primary purpose.  Unfortunately for the U.S. Army, it is extremely 
difficult to write good military doctrine, and even harder to maintain its relevance over long 
stretches dominated by garrison activities while technology and weapons continued to evolve.  
FM 100-10 was limited in value because of all of these limitations, and thus it offered very little 
of practical value for senior staff officers in North Africa and Europe.      
FM 100-10 had been revised repeatedly during the 1940s; the December 1940 edition 
was amended three times before a new version was published in November 1943.  There was 
much continuity between the 1940 and 1943 versions – perhaps too much.  Other than 
reorganizing the table of contents and adding about thirty-five pages, the 1943 edition offered 
little based on the practical experience gained during two years of operations in the Pacific and 
Mediterranean.  The U.S. Army had collected and shared a staggering amount of written material 
on what was working and failing in the various theaters during the first two years of the war.  
This body of work included explanations of the organizational structure and the duties and 
responsibilities of U.S. and British high-level service and joint-combined commands, an 
acknowledged weakness of the pre-war professional education system.  Summaries of lessons 
learned, reports from external observation teams, and newly written standing operating 
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procedures (SOPs) all pointed to areas where these high-level organizations had initially 
struggled and outlined the procedures that they had developed that seemed to work under field 
conditions.  None of this material, or even the suggestion that important questions on 
organization and process still gripped the U.S. Army, made it into the new version of the manual.  
U.S. military leaders were locked in a battle over organization, control of logistical planning, and 
the proper ratio between combat and sustainment forces when FM 100-10 was published in 
November 1943.  Definitive guidance captured in an official War Department document, even if 
it did not represent the best current practice, would have been useful in reestablishing the 
institutional baseline and bringing new officers up to date on the prevailing thoughts among the 
Army leadership.  Instead, the new FM 100-10 read as if two years of operations in the 
Mediterranean and Pacific offered no insights about theater organization or strategic and 
operational logistics.  The arguments over the best way to man and employ NATOUSA and 
ETOUSA remained compartmentalized among a few dozen senior officers in Washington and 
Europe.  
The lack of meaningful change in or additions to FM 100-10 between 1940 and 1943 is 
all the more striking because there was contemporary evidence that the U.S. Army knew there 
were important gaps in doctrine and professional education for staff officers.  In early 1943 MG 
Lee pressed Eisenhower to authorize a course for combined logistics planners to be held in 
London to address the gaps in knowledge and performance that had been identified during the 
lead up to Torch.  MG Karl Truesdale, the commandant of the Command and General Staff 
College, had dispatched COL Henry to visit ETOUSA and AFHQ in November 1942 in order to 
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assess how well Leavenworth was preparing staff officers for service overseas.67  The inspection 
revealed that special staff officers did not know how to do their jobs, especially those serving in 
senior-level commands.   
Leavenworth had already added an eight-week course back in summer 1942 that was 
aimed specifically at service officers selected for duty with base section, SOS, and joint-
combined headquarters.  COL Henry’s inspection tour, as well as the written observations from 
other service and ASF investigative teams, helped refine the curriculum.  This SOS Staff Course 
graduated 200-300 students per cycle, for a total of 1,621 officers over the course of the war. 68  
It was better than ignoring the problem, but insufficient to make much of a dent in the shortfall 
of trained staff officers.  Another avenue that would have helped officers who could not attend 
the course would have been a new doctrinal reference designed to address the problems COL 
Henry discovered at the end of 1942.  This material might also have been included in the 
November 1943 version of FM 100-10, but, for whatever reason, the U. S. Army did not attempt 
to leverage doctrine to help with this issue.   
 In both editions of FM 100-10, about a third of the text addressed theater-level 
organization and control as well as which means of transportation were primary.  The authors of 
the manual understood what should be addressed; they just struggled to offer practical options to 
address the different problems faced in the Pacific, North Africa, and the Mediterranean.  The 
theater commander was recognized as the indispensable link between Washington and the field.  
The War Department established priorities, first among various Lend-Lease recipients, and then 
within the various elements of the U.S. Army.  The ASF managed production and distribution 
 
67 SOS C&S Notes, 1 Nov 43.  RG 498, UD 578, Box 3882, ADM 455.  Truesdale did not mention the full name of 
COL Henry.   
68 Schifferle, 159-160.  The course ran from the summer of 1942 to the spring of 1944.     
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out of the zone of the interior, while the SOS or COMZ moved supplies from various theater 
ports to the army or army group rear area.  Finally, combat forces employed the material to 
destroy the enemy.  The theater staff oversaw the actions of three principal subordinate elements 
-- the “army commander, the air force commander, and the communications zone commander” --   
excluding the “theater air force and…troops held in theater reserve.”69  In a large, mature theater 
the commander usually divided his operating space into a combat zone and a communications 
zone.  The combat zone was further divided to create an army service area, sort of a COMZ 
within the army (or army group) combat area.  Doctrine remained vague on where exactly to 
draw this imaginary line between combat and support units, but it did acknowledge that 
continuing to make this decision as the theater grew was a vital task for the theater commander.  
The manual stated that the theater headquarters should be located near the boundary between the 
combat and communications zone.  
 
 
69 Ibid, 13. 
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Figure 1.1: Notional organization of a theater of operation from FM 100-10 
  
 Next, 100-10 tackled the idea of a chief of each technical service.  This was a confusing 
concept for most laymen, and it was foreign to most combat arms officers who had grown up 
working at the division level and below.  There were eight services: chemical warfare, ordnance, 
transportation corps, quartermaster, finance, medical, inspector general, and judge advocate.  
There were also arms and branches that had service functions, to include the army air forces, 
corps of engineers, signal corps, corps of military police, the armored force, and tank-destroyer 
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force.70  Further complicating matters, the power and authority of these entities evolved as the 
war progressed.  Service chiefs in the U.S. Army had significant bureaucratic and fiscal authority 
during peacetime.  When chiefs of service were assigned to operational commands, their 
presence almost guaranteed a battle for control over their technical area of expertise with 
coordinating, or general, staff officers (the G1 through G6) and subordinate commanders.  Each 
theater commander would have a chief of transportation, a chief of quartermasters, and so forth, 
each with a specific charge:  
The principal duty of a chief of service is planning.…provid[ing] information and 
technical advice to the commander and to his general and special staffs, keeping 
them constantly informed as to the condition, capabilities, and requirements of his 
services.  He develops the commander’s decision into plans for his service and 
drafts the necessary orders for approval and issue by the theater commander.  His 
advance planning includes estimates of the requirements in supplies, equipment, 
personnel, and establishment to meet further needs.  He formulates and 
recommends…a general plan of operation for his service.  He exercises general 
technical supervision over his service as a whole.71     
 
 Theater service chiefs had a direct line back to the chief of service in the United 
States, and the Army Service Force command that supervised them, so that he could 
develop “new, improved, or special types of supplies and equipment to meet the 
particular requirements of the theater of operations.”72   
 It was a system that might produce synergy and solve problems faster than the 
traditional command and staff structure would allow, but it could also spread confusion 
and competing priorities throughout the theater.  FM 100-10 explicitly acknowledged that 
 
70 Perhaps the most fundamental requirement of a service, and what made it different from a branch, was the 
responsibility for managing the supplies and equipment assigned to that organization.  Any attempt to delineate 
exactly how arms, services, and branches were different from one another is impossible based upon the exceptions 
to the rules, and the changing nature of these sub-elements of the War Department over time.   
71 Ibid, 13-14. 
72 Ibid, 14. 
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the chief of service would have to travel throughout the theater to do his job and could 
task field units to provide technical reports.  It empowered these chiefs to direct training, 
establish administrative procedures, and supervise matters of general routine, and to 
engage in periodic correspondence with and conduct frequent conferences with higher 
and lower units.  The doctrine did make clear that command authority to establish policy 
and issue orders remained with the commander and his coordinating staff; but adequately 
supervising a dozen service chiefs was a difficult task.  The tendency would be either to 
rubber stamp products developed by the technical staff sections or else to review and 
coordinate their work properly, thus bringing the pace of staff integration to a crawl.   
Important technical sections often had a high-ranking officer in charge, and their staffs 
might very well outnumber the assigned strength of the G4 staff of the controlling 
headquarters.  In North Africa in the early summer of 1943, both the engineer and 
military railroad sections under AFHQ were supervised by brigadier generals, and the 
U.S. engineer staff outnumbered the U.S. element of the G4 staff by half a dozen 
soldiers.73  The U.S. and British G4s were confronted with the challenge of supervising 
subordinates with equal or perhaps superior operational experience and a more robust 
(and focused) staff, and yet doctrine offered no advice on how to manage this situation. 
 A section titled “Fundamental Considerations” addressed administrative planning 
and the provision of supply within a typical theater command and control structure.  
Supplies flowed to the front lines based upon two demand signals.  First, there was an 
automatic push of consumables based upon approved planning figures; this flow was 
based on the strength of the unit and the general nature of operations it was conducting.  
 
73 NATOUSA Commander Unclassified Decimal File, RG 492, NARA II. 
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Food, fuel, ammunition, and replacement equipment were directed towards the army 
dumps based upon these daily average consumption rates.  The push system was 
supplemented by a more focused pull system, which was driven by explicit requests from 
the forward combat echelon, typically triggered by heavy casualties, heavy consumption 
rates, or special requirements generated by a unique mission.74  If the supply service 
could not meet all demands made by forward elements, commanders determined 
priorities and established ceilings for items that were short across the entire theater.  
Table 1.1 shows this system in a bit more detail. 
Class of Supply Field Army’s POC Authorization Based On: 
I (Food) Regulating Officer Push Based on Headcount 
II (Equipment) COMZ Pull (Lost or Damaged) 
III (POL) Regulating Officer Push Based on # of Vehicles 
IV (Building Material) Theater HQ Pull (Need) 
V (Ammunition) 
Restricted IV 
Regulating Officer based on 
theater issued credits 
Controlled Supply Rate, “unit 
of fire” by ammo/gun type 
Table 1.1: The U.S. Army supply system in WW II 
 
Resupply in the field was a bit more complex than the system described above 
because some supplies were used, maintained, requisitioned, and provided by the branch 
or service that tended to be the major customer.  Vehicle repair parts were requested and 
provided by ordnance -- the units most likely to install them.  Engineers handled most of 
the class IV and class V items related to emplacing and removing obstacles, such as mine 
fields, barbed wire, or road craters.  Signal units stocked telephone wire, radios, and 
telephone and telegraph equipment.  There was doctrinal guidance, and there were 
 
74 Such as the requirement to conduct an amphibious landing, cross a major river, or link up with airborne troops. 
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established norms.  But there were discrepancies between various theaters and commands 
within that theater.  Staying on top of exactly what supplies were needed, available, and 
in motion became much harder because so many agencies were involved. 
This system functioned upon an assumption that combat units needed to travel 
light, living almost hand-to-mouth, confident that the supply agencies would deliver what 
was needed every day or so.  Armies maintained reserve depots with a few days’ worth of 
stock, and these depots were topped off periodically by army-level transportation units 
that would travel back to the closest railhead, forward depot, or base section in the 
COMZ.  Doctrine explained that in a pinch the COMZ commander could push supplies 
all the way forward to army or even division depots and dumps, but in general this was 
not standard practice.  If a unit needed something and that requirement was validated by 
the chain of command, the item was released from the closest depot.  If the item was not 
on hand, the requesting unit was given a credit (promise) for future supply once the item 
arrived in the area.  These credits could be called upon in the immediate future against 
any supporting depot all the way back to a base section, which triggered a delivery 
process managed by the COMZ.  Credits were most often issued to control the 
expenditure of ammunition.  
  The second unifying concept centered on responsibility for administrative 
planning.  The obvious starting point was the theater campaign plan, which announced 
objectives and the general line of action to be taken to accomplish them.75  This would be 
followed by an administrative estimate produced jointly by the G1 and G4 to examine 
replacements, morale, prisoners of war, civil affairs, supply, evacuation, and 
 
75 Ibid, 26. 
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transportation; it consolidated the efforts of all the services working in the theater.  The 
administrative plan flowed from the estimate and included “a statement as to whether the 
desired line of action can be supported and, if not, what deficiencies will exist and how, if 
at all, they may be remedied.”76  The last step was for the commander to consider all of 
the estimates provided by his staff and subordinate commands and then make a decision.  
Doctrine captured the U.S. consensus that the commander might disregard warnings 
presented by the administrative staff, that he might find additional resources to improve 
the logistical situation, or that he might change the scheme of maneuver to make resupply 
easier.  Although not explicitly stated, there was an inherent assumption that the 
operational staff would confer with the administrative staff and produce options that were 
logistically feasible.  This assumption was valid only if the G4 was informed and 
supported by the various service chiefs and subordinate administrative commands.  The 
G4 could advise the G3 on what was sustainable only if he had a clear understanding of 
what was available in theater, the means to employ that material, and good historical data 
on how quickly modern military forces burned through supplies.  Based on the 
complexity of the administrative system and lack of operational experience within the 
U.S. Army in early 1943, these were dangerous assumptions. 
 The physical division of the theater into sub-elements was another attempt to 
clarify duties and responsibilities within the administrative sphere.  There were generally 
two approaches: establish a rear boundary to the combat zone and stand up a 
communications zone and associated command behind it, or else empower a service of 
supply (SOS) organization working in the rear of the combat zone.  In either case, a large 
 
76 Ibid, 27. 
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and well-resourced staff would control the forces assigned to manage and transport 
supplies, repair broken equipment, move replacements forward and wounded soldiers 
back, establish rest and training camps, and oversee the repair and use of rail, ports, 
airfields, and warehouses, and assist with supporting friendly local government or the 
forces imposing martial law in occupied hostile territory.   
 One shortcoming of this concept was the absence of a sourcing pool for these 
various service commands.  Where exactly was the U.S. Army to find the core elements 
for these base sections, service of supply headquarters, depot managers, and traffic 
control and coordination nodes needed across the communications zone?  This had not 
been a significant issue in World War One because the Americans needed to establish 
only one line of communication, and many of the technical details were handled by the 
French.  But by November 1943 these personnel requirements had exploded across four 
theaters with numerous sub-theaters and overseas garrisons.  Much like the table of 
organization and sourcing pool for AFHQ or SHAEF, manning the base sections, SOS, 
and COMZ in North Africa was a pickup game.  It would have been helpful if updated 
doctrine had mentioned the general methods used to address these problems during the 
first portion of the war, and the advantages and disadvantages of each solution.77       
 
77 Base sections seemed to be the easiest problem to solve because unit templates existed for the component parts.  
There was a standard package of service troops necessary to repair and run a port with its surrounding skirt of 
depots, and all of the companies, battalions, and regiments to perform these tasks already existed.  All that was 
necessary was to appoint a commander, typically a colonel or brigadier general, equipped with a small staff cobbled 
together from the War Department, zone of the interior, representatives from the port operating units, and perhaps 
the theater headquarters.  SOS and COMZ was a tougher challenge, and this lack of manpower led to most of the 
examples of dual-hatting that caused so much confusion about the chain of authority.  It was inevitable that when a 
new SOS or COMZ was formed, the personnel would have to come from base sections or the theater staff.  Because 
backfills of the right rank and experience were not available, these officers ended up working at two levels at the 
same time.     
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The SOS or COMZ commander traditionally established a number of sub-
divisions to empower initiative and clarify responsibilities.  The most common was the 
base section; however, FM 100-10 did not explain the purpose and mission of such an 
organization.  The base section was a command assigned a geographic area containing a 
linked system of ports, depots, and transportation infrastructure.  The command was 
designed to supervise and direct the reception and storage of bulk items arriving from the 
zone of the interior (the U.S. or U.K.) and then to push that material forward to combat 
units when directed.  It might also contain the means to extract raw materials or 
manufacture finished goods.  Base sections were likely to start off as advanced sections; 
as the theater deepened and matured, the COMZ might eventually have base, 
intermediate, and advanced sections.  The differences among them and the advantages 
and disadvantages of standing them up were left to the reader’s imagination.   
Eventually each COMZ, at the lowest level, consisted of dozens or even hundreds 
of depots, which were structured as branch facilities for one type of unit or as general 
facilities for two or more types of units.78  If a depot was in the intermediate zone, it 
answered to the intermediate zone commander, simultaneously keeping its chief of 
service informed and following his procedural guidance.  General depots were trickier 
because they demanded the reconciliation of various methods of running a warehouse, all 
without the advantages of a preexisting staff or habitual relationships among the 
constituent units assigned to that depot.  In a perfect world, all depots, regardless of 
 
78 For example, a branch depot might be an ordnance depot with ammunition and spare parts, while a general depot 
contained spare parts (ordnance), clothing (quartermaster), signal equipment, and obstacle material (engineers).  A 
branch or service depot would be manned and run by its associated personnel.  A general depot created the need to 
form a new command organization that merged the various branches and services present at that location, although 
the heart would be provided by the quartermaster service.   
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service or battlefield location, would follow the same general reporting and operating 
guidelines.  Since this would require perfect coordination between the geographic chain 
of command (sections within the COMZ) and the functional chain of command (by 
service and branch), it was highly unlikely to be the case.  As we will see, the challenge 
to maintain uniform procedures and to enforce discipline among a dozen service chiefs 
running depots sprinkled throughout numerous geographic commands hindered effective 
logistical support to the Army in Great Britain and France.  The very structure of the 
system almost guaranteed breakdowns under field conditions. 
 The static supply system centered around depots managed by base, intermediate, 
or advanced sections, but the transportation system and responsibility of tracking material 
once it was on the move belonged to the regulating stations.  This was a tried-and-true 
system with precedent back to the American Civil War and the Wars of German 
Unification.79  Regulating stations were both physical locations on the ground as well as 
command and control nodes with important duties and responsibilities.  According to FM 
100-10, the purpose of a regulating station was “to maintain regularity and smooth 
movement of supplies and replacements to the combat zone and evacuation of casualties, 
prisoners, and salvage from the combat zone.  It prevents congestion and permits 
maneuver of supplies and troops in rear of the combat forces.”80   Regulating stations 
were primarily concerned with rail traffic, but they might also supervise motorized, 
maritime, and aerial lines of transportation.  Regulating stations were placed at the 
boundaries between field army rear areas and the COMZ, where lines of communication 
 
79 Major Raymond G. Moses, “The Organization and Operation of Military Railways” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: 
Command and General Staff School, 1931), 1-2.   
80 FM 100-10, 39. 
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intersected and tended to be within the geographical footprint of the COMZ advanced 
section, if one was activated.  FM 100-10 advised that under ideal conditions each army 
would have an aligned regulating station.  Each regulating station received large trains or 
convoys, confirmed the contents, broke them down into smaller elements if necessary, 
and then forwarded them to drop-off points established by the field army they supported.  
Regulating stations performed the same function for traffic headed out of the combat 
zone, and they needed adequate facilities, repair parts, and mechanics to keep trains and 
trucks moving.  So far so good. 
 The harder mission was to stay abreast of the changing supply demands of combat 
units.  Trains and trucks dispatched from the COMZ might take anywhere from a day to a 
week to reach the rear of the field army; meanwhile priorities had probably changed.  It 
was up to the regulating officer to track the tactical situation and react to new guidance 
from theater, the COMZ, or army staffs, and he was equipped with a staff to do so, to 
include Military Railway Service personnel and liaison officers from each service 
section.  It was understood that the regulating officer would pull apart trains or trucks and 
reroute supplies to new locations if the changing tactical situation warranted.  To whom 
exactly the regulating officer would listen if a conflict of guidance arose was not 
addressed; but, due to the physical presence of representatives from all the services and 
communications links with as many as four echelons of the COMZ and army or army 
group staffs, this conflict was sure to develop.  The chaos was compounded when 
convoys arrived with no manifests of cargo, or with incorrect ones, or with fuzzy 
instructions on who should receive the supplies.  The regulating station did not have the 
storage space or the personnel to sort through crates and boxes figuring out exactly what 
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each truck or car was carrying – the driving imperative was to push supplies towards the 
combat zone and what was hoped to be the most pertinent depot.  Regulating stations 
were created to manage rail traffic, but by 1943 senior leaders in the ASF realized that 
roads would become more and more important to theater-level resupply, and FM 100-10 
acknowledged that additional stations might be necessary at major road choke points as 
well. 
 The manual acknowledged the criticality of transportation at the theater level by 
dedicating an entire chapter to the subject, addressing rail, motor, inland waterways, and 
aerial means of moving large quantities of supplies.  At the risk of being redundant or 
further confusing chains of authority and responsibility, another method for subdividing 
each transportation network was introduced.  But by presenting a consolidated view of 
how various means of transportation might mesh into a theater-level distribution system, 
this chapter helped clarify concepts presented earlier in the manual and hinted at areas of 
overlap likely to emerge in practice.  All rail transportation in a theater was the 
responsibility of the chief of transportation (the theater-level service chief of the 
transportation corps), sometimes called the director of railways, who was likely to 
appoint a subordinate as the general manager of the Military Railway Service.  FM 100-
10 stated that “[d]irect control is decentralized to the commander of the communications 
zone.”81  This rail network was then to be broken down into a number of divisions 
charged with running operations and maintaining the infrastructure, all answering to the 
general manager and not to regional base section commanders.  It was likely that the rail 
service would also have ordnance units assigned to repair rolling stock and engines and 
 
81 Ibid, 49.   
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construction engineer units to fix and add to existing rail lines, support facilities, and 
bridges.  It was also reasonable to conclude that signal units would be available to 
emplace, maintain, and operate radios and wire-based networks.  This rail system was 
laid out in beautiful detail and simplicity; the problem was that the manual did not 
address how rail management meshed with all the other potential chains of supervision 
and oversight.  In a similar way, lines of communication on land and water were 
described.  Each method of transportation demanded its own structure for control, 
reporting, repair, and stockage of essential materials, plus an array of companies and 
battalions to maintain and operate the system.   
The relationship between the chief of transportation and the director of the 
Military Rail Service was not addressed.  Some guidance on the division of responsibility 
between the two -- as well as their relationship with any regulating stations, base or 
advanced section commanders, and the COMZ and theater-level coordinating staff 
officers -- would have been helpful and might have prevented some of the friction in 
North Africa and France that was to follow.  A certain level of complexity and overlap 
was to be expected; there was no clear-cut way to run three or four major transportation 
systems, supervise millions of service troops, and deliver tens of thousands of tons of 
supplies daily while reacting to the changing realities of tactical developments and 
weather.  The system was going to be messy from time to time, and too many people 
might be trying to fix one problem while another remained unaddressed.  FM 100-10 did 
not stay abreast of recent operational experience.  Viable solutions, recurring problems, 
and the War Department’s preferred approaches remained confined to a small circle.  
Learning occurred by word of mouth, and organizations and individuals not in the loop 
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stumbled across the same problems repeatedly, triggering the slow development of 
working procedures through trial and error.  Finally, arguments over organization and 
process persisted long past the point when they might have been addressed in time to 
produce a different result.  Effective doctrine could have pointed out the priorities, 
organizations, and relationships preferred by the War Department so that units in active 
theaters could get on with making the system work rather than debating the basics.         
 Sustaining millions of men across hundreds of miles was obviously easier if a robust 
distribution infrastructure already existed and was preserved from battle damage as much as 
possible.  Warehouses, rail and motor repair facilities, coal mines, fuel stores, bridges, rail lines, 
and rolling stock were all mentioned specifically as key assets for logisticians to find, repair, and 
use.  U.S. thoughts about theater sustainment had not kept pace with the level of destruction that 
friendly bombers might inflict upon this infrastructure, and there was no written guidance about 
the pros and cons of targeting it in the first place.  After reading the first third of FM 100-10, a 
staff officer would understand the complexity associated with distributing tens of thousands of 
tons of supplies on a daily basis but would probably not be prepared to present a compelling 
argument as to why parts of the enemy’s infrastructure should be preserved for future use even at 
the risk of letting the enemy continue to use them. 
 
 The Manual of Movement, 1933 
The Manual of Movement is an odd document to have emerged from the British military, 
an organization not known for prescriptive, high-level direction on how to operate.  It was almost 
twice the length of FSR Volume III, very thorough in its descriptions, and generally adhered to 
by Gale and other senior logisticians in the British Army.  The manual described how to 
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accomplish the specific tasks associated with large-scale transportation and deployment in great 
detail, going into specifics by stage, to include the interaction required among various agencies 
and the transfer of cargo among different means of transport.  The manual is something of a cook 
book, aimed primarily at the novice, offering techniques, methods, and illustrative examples.  
Motor transport was acknowledged as a new and critical addition to the transportation arsenal, 
but the potential that aerial resupply might eventually provide a similar advantage was not 
mentioned.  The manual benefited from the deeply engrained understanding among the British of 
the relationship in any expeditionary campaign between logistics and operational possibilities, 
stating on page one that “…the size of the force which can be employed and the scope of the 
operations will depend on the existing and potential capacity of the lines of communication.”82  
If there was any confusion about the relationship between logistics and maneuver, the 
introduction clearly stated that “…the capacity of a movement system is often a limiting factor in 
the conduct of operations.  Limited capacity, in fact, stands out as a marked characteristic of 
military movement agencies in war, and consequently the utilization to the best advantage of 
such resources as may be available is of the highest importance.”83  Movement was a long and 
complex cycle that progressed from mobilization, movement to British ports, a sea voyage to the 
theater, movement to the front, and then the flow of replacements and supplies to maintain that 
combat power once in contact with the enemy.  After establishing this framework in the 
introductory chapter of the book, the manual was then organized to cover each step in detail.   
What followed next was what was arguably the most valuable chapter of the book -- the 
presentation of four interrelated and interacting principles that ideally governed each stage of the 
 
82 Manual of Movement (War) (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1933), 1.   
83 Ibid, 3. 
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expeditionary movement cycle.  These were not overly simplistic catch-phrases, but the 
distillation of hard-won wisdom that provided a framework used to organize all the subsequent 
chapters.  The first principle was centralization of control; one well informed and adequately 
connected headquarters had to direct the entire transportation machine.  Only the theater or 
national GHQ had the information required to see the big picture – military and civilian – and 
therefore control was a military function.  “It is therefore impractical to delegate to subordinate 
commanders control of those parts of a connected system which lie in their areas.”84  Delegation 
worked well for combat units, but would not work in the realm of transportation.  Because the 
overall plan of campaign was likely to change often, so too would the output capacity of the 
various carrying agencies.  The sooner the logisticians knew about these changes the better, but 
security concerns would restrict access to this information, again calling for military control over 
the system.  It was critical that no matter how honorable their intentions, local authorities and 
troops must not interfere with the operation of this system.85  In order to manage this system, the 
GHQ had to understand the carrying capacity of the entire transportation network in detail, and 
the executive agent for the commander was his deputy quartermaster general.86 
The second principle, which was directly linked to the first, was the regulation of 
dispatches, or an operational extension of the idea of centralized control.87  This principle spelled 
out the fact that all decisions to load, haul, and unload cargo would be centrally managed; the 
 
84 Manual of Movement, 19. 
85 Ibid, 19. 
86 The intellectual linkage between the British model for controlling the transportation network within a theater and 
modern thoughts about how to best manage airpower is a direct one.  It is acknowledged that as long as two-way 
information is guaranteed it is the most efficient way to manage scarce but critical assets.  The U.S. Army did not 
approach a similar consensus over centralizing control over all means of transportation in one directorate of one 
supreme theater command until early 1945 at SHAEF assisted by Ross’ transportation section, which was notionally 
subordinated to ETOUSA and LTG Lee. 
87 Ibid, 20. 
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DQMG managed the prioritization of supply items paired with their means of transportation, and 
also had responsibility for confirming that the system was prepared to respond before beginning 
a movement.  This translated to ensuring that all three points (loading, transit and transfer nodes, 
unloading) associated with any movement were prepared to execute their duty, reducing 
surprises and delays.  If done correctly, this avoided congestion at any choke point.  Choke 
points were dangerous because of how quickly they created snags along the entire distribution 
chain, and were to be avoided or discovered and fixed as quickly as possible.  The British had 
learned to adjust the volume of demand to match capacity, rejecting the natural tendency of 
allowing combat organizations to list their demands and then trying to find ways to provide 
them.  Directly linked to this task was the requirement to establish and enforce priorities for the 
movement of material by each means of transportation available.  There would never be enough 
equipment to carry everything units wanted, making it doubly important to move the essentials 
first. 
This idea suggested the third principle, the even flow of material across the intertwined 
chains of the network.  A theater line of communications was a series of nodes and links, each 
with its own individual handling capacity.  Limiting factors at one location or within one system 
could not be magically overcome, and efforts to try to shove more material through the system 
than it could handle was actually counter-productive.  The goal was to maintain even and 
continuous movement in both directions while retaining a bit of flexibility for priority traffic as 
local emergencies arose.  This theme was emphasized repeatedly throughout following chapters 
– every distribution node and network had fixed constraints, and ignoring them tended to make 
things worse, not better.  The British system believed that the solution was to figure out the 
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constraints of the logistics system and work backwards from there – the size of the combat force 
and pace of projected operations was dictated by theater logistics.88  
The last principle was the importance of full utilization of carrying power.  
Transportation assets sitting idle along the route were wasted resources; quick turnaround was 
essential, and would logically flow from adherence to the first three principles.  Full loading was 
a second sub-set of the last principle, and past experience had taught the British Army that bulk 
and not weight was most often the limiting factor.89  It was also more efficient to practice 
movement over full distances, meaning long legs that avoided the need to handle the same cargo 
multiple times over a short period were best when possible.  Perhaps the most difficult guiding 
concept to achieve was the need to try to maintain uniform speed of movement in an aggregate 
sense.  Predictability in the volume of traffic at each node and along each link provided 
advantages to everyone involved.  This was easiest with rail traffic, and manageable with air 
resupply when the weather cooperated, but trucks presented the most difficult case.  The British 
hoped to avoid a situation where nothing arrived at a node for a matter of days, only to see a 
massive amount of material surge along the system and overwhelm a distribution point in a short 
time window. 
After describing the conceptual framework and four principles governing transportation, 
the Manual of Movement included an overview of the best way to organize for the mission.  A 
theater movement control team was formed from two main organizations: the movement section 
from within the GHQ DQMG directorate, and the transportation element of the War Office 
 
88 Gale had to teach this lesson to Eisenhower and his subordinate commanders in January 1943. 
89 The British and Americans would eventually prioritize commodity loading over full loading, but only after their 
overall transportation crisis had eased after the opening of Antwerp.   
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assigned to that theater.90  Experience had taught the British Army to insist upon rigid control by 
the GHQ over all movements from ports to the end of the rail line (called the railhead in their 
doctrine), but flexibility and decentralization were encouraged in managing distribution forward 
of the railheads.91  The War Office understand that in order for this conceptual structure to work, 
the theater DQMG had to control the two key subordinate functions – movement control and 
what they called maintenance, or the purposeful evaluation and prioritization of supply needs at 
the front.  Q Maintenance extracted and prioritized the supply shortages needed at the front, 
confirmed where those supplies were stockpiled, and then turned to Q Movement for the 
allocation and management of the various type of transportation required.  Q Movement also 
directly supervised any transportation troops (manning trains, trucks, and coastal or barge 
shipping) that transited more than one base command’s area.  The movement control 
organization was also the executive agent for implementing the theater prioritization process, and 
the manual elaborated that “they must explain the constraints to the other services and arrange 
for adjustments in demands.”92 
The manual went on to note that this system was predicated on reliable long-distance 
communication, standardized and disciplined reporting by combat and service units, and the 
ability to monitor and keep a program of long duration on track.93  The term “program” carried a 
very specific meaning in the British military, describing a long-term and gradual process 
designed to accomplish some major task.  Staff sections had to monitor progress carefully using 
 
90 Manual of Movement, 25-26.  This was similar to the U.S. concept where the transportation special staff section 
would work closely with the theater (ETOUSA or NATOUSA) coordinating staff, primarily the G4.  This logical 
arrangement was complicated when Ross and his OCOT was placed under Lee and the SOS chain of command in 
May 1942.  
91 Ibid, 27. 
92 Ibid, 28. 
93 Ibid, 40-41.   
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statistics, and recognize and take corrective measures should the program fall off-schedule.  The 
overall logistics plan, which consisted of a number of programs, unit lists, and projected 
operating locations, was to be published in two documents.  The overall concept of support was 
called the maintenance project, and the allocation of physical locations and facilities to the force 
was referred to as a key plan; both documents were revised periodically, and British officers 
often referred to a second, third, and even fourth key plan as changes and the operating area 
expanded.94  The manual wrapped up the chapter on overall organization and operation by 
stating that “As a general rule…nothing is sent up from the base to a force operating in the field 
unless it is first demanded from the front.”95  The exception was ammunition, which would be 
pushed forward based on historical consumption figures.  Because the push and pull demand 
signals would compete for the same transportation capacity, the Manual of Movement offered the 
suggestion that a command should conduct a “daily trains conference” at GHQ to work out the 
delivery plan.96   
As will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters, the senior logisticians of the British 
Army knew and tried to adhere to the principles and concepts threaded throughout the Manual of 
Movement.  When confronted by a sticky problem with operational-level logistics, Gale usually 
linked its solution back to some violated principle contained in this volume.  The administrative 
officers at 1st Army and 18th and 21st Army Groups shared the same perspective.  Senior British 
officers knew this doctrine, believed in the advantages conferred by following it, and attempted 
to teach younger, less experienced officers how to implement that guidance in the field.  Gale 
 
94 Manual of Movement, 59. 
95 Ibid, 90. 
96 Ibid, 92.  This is precisely what AFHQ initiated in mid-December 1942, although it was expanded to include all 
modes of transportation and not just trains.   
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was surprised and disappointed by the lack of a similar unifying vision, or at least adherence to 
one, within the U.S. Army in North Africa and France.   
 What other source documents existed in the 1940s that might have helped senior staff 
members better anticipate the challenges they would face in combat, particularly how to organize 
the highest-level staffs and integrate the differing priorities between the maneuver and logistics 
communities?  Did other manuals exist to help unify disparate communities within the U.S. 
Army and help them communicate with their British counterparts?  FM 101-5 Staff Officers’ 
Field Manual: The Staff and Combat Orders was something of the Leavenworth bible for 
succeeding as part of a general staff.97  Every graduate of CGSC would have been familiar with 
it, and many copies would have been floating around headquarters.  The purpose of the 
document was to establish the scope of duties for each special and general staff section during 
planning and execution.98  It also provided a template for orders and estimates by mission type 
and staff section.  This was a very helpful reference work for anyone working at the division-
level or above for the first time, but it also tended to reinforce the idea that military operations 
consisted of combat at the corps level and below and that everything else was either not very 
important or else easy enough to figure out without much help.  The second volume was a 
similar desk reference: FM 101-10 Staff Officers’ Field Manual: Organization, Technical and 
Logistics Data.99  The book served three main purposes: to break down the personnel and 
 
97 The U.S. Army used the version published in 1940 for the duration of the war. 
98 The general staff refers to the G1 through G4 and is also sometimes called the coordinating staff.  The special 
staff includes personal assistants to the commander (like the chaplain and inspector general) and service and branch 
chiefs and their assistants.  In theory each service and branch could provide a senior representative at the theater 
headquarters, but the traditional branches typically did not.   
99 This was a massive book of 358 pages; the most recent version was published in June 1941, six months before 
official U.S. involvement in the war.  Services and branches published supplements periodically throughout the war 
to update the data on U.S. unit composition.  All of these supplements would inevitably be a little out of date, but 
accurate enough for planning. 
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equipment composition of every unit in the U.S. Army; to provide technical data on a vast range 
of topics, including weapons, equipment, field engineer projects, and truck and rail carrying 
capacity; and to provide uniform planning factors to determine what it took to sustain various 
units in different types of combat.  It was not a manual you sat down to read from start to finish.  
Rather, you carried it in order to search out just about any fact needed in planning military 
operations.  But there were problems.  For example, the tables designed to estimate friendly 
casualties and to project the daily consumption of various supplies were based on data from 
France in 1917 and 1918 and proved to be extremely inaccurate for World War II combat.  A 
new version of the manual was not published until December 1944.  There would be near 
universal criticism of the G4 estimates used to prioritize the supplies sent to France during the 
first three months of Operation Overlord, estimates pulled from FM 101-10 supplemented by 
information shared by NATOUSA or based on the personal experience of officers that served in 
both theaters.  ASF leadership understood the problem but found it extremely difficult to extract 
data at the requisite level of detail from the combat theaters to update these tables. 
 Doctrine tends to get a bad reputation.  Published guidance tends to be criticized after the 
fact for one of two related mistakes.  The first sin is that of going into too much detail at the risk 
of being over-prescriptive, limiting free thinking and inviting dogma to displace critical analysis.  
Or doctrine is judged to be too vague, offering little of practical value to both experienced and 
inexperienced combatants confronting new circumstances.  The hardest bit to get right is how the 
combination of new technologies and weapons will be grouped into new formations and original 
methods of employment, and how the different approaches taken by participating nations will 
play out on the battlefield.  Allied doctrine during World War II is susceptible to two criticisms.  
First, the hard lessons learned from operations and combat during the Great War and during the 
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first half of World War Two were not adequately captured in the wave of updates to U.S. 
doctrine published in 1943 and 1944.  MG Littlejohn, the ETOUSA Quartermaster from 1942 to 
1945, wrote while preparing his input for the USFET General Board: 
We entered this campaign with very limited information, particularly in the 
logistical side from the last war.  It was only by having access to certain personal 
files and particularly the personal files of General DeWitt and a few others that I 
was able to gather together some bits of information to guide me in the planning 
and to gauge the QM task in this war.100 
 
Second, the manuals offered very little in the way of practical and concrete method for 
organizing a theater, planning campaigns, and sustaining mass industrial warfare.  If anything, 
U.S. doctrine introduced confusion by advocating a wide range of headquarters to supervise 
every conceivable function, without addressing how they would be resourced or how they would 
coordinate among one another.  The second shortfall was less excusable because it depended less 
on the enemy, terrain and weather, and new technologies.  It should have been relatively simple 
to explain how a theater staff interacted with their combat and communication zone counterparts 
to plan and control a campaign; but that was not the case, much to the detriment of operations in 
North Africa and France. 
 
100 Letter Littlejohn to Lee, 23 Aug 45.  ETOUSA QM Records, RG 498, UD 1089, Box 5122, NARA II.  Littlejohn 
was responding to the COMZ directive to submit topics for the USFET General Board process just getting started at 
this time.  LTG John L. DeWitt was an infantry officer who had established a reputation as an experienced 
quartermaster in World War One and during the inter-war period.  DeWitt served as the quartermaster for the 42nd 
ID and 1st Army in the Great War, and then served as the Quartermaster of the Army in 1930.  He went on to serve 
as the assistant commandant at CGSC, commandant of the Army War College between 1937 and 1939, and 
commandant of the Army-Navy Staff College from 1943 to 1946.  The combination of these three assignments 
afforded DeWitt the opportunity to influence a large portion of the mid-level logisticians in the U.S. military.  
DeWitt is more infamously known as the senior officer who recommended internment of Japanese Americans in 
1942 and executed the executive order to put it into effect as the IX Corps Area Commander with jurisdiction over 
California, Oregon, and Washington.   
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 Practical Operational Experience 
Doctrine was not the only source of insight into contemporary expeditionary campaigns 
and effective organizational techniques for a U.S. staff officer in the 1940s.  Moving beyond the 
strong institutional bias against trying to conduct amphibious operations resulting from their 
experiences during the Great War, the British military had expanded their appreciation for what 
contributed to successful ventures based upon three years of joint and combined operations by 
the summer of 1942.  Although these insights were not integrated into capstone British doctrine, 
they did inform the organization and approach taken by their highest military headquarters, and 
they did help the AFHQ become effective much faster than if it had been an exclusively 
American enterprise.  The experience gained by the Middle Eastern Command and Western 
Desert Force/8th Army from 1940 to 1942 was especially helpful and relevant.  One item of 
concern was just how intimidating Allied leaders found the thought of conducting an opposed 
landing, which led them to spend a lot of energy on the initial landing and to leave little time to 
think about what came next.  Although the U.S. Army amassed considerable first-hand 
experience in the Pacific and subsequently transferred battle-hardened commanders to the 
ETOUSA to lead corps in Normandy, these island operations did not offer many lessons beyond 
the tactical level for the Army participants.  Also, the smaller scale of battles in the Pacific made 
it easy for the generals who had served in North Africa and Italy to dismiss the observations and 
recommendations of these transferred officers.  It was a messy blend of all these experiences, 
combined with those of Torch, Husky, Avalanche, and Shingle, that created the Allied mindset 
about what would be necessary to ensure that Overlord succeeded. 
Most senior Allied officers had some personal exposure to either preparing forces for 
World War One or fighting in France and the Mediterranean.  If not veterans of the war itself, 
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most professional officers had read “lessons learned” and doctrine derived from the experience 
of the Entente in France, Italy, Greece, and the Middle East.  Gallipoli and Salonika held a 
special importance for amphibious operations, and both campaigns were considered unfortunate 
failures.   
As they had during the Great War, joint operations in the Mediterranean between 1942 
and 1944 helped create a shared vision of contemporary warfare among the men who would lead 
Overlord.  Combat in North Africa, Sicily, Salerno, and Anzio helped develop a new orthodoxy 
on how best to organize and employ an interservice and multinational force and on what one 
should anticipate when fighting the Wehrmacht when it was conducting an operational defense.  
The Germans developed a new reputation for reacting quickly, launching aggressive 
counterattacks, and conducting a tenacious and methodical defense, trading space for time only 
after every effort to repel the lodgment had failed.  Torch also offered valuable insights into 
operational-level theater logistics, leading to better planning, more effective organization above 
the army level, and more robust allocation of service troops for Overlord.  Senior leaders within 
the U.S. Army interpreted early difficulties during the North African campaign to justify their 
preference for layers of echeloned headquarters responsible for sustainment.  By sticking with 
orthodoxy and rejecting the experiment being led by Gale at AFHQ, the U.S. Army chose not to 
explore the possibility that fewer headquarters might be both more efficient and more effective.  
It also distracted the ASF and War Department from what may have been the more significant 
issue, motorized transportation and its critical role when railroads were too damaged to carry 
much of the load. 
 The British learned from Gallipoli, Salonika, Iraq, and Palestine how to project ground 
forces to distant theaters and then sustain them in a harsh climate with limited infrastructure.  For 
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every setback (Gallipoli and Salonika) there were success stories like the drive through Palestine 
and the second expedition to Baghdad.  Amphibious expeditions were a key element in the 
British way of war; sometimes they were successful, and sometimes they were not.  Early 
experience in World War II demonstrated that air superiority was almost essential in order to 
achieve success in amphibious operations.  Dieppe demonstrated just how hard and costly 
landing directly into the teeth of a prepared defense could be.  One take-away was that success 
required landing where the enemy was not.  If this was not an option, the attacker would have to 
conduct the ultimate set-piece battle to overwhelm the opponent with firepower and mass.  Early 
U.S. experience in the Pacific reinforced the lessons of Dieppe while eliminating the possibility 
of avoiding enemy strength – the islands were just too small.  The key to success in the Pacific 
boiled down to synchronizing overwhelming firepower.  Also, key to these efforts was the 
coordinating of strategic logistics – moving men and material over thousands of miles by ship – 
with tactical objectives and maneuver.  Operational logistics, or shifting supplies hundreds of 
miles inland, was part of the British experience early in World War II, but not something the 
Americans needed to perfect in the Pacific.  These were the two mental models that American 
and British planners brought with them to the early stages of planning for Torch, and the 
attitudes that would be modified, but not completely replaced, as a result of the experience in the 
Mediterranean.     
All British officers who had served in the Army during World War Two were indirectly 
shaped by their experience at Gallipoli and, to lesser extent, Salonika.  Twenty years after the 
fighting at Salonika and Gallipoli, it was probably difficult to tell the difference between bad 
strategy and poor execution, but what lingered was an inclination to avoid opposed-landing 
amphibious operations.  Problems in Norway, France, and Greece in 1940 and 1941 did little to 
69 
 
convince the average British officer that trying to project land power ashore in the face of 
German resistance was a good idea, despite the fact that their doctrine and historical experience 
dictated that it would be the norm.  Air power added a new dimension to the traditional challenge 
of coordinating sea and land forces, and, during the first half of the war, the Germans seemed to 
have the upper hand in the skies when and where it mattered most.   
Lesser-known amphibious operations reinforced British appreciation of just how risky 
force projection across the ocean could be.  British and Free French forces attempted Operation 
Menace in September 1940 to secure Dakar, Senegal from the Vichy garrison.  The operation 
was disrupted by elements of the Vichy French fleet and by heavy artillery in the fortress at 
Dakar; the British and Free French abandoned the affair without even trying to get ashore.101  
Operation Ironclad, conducted in April and May 1942 to seize Madagascar, went off much 
better, but against very light Vichy French resistance.  The operation benefited from lessons 
learned from Operation Menace, better coordination by the Combined Headquarters command, 
and a much less resolute reaction from the enemy.102 
Any euphoria from the success on Madagascar was short-lived.  The decision to stage a 
one-day raid at Dieppe along the Channel coast of France on 18 August 1942 was a curious one.  
By the time the raid was launched, the idea of launching Sledgehammer in 1942 was already off 
the table for everyone except General Marshall.103  There has been lively debate ever since over 
why the British carried on with the operation, some speculating that Canadians were sacrificed to 
 
101 Paul Kennedy, Engineers of Victory: The Problem Solvers Who Turned the Tide in the Second World War (New 
York: Random House, 2013), 227 
102 Ibid, 227.  Air support provided by two fleet carriers was much more effective, the ground force was increased to 
a full division, and there was a dedicated non-combatant headquarters ship.  French air and naval forces were 
significantly weaker than those encountered at Dakar.   
103 Sledgehammer was the codename for a small-scale Allied invasion of France in 1942.  The decision to abandon 
Sledgehammer will be discussed below. 
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drive home to the Americans just how hard a cross-Channel attack was going to be.104  If so, it 
was a complete success.  The Royal Air Force lost 119 aircraft while shooting down only 46 
German planes.  One British destroyer and thirty-three landing craft were sunk.  Also, of the 
6,100 ground forces put ashore, 1,000 were killed, 2,300 captured, and another 1,000 never made 
it to the beach.105  It was a wake-up call that Allied political and military leaders could not 
lightly brush off.  Joint operations conducted off the southern coast of England crossed every 
functional and geographical boundary imaginable. Mountbatten’s Combined Operations 
Command realized after the fact that there were a host of other organizations with whom they 
should have coordinated more closely.  Joint cooperation broke down, and units struggled to find 
the right beach, unload their ships, and get past the initial belt of obstacles.  It was a disaster that 
captured the attention of Allied planners working on the landings for Torch and an eventual 
return to France.  It is easy to see why the United Kingdom was so cold on the idea of direct 
confrontation with the Germans along the Atlantic coast from 1942 to 1944.  Their operational 
experience demonstrated that amphibious assault against the Germans and their allies was a 
tricky business that required overwhelming superiority and joint force integration that the British 
were only just beginning to figure out by the late summer of 1942. 
 
 Early U.S. Experiences in the Pacific 
A comparable body of U.S. experience with long-distance force projection and 
amphibious assault in both Europe and the Pacific emerged throughout 1943.  The first Army 
unit to see amphibious combat in the Pacific was the 7th ID, which fought on Attu in the 
 
104 Ibid, 231-232. 
105 Ibid, 233. 
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Aleutians from 11 to 29 May 1943.  The division’s initial landing was not contested by the 
Japanese, but the force did face fierce counterattacks once established ashore.  The U.S. Marine 
Corps had already learned about amphibious operations at Guadalcanal from August to 
November 1942, but they were not joined by the Army in any significant numbers until 
December, after Torch had already begun.  MG Joe Collins’ experience in the Solomon Islands 
as the commander of the 25th Infantry Division began in January 1943, and in the campaign the 
Army tended to act as a supporting force for the Marines.  The Army landed with the second 
wave at New Georgia in July and then, in mid-August, as the assault force on an undefended 
beach.  Even by late summer 1943, the Army’s experience in the Pacific still offered little on 
how to conduct an assault landing, but it had reinforced the lessons from North Africa on the 
critical importance of the follow-on buildup phase.   During these operations to consolidate the 
toehold, U.S. Army leaders learned that the terrain and the climate could be a greater challenge 
than isolated enemy forces insufficiently supported by air and naval power.106 
In the second wave of U.S. amphibious assaults in the central Pacific over the winter of 
1943-1944, the Army took on more of the burden of fighting their way ashore than they had 
taken on in the first wave.  At the end of November 1943, the 2nd Marine Division and a 
regiment of the 27th Division captured Tarawa and Makin Islands.  Marine casualties were 
heavy, with about 1,000 dead and 2,000 wounded, or a fifth of the division.  The Army lost 
fewer men, but it still suffered a ten percent casualty rate among the regiment that had been 
committed to root out the small Japanese garrison, a task that required four days.107  Lessons 
from Tarawa were taken to heart and applied during the landings on the Kwajalein group on 1 
 
106 Stephen R. Taaffe, Marshall and his Generals: U.S. Army Commanders in World War II (Lawrence, KS: 
University Press of Kansas, 2011), 37-44. 
107 Ibid, 151. 
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February 1944, but the Marines still suffered about five percent casualties and the 7th ID seven 
percent in only two days of fighting.108  MG Charles Corlett, the commander of the 7th ID, 
caught senior Army leaders’ attention with his idea of seizing nearby islands and emplacing 
supporting artillery on them before tackling Kwajalein proper.   
This initiative resulted in Richardson, the senior Army leader in the central Pacific, 
nominating Corlett to form and lead a new corps headquarters, the XXIV.  But Marshall 
overrode Richardson and transferred Corlett to Europe in March where Eisenhower made him 
the commander of XIX Corps.  Marshall made it obvious that he valued Corlett’s practical 
experience in planning and conducting amphibious operations and hoped the team at SHAEF 
could learn from him.  Corlett’s memoirs suggest that the British were game but that he received 
only a lukewarm reception from his fellow Americans.109  He later wrote: “Not a single 
American General or staff officer in England – Bradley, Lee, Patton, Smith, Hodges or anyone 
else [ -- ] ever mentioned my experience in the Pacific or asked my opinion on anything although 
our contact were frequent.  Many times, I made suggestions about amphibious matters, but these 
ideas of mine were brushed off.” 110  The only exception within the U.S. camp was LTG Sandy 
Patch, the man slated to lead 7th Army ashore in southern France.  Patch flew from Italy to Great 
Britain and spent two days with Corlett, going over the draft plan for the Dragoon landings.111  
Corlett was worried about a couple of aspects of planning for Overlord, but his memoirs 
implied that the Americans he talked to did not share his concerns.  Based on his experience at 
Kwajalein, he thought that the Americans were landing with entirely too little ammunition to 
 
108 Ibid, 152. 
109 21st Army Group invited Corlett to brief senior commanders and staff for about an hour to share his thoughts on 
training methods, amphibious techniques, and the overall strategy in the Kwajalein campaign.   
110 Charles H. Corlett, “One Man’s Story, Some of it about War,” ms. autobiography, Corlett Papers, AHEC, 231-
232.  This was an early version of what would become Corlett’s autobiography, which was published in 1974. 
111 Corlett, 232. 
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support combat operations during the first few days of Neptune and, too, that the Sherman tanks 
that had been modified to swim ashore (dual-drive or DD tanks) should have been supplemented 
with LCTs, amphibious tractors, and other specialized equipment like that embraced by the 
British.112  After watching a rehearsal by VII Corps, Corlett recorded that “…these troops were 
six months or a year behind the Pacific in amphibious technique and apparently nobody knew it 
except perhaps one man.  He was Admiral Kirk, the Naval Task Force Commander.”113  In all 
fairness to Eisenhower’s staff, it was impossible to make major changes to the plan in March, 
and Corlett was probably echoing concerns about resources that SHAEF had been fighting (with 
only limited success) for months.  But his observations offer evidence that information sharing 
between various theaters was not as efficient as one might have hoped, at least within the Army. 
Corlett wrote: “I soon got the feeling that American Generals in England considered 
anything that had happened in the Pacific was strictly Bush-League stuff, which didn’t merit any 
consideration.”114  It was logical that the veterans of Torch, Husky, and Avalanche felt a sense of 
superiority over their counterparts from the Pacific.  Army operations in the Pacific conducted 
prior to Overlord tended to involve a regiment, division, or two divisions in an operation lasting 
anywhere from two days to two weeks.  Early efforts in North Africa, Sicily, Naples, and Anzio 
had presented challenges on an entirely different scale of complexity, scope, and duration than 
the operations in the Pacific.  Corlett, Collins, and others in the team that was transferred from 
the Pacific might have useful suggestions at the lowest tactical level, but the SHAEF team 
thought that they had the superior understanding of large and complex amphibious operations.  
Finally, while admittedly unfair, there was doubtlessly a bias among the European team towards 
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the martial capabilities of the Germans over the Japanese, especially when it came to mechanized 
combined-arms warfare.   
Not all combat experience is equal, and ETOUSA could only benefit from the hard-won 
lessons of other theaters if they were willing to really listen.  Corlett offered small-scale input 
very late in the Overlord planning process, but his observations showed how wide a gulf there 
was between ETOUSA and Southwest Pacific Area.  The natural human tendency to dismiss the 
experiences of others ensured that lessons learned in the Pacific during the winter of 1943-1944 
could not be fully exploited to better the provision of resources for the Overlord operation.  By 
the time Corlett could share his observations and recommendations in person, it was too late to 
act on most of his suggestions.      
 
 Learning from 8th Army: Insights on Extended LoCs in Austere Conditions 
Logistical planners in both armies had an excellent point of reference in British 
operations in the Middle East, especially the numerous campaigns conducted by the 8th Army.  
These experiences were even more relevant and accessible because of direct American 
involvement by the 9th Air Force and the U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East (USAFIME).115  
The theater presented both aspects of the modern logistical challenge: strategic sustainment 
centered around shipping the right equipment to the theater on an appropriate timeline, and 
operational logistics predicated upon distribution over great distances with limited transportation 
options.  But U.S. planners in the War Department, in ETOUSA, and at AFHQ were not familiar 
with much of what the British had learned, and they had no time to absorb the insights their 
 
115 General Andrews took over as its second commander in November, and MG Crawford was the chief of its SOS.  
USAFIME was established in Cairo in August 1942.   
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counterparts had to offer.  In Egypt the British had learned how to establish and sustain a base of 
operations dependent upon ship-delivered supplies while projecting a half-dozen divisions 
hundreds of miles from their rail- and road-heads relying on coastal shipping and a single rail 
line and a single paved road.  If the time had existed to integrate these insights, the AFHQ and 
U.S. War Department would have developed a better deployment and sustainment plan for 
Torch. 
 The German advance to Alamein in early July 1942 forced the British Middle Eastern 
Command to modify and expand their base in the Nile Delta.  LTG Sir Wilfrid Lindsell directed 
the effort to build new airstrips and amass supply dumps just to the west of Alexandria while 
integrating the retreating 8th Army, Desert Air Force, Commonwealth reinforcements, and 
elements of the U.S. Army Air Force.116  The crisis drove the command to establish its first 
crated-vehicle assembly plan in Egypt that summer, and one of Alexander’s first priorities as the 
new theater commander in August was to strengthen his base in Egypt while equipping the 8th 
Army and Desert Air Force with the capability to go on the counteroffensive.  In order to sustain 
the three corps and approximately eleven divisions in the growing 8th Army, the British built up a 
formidable support command.117  By September, HQ LoC, Middle Eastern Command controlled 
36 3-ton General Transport (GT) companies, six tank transporter companies, nine water tank 
companies, and a bulk petrol transport company, totaling over 8,700 general service vehicles.118  
To ease the initial transportation burden, the Middle Eastern Base command had also constructed 
water pipelines from Alexandria to the 8th Army camps around Alamein.  There was a new 
 
116 MG Ian S. Playfair, British Fortunes Reach Their Lowest Ebb, vol. III in The Mediterranean and Middle East 
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emphasis on vehicle repair as far forward as possible.  To better coordinate the effort, the British 
Army formed a new Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineer (REME) Corps to consolidate all 
repair units that had formally operated under the Ordnance Corps. 
Montgomery and Alexander, assuming that the counteroffensive projected for the fall 
would be successful, took steps to ensure that the attack could be sustained to Tobruk, Benghazi, 
and then Tripoli.  A new support organization was created to bridge the gap and handle some of 
the burden of administration and coordination between the 8th Army support command and the 
Middle East GHQ and Base Command under the direction of BG G. Surtees.119  Alexander made 
it very clear that Surtees answered to Montgomery; Surtees’ job was to convey 8th Army’s needs 
and priorities to the GHQ, and help repair and operate the line of communications as it expanded 
to the west, to include the maintenance and operation of rail, engines, rolling stock, and water 
supplies.  The British also assigned pioneer units to Surtees’ command to repair the coastal 
improved road and rail line, and prepared coastal shipping with building material, bulk supplies, 
and technical experts to restore the ports at Tobruk and Benghazi as quickly as possible.  Rail 
movement would terminate at Tobruk where supplies would be shifted to coastal vessels and 
shipped to Benghazi. 
As a result of these thorough preparations, Montgomery’s pursuit through Benghazi and 
up to El Agheila went very well, at least from a logistics perspective.120   For the last lunge to 
Tripoli, Montgomery decided he would have to augment the 52 GT companies now supporting 
8th Army and its LoC command with all the transport he could generate by grounding the X 
Corps.  This generated another fifteen GT companies that were attached to the support command 
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for the first six weeks of 1943, allowing the 8th Army to reach Tripoli and continue to push Axis 
forces into southern Tunisia.121        
AFHQ was well informed on all aspects of the British drive from El Alamein to southern 
Tunisia and had access to the daily reports, innovations employed to extend the reach of the 8th 
Army, and lessons distilled after the campaign.  The AFHQ was aware of these extensive 
preparations prior to 8th Army’s drive, Montgomery’s progress from early November to mid-
February, and received dozens of copies of a written after-action report prepared at the end of the 
advance into southern Tunisia.  ETOUSA had access to all message traffic sent between 
USAFIME and the War Department during the operation.  AFHQ worked at Norfolk House from 
July to November close to the senior British service and ministry headquarters, and it had 
excellent relations with service and joint planners involved in the U.K.’s global strategic efforts.  
All major commands sent courtesy copies of important documents, to include lessons summaries, 
to the War Ministry and equivalent theater, joint, and Army commands.122  Finally, 8th Army 
offered two lectures on recent lessons learned in a conference it hosted in Tripoli from 14 to 16 
February 1943.  This action was obviously too late to be of much help with the execution of 
Torch, but it did ensure that a written record of operational and administrative lessons reached 
the AFHQ staff.  General Smith and LTG Gale directed each general and special staff section to 
send one officer to attend the conference and take notes.123  Copies of BG Richardson’s written 
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summary were provided to all the staff sections in AFHQ, its subordinate units, and major 
commands in Great Britain and the United States.   
Brigadier Richardson emphasized a few points that should have resonated with AFHQ, 
ETOUSA, and NATOUSA planners.  First, in a long-distance mobile pursuit, it was essential to 
have an administrative command post that could break down into two functional halves to leap-
frog behind the combat elements and provide continuous coordination with the base area and line 
of communications.  Second, by this stage in the Desert War Montgomery and his operations 
staff had learned to consult with the administrative and support staff before developing maneuver 
concepts, hoping to ensure anything considered was logistically feasible first.  Finally, 8th Army 
had realized that the advance to Tripoli and then the southern Tunisian border was possible only 
if X Corps halted at El Agheila and turned their trucks over to sustain the advance by the 
remaining two corps.  This was a risk Montgomery was comfortable taking based on the 
weakened state of the Axis forces in Libya and the narrowness of navigable terrain along the 
coast, which made deep envelopment of his left or southern flank extremely problematic.  The 
decision demonstrated great pragmatism, creativity, and a mastery of the interrelation between 
logistics, maneuver, and operational objectives.  
Reading a written report or attending a lecture is helpful, but each has obvious limitations 
in generating an intellectual revolution within a busy headquarters.  But in July 1943 ETOUSA 
and its SOS gained a valuable officer when MG Robert Crawford was assigned to the command.  
Crawford had been the SOS commander at USAFIME during Montgomery’s drive across Libya, 
and he had first-hand experience with supporting air and ground units fighting at the end of a 
tenuous line of communications.  He had witnessed British sustainment operations at the theater 
and army level, and synchronized U.S. service troops during the same campaign.  When he 
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attended his first SOS command and staff meeting at Cheltenham on 5 July 1943, he was invited 
to share his observations about this combat experience. 124    
During this hour-long lecture, Crawford emphasized the vast scope of the theater, how 
intertwined British and U.S. logistics had become, and the challenges of sustaining deep 
offensive operations using a meager distribution network.  U.S. service units had advanced from 
Cairo to Tripoli, side by side with their British counterparts, during the campaign, creating 
communication and sustainment challenges equal to those faced by the combat formations.  
Crawford witnessed first-hand the damage inflicted at Tobruk and Benghazi by the Axis during 
their retreat, and he emphasized to his audience just how important truck companies were in 
sustaining a pursuit when ships and trains were of limited use.  Crawford appreciated 
Montgomery’s generalship, pointing out Montgomery’s careful attention to logistics and refusal 
to take tactical risks until his line of communication was restored, or at least until reserve stocks 
were available to carry the command through the next phase of the advance.  Montgomery 
tended to progress across Libya in pulses, lunging forward to capture a port or road and rail 
junction, then pausing until those facilities were repaired and receiving ships and trains before 
moving on to the next objective.  Yes, this often allowed the enemy to slip away, but at no point 
was 8th Army exposed to a major reverse caused by insufficient supplies.   
As demonstrated by the points he emphasized during this lecture and by his actions 
during his first few months in the SOS, Crawford understood what was required to sustain 
maneuver forces in combat.  He brought a wealth of practical experience to the SOS, an 
appreciation of the pace and volume of work during combat operations, and a host of important 
British contacts.  Lee positioned Crawford in London to improve the ties between the SOS and 
 
124 SOS C&S Notes, 5 Jul 43.  RG 498, UD 578, Box 3882, ADM 455, NARA II.   
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ETOUSA, COSSAC, and SHAEF, and to assist with operational planning and preparation for 
Roundup.  Crawford would contribute significantly to Allied readiness for Overlord, but as a 
member of the staff at COSSAC and then SHAEF and not as the deputy commander of the SOS.  
Before Crawford left the SOS, he could not fundamentally alter the focus of Lee’s organization, 
nor could he assemble his own team that could adequately perform operational functions on the 
SOS’s behalf.  Despite his impressive qualifications, Crawford was incapable of passing along 
his operational competence to the senior general staff officers at Cheltenham.   
               
 Conclusion 
 There were important links between the U.S. Army’s frustrations at the end of World 
War One, imprecise American doctrine that contributed to early struggles in World War Two, 
and Allied reaction to early operational experience with amphibious and expeditionary 
campaigns at the beginning of the war.  It was these factors that created the initial and 
problematic U.S. approach to theater-level warfare and made meaningful evolution so hard a 
task.  At the heart of the problem was unresolved conflict over the best way to properly organize, 
resource, and synchronize a communications zone working in tandem with a combat-centric 
headquarters.  Since the U.S. Army had not perfected this task in the last 40 years, it was 
impossible for its doctrine to clearly explain the critical aspects of the problem, historical pitfalls 
of past solutions, and methods and techniques that would be useful in future situations.  The 
number of officers with first-hand experience with theater level command and control, never 
large to begin with, quickly declined in the 20s and 30s as the U.S. Army shrank back to its 
peace-time establishment and the associated exodus of personnel.  Whatever insight doctrine 
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could provide had to be presented in such a manner that it could be understood by an 
inexperienced staff officer serving at the theater level for the first time.   
Inadvertently, a strong reaction to what the AEF considered micro-management by the 
Army Chief of Staff formalized the operational authority of that position and created an 
imbalance in authority between center and periphery at the beginning of the war.  Finally, U.S. 
experience, doctrine, and mental models missed the transition of primacy from a national theater 
headquarters to a joint-combined operational entity such as AFHQ, COSSAC, or SHAEF.  All 
three of these paradigms slowed the development of effective senior headquarters during the first 
two years of the war, a challenge only slightly eased by a different approach in the British Army 
and by its three additional years of combat experience.  British capstone doctrine was short, 
written for senior and experienced officers, and of little use in accelerating the development of 
the U.S. Army.  Familiarity with the far superior Manual of Movement, War was restricted to 
such a small group that it could not help bridge the gap.  Historical examples of effective joint 
and combined theater headquarters were widespread, but, when it came to the synchronizing 
modern combat and logistics across continental distances, the British were only a few steps 
ahead.      
 This chapter has set the conditions necessary to explore the friction associated with 
Allied and American growth in their approach to organization, command and control, and 
integration of combat and sustainment tasks.  It has provided a common language to describe 
components of those tasks, illustrated where doctrine and experience were helpful, and suggested 
shortfalls that would complicate the process.  It has set conditions for the next chapter by 
providing a conceptual start point for shared Allied thinking about theater level warfare in the 
Mediterranean, and specifically the roles and relationships between the U.S. War Department, a 
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joint-combined operational headquarters, national service headquarters, and responsibility for 
synchronizing maneuver and sustainment. 
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Chapter 2 - Torch and the Mediterranean Theater 
The pre-existing gaps in Western Allied experience and thought about how to plan, 
prepare for, and execute an expeditionary campaign discussed in the preceding chapter were on 
full display during Operation Torch.  Allied efforts between August 1942 through February 1943 
demonstrated that the British and Americans did not agree on the best way to organize a joint 
combined operational headquarters and did not know how to develop a campaign plan within the 
constraints imposed by maritime deployment and resupply.  The expedition also illuminated how 
the U.S. Army was woefully unprepared to create and execute a logistics support plan at the 
operational level.  Because the senior Americans in charge of Torch prioritized the number of 
fighting troops put ashore during the initial assault landing phase at the expense of all other 
considerations, there were not enough service units and transportation assets to support a multi-
division drive into Tunisia during the first month of combat.  Focusing on the initial landing of 
the three U.S. task forces, Eisenhower and Clark left the details of subsequent ground campaign 
to General Kenneth Anderson and his 1st British Army.  Because of compromises to the original 
shipment plan, Anderson did not have enough trucks to sustain more than a composite division in 
the isolated terrain of central Tunisia, a force insufficient to overwhelm the rapidly reinforced 
Axis defenders.  Caught off guard by the strength of Axis ground and air units committed to 
shielding Tunis and Bizerte, the Western Allies were forced to improvise a new campaign where 
bad roads, insufficient rail assets, and truck shortages did more to slow the accumulation of 
overwhelming combat power than German and Italian resistance.   
In the face of a tough fight in forbidding terrain and with virtually no theater-level service 
units, General Humfrey Gale, the chief administrative officer for AFHQ, managed to piece 
together a coherent theater supply and distribution system by mid-December 1942.  In the 
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process, Gale slowly taught Eisenhower and Bedell Smith how to manage logistics at the 
operational level, which hinged on the relationship between the carrying capacity of a line of 
communications, the weight of combat power that could be maintained in contact with the 
enemy, and the tempo of offensive operations they might sustain.  Eisenhower slowly came to 
appreciate that the critical limiting factor on his joint campaign was the distribution system in 
North Africa.  Until Gale had widened each bottleneck in the distribution chain, AFHQ could not 
mass its superior ground strength in Tunisia and punch through or wear down the Axis 
defenders.  Setting up such a distribution system required a wide variety of service troops; 
trucks, trains, and coastal ships; a long-distance communications network; and effective staff 
procedures.  Luckily for the U.S. Army the British entered the campaign with a working 
doctrinal framework, trained and experienced officers, and the right blend of technical skills 
within the line of communications command assigned to AFHQ.  Gale and the British knew what 
they were doing, but did not have the volume of men and equipment they needed to match Axis 
air and ground strength in Tunisia.  Furthermore, Gale had to teach the Americans to stop 
packing troops and planes into the forward combat area until the distribution system had 
demonstrated it could keep them resupplied, and to conduct the operation accordingly. 
In the end Gale succeeded, both in establishing a robust theater requisition and 
distribution system, and in teaching his U.S. counter-parts how to run one of their own.  He also 
helped teach his American counterparts at AFHQ how plan operations according to the 
limitations of that logistical infrastructure.  This sort of learning happened in every major unit 
that participated in the campaign, to include AFHQ, the various tactical maneuver formations 
and their numbered army and air force commands, and NATOUSA, the U.S. Army’s 
administrative and sustainment headquarters for the theater.  But these lessons about the linkage 
85 
 
between long-distance distribution networks and the tempo and tactical objectives within a 
campaign were somewhat obscured by the tactical imperatives of the assault landings at Sicily, 
Salerno, and Anzio, and the organizational gulf between NATOUSA and ETOUSA.  A 
surprising number of insights about how to set up and run a requisition and distribution system 
did not migrate from North Africa to Great Britain, and ETOUSA would repeat many of the 
mistakes made by AFHQ, 1st Army, and NATOUSA.  This failure to learn illustrated how hard it 
is to profit from the insight of others without a direct infusion of leaders and units with firsthand 
experience, and the limitations of any lessons learned process, regardless its merits and 
shortfalls.  
This chapter examines Torch in detail and then offers an overview of the salient lessons 
extracted from Sicily, Salerno, and Anzio.  These operations radically transformed AFHQ and its 
key subordinate organizations between August 1942 and January 1944.  Because ETOUSA, 
SOS, and COSSAC did not directly participate in the Mediterranean campaign, there was a risk 
of internal rifts developing between the two communities and their approach to managing a 
theater.  In order to prevent this from happening, it would be imperative for the senior 
expeditionary commands in the U.K. to learn vicariously from AFHQ and NATOUSA.  The 
chapter seeks to explain what exactly AFHQ, NATOUSA, and other subordinate formations 
learned about theater-level warfare in the Mediterranean and how well that information was 
shared with the U.S. and British military. 
The chapter consists of three major sections: Allied preparation for Operation Torch, 
ground operations in North Africa, and a description of how the very different style of operations 
conducted on the Italian mainland conditioned Eisenhower and his senior advisors to think about 
amphibious campaigns.  Because of the ferocity of the air-ground reaction of the Wehrmacht to 
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Torch, Husky, Avalanche, and Shingle, Eisenhower and his lieutenants overwhelmingly focused 
on the initial beach assault and the ensuing battle of the build-up.  As a result, SHAEF was 
comfortable with a smaller supporting force than his logisticians argued was necessary and 
accepted the long-term complications that destruction of the French transportation network 
presented in order to isolate the Normandy area from German reinforcement.  These were 
conditioned responses learned from dealing with German counterattacks in the Mediterranean.  
Just as AFHQ officers brought their operational experiences with them to SHAEF, there was no 
corresponding shift of leaders and experience between NATOUSA and ETOUSA.  Cross-
pollination happened, but not to the extent that the wholesale transfer of ground divisions, air 
wings, and flag officers in the combat arms triggered.  The Allies had a wide range of ways to 
propagate lessons learned, but, in the end, they proved to be insufficient.  Lee’s headquarters was 
unprepared to manage theater logistics when it took over in France in August 1944.            
Torch was the first major ground campaign planned and then executed by the U.S. Army 
in World War Two, and their inexperience was glaring.  The need to create a combined 
operational headquarters, AFHQ, called into question the purpose of ETOUSA and triggered a 
battle over qualified staff personnel.  The decision to form and land three quasi-independent joint 
task forces presented a second complication not addressed by existing U.S. doctrine or by pre-
war planning.  During the struggle to plan the invasion and to equip and deploy the U.S. force, it 
became apparent that American planners did not understand the links among the three tasks and 
lacked the systems and discipline to prepare a complex expedition that could transition into 
combat immediately upon arrival.  It was only with significant help from the U.S. War 
Department and British joint planners that the expedition was successfully launched.  The one 
bright spot of the initial plan was the flexibility and aggressiveness demonstrated by Anderson 
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and the British 1st Army.  The British landed a balanced force capable of projecting a reinforced 
division into eastern Tunisia by mid-November that almost pulled off a win before the Axis 
could secure the last two deep water ports on the continent.  The operational pause that followed 
was influenced by bad weather and a shortage of transportation, but it was mainly caused by 
unfavorable odds at the front.  It took time for AFHQ to figure out how to run a joint team, a 
process complicated by the merger with 8th Army and the Desert Air Force in February.  U.S. 
combat units were green, and some U.K. units little better.  Perhaps the hardest task was to shift 
all the combat power available in North Africa into Tunisia without undermining the ability to 
sustain the forces massed there. 
Positive developments were offset by opportunities missed.  AFHQ initiated the 
campaign with a decidedly unorthodox approach to running theater logistics, at least when 
compared with the systems expounded by U.S doctrine.  This unconventional approach did not 
survive the supposed transportation crisis of January and the massive overhaul of command and 
control completed in February.  As a result, the Americans added two intermediate theater and 
administrative headquarters in the form of NATOUSA and its SOS, two organizations that 
suffered from having scopes of authority that were poorly defined if not outright redundant with 
one another and with the AFHQ administrative staff.    
These developments exposed the challenges associated with the lessons-learned process 
in general.  Validating and then implementing best procedures is a tricky proposition – official 
written lessons do not necessarily correlate with the personal conclusions reached by senior 
leaders.  Not every acknowledged deficiency could be fixed with the time and resources 
available, while other shortcomings, or the exact reasons for their emergence, were completely 
missed.  Lessons and priorities that had emerged at the end of Torch were called into question or 
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obscured by the difficulties experienced during opposed landings against Italy.  Getting and 
staying ashore became such a pressing concern by the end of the Anzio operation that 
Eisenhower was willing to sacrifice any other considerations tied to future operations.  The result 
was a willingness to shortchange service troops in order to bring in more combat elements during 
the initial stages and to obliterate French infrastructure to block German reinforcements.  
Immediate needs took precedence over what would come next.   
 
 Preparing for Torch 
The U.S. War Department was forced to adapt a new sense of urgency in planning the 
counteroffensive against Germany when Churchill and Roosevelt agreed in late July 1942 that 
North Africa would be invaded before the end of the year.  Suddenly both countries needed to 
accomplish a staggering number of difficult tasks in a matter of three to four months.  Given the 
complexity of the operation, the inexperience of the U.S. Army, the lack of a formed combined 
operational headquarters, and the short amount of time available, it is remarkable that Operation 
Torch succeeded at all.  The Americans failed to develop a comprehensive vision of the 
campaign, and therefore they deployed an unbalanced, combat-heavy force that lacked the ability 
to shift themselves east to meet Axis reinforcements.  Restoring that balance proved to be 
extremely difficult.  Combined with aggressive operations by Axis ground and air units, the need 
to establish a functional communications zone extended the duration of the campaign into May 
1943.  The fact that the Allies quickly established themselves ashore and almost won the race to 
the Tunisian ports in December was a testament to British operational and tactical 
professionalism.  The early efforts of AFHQ provide a remarkable contrast not only with 
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SHAEF’s ability to plan joint operations but also with those critical capabilities that evaded both 
organizations.    
One of the main sources of friction in the resulting campaign in North Africa was how 
little time the United States Army had in which to plan its first major ground campaign.  The 
U.S. was suddenly confronted with the need to execute a host of tasks with which it had no 
experience whatsoever, and it needed to do so about six months sooner than anticipated.  
Roundup, which would require the same organizations and tasks as Torch, had not been expected 
to happen before spring 1943.  Beyond transforming the initial coordinating bodies in the United 
Kingdom into a full-fledged theater command, the Army also needed to create a combined and 
joint operational headquarters.  It needed to turn a conceptual outline for operations in northwest 
Africa into detailed orders with assigned and ready forces, and this could happen only after 
Washington and London came to an agreement on exactly what Torch was to accomplish and on 
the level of risk both countries were comfortable accepting.  Finally, the prospective theater 
commander needed to decide how he planned to defeat his German and Italian adversaries once 
established ashore and how to sustain this effort in a campaign likely to last months while 
spanning half of the northern coast of Africa.  Since the U.S. had no practical experience with 
operations at this scale, it was bound to be less efficient than anyone hoped.  The British would 
have to pick up much of the slack until U.S leaders gained the experience, and fielded the 
organizations and units, necessary to carry their share of the burden.       
When Eisenhower moved from the War Department in Washington D.C. to England in 
late June 1942, he went to assume command of ETOUSA and to accelerate preparations for 
Sledgehammer and Bolero.  These two operations were designed to land Allied forces in France, 
either in an emergency to prop up a collapsing USSR or else as a deliberate assault in 1943.  
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Back in March, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill had agreed to indefinite 
postponement of Gymnast (an earlier plan for the Allied occupation of North Africa) due to a 
lack of resources and to recent setbacks in the Pacific and Middle East.  By late May the British 
realized that by backing away from Gymnast they had opened the door to the U.S. Army’s 
preferred operation, Sledgehammer/Roundup, well before the British thought either force would 
be ready.  As a result, beginning at the end of May, the British mounted a campaign to pressure 
the Americans to turn elsewhere in 1942.  As a preliminary step, Force 110 at the Combined 
Operations Command was redesignated as 1st Army in June, assigned control of 5th Corps 
containing 4th and 78th Infantry and 6th Armoured divisions, and directed to continue to refine 
their earlier work on Gymnast.1  They would begin working with AFHQ in mid-August.    
 This series of engagements, messages, and planning papers culminated in a mid-July visit 
to London by Hopkins, Marshall, and King.  By 22 July the Americans were forced to admit to 
the President that they had been unable to convince the British to give France a try in 1942.  
Directed by Roosevelt to conduct some major offensive to provide aid to the USSR and hurt 
Germany in 1942, Marshall and King conditionally agreed to support Gymnast.  On 24 July 
Marshall shared with Eisenhower his interpretation of the deal struck with the British.  If by 15 
September the Russians did not seem to be on the edge of imminent collapse, the Allies would 
commit to an invasion of Northwest Africa, to be launched before December 1942.2  The next 
day Marshall told Eisenhower that the operation would be called Torch and an Allied team 
would plan it there in London under the direction of the supreme allied commander.  Marshall 
implied that Eisenhower would probably command the invasion, but this was not officially 
 
1 Complied by LTC J.A.H. Carter and Major D.N. Kann, Maintenance in the Field, Volume II: 1943-1945 (London: 
The War Office, 1961), 10. 
2 History of AFHQ, Part One, August to December 1942, 1.  Published as a classified document on 1 August 1945.  
ETOUSA Historical Division, RG 331, NARA II.  
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endorsed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff until 14 August.  President Roosevelt immediately 
approved the recommendation to launch Torch, as modified by Hopkins, not later than 30 
October and to share with the Prime Minister that his orders were “full speed ahead.”3 
Meanwhile, Eisenhower did what he could with the resources and authority available to 
him as the commander of ETOUSA to start work.  On 2 August he told Marshall that he wanted 
to appoint MG Mark Clark as his deputy and assign him as the planning chief for Torch, a 
request Marshall approved on 11 August.4  A few weeks earlier (immediately after the mid-July 
meeting of the CCS in London) the British had reexamined the plan for Gymnast; the joint 
executive planning staff worked from 18 to 25 July to produce a new appreciation to serve as a 
starting point for coalition planning.5  Eisenhower pulled six planners, including BG Gruenther, 
from the ETOUSA staff and had them join their British counterparts at Norfolk House on St. 
James Square on 4 August.  BG Gruenther would lead the twelve-man planning team until the 
arrival of MG Clark and then serve as his deputy with the London team when Clark was working 
in Washington, D.C.  
This early planning activity brought together the nucleus of what would become the 
Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ), although it was not officially established until 12 September 
1942.  Major General Gale held his first CAO coordination conference on 22 August, a meeting 
he would chair six days a week for the next five months.  The list of attendees at this first 
meeting included the future AFHQ G1 and G3, COL Everett Hughes (listed as the deputy CAO, 
 
3 Matloff and Snell, 282.  This created an uncomfortable dilemma.  The President and Prime Minister had 
immediately approved Torch, ignoring Marshall’s hard-won concession to wait until 15 September and then gauge 
Sledgehammer and Torch based on Soviet fortunes.  The result was a delicate dance within the U.S. Army and Navy 
to plan Torch, put Sledgehammer on ice, but preserve the illusion that both options were still on the table until 15 
September.     
4 History of AFHQ, 5. 
5 Ibid, 16. 
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but destined to become the NATOUSA commander in February 1943), and MG Dewing 
representing the British Home Army.6  At this point the staff was not formed, specific assault 
units were not identified, and only Gale understood an early outline of the plan.  During this 
meeting Gale warned the attendees that the headquarters would have to establish a forward 
command node, first at Gibraltar and then in Africa, and that they would work with significant 
restrictions on which personnel and equipment they could expect to take with them.  Within two 
weeks the committee was joined by the American G4, COL Hamblen, and representatives from 
1st British Army and the three assault task forces, among them BG Larkin, the commander of the 
service of supply for the central task force.   
COL Sawbridge, the AFHQ G1, conscientiously designed the headquarters in an effort to 
keep numbers from ballooning.  As a part of that effort, Gale, Sawbridge, and the G4 decided 
that they did not want a COMZ or SOS commander inserted between AFHQ and the field army 
and corps.7  It was an original concept that departed from U.S. doctrine and from General 
Marshall’s preferred method of organization, and it would eventually complicate coordination 
with ASF and the War Department.  It also meant that the AFHQ would have to be a very 
capable organization to make the system work.  When first established the G4 officially 
consisted of eight officers with an even split between the Americans and the British, headed by 
COL Hamblen on the American side and Brigadier R.G. Lewis for the British.8  The G4 had 
coordinating authority over the Transportation, Ordnance, Quartermaster, Engineers, Chemical 
 
6 Minutes from the CAO Conference 22 August 1942.  CAO Conferences File, RG 492, NARA II.   
7 History of AFHQ, 192, AFHQ G1 Staff Study, “Organization of AFHQ and US SOS Torch,” 2 November 1942.  
Eisenhower discussed the issue with Marshall throughout September and October and both generals agreed that the 
current system in place in Great Britain was a poor model to follow.  Through the middle of January all the key 
players in AFHQ believed that they could manage the linkage between base sections and lines of communication 
with the tactical combat elements.   
8 Personnel assignments 22 October 1942.  CG Decimal File, AFHQ, RG 492, NARA II.  By July 1943 the 
American G4 section consisted of fifteen officers and fourteen enlisted soldiers.    
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Warfare, Surgeon, and Finance service sections, and it could count on their manpower for help.  
By 3 September the entire headquarters consisted about 2,100 men, with 205 officers and 793 
enlisted from the Americans and 344 officers and 726 men coming from British organizations.9  
  
 
Figure 2.1: Organizational diagram for the AFHQ staff, 26 Aug 42, History of AFHQ 
 
LTC J.W. Ramsey, an infantry officer assigned to ETOUSA, was made the headquarters 
commandant for the U.S. portion of the AFHQ staff.  He was given an oral warning order to 
assemble a headquarters and headquarters command on 18 August; and after three frantic weeks 
of work he had pulled the organization together at Shrivenham by 15 September.10  Ramsey and 
Sawbridge found themselves working without a safety net.  Ramsey was advised to start with the 
table of organization and equipment for a U.S. field army headquarters and adjust from there as 
 
9 History of AFHQ, Part Two, Section 2, 240. 
10 Memo from COL Ramsey (HHC commander) to AFHQ CoS, MG W.B. Smith, “Lessons Learned from 
Operations Torch,” 3 Feb 1943.  RG 492, NARA II.   
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he saw fit.  He would eventually command 8,000 U.S. personnel distributed in four different 
locations charged with supporting the command and staff element that was directing Allied joint 
and theater operations in the Mediterranean.11  The U.S. Army was learning the hard way that 
the overhead necessary to run a theater was more significant than everyone had hoped. 
BG Walter B. Smith joined the AFHQ team on 15 September; BG Gruenther was moved 
from chief of plans to become the American deputy chief of staff.  MG Gale was officially 
assigned as the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO), a powerful position on most British staffs, 
but an anomaly to Americans.12  The CAO combined the functions of a chief of staff, deputy 
commander for sustainment, and commander of service troops and communications zone 
headquarters.  Gale would supervise the AFHQ G1, G4, and technical service sections 
(engineers, ordnance, and quartermaster) affiliated under them and answer only to Smith, Clark, 
and Eisenhower.  The G4 section was one of the largest and ended up being split into three 
different sub-sections to account for differences between U.S. and British staff structure.  There 
was a small logistical plans section that answered directly to MG Gale, and a Movement and 
Transportation (M&T) section that was a coequal to the G4 section that dealt exclusively with 
distribution of supplies by rail, road, waterway, sea, and air.  The authorized strength for the G4 
and logistics planning section by November 1942 had doubled to seventeen officers and nine 
enlisted personnel.13  The M&T section was led by COL A.T. de Rhé-Philipe (promoted to 
brigadier on 12 October) and accounted for another eighteen personnel assigned to the logistics 
team.14  This team worked closely with the Eastern Task Force M&T section until the AFHQ 
 
11 The four locations were London, Shrivenham, Gibraltar, and Algiers.     
12 History of AFHQ, 18-20. 
13 Ibid, 51. 
14 Ibid, 54 
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relocated to Algiers in early December.  Gale and the British were providing their American 
counterparts an education on what was required to supervise logistics at the theater-level.   
 A decision on the exact way to coordinate support for Torch once the operation started 
emerged from a series of conversations in late September and early October.  It became obvious 
to Smith and Gale that the command would need a rear command post in London for at least a 
few weeks while the rest of the staff was flowing into Gibraltar and Algiers.  This element would 
maintain links with military and civilian agencies in London and Washington to track the 
progress of the first few waves of ships and update command priorities for future convoys.  The 
AFHQ rear would be joined by liaison sections from the central and eastern task forces and 
deploying air units.15   
This in turn triggered a minor manning crisis by the middle of the month. General Smith 
published a memo on 24 October directing staff chiefs to submit a wish list for any increases to 
their sections with a suspense of 27 October.16  The staff was proving to be too small relative to 
its workload, compounded by the need to echelon the headquarters at numerous locations.  
Watching a large part of the staff disappear for the twenty-day journey by ship to Algiers did not 
help.  Clark moved the advanced party of the AFHQ to Algiers on 9 November and transferred 
the control of operations to the continent on 25 November.  The last of the London staff departed 
on 25 December, and the entire AFHQ was reunited in Algiers by 4 January 1943.17  The 
requirement to maintain two fully operational headquarters for almost two months illustrated 
again the scale of staffing necessary to run joint-combined operations in a theater of war.  The 
idea that a theater might be run by a pick-up team of a couple of hundred men was exposed as 
 
15 CAO Conference Notes, 2 October.   
16 “Allotment of U.S. Personnel, AFHQ,” 24 October.  CG Decimal File, AFHQ, RG 492, NARA II.  
17 History of AFHQ, 98-99. 
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unrealistic.  It also illustrated that, if a headquarters was going to try to eliminate one to two 
echelons of the chain of command outlined in contemporary doctrine and consolidate the work at 
a higher level, there would be a personnel cost associated with that decision.  Only time could 
tell which method was more effective. 
 Forming the AFHQ staff in four months while concurrently planning Torch and 
supervising preparation of the force sailing from Britain was impressive.  Senior staff officers 
followed Eisenhower’s wishes to keep the size of the headquarters as small as possible, despite 
the need to function at three different locations simultaneously.  The decision to try to cut out a 
SOS and COMZ command, at least during the early stages of the operation, was deliberate and 
underwritten by both Eisenhower and Marshall.  This was a bold initiative that might illustrate a 
more efficient way to run a theater, but it was also likely to trigger a reaction from the 
traditionalists within the service of supply community. The sustainment portion of the AFHQ 
staff would be under a lot of pressure to make their solution work; if it was perceived as a failure, 
they would be forced to conform to a more conservative approach.  Their cause was not helped 
by the distractions associated with forming the staff and assembling the invasion force. As a 
result of these more immediate concerns, the staff at AFHQ had thought little about what came 
next after securing Algeria. 
 
 The Base Plan: War Department OPLAN Northwest Africa Theater 
The AFHQ deployed to Algiers to control an operation that had been coordinated in less 
than four months, but it was also a problem that had been studied off and on since December 
1941.  The U.S. War Department had published a hefty document titled “War Department 
OPLAN Northwest Africa Theater” on 20 February 1942 and had continued to work with the 
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British to refine the plan into early April.18  The earliest ideas for how the United States would 
conduct operations in Northwest Africa, in cooperation with the United Kingdom and a 
compliant Vichy France, were outlined there.  The document was written by the GHQ G5 (a pre-
cursor to the War Department’s OPD) and included a base order and dozens of annexes.  The 
document outlined an Allied occupation of northwestern Africa to preclude a German move 
through Spain to do the same.  The document included G4 and ordnance annexes, and a complete 
copy was found in the SOS, NATOUSA operational plans files after the war.19  The list of 
assumptions driving the plan included slight (or no) resistance by Vichy French forces, a U.S. 
theater commander but largely independent British operations within the Mediterranean, and a 
total commitment of six divisions.20  The plan included the assumption that “local labor will be 
sufficient to handle supplies and cargo” for the Allied force.21  This incorrect assumption was 
retained for the duration of the campaign, and it caused numerous problems in maintaining and 
operating the railroads and in keeping a truck shuttle system running from the ports to the rear of 
the 1st Army combat zone.  According to the draft plan, the British would land at Algiers and 
then occupy Algeria and Tunisia while U.S. forces seized Casablanca and northern French 
Morocco prior to linking up with the British in Algeria.  Upon unification the British force would 
fall under American control.  It is obvious that some of these assumptions and concepts survived 
the frenzied planning of August through October 1942 even if they did not make perfect sense 
based on current conditions. 
 
18 Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942 (Washington, D.C:  
Chief of Military History, 1953), 176.  The final version was written by a joint coalition body of planners answering 
to the CCS.  American officers on the War Department and Service of Supply staff were involved in this lengthy and 
far reaching project.  A copy of the entire document, with annexes, was filed for record by the AG for the SOS, 
NATOUSA.     
19 SOS, NATOUSA, Operations Plans File, RG 492, NARA II.   
20 Ibid, 1-2. 
21 Ibid, 2. 
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 The authors of the G4 annex grappled with how to sustain three unidentified U.S. 
divisions landing at Casablanca in the assault wave with perhaps one or more divisions arriving 
in a second wave.  Other than vague references to linking up with the British in Algeria there 
was no sense of the flow of the overall campaign, and therefore, no way to anticipate how to 
logistically support it.  The logistical planners did understand that “motor vehicles will be the 
principle (sic) means of transportation, augmented by existing railroad facilities.”22  The plan 
stated that engineers would operate the railroads, a directive out of touch with recent moves to 
establish and define the role of the Transportation Service in the U.S. Army.  Seemingly a minor 
issue, this would nonetheless lead to some confusion and wasted energy between BG Larkin and 
MG Hughes near the end of the campaign as the two leaders traded a series of notes to one 
another in April 1943 trying to determine exactly who was responsible for what. 23  Larkin was 
forced to point out to his boss that both doctrine and early guidance provided to assist with 
planning for Torch had assigned responsibility for new construction and major repair work to the 
engineers and not to the Director General of the Military Railway Service.  It was not a good 
omen for clearly understood division of responsibility if senior commanders were debating the 
issue in April 1943.   
Planners in the War Department hoped that most of the French rail equipment would be 
voluntarily handed over in good working order.  According to the plan, Morocco had 133 
engines and 4,088 freight cars that could constitute twelve trains daily, each train carrying 240 
tons of equipment.  It was also noted that Casablanca harbor could shelter 43 ships with room 
 
22 Ibid, 11. 
23 Letter from Larkin to Hughes 15 April 1943.  MG Larkin file, SOS, NATOUSA, RG 492, NARA II. 
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enough for eighteen of them to berth at any one time, and there were plenty of cranes and other 
equipment for handling already in position.   
After the assault wave, the force would be supported by five reinforcing convoys, 
generally arriving about once a month.  The critical priority for convoy one was fighter aircraft, 
the priority for convoy two was not designated – it would respond to theater priorities; convoy 
three would deliver dive bombers, and convoys four and five would prioritize tanks.  The plan 
also called for fantastic levels of reserves for each class of supply, preferring 30-45 days of 
supply and at least twelve units of fire for every major weapon system.  But the plan did not 
explain how these mountains of supply would be stashed in warehouses around Casablanca or 
shuttled to the east once it was time to link up with the British.  The British would be responsible 
for their own resupply from the U.K, which added to the complexity of the operation but also 
provided the opportunity to make up for problems with logistics on the U.S. end.   Finally, G4 
planners emphasized the criticality of properly marking containers and pieces of equipment in 
accordance with the Army regulation covering this subject, AR 30-1190.  It was good advice that 
was not followed; improperly marked containers were a major cause of the initial backlog along 
the docks that developed at Casablanca and Oran.  
 One annex outlined the concept for ordnance support, which, at this point in U.S. Army 
organization, was the plan to maintain all aircraft and tracked and wheeled vehicles and to 
provide ammunition to ground and air units.  The plan assumed that ordnance service troops 
consisting of about 2,600 men would be included in the deployment schedule.  This force would 
be sufficient to support four divisions, as well as corps troops and three aviation groups. This 
would include a repair battalion, an ammunition handling battalion, and an aviation mixed-
detachment of about two battalions including mechanics and ammunition handlers.  There was 
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no transportation annex, since this service was too new to have staked out distinct mission areas 
that were universally understood by other branches and services.  This was one of many 
examples of a persistent blindness across the U.S. Army to the criticality of distribution networks 
managed above the army or army group level.24     
    
 The Updated Scheme of Maneuver and Sustainment Concept 
At the beginning of August there was a lot of difference between the U.S. and British 
concepts for how the invasion would unfold.  The initial American position was more risk-
adverse, likely affected by the exclusively American operation to establish a base at Casablanca 
before moving inland.  Only after securing a base on Africa’s Atlantic coast would U.S. divisions 
advance into Spanish Morocco to open the Mediterranean.  The British were comfortable with 
staging a simultaneous landing in Algiers while the Americans seized Casablanca.  It was only in 
early September that the final version of the assault plan was approved, calling for three separate 
task forces landing at Casablanca, Oran, and Algiers.  Planning in something of a logistical 
vacuum, the team agreed upon the desired strength for each assault force.25 The Western Task 
Force would sail from the eastern coast of the United States and land 29,000 men around 
Casablanca.  The Central Task Force would form in Great Britain and put 25,000 Americans 
 
24 COL (later MG) Frank Ross, the ETO chief of transportation, probably got it.  Gale referenced a staff paper 
written by Ross in September that explained how shortages among the various modes of transportation would 
impact the campaign at various stages.  Even if AFHQ realized they needed a long-distance distribution system, they 
hoped 1st Army and the British 1st LoC command would solve the problem.  Also, they did not foresee the need to 
move American units from the CTF or WTF to Tunisia as quickly as the situation demanded.  Finally, shipping 
limitations drove massive reductions in the number of vehicles delivered in the first three convoys; AFHQ would 
have faced a tough battle adding theater truck companies to the prioritized deployment list.  Eisenhower only saw 
the light by mid-January 1943. 
25 Richard M Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy 1940-1943 (Washington, D.C.: 
Center of Military History, 1955), 420-426. 
 
101 
 
ashore around Oran.  The Eastern Task Force would also arrive from Britain and land 10,000 
Americans in the first wave before (with any luck) landing follow-on U.K. forces a few days 
later.  The British hoped to land at the end of October, but Eisenhower projected 8 November as 
more realistic.  There was only a vague understanding of what would happen once the invasion 
was ashore and Vichy officials came around to the idea of cooperation.  Eventually 1st Army 
would move east into Tunisia, either to link up with the French or to defeat early Axis 
reinforcements.  It was hoped that 1st Army could help 8th Army destroy the German and Italian 
forces in Libya and Egypt. 
 The term “sustainment plan” is misleading for Operation Torch.  It might be more 
accurate to refer to two plans: a convoy plan and a theater communications zone plan.  For 
logistics to work in North Africa, the plan had to blend two interlocking but separate activities: 
moving the right mountain of vehicles, personnel, and supplies to ports in Northwestern Africa 
for months on end; and shifting those assets forward into the combat zone.  AFHQ understood 
and addressed the first portion, but it delegated too much of the second task to 1st British Army, 
assuming the theater command would have time to flesh out the system once the joint 
headquarters had relocated to Algiers.  The first phase of the sustainment problem was complex 
and consumed most of the attention of the AFHQ and ASF planners, and, to a large extent, 
resourcing and coordinating the details were out of Eisenhower’s hands.  The second phase was 
not prioritized by AFHQ; what would happen if 1st Army made contact with a sizable German or 
Italian force before reaching northern Tunisia was not addressed in any helpful way.  There was 
no Plan B for moving U.S. units into the fight or for sustaining a large Allied force in the 
mountains of Tunisia.   
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 The two major gaps in the Allied plan for logistical support on the continent were the 
result of two separate decisions.  First, 1st Army was given control over the Line of 
Communications command (L of C in British terminology) and its rear area operating zone until 
some projected date when control would pass to AFHQ.  This occurred officially on 1 January, 
but Gale had assumed effective control by 3 December 1943.26  As a result, 1st Army owned the 
planning process, coordination with the War Office, and supervision of the first few weeks of the 
campaign.  Theoretically there was nothing wrong with that decision, but in hindsight Gale 
believed 1st Army held on to that authority for about a month too long.  But during the planning 
process for Torch Gale insisted on establishing a liaison element, headed by the 1st Army deputy 
quartermaster general, at AFHQ to reduce overlap and delays.  Gale and his British logisticians 
knew was 1st Army was planning, but the Americans were noticeably missing.27  The U.S. G-1 
and G-4 were not effective integrated with their British counterparts until January and a 
combined logistics planning section created until early February.   Gale and his counterpart at 1st 
Army felt they had a good handle on how the early ground campaign would unfold, but U.S. and 
joint (air force and navy) requirements remained something of a wild card. 
 The first maintenance project, or scheme of logistical support, was developed by 1st 
Army in early September and validated by Gale and the Inter-Services Committee in October.28  
Anderson’s goal was to capture Tunis and Bizerte by D+24, or around 3 December.  The first 
intermediate objective was to reach Bougie and Setif and be ready to continue on to Philippeville 
by 20 November.  Bône was the second objective and base area, which would be run by British 
 
26 Carter and Kann, 6-7, 24.  
27 Carter and Kann, 7-8.  AFHQ had a British logistical plans section from the outset, with the three traditional 
departments, AQMG, DAQMG, DAD Transportation, and small clerical staff operating under Gale’s direction.  An 
Inter-Services Planning Committee was set up in August 42 and the British chief of logistical plans from AFHQ 
attended these meetings.   
28 Carter and Kann, 11. 
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support troops arriving on convoy KM 3 around 22 November.  The team believed they had 
sufficient resources to support the campaign, but worried that all of these units had no combat 
experience.29  There were never going to be enough ships to move everything as soon as 
everyone wanted, so 1st Army established a set of priorities to guide the flow of service units into 
theater.  Units that would help maintain the initial landing parties by unloading supplies over 
open beaches were the highest priority, followed by units that unloaded ships and pushed the 
supplies forward, and finally, troops that would work the line of communication by hauling 
supplies up to the front line were the least critical.30  In the end 1st Army believed it had 
everything it needed on the first three convoys to sustain a drive that could reach the two large 
ports in northern Tunisia.  But Gale and the planners at 1st Army failed to anticipate how much 
they would have to help the RAF and U.S. Army with logistical support east of Algiers, which 
overturned the finally tuned balance of combat and service troops distributed across the first four 
convoys landing in North Africa.31     
During the fall AFHQ admitted that they would probably need to merge the three services 
of supply within each task force as the campaign progressed.  AFHQ planners also indicated that 
they would delegate the authority and resources necessary for 1st Army to supervise sustainment 
in the combat zone after being joined by U.S. units.  Marshall and Eisenhower traded thoughts 
on the best way to organize logistical support in North Africa in September and October, and 
Marshall agreed with Eisenhower that replicating the structure currently in place in Great Britain 
would not be a good solution.  Marshall’s reply to Eisenhower on the subject concluded: “The 
organization of HQ ETO and the HQ SOS in Great Britain has proven so uneconomical in 
 
29 Carter and Kann, 13. 
30 Carter and Kann, 14.   
31 Carter and Kann, 22. 
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personnel and so unsatisfactory in coordination between the two headquarters that AF ought not 
to repeat the errors.”32  Eisenhower and Smith must have agreed, and Gale planned on running 
Allied logistics himself for as long as possible, with no intermediate headquarters between 
AFHQ and the task forces or 1st Army.   
Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ) published its first draft of their logistics plan on 27 
October 1942, and it did so only after prodding by the U.S. War Department Service of Supply 
command (the future ASF).  AFHQ found it difficult to prepare adequately for the coming 
invasion, and setting down written instructions on how the headquarters wanted to operate in 
theater was considered a secondary priority.  The paucity of details contained in the draft 
submitted at the end of October, and the time required to turn that draft into a final version 
illustrated the problems the AFHQ staff was wrestling with.  The AFHQ logistics plan was 
finalized on 4 December, almost a month after Torch began.33   
The final version of the sustainment plan focused on who was in charge of supplying 
each task force, the boundaries for three base areas (eventually one per U.S. task force and major 
port), the required stockage levels by class of supply, and the places in the United States and 
Great Britain from which supplies would travel.  In hindsight, all three versions of the logistics 
plan for Gymnast or Torch were missing a couple of key components.  The plan gave no detail 
on how a theater distribution network would be established.  Exactly how supplies would be 
moved from the port region to the forward dumps over poor roads and one rail line and then be 
forwarded to the combat divisions was not addressed.  What would have been very helpful was 
 
32 History of AFHQ, 198.  Marshall made this comment in September or October 1942.  Taken in context with the 
developments that will be covered in the next chapter, Marshall was calling for a merged theater and SOS 
headquarters, and not talking about the manning of AFHQ or its relationship with any U.S.-only organization.  The 
practical application is that ETOUSA (and its SOS) should manage all U.S. administrative functions in North Africa.        
33 George F. Howe, Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of 
Military History, Department of the Army, 1957), 66-67. 
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an estimate of what 1st Army would need to sustain not only British forces but also two to four 
American divisions and any air elements stationed east of Algeria.  Based on experience 
gathered over the coming year, the logistics estimate for the campaign should have listed service 
units and special equipment required, and outlined the procedures of how to report shortages 
within American units attached to a British field army.   
Finally, a projection of what the final Allied footprint in northern Tunisia would look like 
at the end of the campaign would have been helpful.  Bizerte was the logical place for the 
Germans and Italians to try to intervene, or the best base from which to try to interdict the 
resupply or evacuation of Panzer Army Africa.  It may very well have been the best assembly 
area for a follow-on campaign to capture western Libya and force Rommel to fight in two 
directions.  What would be required to direct and sustain the forces in each of these 
contingencies?  A joint estimate aimed at defining the general parameters of these options would 
have outlined the various service headquarters needed to direct their efforts and the support 
troops needed to sustain their work.  The estimate also suggested a general timeline for the 
activation of intermediate service headquarters as they became necessary. Allied leaders knew 
they had an insufficient concept to drive the preparation for the next stage of the campaign 
beyond the initial landings and a lunge for northern Tunisia, but they ran out of time to address it 
before the invasion.  They believed they would have time to work it all out once in Algeria, 
because they understood the fact that the limited infrastructure would slow the movement of 
Americans to join the eastern task force.  The most significant variable was how the enemy 
would react to the invasion, and, until the Germans tipped their hand, detailed planning would be 
problematic.  Lacking both practical experience and well-developed doctrine to guide their 
efforts, the AFHQ did not know how to focus their preparations on the most critical aspects of 
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the campaign.  Lacking a practical understanding of how shortcuts in resourcing the 
communications zone would limit tactical options in the combat zone, the opportunity for an 
overwhelming victory as soon as December 1942 slipped through the Allies’ grasp.   
   
 Sustainment Phase One: Deployment 
Simultaneous planning at various echelons in the chain of command was a painful 
necessity for the Allied expeditionary force from August to October.  The War Department 
(specifically the Operations Division, or OPD), ASF, and WTF operational planning staffs 
started working together in early August, making assumptions about the most desirable troop list, 
timeline, and overarching campaign plan.  Who exactly was in charge of what was a jumbled 
mess.  In the end a balanced team of OPD, ASF, and WTF planners coordinated with AFHQ to 
get a force equipped and mounted for movement to Morocco.  OPD and ASF were forced to plan 
at two levels: one focused on the overall Torch invasion and subsequent build-up, and the other 
oriented on the details associated with moving the WTF.  It was not until 2 September that OPD 
could publish the list of divisions in the United States that would participate in the operation.34  
OPD and ASF relied on ETOUSA and AFHQ to get the U.S. forces in Great Britain ready for the 
invasion.  The 1st Infantry, 1st Armored, and 34th Infantry divisions would deploy from Great 
Britain, and prove to be the tougher problem for the ASF.  The desire to plan things in detail well 
in advance of deadlines proved to be impossible because no one really understood how the 
 
34 Leighton and Coakley, 426.  The troops were projected to arrive in three waves: 3rd and 9th ID and 2nd AD in 
wave one; 3rd AD in wave two (support for this division was complicated by the fact that the first brigade was 
equipped with Grants rather than Shermans); and 4th, 36th, and 45th ID in wave three.  Each wave also brought in 
headquarters, service, and non-divisional support troops.  Shipping and port constraints extended the movement to 
four waves.  Table 9 on page 437. 
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movement by sea was going to work, nor did they realize the last-minute heroics that would be 
necessary to make up shortages of equipment and supplies. 
 The three divisions in Britain had been rushed overseas and were missing critical organic 
equipment.  The 1st Infantry deployed without its artillery and the 34th ID still had its old World 
War I howitzers.35  Much worse news arrived from Eisenhower on 8 September – a fourteen-
page list of missing supplies and equipment needed to pull off the attack from Britain, amounting 
to 344,000 ship tons of cargo.36  COL Hughes, the senior American SOS planner attached to 
AFHQ to help plan Operation Torch, had discovered these issues by going door to door to all of 
the service chiefs at Cheltenham inquiring about their shortages.37  By 4 September Hughes had 
turned this into an official memo to share with the War Department and AFHQ staff.  There were 
some outright shortages, primarily in artillery, anti-tank guns, small arms, a few categories of 
ammunition, and trucks for the Central Task Force, but for the most part Hughes was pointing 
out insufficient supplies of repair and replacement items.38  This early in the war the U.S. Army 
was still in the process of outfitting its first divisions and air groups with modern equipment; the 
units that had been rushed to the U.K. went with obsolescent heavy weapons or outright 
shortages.  Eisenhower passed along a consolidated list of his missing items to Washington on 14 
September.   The ordnance portion of the report identified the key shortages that had to be 
addressed before the launch of Torch: 38 75mm SP guns, 32 75mm SP howitzers, seven towed 
 
35 Ibid, 424-425.  
36 Ibid, 429. 
37 Diary, August 1942, Box I-2, Everett S. Hughes Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.   
38 “Report from Ordnance Chief, SOS, ETO” 4 Sep 42.  Hughes focused on a lack of repair parts for rifles, machine 
guns, indirect fire control equipment, and howitzers.  Repair parts for wheeled and tracked combat vehicles were in 
short supply, but at least 15 DOS were on hand; there were almost no repair parts or replacement major assemblies 
for wheeled support vehicles.  There were less than five units of fire for some weapons, to include rifles, BARs, and 
105mm artillery.  Radio batteries were also in short supply.  Although the document would go on to report a massive 
number of shortages, work arounds existed to preserve Allied tactical flexibility.  The late identification of these 
problems caused a lot of stress among the staff, but did not impact operations in North Africa.  Box I-6, ESHP. 
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artillery pieces (105mm and 155mm), 114 37mm anti-tank guns, 200 company and battalion 
mortar tubes, 4,200 rifles, 10,000 pistols, and repair parts for the lot.39  The cable also pointed 
out that the central task force was short 3,800 2.5-ton GMC trucks and 200 heavy tractors, but in 
the next few weeks the coalition planning team would realize they did not have enough ships to 
move all of these vehicles with the assault force at the same time anyway.   Meanwhile, Hughes 
and Eisenhower had just dropped a major problem in the War Department’s lap.      
It did not help that the SOS in Washington and the port command in New York could 
produce records indicating that most of the missing equipment had already been shipped to the 
U.K.  In the SOS’s defense, they had only been operating for about three months by this point, 
and they had not integrated any meaningful number of U.S. service troops until early August.  
The first shipments of supplies had been received and dispersed by the British, and now no one 
could figure out where everything was stored.  Containers arrived in country with vague or 
missing shipping labels, and record keeping on where cargo had ended up was non-existent.  
COL Frank Ross, the chief of transportation at ETOUSA, conducted a survey over the summer 
of 1943 that helped reveal the scope of the problem.  Ross examined all the cargo on one ship 
coming from the United States and discovered that 30% was not marked at all.  Of the remaining 
items, 25% had no delivery address.40  Record-keeping in depots and warehouses located all 
around Great Britain was no better.  Yes, the material had been shipped, but it had seemingly 
disappeared, and now the most important items would have to be replaced.    
New material to make up the critical shortages would have to be loaded in the States and 
arrive in Britain for distribution to the assault forces before their loading date of D-14, or around 
 
39 Cable 1949, 14 Sep 42, Eisenhower to AGWAR.  Box I-6, ESHP.   
40 Leighton and Coakley, 333. 
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20 October.  Slow convoys from New York to the British Isles took about fifteen days, so the 
ASF had less than a month to find and load the equipment for Eisenhower.  They were not 
successful.  Convoys left the United States, usually late and anywhere from half to three-quarters 
full, headed to the United Kingdom, Oran, or Casablanca, where their cargo was then moved by 
rail to Oran.41  By late September BG Hughes was so concerned about remaining shortages that 
he advised his superiors at AFHQ to postpone the invasion until 15 December; General Clark 
would not even consider the idea.42  Some of the requested material reached North Africa just 
before December, but over two-thirds was unloaded in Britain where it was added to the pile of 
critical items awaiting movement to Algiers.  U.S. planners at AFHQ still had a lot to learn about 
how far into the future they had to be thinking, the practical cutoff for changes and new requests, 
and the implications of missing those deadlines.  The implications of the September supply crisis 
were the expenditure of a lot of effort with no positive outcome, clogging the distribution system 
with irrelevant supplies, and the deterioration of trust among the ASF, ETOUSA, and AFHQ 
staffs.  In the short term the pain associated with the emergency demand for supplies from the 
United States was unproductive and avoidable, but it was necessary in the long term to fuel 
learning and reform that would occur in 1943. 
 The worst blow of all came between 17 and 28 September.  Until then, planners had 
ignored the tricky calculus needed to figure out exactly how many men or tons of equipment 
could arrive with each convoy.  It really was an algebra equation, and one that the AFHQ staff 
only got around to solving at the end of September.  Time and experience would demonstrate 
that this was the fundamental business of effective strategic and operational staffs; but in the late 
 
41 Leighton and Coakley, 434-435.  The emergency list generated by Eisenhower’s Message 1949 got tangled up in 
the routine convoy schedule moving between New York and Britain and the ever-changing material lists for UG-2.   
42 Hughes diary, September 1942.  ESHP, LoC. 
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summer of 1942 the Americans were just not there yet.  They had committed a common mistake 
– they had dreamed up a scheme of maneuver and then tried to see if it was possible to move 
everything at the same time and then sustain it once it was all in place.  The experts realized that 
Eisenhower’s initial plan was impossible to carry out, and by 28 September they had worked out 
a convoy schedule that was grounded in reality.43   
 The maximum size of each convoy depended on two independent variables.  The first 
non-negotiable variable was the number of anchorage sites at each port that the Allies hoped to 
control in North Africa.  Linked to this number was an estimate of how long it would take to 
unload each ship and how much risk the navy was willing to accept by allowing loaded ships to 
loiter in submarine- and airplane-infested outer harbors.  In hindsight this was not the limiting 
factor.  The second independent variable was the number of combat escorts offered up for Torch 
by the U.S. Navy and Royal Navy and the fixed ratio of combatants to non-combatants that the 
U.S. Navy used as their planning factors.  The navies would take a little more risk with the slow 
convoys used to move material and supplies but not with the fast convoys carrying thousands of 
human beings.  Equipment and a couple of dozen merchant marine crewmen were expendable in 
the big picture; thousands of soldiers were not.  This proved to be the factor really limiting both 
the number of cargo ships within each convoy and the frequency with which new convoys could 
depart the United States or Great Britain.44  When the professionals compared the number of 
ships available within each convoy with the number of men and tons of equipment and supplies 
 
43 Leighton and Coakley, 435-439. 
44 Ibid, 436.  Table 8, “Anticipated Port and Convoy Limitations for Slow Convoys to North Africa: September 
1942,” and associated text explain all the variables and conclusions.  The text is incorrect in concluding that both 
independent variables led to the same limiting factor of 100 ships in theater at any one time.  The Allies found ways 
to unload ships, both berthed and out in the harbor, much quicker than their earliest estimates had indicated.  See 
page 468.  But the Navy stuck to their guns on 45 ships per convoy (UG and KM) and would not assign more 
escorts.     
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to be moved, they realized something had to give.  Eisenhower and his planning team decided to 
prioritize men over equipment, and the extravagant earlier estimates for reserve days of supply 
and units of fire were slashed to the bone.45  More troubling was the decision to cut down the 
total number of wheeled vehicles from the central and eastern task forces; the late September 
estimate of cutting only 25% of the trucks gave way to a more realistic estimate on 14 October 
that half of the trucks would have to go.46  Patton’s WTF experienced the same pain; when 
General Clark elected to preserve a 167,000 man force, equipment and supply reserves were the 
bill payers.  
 
 Sustainment Phase Two: Operations on the Continent 
Early in the planning process the AFHQ sustainment team did not understand the scheme 
of maneuver.  As of 22 August, it was assumed that there would be only two assault task forces, 
one at Casablanca and one at Algiers.  Each task force would have its own service of supply to 
direct the assigned sustainment troops; they would unload supplies at the port and then move 
them forward to the tactical units.  Eventually the two task forces would merge under 1st Army 
with one overarching SOS, but the timing was purposely vague.47  Two weeks later the planning 
group understood that it needed to sustain three task forces, and their efforts intensified when 
Gale informed them that the deputy commander, MG Mark Clark, expected a draft 
administrative plan by 19 September.48  This had to be frustrating since the planners still did not 
 
45 Ibid, 437-38. 
46 A process illustrated by the notes from the CAO meetings in September and October outlined below. 
47 CAO Conference Notes, 22 August.   
48 CAO Conference Notes, 12 September.   
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have sufficient details on the size of the invasion force or the associated convoy schedule to land 
and sustain the three elements.49 
 The core of the AFHQ planning staff received assistance from other U.S. and British 
organizations, to include the SOS of ETOUSA.  COL Frank S. Ross, the chief of transportation 
at ETOUSA, was a key early addition to the team, and an officer who would play an important 
role in trying to sustain the drive across France in 1944.  Ross worked with the ASF to match the 
inland transportation requirements against the projected invasion force.  Gale called attention to 
an early estimate written by Ross during the 19 September conference on administrative 
coordination and advised all the planners to study the document.  Ross was wrestling with the 
fact that the Moroccan ports could handle more tonnage than the projected transportation force 
could shuttle to Oran.  Ross assumed that the Allies could run five military trains a day from 
Casablanca to Oran, and that the service forces would have 8,000 2.5-ton trucks with trailers 
available as well.  Based on these capabilities, the U.S. would have to underutilize Casablanca or 
find additional rail or truck assets to move 60,000 additional short tons a month from Morocco to 
the front.50  Only his first assumption proved to be accurate during the first two months of the 
campaign, meaning that the transportation shortage was even more pressing than Ross had 
predicted.     
Helpful details continued to emerge as the planners raced against the deadline for loading 
ships along the eastern U.S. seaboard.  By 23 September the team knew that they would have to 
 
49 Ibid, 12 September 1942.  Eisenhower sent his final proposed convoy schedule to the War Department on 27 
September.  This was the first convoy schedule that took into account Navy requirements for minimum speed of 
merchant vessels, escort to merchant ratios, berthing space at the ports in North Africa, and Eisenhower’s desired 
troop strengths by convoy.  See Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy 1940-
1943 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1955), 435-438 for the adjustments to the scheme of maneuver 
and convoy plan after the staff figured out the relevant limiting factors.  
50 Leighton and Coakley, 469.  Table 12 is based on a series of planning memos circulating between the extended 
AFHQ planning team and the SOS/ASF staff in Washington, D.C. 
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support a force of thirteen divisions, nine U.S. and four British, and their associated headquarters 
and supporting combat and service troops.  AFHQ assumed that the Allies would have 90 days to 
set conditions for two U.S. divisions to be operating with 1st Army along the eastern Algerian 
border with their logistical support flowing through Algiers.51  Primary administrative concerns 
haunting Gale and his team during the second half of September continued to be coal, fuel, and 
ammunition requirements.52  The debate over coal revolved around establishing a realistic 
estimate that included civil and military requirements and identified whether the coal would 
come from the United States or Great Britain.  This was important because for every ton of coal 
loaded on a ship there would be one less ton of equipment and supplies for the combat forces.  
The concern with fuel was not just about moving it in bulk to North Africa. Also crucial was the 
requirement to move it inland with a mixture of a new pipeline, bulk wheeled tankers, 55-gallon 
barrels, and five-gallon jerry cans.  The ordnance planners could not progress beyond 
generalities until the G3 established exactly what a unit of fire was for every weapon system in 
both the U.S. and British inventory.53        
One of the most significant problems that some senior leaders realized would plague the 
campaign was a shortage of trained and equipped service troops; logistics units would comprise 
 
51 CAO Conference Notes, 23 September 1942. 
52 CAO Conference Notes, 18, 21, 28, and 30 September. 
53 Gale turned over ammunition questions to the G3 rep at his daily conference on 28 and 30 September.  It was a 
complex issue because the G3 had to establish not only the total number of rounds that would constitute a unit of fire 
but also the percent of different shell and fuse types.  As an example, the G3 issued guidance on 28 September that 
the 25-pounder (a medium howitzer) unit of fire would consist of 90% high explosive, 10% smoke, and 5% overage 
(of the normal unit of fire) for anti-tank ammunition. Similar guidance had to be published for hundreds of direct 
and indirect fire weapon systems.  Although the U.S. and British shared a large number of weapon types, it could 
not be assumed that their units of fire were the same, either.  Unit of fire is a complex concept that was sometimes 
mistakenly equated to a daily consumption rate in heavy combat.  Weapon units of fire were aggregated at the 
formation level (platoon, company, battery, squadron, etc.) to designate the number of rounds carried organically to 
sustain a few days of intense combat.  As a unit was in sustained combat for a day or more the service chain would 
push forward a replacement unit of fire.  The modern military term is a “basic load.” 
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only 11.8% of the U. S. Army at the end of 1942.54  Somervell and Leroy Lutes (the operations 
officer for SOS/ASF) had seen the problem coming.  During a visit to the United Kingdom in the 
spring of 1942 the two leaders realized that the U.S. Army had committed an organizational error 
in putting all service forces at the level of field army and below while retaining doctrine that 
called for a separate COMZ.  ETOUSA needed separate service companies and battalions to 
accomplish its mission, and these forces were not currently available without taking them from 
their associated armies, corps, and divisions.55  Upon his return to the United States in June, 
Somervell submitted a request to increase the SOS by 625,000 men in 1942 to fill out these units.  
But Marshall could not absorb these numbers without wrecking the plan for balanced expansion, 
and the War Department authorized an increase of only 200,000 men for 1942.  Regardless, the 
SOS could not form, train, and equip these units in the four months available before Torch.  
Eisenhower recognized the likely impact of the shortage himself.  After stripping everything 
possible out of ETOUSA, he still needed significant reinforcements of service troops from the 
United States to cover his requirements.  But at the end of October Marshall and Somervell knew 
the training base was empty and told Eisenhower he would have to make up his shortages from 
British troops or native labor in North Africa.56  It was not until the end of March 1943 that 
AFHQ and ASF believed that the right balance of combat, aviation, and service troops had been 
achieved in theater.    
 The U.S. and British plan was well thought out and properly resourced with operators, 
mechanics, and line maintenance teams.  Both teams hoped that French engines and rolling stock 
would meet most needs but submitted an estimate for material to be delivered from the United 
 
54 Ruppenthal, Vol I, 56.  By the end of World War I, service troops accounted for 34% of the AEF in France.   
55 John D. Millett, The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military 
History, 1954), 59. 
56 Leighton and Coakley, 480.   
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States just to make sure.  The task was complicated by the fact that the United States and United 
Kingdom operated with a standard-gauge rail system while the French had built lines based on 
the metric-gauge in North Africa.  If the AFHQ discovered they had to import equipment, it 
would be much easier to find standard-gauge cars, but they would have to be converted for use 
on the metric-gauge lines.  The early joint estimate on what would need to be imported was 250 
standard- and 175 metric-gauge engines and 5,000 freight cars of various types and gauges.57  
This equipment was given a relatively low priority, and the first pieces did not arrive in North 
Africa until January 1943.  Specialized transportation units would land with the U.S. assault 
forces at Casablanca and Oran to repair and run trains; the British would follow on 13 November 
at Algiers.  One American and one British rail-operating company would land with the initial 
assault, to be joined by headquarters, construction, and repair units on KM and UG-2.58  
Orleansville was selected as the initial dividing point between the two national efforts.59  The 
British would work on two priorities simultaneously.  Priority A was to restore the coastal route 
from Algiers to Bougie, then inland to Setif and Constantine, and then westward to connect with 
the Americans at Orleansville.  Priority B was the line from Bône running along the coast to La 
Calle, then inland along the Algerian-Tunisian border, and finally back to link in with the Algiers 
system and Philippeville and Constantine.60 Leaders would be provided by U.S. COL C.L. 
Burpee of the 703rd Railway Grand Division landing at Casablanca and LTC E.T. Barrett of the 
761st Railway Transportation Company at Oran.  The British planned to include a few officers 
 
57 AFHQ Military Railway Service, “Chronological Statement of North African Railway Operations” 30 Nov 43, 4.  
Transportation Section, MTOUSA, RG 492, NARA II. 
58 Ibid, 1-4. 
59 The modern Algerian town of Chlef which is about equidistant between Oran and Algiers.   
60 “…North African Railway Operations”, 2. 
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from the Headquarter, No. 1 Railway Operations Group with the operating company landed at 
Algiers on 13 November. 
 A Shortage of Naval Escorts Unravels the Plan 
In early October the implications of the reduced tonnage estimates for the first few 
convoys began to hit home.  At the daily meeting on 2 October the 1st Army representative 
briefed that they were cutting 260 vehicles from KM 3, primarily 3-ton lorries, based on recent 
guidance on the anticipated size of the convoy and the prioritization of manpower over 
equipment.61  The next day the news got worse; informed that the RAF would send considerable 
numbers of crated fighter aircraft starting with KM-3, 1st Army reported that they would have to 
increase the projected cuts to supply trucks up to 415.  Gale lost the fight to find another ship to 
carry these planes and his suggestion to the Chief of Staff to prioritize trucks over aircraft was 
denied.62  Near the end of the month 1st Army was back, talking about cutting 400 more wheeled 
vehicles; everyone in attendance was aware that the continued cuts were putting at risk the 
ability to move cargo from the docks into local warehouses and then forward to the fighting 
troops.63    
 
61 CAO Conference Notes, 2 October 1942.  All convoys from Britain to Oran or Algiers began with “KM”.  US 
convoys to North Africa started with “UG”.  This was followed by a “S” or “F” to designate slow and fast convoys.  
Fast convoys carried troops while slow convoys carried supplies, equipment, and vehicles.  Slow and fast were 
relative terms.   The minimal speeds necessary to join one of these convoys were established by the escorting navy.  
The number following the two or three letter code equated to the wave of convoys; there was a new convoy from 
Britain about every 15 days, and every 21 days from the United States.  Three-ton lorries were the 2.5-ton GMCs of 
the British Army. 
62 CAO Conference Notes, 5 October 1942.  The system used to track major administrative issues through resolution 
(for better or worse from the perspective of the logistics community) was impressive.  Each issue received a distinct 
number, and Gale hounded the staff on open issues until they were closed out.  Every problem raised in this forum 
was closed out in a few days and never more than a week.  If someone forgot about a problem, Gale would bring it 
up and demand an answer after a few days without a progress report.  The distribution list for the daily meeting 
notes grew from ten recipients on 22 August to 38 by 2 October. 
63 CAO Conference Notes, 23 October 1942.   
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The U.S. trend of prioritizing immediate combat power at the expense of the means 
necessary to sustain men and equipment with spare parts, ammunition, and fuel continued 
throughout the planning phase of Torch.  It was a habit that Eisenhower found difficult to 
consistently break over the next two years.  It seemed that Eisenhower and Clark could not 
envision the repercussions of their priorities and that no one on the staff could help them 
recognize how these decisions would play out in Tunisia.64  In the interest of reducing risk to the 
initial landing, Eisenhower was actually projecting additional risk into follow-on stages of the 
operation.  By weighting the first strike with assault troops, supporting fires, and follow-on 
combat troops, the chance that the initial landing would be successful increased.  But it also 
meant that the force would have a harder time transitioning to mobile operations designed to 
exploit the landing and would be slower in developing the logistical capacity of nearby ports and 
in restoring the transportation infrastructure.  Avoiding casualties during the initial landing was 
laudable, but rushing to Bizerte and Tunis may have been more economical in the long run.  
Managing risk is an art, not a science, but Eisenhower always seemed uncomfortable accepting 
any risk during the landing phase, even if he understood it might produce disadvantages during 
the exploitation phase.   
 This had to be a frustrating and surreal experience for logisticians at the theater and task 
force levels.   On 15 October Gale reminded the audience of an upcoming commanders’ 
conference to be held the next day.  The purpose of the event was to discuss the scheme of 
maneuver for each task force; Gale wanted to ensure that SOS chiefs attended as well, ready to 
 
64 Eisenhower was consistent.  Over the next eighteen months he repeatedly prioritized reducing the risk to the initial 
landings, even if this increased the chance that it would be more difficult to conduct follow-on operations.  
Eventually the logisticians around him developed techniques to help explain the connected nature of these decisions.  
By early January AFHQ had a good understanding of the interrelationship between transportation and front-line 
combat strength, and it produced a succinct appreciation in late January to explain why each additional combat unit 
in Tunisia had to be matched with an increase in service troops along the entire line of communications. 
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answer any questions about the scheme of support.  This conference triggered the publication of 
two important draft plans for Torch, a supply plan and a concept of support on the continent.  
The two-page AFHQ supply plan, written largely to satisfy the U.S. SOS at the War Department, 
spelled out how each task force would be periodically resupplied and how that plan would 
evolve over time.65  The plan formalized earlier oral agreements on supplying the Western Task 
Force from the U.S., the Eastern Task Force from the U.K., and a blended system for the Central 
Task Force.  Initially the Central Task Force would be supplied from the United Kingdom; but 
by the third or fourth convoy from the U.S., their base would switch to the U.S.  The plan also 
made explicit how each task force would requisition supplies from the appropriate base, flowing 
from the task force SOS through AFHQ and then back to the applicable national structure in the 
U.S or U.K.  In any case, ETOUSA did not have an acknowledged role in the process, despite 
Hughes’ attempt to add them to the mix.66  
The second document, sent from the G4 to Gale for staffing on 2 October, was a first stab 
at how the AFHQ would coordinate sustainment in theater.  No one was sure about the timing, 
but eventually all three task forces, and their associated base areas, would be linked into one 
overarching theater distribution system.  This would necessitate an overall SOS, which BG 
Hamblen argued should locate with AFHQ in Algiers to ensure that coalition priorities trumped 
service interests.  The AFHQ administrative staff could enforce internal priorities and manage 
 
65 “Draft of Torch Supply Plan” 21 October 1942. 
66 “Assessment of AFHQ G4 Memorandum on Supply” 9 October 1942. Hughes to Gale.  This document captured 
Hughes’ thoughts on the draft concept of support for AFHQ operations written by the G4 section a week earlier.  
Hughes did not agree with the G4 plan that would use AFHQ as the coordinating authority for the three SOS 
organizations in North Africa.  Hughes preferred to use the ETOUSA SOS in London to coordinate resupply to the 
theater.  Hughes also disagreed with a system build around requisitions rather than pushing supplies based on 
historical consumption data.  Communication infrastructure in North Africa would be insufficient, and requisition-
based systems tended to be too slow; the command usually ended up meeting last month’s priorities rather than 
addressing the current crisis.   
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items of common use among the Americans and British to address some shortfalls before ever 
having to engage either zone of the interior.  Hamblen speculated that the earliest date when a 
theater SOS might be necessary was around D+45, or 25 December. 
 A trend in each major campaign conducted by the Allies between 1942 and 1944 was 
how the focus of the sustainment community would change throughout the operation.  
Logisticians could never rest on their laurels, and accelerating one step of the process tended to 
expose friction in another.  Resources were limited; by shifting assets to solve one problem 
might trigger the development of two or three new ones.  During the second half of October and 
the first two weeks of November the CAO conference was dominated by discussions about ships.  
The type of ships within each convoy, seaworthiness of individual vessels, progress in loading 
cargo, deadlines necessary to remain on schedule, and the priorities of cargo seemed to change 
daily, and this after significant portions of the staff had left for the theater.  It got harder when 
enemy action knocked ships out of their convoy or sank slow transports with the loss of 
everything aboard.67  Across the Atlantic the ASF shared their frustration.  UG-2 through UG-4 
had not gone smoothly; the average sailing lengthened out from 25 to 30 days with many ships 
leaving port with cargo space available.68  If all ships had carried their maximum safe loads, they 
would have delivered 1,600,000 tons to the theater between October 1942 and early February 
1943; the actual figure was 1,254,000 tons, or 20% below the initial estimate.69  The heart of this 
problem with inefficiency was determining the priority for each convoy in a timely manner.  
Four organizations battled to decide exactly what would be loaded on the ships in New York: the 
ASF, the OPD within the War Department, the WTF SOS staff, and AFHQ.  AFHQ priorities 
 
67 The AFHQ G1 briefed the loss of Allied warships and cargo vessels at the 10 November CAO Conference, along 
with incorrect information on the extent of damage to French ports, which he corrected the next day.   
68 Leighton and Coakley, 472. 
69 Ibid, 472. 
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changed as the tactical situation changed in Tunisia, while the ASF had to link production and 
stockpiles to inland transportation to how long it took to load a ship.  To announce a deadline for 
changes to a manifest is one thing; to demonstrate the discipline to stick to that timeline is 
another.  By the original plan the first four convoys should have transported equipment left 
behind by the assault wave, but new priorities kept jumping to the top of the list.  Signal 
supplies, salvage gear, and material-handling equipment (such as cranes); new tanks for the 
British 6th AD; weapons for Free French forces; and essential supplies for the civilian population 
soaked up slots originally intended to move trucks and weapons left behind by the combat 
divisions.70  Leaving this equipment behind in the first place had been a calculated risk; 
continuing to delay its arrival lengthened the window of risk Eisenhower was underwriting 
before he could establish a stable distribution network in theater.  
 
 The AFHQ in Combat 
Torch was the first large-scale combat operation conducted by U.S. and U.K. joint forces.  
The chance of a quick victory by December was undone by a lack of sufficient power in the 
initial thrust into northern Tunisia.  AFHQ and 1st Army had never developed an appreciation of 
what it would take to seize Tunis soon after the initial landings and how they should allocate 
resources across the various task forces accordingly.  The British managed to project the 
equivalent of one division deep into Tunisia by the end of November, but this was not enough.  
Over time historians have emphasized the impact of bad weather on the Allied advance, 
suggesting that unsolvable logistical challenges contributed to, if they did not altogether cause, 
culmination just short of Bizerte and Tunis.  But the truth is that Eisenhower and the AFHQ had 
 
70 Ibid, 472.   
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not managed to think beyond the first critical task, and Anderson had developed an insufficient 
plan when left to his own devices.  The Allies lacked an appreciation of how air, ground, and 
logistics could interact to slow Axis reinforcement on the continent while winning the race to 
build up power in central Tunisia.  They seemed to be mesmerized by improbable German 
cooperation with Spain or fierce French resistance while underappreciating the most logical Axis 
reaction.  AFHQ failed to wield the full power of their joint command, and it could not 
coordinate a powerful air and ground thrust backed by sufficient service troops.  The U.S. War 
Department either could not, or would not, help Eisenhower and Clark develop a more 
comprehensive and aggressive approach.  A strong preference for avoiding risk at the War 
Department probably contributed to the conservative decision to put too many combat forces 
ashore around Casablanca at the expense of other landing sites or troop priorities.  Once the 
initial Allied attack into Tunisia had culminated by mid-December 1942, the balance of the 
campaign conformed to a pattern that would repeat itself elsewhere for the next two and a half 
years.  Constant pressure, in both the air and on the ground, would bleed Axis forces dry while 
the Allies built up their capacity in the theater and deployed new units into the line.  Eventually 
Allied reinforcements, Axis attrition, and better U.S. tactical performance tipped the balance of 
power overwhelmingly in favor of a decisive Allied breakthrough.  Failure in December 
inadvertently contributed to the development of AFHQ as an effective joint-combined 
operational headquarters that could blend combat and sustainment to defeat a dangerous 
opponent.   
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 An Unanticipated Race for the Tunisian Ports 
It only took about six days for the initial Allied timeline and scheme of maneuver to start 
breaking down.  The speed and scope of the Axis reaction to the invasion seemed to catch 
everyone by surprise.  On 9 and 10 November about two dozen German replacement battalions 
associated with Panzer Army Africa were airlifted into Tunisia and were joined by about a 
hundred aircraft.  A major airlift commenced on 12 November, bringing in artillery, wheeled 
vehicles, supplies, and additional men.  That same day, Walther Nehring assumed command of 
what would soon become the 90th Corps.  By the end of November five divisions, including a 
panzer division, and major units of the Luftwaffe had repositioned to defend Tunisia.  As a result, 
the CAO conference on 16 November introduced the need to shift American combat assets to 
reinforce 1st Army immediately, not after a 90-day preparatory period as first envisioned.  The 
first concern of the conferees now was how to move ammunition and additional fuel to follow a 
brigade’s worth of armor and field artillery already transferred from Oran to the Tunisian border.  
This included moving 2,000-gallon fuel wagons to ETF control.71 
  
 The 1st Army Lunge Towards Tunis Fails 
The 1st Army had anticipated the need to move against Tunis and Bizerte sooner than 
originally planned, and it had options prepared for further amphibious landings and airdrops if 
necessary.  The speed of the German reaction on 9 and 10 November quickly confirmed that 
these contingency plans were needed.  The first step was to carry out a follow-on amphibious 
landing at Bougie 100 miles to the east of Algiers on 11 November.  The next day commando 
and parachute troops secured Bône, another 125 miles closer to Tunis and Bizerte.  Two-thirds of 
 
71 CAO Conference Notes, 16 November.  
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the 78th Division had followed the Americans ashore at Algiers on 8 November, but they had 
done so with almost none of their organic heavy weapons and support vehicles.72  On 12 
November the first reinforcing convoy landed the core of the British base organization for the 
theater, two sub-base commands and the line of communications headquarters.  This convoy also 
delivered the advanced element of 1st Army command post, a regimental group of the 6th 
Armoured Division (Blade Force), a parachute battalion, and other combat enablers.  On 14 and 
15 November Anderson got elements of the 78th Infantry and 6th Armoured Division mounted up 
around Algiers and moving towards Tunisia to link up with Free French and Allied paratroops 
already in the country.  The only way to motorize elements of the 78th Division was to attach port 
clearance truck companies from the Algiers sub-base.  Fuel for wheeled and tracked vehicles 
would come from rail tankers rushed to the front by AFHQ. 
Watching Axis reinforcements pour into northeastern Tunisia, AFHQ alerted three U.S. 
units to reinforce 78th Division between 15 and 24 November.  An American artillery battalion, 
175th FA from the 34th ID, was the first U.S. combat element directed to reinforce the British 
advance.  On 15 November they were directed to get their thirty-five 2.5-ton trucks back from 
168th RCT and to depart Constantine the following morning.  They would join elements of the 
78th Division three days later, somewhere between Le Fondouck and Souk Ahras.73  The 175th 
FA were issued six days of rations, instructed to take as many fuel cans as they could carry, and 
to take 175 rounds per 105mm howitzer.  The 1st Battalion of the 1st Armored Regiment, from 
CCB of the 1st Armored Division, was given similar instructions on 17 November.  They would 
send their Stuart light tanks by train and would road march their wheeled vehicles from Oran to 
 
72 Playfair, The Destruction of Axis Forces in Africa, 166.  They landed in an assault configuration, the lightest of 
the pre-established movement categories.  Follow on convoys would bring the equipment necessary to achieve the 
light and then heavy status.  
73 “War Diary of the 175 FA BN, 9 Nov 42 to 1 Mar 43”, RG 407, NARA II.  Entries on 15 November.   
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Le Kef starting on 18 November to join Blade Force approximately a week later.74  The balance 
of CCB was directed to follow on 24 November and act as the 1st Army reserve during the 
advance on Tunis.75   
 
Figure 2.2: Route of 175th FA BN from Algiers to Tunisia, 16-18 Nov 42 
 
These long-distance road marches went remarkably well.  The 175th FA battalion made 
the journey in three days, averaging about 130 miles a day with no trucks lost to combat, 
accident, or mechanical breakdown.76  The light tank battalion from 1st Armored Regiment 
managed to unite tracks, trucks, and personnel and advance to link up with Blade Force at Beja 
on 24 November.  CCB arrived at Medjez el Bab late on 29 November.  All three units reported 
 
74 “First Battalion, First Armored Regiment’s Participation in the Beginning of the North African Campaign”, 31 
December 1942.  1-1 AR, 1st AD, RG 407, NARA II, 59. 
75 “S3 Journal 8 Nov 42 – 1 Jun 43”, CCB, 1st AD. RG 407, NARA II, 6.     
76 “War Diary” 175 FA BN, 9 Nov to 1 March 43, 175th FA BN, 34th ID, RG 407, NARA II, entries for 16 to 18 
November.  The battalion covered 190 miles on the first day, and 154 miles on 17 November.  The distance covered 
on 18 November is not provided, but they did not arrive at Souk Ahras until late in the evening. 
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rain, snow, narrow roads, and numerous broken-down British trucks along the route.  In all three 
units the first report of enemy contact was from air attack, usually before they had managed to 
link up with their local British guides.  CCB’s first casualties of the campaign came in the 13th 
Armored Regiment on 1 December when both the combat command and regimental CPs were 
strafed by Me 109s.  At no point did the unit logs mention a problem with resupply or 
transportation during the move to Tunisia. 
Meanwhile, the British had continued to push into Tunisia, with the base at Bône up and 
running on 18 November and the first trains arriving at Souk el Arba (40 miles to the northeast of 
Souk Ahras) two days later.77  British 1st Army had a line of communications supported by 
military coastal shipping and trains delivering supplies within 100 miles of front-line troops by 
21 November.  Coastal shipping did not provide the hauling capacity planners had hoped for, and 
the operation suffered from a series of sinkings, bad record keeping, theft, and unanticipated 
requirements.78  Rail service was actually restored sooner than anticipated, but because military 
operators and line mechanics arrived on later convoys, 1st Army was forced to rely on the poorly 
equipped civilians employed by the Vichy government.  It was during this same time that the 
task force built around the 78th Division began to bump into Axis columns advancing to the west 
from Bizerte and Tunis, where a frontline running from Sidi Nsir to Medjez el Bab began to 
stabilize.  For the next four weeks Allied air and ground strength in Tunisia steadily increased, 
but this was matched by equal increases in German and Italian formations.  The five weeks 
lasting from 17 November to 24 December were marked by alternating small-scale attacks as 
each side received a few new battalions at the front, shipments of ammunition and replacement 
 
77 Playfair, The Destruction of the Axis Forces in Africa, 175. 
78 Carter and Kann, 20. 
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equipment, or increased air support.  But in each case these localized offensives ground to a halt 
after a few days as casualties mounted and reserve supply stocks dwindled.  Neither side could 
amass enough power to punch through the lines and exploit local breakthroughs. 
Eisenhower blamed the breakdown of the Allied offensive at the end of December on bad 
weather and rising enemy air and ground strength and to some degree on logistical shortfalls.79  
Logistics had not stopped the offensive, but transportation difficulties would slow down efforts 
to return to the attack.  The key issue was the limited capacity of the long-range distribution 
network linking Casablanca, Oran, and Algiers with Souk Ahras. 80  In some cases the network 
could have handled more traffic if 1st Army had sufficient headquarters to supervise the effort.  
Staff officers discovered 100 loaded but abandoned wagons at Souk Ahras near the end of 
November; no one knew the cars were there, much less assigned manpower to unload them.81  
The first task given to the staff officers from 5th Corps upon their arrival on 26 November was to 
establish a communications network that could link together the logistics and transportation 
nodes scattered throughout the rear area.  Once completed, this allowed the Corps to centrally 
control the issuance of movement instructions for each train, truck convoy, and ship, to ensure 
they did not gum up choke points and that manpower was ready to unload them immediately 
upon their arrival at the final destination.  It took the Corps until 3 December to clear up the 
snags they had inherited from 1st Army.  A shortage of transportation resources, combined with 
mismanagement of what was available, forced the Allies to pick among adequately sustaining the 
 
79 Howe, 343-4. 
80 “AFHQ Summary of Information for Administrative and Special Staff” 28 November 1942.  The 78th Division 
continued to advance toward Tunis/Bizerte, but the “Maintenance problems of the above forces are acute owning to 
the length of the L of C and owing to some need for sharing facilities for movement of French stores and troops.”  
Box I-2, ESHP. 
81 Carter and Kann, 24. 
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forces already in Tunisia, building up reserves of equipment and supplies near the front, or 
shifting large U.S. formations from Morocco and Algeria to join the fight.   
The various battalion and regimental battle groups fighting in Tunisia in November and 
December received enough supplies and replacement equipment to remain effective in a 
punishing environment.  The history and war diary for the 175th FA BN show several instances 
when they fired almost all of the ammunition available, also lost guns in combat, but were then 
resupplied immediately and provided with new 105mm howitzers within a matter of days.82  The 
battalion received logistical support from British units until 1 December, when CCB picked up 
responsibilities for all items except ammunition, which continued to flow through the British 5th 
Corps.  Both 1-1 AR and CCB experienced the same heavy combat while receiving reliable 
support from British service units during the last week of November through mid-December.  In 
an action on 2 December, 2-13 AR was reduced to nine operational tanks and very little 
ammunition, and they were concerned about their fuel situation; four days later 1-6 IN was 
almost wiped out by a well-executed Axis combined-arms attack.83  Despite these casualties, 
CCB remained in the line and continued to receive supplies from the British that sustained their 
fighting potential.  On 5 December British trucks arrived with 60 armored crewmen 
replacements and the next day they delivered a stock of anti-tank mines and 105mm field 
artillery ammunition.  The British logistics system worked, despite the unexpected burden of 
supporting U.S. units and heavy losses of men and equipment to combat.   
 
82 “War Diary” and “From Beer Beach to Kasserine Pass – The Story of the 175th FA Bn,” 175 FA BN, 34th ID, RG 
407, NARA II.  The battalion ran low on ammunition on 20 November but was resupplied in time to fire a 15-
minute preparatory barrage on 25 November.  On 10 December one battery was forced to conduct an emergency 
resupply from a nearby ammunition bump and A Battery lost three of their four guns to enemy fire.  The battery was 
back to full strength a few days later.  The battalion suffered fifteen battle casualties between 19 November and 21 
December.   
83 “S3 Journal 8 Nov 42 – 1 Jun 43,” CCB, 1AD, RG 407, NARA II.  Entries for 2 and 6 December.     
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The CCB’s focus for 8 and 9 December was vehicle recovery and repair and by 15 
December the various elements of CCB had been worn down to the point that the unit was pulled 
back into V Corps reserve.  Tank losses had been severe, and instructions went out to consolidate 
the remaining Stuart light tanks in 1-13 AR, sending 1-1 AR and 2-13 AR back to Oran to draw 
replacement equipment.  While working for Blade Force, CCB, and then the 1st Guards  Brigade 
over a three-week span, 1-1 AR suffered 22 KIA, 37 WIA, and 47 MIA, or approximately 30% 
of its authorized strength.84  Losses in the other two light tank battalions of the 13th Regiment 
were equally severe.85  The first battalion of the 1st Armored Regiment was effectively 
eliminated from the Allied order of battle, and CCB would be used in a limited role for the 
remainder of the campaign based on these losses in men and equipment.  But in a final analysis, 
the Allied attempt to push the Axis out of northern Tunisia was stopped by German and Italian 
battle groups – not by the weather, supply difficulties, or air attack.  Allied armor, infantry, and 
field artillery units had adequate fuel, ammunition, and replacements to remain effective after 
weeks of anything but the most devastating combat.  And when a battalion or brigade was 
mauled beyond repair there were plenty of new organizations already in North Africa to take 
their place on the line.  The British 1st Army culminated just short of overrunning northern 
Tunisia because it could not mass enough combat units to penetrate or overwhelm the Axis 
defensive line.  As a result, AFHQ would have to try a new approach; by late December it was 
obvious that the lunge to Tunis had failed. 
        
 
84 “First Battalion, First Armored Regiment’s Participation in the Beginning of the North African Campaign”, 31 
December 1942.  1-1 AR, 1st AD, RG 407, NARA II.  Casualties are listed in the last two pages of the report. 
85 Howe, 333-4, footnote 36 and 38.  Two battalions had about 33% of their tanks operational by late December.  1-
13 AR was down to about 12%. 
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 Establishing AFHQ in Algiers 
Allied direction of this early phase of the campaign was complicated by the need to close 
the AFHQ’s rear command post in London and then to deploy to Algiers onboard convoy KMF-
4.  Between 23 and 30 November AFHQ staff worked with their ETOUSA counterparts to 
ensure that the Americans understood how to coordinate among all the critical players in London 
and Washington.  On 30 November BG Baker (the G3 for ETOUSA) took over as chair of the 
AFHQ Rear CAO conference, a meeting that ETOUSA hosted through 19 December.  The lack 
of driving purpose to the meeting was immediately obvious – ETOUSA was not in touch with 
the right agencies within ASF, AFHQ, and the three task forces.  ETOUSA struggled to identify 
what critical problems they should tackle, and the meeting notes degenerated to calling attention 
to cables coming out of AFHQ forward, procedures for handling routine business within the new 
CAO working group, and an early attempt to cut back from six to three meetings weekly.86  
ETOUSA quickly became a spectator rather than a problem-solving organization, a development 
that did not bode well for operations in the future. 
 Gale and the core of his administrative team arrived in Algiers on 7 December and “On 
reporting to AFHQ [I[ saw General Eisenhower.  He told me of the maintenance difficulties 
which 1st Army had got into owing to congestion on the railways and lack of transport to clear 
trains.”87  Here was task one for AFHQ to solve, despite the fact that the problem technically 
belonged to 1st Army.  Gale called Brigadier Benoy, the chief administrative officer in 1st Army, 
that same evening to begin the coordination process.  By 9 December it had been decided that 
COL Frank Ross would head up a team of technical experts that would focus on traffic control 
 
86 CAO Conference Notes, 30 November to 19 December.  To their credit, ETOUSA gave up on the idea of cutting 
back to three meetings a week only three days after mentioning it.   
87 Gale’s Official War Diary, 7 Dec 42.   
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between Algiers and the front lines, while Gale assembled a scratch theater logistics staff using 
AFHQ and 1st Army personnel available in country.88  As soon as he felt comfortable that his 
staff could handle routine events, Gale toured the combat zone and rear area between 11 and 14 
December.89 
A shortage of transportation was the number one problem facing the logisticians, and 
since they could not generate more trucks or trains, it became imperative to maximize the value 
of the resources they did have.  Gale announced AFHQ would chair a daily priority of 
movements (POM) meeting beginning on 14 December; G-4 Movement and Transportation 
would run the session and G-3, G-4, the naval command, air staff, and 1st Army were directed to 
send representatives.90  This meeting helped the group realize that 1st Army was being 
overwhelmed with unanticipated support requests from the two air forces and U.S. units attached 
to 78th and 6th Divisions.  Eastern Air Force needed 446 tons of supplies every day, and two-
thirds of this weight had to be carried by trucks, with the rest travelling by coastal barge; the U.S. 
12th Air Force added another 557 tons of requests daily.91  Gale’s solution was simple – Benoy 
needed a POM of his own, and he was authorized to tell the air component “no”.  AFHQ had 
foreseen the need to maintain a powerful air element in North Africa, but not so close to the front 
lines.  Because of the powerful response by the German Luftwaffe, Allied fighters needed to be 
as close to the front lines as possible, placing a painful drain on 1st Army’s transportation 
resources.92  Adding half-a-dozen U.S. battalions to 1st Army gave the advance more punch, but 
 
88 CAO NA No 1, 9 Dec 42.  Gale Papers, Liddell Hart Center.  Most of the AFHQ administrative staff were 
traveling by ship from London to Algiers in early December.     
89 Gale Official War Diary, 11 to 15 Dec, 42. 
90 CAO NA 13 Dec 42.  Gale Papers, Liddell Hart Center.   
91 CAO NA, 15 Dec 42. 
92 Gale’s Official War Diary, 17 Dec 42.  Gale admits AFHQ had been surprised by the duration, intensity, and 
scope of German resistance in the air.   
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added to the drain on transportation.  On 22 December 1st Army reported it was logistically 
supporting 300,000 men, almost three times the strength they had planned on at this stage of the 
campaign.93  
By 22 December Ross thought he had worked out the procedural problems that had 
limited Allied exploitation of the rail lines; after this date the limiting factor was rolling stock 
and coal.94  To help offset rail shortages, the AFHQ staff partnered with 1st Army to try to mass 
truck assets and get a shuttle system running from Oran to the combat zone base area.95  Similar 
to what had been discovered at the end of November with 1st Army management of the rail 
network, Gale found that the two officers in charge of the movement section needed help.  
During a visit to 1st Army on 15 December, Gale worked with LTCs Curwin and Pole to 
rationalize their movement control procedures.  That evening Gale recorded that during the visit 
he:   
Went thoroughly into [their] situation and found main troubles were due to lack of 
proper Movement control organization.  Telephoned AFHQ and told DQMG 
Movements to set up ‘Freedom Advance Movements’ directly under AFHQ to be 
located at Constantine….Impressed upon AQMG need for strict control of 
dispatches; advices of trains moving must be promptly sent and no trains should 
proceed to railhead unless 5 Corps were in position to clear it.  These 
arrangements produced immediate results in the next 24 hours.96 
 
Gale was following the principles from The Manual of Movement and demonstrating the 
leadership demanded of senior logisticians.  The only way to fix 1st Army’s problems was for 
AFHQ to help – they had the knowledge and resources to set up the required control points and 
then link them together with communications gear.  Gale was far from a micro-manager; he 
 
93 CAO NA 22 Dec 42. 
94 Gale’s Official War Diary, 22 Dec 42.   
95 CAO NA No 12 and 13, 20 and 22 December.  Upon relocation to North Africa, Gale announced the new title and 
numbering system.  This is also the point at which each issue discussed was assigned a number and tracked by that 
number until it was resolved or became irrelevant.       
96 Gale’s Official War Diary, 22 Dec 42.   
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preferred to establish and chair a comprehensive array of boards informed by well-written staff 
papers focused on decisions that needed to be made far into the future.97  But he was also not 
above roaming the battlefield in order to find pressing problems, and then taking decisive action 
to fix them, and directed trusted subordinates such as Ross and de Rhe Philipe to do the same.98  
Senior British logisticians were also comfortable relieving officers that could not handle their 
duties; Brigadier Gough, the commander of No. 4 Base Area, was relieved on 28 December after 
Gale, Anderson, and Brigadier Pinder, the General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the L of C, 
agreed he had to go.  
As AFHQ staff arrived from London, Gale filled up his existing staff sections and created 
new ones.  On 19 December a combined logistics plans section was formalized, joined by a 
quartermaster maintenance section (the British equivalent of the U.S. ordnance service section) 
on 1 January.  Upon his arrival in Algiers, Gale had decided that he needed to increase his long-
range logistics planning section, adding Joint and U.S. members, in order to contextualize the 
implications of decisions at the operational level, asking General Smith to authorize the new 
positions.  Smith was concerned with the growth of new staff sections; Gale assured him that the 
logistics planning section belonged to and would be supervised by the AFHQ G-4.  In reality, 
they would answer directly to Gale.99  Gale won the round with Smith, but it would take the 
enlarged plans section about twenty days to get its legs under them.  Gale suspected their staff 
 
97 After sitting through the North African Economic Board on 20 December, Gale wrote the following comment in 
his diary: “Meeting too big – time has come to arrange proper Board Meetings with specifically prepared papers 
submitted to it.”  Gale’s Official War Diary, 20 Dec 42. 
98 Gale’s Official War Diary, 23 and 27 Dec 42.  Gale visited L of C on 23 December and had Rhe Philipe 
investigate Bone on 27 December.  Rhe Philipe returned with a recommendation to sack the commander of the dock 
company there, LTC Russell. 
99 Exchange of memos between GEN Smith and General Gale, 19 and 20 December 1942.  CAO File, AFHQ, RG 
331, NARA II. 
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estimates would be essential to getting the campaign back on track after the temporary tactical 
setbacks in mid-December. 
Instructions to shift the balance of three American divisions that were available in the 
eastern and central task forces forward into Tunisia had made their way from AFHQ in mid-
December, instructions that had not been run past Gale and the G-4 section.  When they got wind 
of these developments, the CAO typically could demonstrate that the transportation network 
could not move them as quickly as planned, nor could it sustain them once they arrived in 
Tunisia.  On 28 December Gale met with General Anderson and NCXF to plan out the next stage 
of the campaign, trying to match movement and supply priorities against how the maneuver 
commanders wanted to proceed.  The drain on transportation needed to support the air 
component continued to limit options; at this point the air units were consuming 66% of the rail 
capacity east of Algiers.100  But as a result of this meeting, AFHQ issued revised movement 
instructions on 28 and 29 December that included the transfer of large U.S. units into Tunisia, 
along with the supplies required for a new offensive at the end of January.101  This directed 
build-up would be tracked through a periodic progress report to be briefed at the CAO meeting 
starting on 29 December.   
  Once again Gale was confronted by the challenge of expanding the volume of material 
that the transportation network could process daily, both by adding resources and running things 
more efficiently. The theater engineer announced the start of a project to build a fuel pipeline 
from Algiers to the western edge of the 1st Army boundary using French labor and local 
materials.102  The air wings and motorized formations employed by the Allies would require 
 
100 Gale’s Official War Diary, 28 Dec 42. 
101 Ibid, 29 Dec 42. 
102 CAO NA 29 December.   
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thousands of tons of fuel a day.  Further efforts to rationalize the entire administrative structure 
needed to sustain a much larger force in the Tunisian hinterland soon followed.  The logistics 
staff at 1st Army implied that they did not understand their relationship with the U.S. II Corps 
and the Free French XIX Corps when it came to tracking, requisitioning, and moving their 
supplies, nor did they see where the AFHQ, Mediterranean Base Section (MBS), and American 
Army Air Force fit into the logistics process.103  To address these emerging issues, AFHQ 
decided to centralize management of the various sustainment organizations under their direct 
control.  On 30 December the Atlantic Base Section (ABS) and MBS were detached from the 
western task force and II Corps and directed to work with the joint theater staff.  The 1st Line of 
Communications command was detached from 1st Army and assigned to AFHQ the next day, 
with Gale given command authority over MG J.C.W. Clark, the 1st LOC GOC.104  Although 
directed to coordinate directly with AFHQ, MBS was responsible for coordinating all logical 
support to U.S. units assigned to or operating in the 1st Army footprint.105 
Whatever problems the Allies were having with command and control, distribution, and 
supplies reaching the front, 5th Corps of the 1st Army continued to launch local offensives during 
the first half of January, and the U.S. II Corps was busy filling up dumps to sustain a major 
attack of their own projected to open at the end of the month.  5th Corps made little progress in 
two attacks conducted on 5 to 7 January and 11 to 13 January, running into Axis reserves that 
launched immediate counterattacks of their own.  Regardless of these setbacks, the official 
British history of the campaign noted that, when AFHQ assumed overall direction of 
 
103 CAO NA 4 and 5 December.   
104 History of AFHQ, 175. 
105 AFHQ GO 38, 30 December 1942.  The next day GO 39 eliminated the eastern task force and provided an 
overlay depicting boundaries for the 1st Army, 1st Line of Communications, and all British base areas.  Bone and 
Constantine remained in the 1st Army area while everything to the west transitioned to 1 LoC authority.     
135 
 
administrative support to the front from 1st Army on 1 January, the general logistics situation was 
in good shape.  New Churchill and replacement Sherman tanks were flowing into the U.K. 
armored and tank brigades, 17-pounder guns and 7.2-inch howitzers were being integrated in 
anti-tank and artillery units, and new formations continued to land at Algiers and move up to join 
1st Army in Tunisia.106  Admittedly, the chief admin officer of 1st Army, Brigadier Benoy, 
complained as late as 9 January that the U.S. Army continued to pack new units into the army 
area without providing service units or transport to support them.107  Sustainment in Tunisia was 
not easy and some shortages existed, but clearly there was no supply or distribution crisis in 
early January for the units already in the country.  
Petroleum and ammunition rapidly emerged as the two critical and bulky resources 
driving the pace of Allied operations.  As was the case with most supplies, distribution and not 
availability presented the most important challenge. The Allied inventory and assessment as of 
11 January 1943 is captured in the table below: 
 100 Octane 87 Oct 75 Oct DERV (diesel) 
O/H 22,492 770 17,509 847 
Average Daily Port Discharge  2,730 50 4,350 50 
Daily Consumption (Max to date) 541 27 597 81 
Table 2.1: Major POL types on hand, 11 Jan 43, in tons 
 
The report noted that there were three items of special concern – diesel, aviation oil SAE 
120, and hypoid 90 gear lubricant.  The AFHQ G-4 was monitoring consumption and working to 
increase resupply of these items from the U.K and U.S.108   As was commonly the case, items 
 
106 Playfair, The Destruction of Axis Forces in Africa, 273. 
107 Gale’s Official War Diary, 9 Jan 43. 
108 Theater POL Report, 11 Jan 43.  G-4, AFHQ, RG 331, NARA II. 
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used by only a very small percentage of the force emerged as the shortages that might negatively 
impact Allied freedom of action. 
 AFHQ and 1st Army quickly learned how to improvise a requisition process and get the 
distribution network to prove the essentials, but the harder battle was to meter the flow of new 
forces into Tunisia in a deliberate and balanced manner.  It seemed that each time Gale and his 
associated figured out how to make the logistics chain work, someone complicated the problem 
by trying to pack more combat forces into the combat zone.   
 
 Teaching Eisenhower to Listen to His Logisticians 
Gale’s frustration with his boss boiled over after Eisenhower hosted a major 
commanders’ conference on 10 January at Constantine to which he and General Smith were not 
invited.  His diary entry that evening captured why Gale found the development so frustrating.   
“Receiving disturbing information that decisions taken at the CINC’s conference yesterday 
concerning future operations may have Logistical implications which are impossible of 
achievement.  As I was not invited to the Conference, I did not have an opportunity to express an 
opinion.  I am, however, putting it on paper to the CoS.”109  For the first time, Gale’s creation of 
a joint, combined logistics planning element at AFHQ was about to demonstrate its value.   
On 12 January Gale shared a copy of a draft of their first comprehensive assessment with 
the Chief of Staff.  The log plans section, headed by LTC Dalton, published two documents in 
January that were essential to the process of bringing clarity to the nature of the distribution 
challenge and its impact on maneuver options.  LTC Dalton’s team published their first 
comprehensive logistics assessment on 26 January 1943, supported by a transportation and 
 
109 Gale’s Official War Diary, 11 Jan 43.   
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distribution fact sheet that had been distributed earlier.  Both documents provided the first 
evidence of an overarching administrative appreciation that had been missing at AFHQ since its 
inception and provided insightful bookends to the AFHQ staff process before and after 
Casablanca.  Smith found the draft of these products so compelling that he ordered Gale to send 
a representative he trusted to explain these facts to Fredendall, Benoy, and Hamblen (the G-4 of 
AFHQ) at Constantine on 12 January, and get the campaign plan back on track.110  Gale selected 
Brigadier A.T. de Rhe Philipe for the mission, who returned triumphant on 14 January.  De Rhe 
Philipe convinced everyone that they had gotten ahead of themselves, but that it was not too late 
to salvage the overall concept.  The group agreed that II Corps might still launch an attack in late 
January on the southern end of the 1st Army line if AFHQ could mass 240 trucks, or about five 
British companies, to move 720 tons of supplies a day over the next two weeks.111  But only 
three days after Gale had figured out how to enable Eisenhower’s concept, General Alexander, 
the CINC of the British Middle Eastern Command, visited AFHQ and convinced Eisenhower to 
call off the II Corps attack.112  Despite this decision, the effort to move combat forces and 
establish supply depots continued.  The next day maneuver commanders in Tunisia were still 
calling for more forces than could be sustained, but now Gale was in the room, and Eisenhower 
was listening to his advice.113 
It is helpful to examine in detail the staff product that helped Gale make his point with 
Eisenhower.  The draft was released from the log plans section on 12 January, and its final 
version finished on 26 January.  The assessment, entitled “Maintenance of Troops East of 
 
110 Ibid, 12 Jan 43.   
111 Gale’s Official War Diary, 14 Jan 43.   
112 Ibid, 17 Jan 43.  Gale wrote: “This in some ways is a pity, as it means several more weeks’ inactivity whereas I 
think what this theater wants is some fighting.”   
113 Ibid, 18 Jan 43.   
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Algiers FEB/MAR 43,” was well organized and succinct, and it made the need for some tough 
command-level decisions crystal clear.114  Based on projections for late February, combat forces 
in Tunisia would need 3,700 tons of supplies a day to operate, discounting any desire to build up 
reserve stocks.115  By mid-March port discharge would reach 12,000 tons daily, with an 
additional 300 tons shuttled to La Calle; distribution and not discharge would be the limiting 
factor.  Rail lines could move 2,200 tons out of Algiers daily, and this was only about half of 
what the lines could handle if more rolling stock, repair parts for French engines, and U.S. 
operators could be provided.  This would be supplemented by two new GT companies 
anticipated in early February that would provide an additional 1,400 tons of daily lift from the 
port to the 1st Army depots around Souk Ahras.  British engineers were working on a dual-pipe 
POL line from Algiers and Bône to the front, but this would not be up and running until April.   
The bottom line was that the Allies could sustain the projected footprint in Tunisia by 
early February, and by mid-March there would be a surplus of lift that could be used to either 
move the equivalent of four more divisions into the line, build up reserve stocks of supplies, or 
shift air units closer to the front.  Just before Eisenhower left for the Casablanca conference his 
staff managed to clearly explain, in writing so it could be shared with a mass audience, the 
limitations of his line of communication between Algiers and the 1st Army rear area.  Upon his 
return they had a more useful tool to assist in the process of extracting guidance on how to 
prioritize the use of the transportation that was available.  The formation of a competent logistics 
planning cell was a significant improvement to the AFHQ staff that practically demanded leaders 
to begin thinking at the operational level. 
 
114 Logistics Plans Section Files, AFHQ, RG 331, NARA II. 
115 The break down by major formation was 1st Army – 1,350 tons; II Corps – 685 tons; Allied Air Forces – 850 
tons.  The balance of the requirement was for the LoC units, French formations, and civilian relief. 
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Figure 2.3: Staff sections supervised by the AFHQ CAO, Nov 43 
 
 By mid-February the AFHQ logistics staff had come a long way.  Gale had not been 
terribly impressed with the U.S. staff officers he had come into contact with at the headquarters, 
at least initially.  He was disgusted that the American logisticians that had been present for the 10 
January 1943 commanders’ conference at Constantine had not spoken up and pointed out how 
the plan for a late-January offensive by II Corps was not possible as conceived.  His frustration 
with Hamblen boiled over on 3 February – he recorded in his diary that evening that he had 
shared his opinion that “the G-4 section was not professionally led” despite over three months of 
exposure to combat under the tutelage of very experienced British officers.116  Gale had always 
been conscious of need for British officers to help train their U.S. counterparts, but to do so with 
such a light touch that no resentment was created.  To this end he had gathered all the British 
 
116 Gale’s Official War Diary, 3 Feb 43. 
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colonels and brigadiers assigned to AFHQ on 6 February and had given them a pep talk.  Gale 
shared with the audience his feeling that they must “assist the U.S. staff in every way possible, 
without appearing to do so” for the long-term health of AFHQ, the campaign in North Africa, 
and Allied relations.117  By this point Gale thought he had successfully merged the groups of 
officers into an effective combined team, and was well on his way to teaching them how to do 
their job.  He had also convinced Eisenhower and his subordinate commanders that the 
logisticians needed to be in the room before, during, and after major decisions were made about 
the direction of the campaign. 
 
 Figuring out Procedures and Getting the LoC Up and Running 
During the first month that AFHQ was in charge of theater logistics, keeping everyone up 
to date on the latest changes to the administrative procedures had proven to be as difficult as 
developing the solution itself.  On 12 January the command discovered that both the ordnance 
service section and the G3 section were transmitting ammunition requests back to London – Gale 
directed the G3 to get out of the resupply business.  A few days later it was reported that despite 
the publication of numerous memos on the subject, members of the staff and subordinate 
commands were still confused about the distribution of responsibility for logistical support 
among the various actors.118  This confusion persisted despite a flurry of instructions from 
AFHQ.  Even the wholesale changes to the command structure executed in February did not 
solve the problem.  Meanwhile, BG Lewis, the British G4 at AFHQ, continued to share the sense 
of confusion about exactly how his superiors wanted the supply arrangements to function.  
 
117 Ibid, 6 Feb 43.   
118 CAO NA 16 and 18 Jan 43.  Gale confirmed that he continued to get questions from senior officers in the field, 
and that he would discuss the issue at the commanders’ conference on 18 January.   
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General Gale’s guidance to the CAO coordination group on 27 January provided insight into the 
real cause of confusion between the 1st Army staff and AFHQ that had hampered coordination 
off and on since the end of December.  One can infer from Gale’s comments that the real issue 
was not confusion at all but disagreement over who should establish stockage priorities and 
procedures for the technical services and branches.119   
This was the same debate with which ETOUSA had been wrestling since May 1942 and 
which AFHQ had decided in November.120  In some places the instructions were confusing, and 
doubtlessly some officers had not read the original document, but in general the problem was 
disagreement and not confusion.  This debate over who would control logistical priorities and 
directly supervise the technical service sections was never really solved during the war and 
generated a lot of frustration as a result.  Because Marshall’s and Somervell’s preferences were 
never captured in doctrine or instructions that reconciled the coexistence of joint, combined, and 
U.S.-only theater-level commands, it remained a distraction that refused to go away.   
Gale promised the group that he would investigate various concerns over distribution that 
had been reported to the G4 staff.  He was due to visit the line of communications headquarters 
at Setif (a British organization with a decidedly Allied composition by this point) the next day, 
and it would be a perfect opportunity to get to the root of the problem.  The outcome of this fact-
finding trip was an expansion of the AFHQ weekly movement prioritization board, a daily 
meeting that had started up on 13 December, to include more representatives from L of C Area 
 
119 CAO NA 27 Jan 43.  Obviously, Gale’s answer was the AFHQ staff, who in theory understood the entire theater 
and joint picture, as opposed to 1st Army, who only had details on the ground and U.S. air situation in the combat 
zone.  Based on reports from U.S. organizations within 1st Army submitted after the campaign, and the conclusions 
of the AFHQ official history, AFHQ was insufficiently aware of current conditions within 1st Army to manage three 
base areas and the line of communications to deliver the supplies that were available in a proactive manner.   
120 Draft AFHQ G4 memorandum on supply, 2 October 1942.  Copy in Box I-6, ESHP. 
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command and its subordinate organizations.121  The meeting had proved to be particularly 
helpful and Gale continued to add representatives for new units, headquarters, and staff sections 
as AFHQ continued to grow over the winter.  Gale also decided to establish a POL section in the 
G-4 staff at AFHQ and to hold a weekly prioritization meeting for fuel that resembled the 
movement meeting.  Although it seems obvious in hindsight, this was a novel concept for units 
in combat.  All the key players would assemble face-to-face and prioritize delivery of supplies, 
equipment, and units to the combat zone with the same appreciation of what transport was 
available, what the rest of the joint team felt was critical to sustain the fight, and the opportunity 
costs associated with each win for their own requests.  It was an essential bureaucratic and 
procedural breakthrough well suited to making informed decisions and eliminating animosity 
and rumor-spreading when one organization did not get its way with the AFHQ or COMZ staff.  
While arguably inefficient, the meeting forced AFHQ and its major subordinates to make 
decisions publicly, allowing each organization to have its say, and then to prioritize 
transportation resources with a complete understanding of everyone’s desires and of the way 
more for one resulted in less for everyone else.  It was one thing to find out that you would not 
be getting everything you wanted, but it was a completely different proposition to discover that 
you would not get all the fuel that you had asked for so that the Air Force could protect you from 
enemy bombers.  AFHQ was learning that a system based on compromise and consensus was a 
better way to run a theater consisting of loosely coupled services and national forces than 
dictatorial use of authority held by the command.  The Allies were discovering that the only way 
to accomplish several priorities simultaneously was through face-to-face negotiation.  Similar 
 
121 LTG Humfrey Gale Official War Diary, 13 Dec 42.  Collection II, items 1-13.  Liddell Hart Centre for Military 
Archives, King’s College, London.  CAO NA 30 January 43. 
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boards and processes had already been developed at the policy and strategic level, but now the 
AFHQ was realizing that they were necessary at the operational and tactical levels as well.  
Looking at exactly how AFHQ ran one of their meetings to coordinate transportation 
helps illuminate the complexity of the process of inland distribution, the challenging level of 
detail and knowledge necessary to make smart decisions, and the interrelated nature of each 
aspect of the problem.  The AFHQ G-4 Movement and Transportation division ran a daily 
meeting that lasted from thirty to sixty minutes at 1630 daily.  The chairman of the meeting 
followed a standard procedure at each session: staff sections and subordinate units submitted 
bids to move new units to the front by road, these new bids were ranked in priority order, units 
made bids to use a portions of the daily rail capacity, and, finally, units confirmed that there were 
no changes to the movement plans approved at recent meetings.122  The time-scale was different 
for each category; ship movements had to be considered months in advance, while rail and road 
movements focused on the next five to eight days.  The flow of new units and cargo was 
relatively fixed; the group confirmed and acknowledged what was scheduled to arrive in the next 
week and placed bids for changes or additions with the understanding that they could only 
influence convoys well into the future.  The rail and road review produced a movement manifest 
tracking the unit (often down to the company level), the number of passengers, vehicles, tonnage, 
the number and type of wagons assigned, departure and arrival location, and the “sponsor” of the 
movement, which was usually a general staff section from AFHQ but might also include one of 
the primary subordinate organizations.  New requests for rail or road movement were framed by 
a general set of guidelines that helped quickly establish their relative merit.  Depending on the 
 
122 “AFHQ Priority of Movements Meeting,” 6 January 1943, G-4 M&T File, AFHQ, RG 331, NARA II.  Notes 
from the meeting captured the fact that this was the twenty-fifth iteration of the meeting in North Africa.   
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overall command priorities for that particular stage of the campaign, some staff sections, 
subordinate units, and particular capabilities automatically rose to the top of the list.  As an 
example, any requests sponsored by the G-4 (Movement) section, submitted by the L of C Area 
command, or associated with moving Spitfire fighter squadrons into Tunisia were automatically 
moved to the front of the line.  The board would then determine the relative worth between those 
three requests at the daily meeting.  It was a remarkably sophisticated and effective system, at 
least for deciding what got to move to the front; Gale deliberately ensured that the meeting 
driven by the G-4 M&T organization, which was predominantly manned by British officers.123    
        
 Clearing the Ports 
As AFHQ’s assumed direct responsibility for managing the theater rear area in late 
December and early January, it allowed the staff to better understand and take steps to fix the 
real issues that had been holding up resupply across the theater.  The most important issue, after 
inland distribution, was an overall shortage of service units available in the U.S. Army by 
November 1942, coupled with disagreements over what percentage of those troops should be 
deployed to North Africa.  The CTF and ETF embarked 8,500 service troops in Great Britain on 
the assault convoy, or about 18% of their overall strength, leaving 31,700 support personnel 
behind.124  Throughout the duration of the North African campaign between 32,000 and 36,000 
service troops remained behind in the United Kingdom.  The decision to shortchange the 
deployment of logistics equipment and service troops to North Africa during the first three 
 
123 When the AFHQ staff was first formed, the U.S. G-4 had no responsibilities associated with transportation and 
distribution, but the British system held their G-4 accountable for requirements and distribution.  Gale thus formed a 
combined G-4 section responsible for requirements while using a British M&T division to manage transportation.  
As the U.S. transportation special staff section at AFHQ grew in size, experience, and influence, they were merged 
with the British G-4 M&T division.  See the AFHQ History, Part One and Two. 
124 Ruppenthal, Vol I, 99. 
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months of the campaign made everything the Allies attempted in moving supplies that much 
harder.   
British 1st Army had prioritized two rear-area missions and assigned service troops 
accordingly.  The first was port clearance – unloading ships and moving the supplies to depots in 
the local area – all managed by the regional sub-base command.  The second priority was 
transportation to support the advance inland, to include the trucks necessary to fill out combat 
organizations.125  The G-4 and DMG for administration in the 1st Army argued that their initial 
estimates and provision of service forces to run Algiers for the first two months of the campaign 
had been very accurate.  That plan had fallen apart when trucks were stripped from the sub-base 
and assigned to 78th Division and the 1st LoC command to support the advance into Tunisia.126   
Because the western task force had not reserved any troop slots for SOS leaders in the 
assault wave, a massive backlog of material had developed on the docks at Casablanca.127 The 
6th Port Battalion, the unit charged with running the Moroccan ports, arrived with UGF-2 on D+6 
and started clearing away the boxes sitting out on the piers, moving them to local warehouses.  
The next stage of the problem was figuring out where all this equipment was needed.  Many 
items unloaded in Morocco had faulty paperwork; manifests were missing or incorrect, or else 
they had become irrelevant with the changing tactical situation.  The arrival of trained service 
units to support the WTF between 18 November and 1 December helped break up the logjam.  
The 25 ships that arrived on 1 December were emptied in three weeks; the daily discharge 
average jumped from 1,700 to 3,700 tons between November and December.128  The next snag 
 
125 1st Army, “Administrative Lessons of the Campaign in North Africa,” 27 July 1943.  G-4 Files, AFHQ, RG 331, 
NARA II, 1. 
126 Ibid, 2. 
127 The WTF SOS commander, BG Wilson, convinced the Navy to surrender three spots on the assault convoy to his 
team.  Leighton and Coakley, 451.  
128 Leighton and Coakley, 452. 
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discovered in the chain was a shortage of cargo trucks to haul items from the docks out to local 
warehouses.  A large number of the 200 U.S. trucks dedicated to Casablanca and Oran, of 600 
total U.S. cargo trucks landed during November, had been damaged in transit as a result of 
ineffective waterproofing.129  The transportation section at AFHQ scrambled to gather enough 
serviceable trucks with operators to form three reserve companies (300 trucks) that would 
answer directly to the theater staff.130  This sparked Gale to issue a directive on 8 January 
demanding a comprehensive report on all wheeled assets available in theater and, more 
specifically, on those companies controlled directly by AFHQ, 1st LoC, and the U.S. base 
sections.   
 
 Defeating Continental Distances: Getting the Trains Running 
The Allied plan to get the French rail service back into operation as quickly as possible 
worked very well.  The invaders discovered that their estimates of the numbers and working 
condition of French equipment were wildly optimistic, but they landed the right experts to 
maintain in place what they found and to run a reliable service from Casablanca to Bône and 
beyond.  The first increment of transportation units arrived on schedule, and by mid-December 
there were coherent command and control, operating, construction, and engine-repair systems in 
place linking all three clusters of ports with the 1st Army rear.  The Royal Engineers’ estimate for 
the British zone concluded that the network could have handled ten trains a day if the rolling 
stock had been available; five trains a day was the average for December.131  January saw the 
arrival of American units in the British rail sector, and the daily average jumped to seven trains a 
 
129 Weller, 273.  Dworak, 91. 
130 CAO NA 5 Jan 1943. 
131 “North African Railway Operations,” Exhibit T “Royal Engineer Notes on the NA Campaign”, 4. 
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day before leveling off to six in February and March.  Luckily new engines and rolling stock 
started arriving from both the United States and Great Britain by the end of January because the 
rail mechanics could not keep up with the breakdowns of old French equipment. There were 
plenty of mechanics, but spare parts for the old French engines were not available in the system 
and could not be easily manufactured in theater.132 
 
Figure 2.4: Map of the rail network and Allied units manning it, May 43 
. 
Rail operations became more efficient with the activation of the AFHQ Director General 
of the Military Railway Service at Algiers on 9 February 1943.  The six construction companies 
of the French military railway service were folded into the full strength of the Allied rail 
command, and the network was lengthened and expanded to reach dumps in the 1st Army rear.  
In March BG Gray reduced the shipping burden on AFHQ by cutting his request for engines and 
 
132 Ibid, 7. 
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cars down to 165 and 1,500, or 50% and 33% of the request submitted before the invasion.  
Shipments of rolling stock from home increased in scale, bringing engines and various cars into 
theater with each convoy.  Teams of mechanics completed final assembly at the ports, averaging 
eight engines and anywhere from ten to 60 cars a week from the first week of February to the last 
week of April.133  Freight cars included refrigeration cars, flat and box cars, fuel tankers, 
gondolas (used to move taller equipment under bridges and through tunnels), and 50 special 
“warflats” designed to handle the heavy Churchill infantry tank.134  By the end of May, counting 
only the equipment provided by the United States, the Allies had introduced 106 engines and 756 
cars, of which 89 engines and 495 cars were still in service.  Coal consumption peaked from 
December into March, averaging 35,000 tons a month to keep the military trains rolling.  As the 
original logistics estimate foresaw, rail was always going to be a secondary means of moving 
bulk supplies inland from the ports, but the Allied efforts to maximize the capability that was 
available was commendable.  This success was obviously easier to accomplish because neither 
side had the time or inclination to bomb and shell French North Africa into a mess of rubble 
during the campaign. 
        
 Naval Ferries and Long-haul Truck Shuttle 
The Allies had experienced a cargo truck problem in November and December, but only 
because of rapid changes to the tactical situation driven by Axis reinforcement of northern 
Tunisia.  As a result, 78th Division was forced to launch a hasty advance to try to seize Bizerte 
and Tunis before organic transport arrived, and two U.S. battalions and a brigade-sized battle 
 
133 Ibid, Exhibit Q and R.   
134 Warflats was the term used by British logisticians referring to special rail cars built to handle the weight and 
dimensions of the Churchill infantry support tank. 
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group (CCB/1AD) were raced east to strengthen the thrust.  Despite the unanticipated burden 
represented by the U.S. units, 1st Army managed to meet the supply requirements of their slowly 
increasing footprint in Tunisia.135  According to the 1st Army official assessment of the 
campaign, transport did present a “grave concern during the first half of the operation” because 
of equipment lost on damaged or sunk ships, air attacks, and unanticipated loans or support to 
French and American units.136  The 1st Army was forced to pool all the trucks left in the combat 
area and ruthlessly prioritize their support.  What suffered was the buildup of reserve stocks 
forward, and what resulted was a slower rate of major combat-unit reinforcement than the Army 
and AFHQ would have probably preferred.   As we have seen, however, 5th Corps was capable 
of mounting attacks from mid-November through mid-January while sustaining a large multi-
national force in constant contact with German and Italian units.   
Gale understood that, if he could get a ferry system running from Oran and Algiers into 
the smaller ports to the east, he could reduce the demands for rail and truck movement to bring 
new units and reserves of fuel and ammunition into the combat zone.  Evidently the Royal Navy 
seemed to lack Gale’s sense of drive.  They reported that they were in the process of establishing 
a reliable ferry service between Bougie and Djidjelli on 5 January and mentioned problems with 
the shuttle system east of Bône on 18 January.  It seems that the Royal Navy had been too lenient 
with the French, who manned mechanically unreliable ships with unmotivated crews.  Originally 
the coastal shuttle from Bône to La Calle had been operated by a Royal Navy fleet of LSTs, but, 
with the pending arrival of replacement Sherman and Churchill tanks for the British 6th 
Armoured Division and a separate tank brigade, the LSTs were due to be sent back to the 
 
135 1st Army, “Administrative Lessons of the Campaign in North Africa”, 2, 7, 8. 
136 Ibid, 7. 
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west.137  Gale demanded an alternative solution, and a few days later the RN representative 
reported that they had come up with a fix that allowed the accomplishment of both missions.138 
A bit of good news was shared with the group by the U.S. G4 on 26 January.  Based on a 
frank conversation among Eisenhower, Marshall, and Somervell on 25 January at Casablanca 
(the “Anfa” conference), an emergency convoy would depart New York not later than mid-
February to deliver 5,000 cargo trucks, a company of heavy transporters (Diamond-T trucks and 
trailers), railroad engines, and rolling stock.139  This is a well-known and often-repeated story, 
but it is also a damning indictment of decision-making within AFHQ and the U.S. War 
Department.  By the end of January Eisenhower believed he had a truck crisis on his hands.  As 
we will examine below, this truck crisis did not generate a supply crisis within II Corps.  The 
truck crisis should have come as a surprise to no one, however; it was the result of deliberate 
decisions that prioritized men over equipment in the assault convoy.  The problem got worse as 
the AFHQ staff continued to remove that equipment from the convoys sailing between 
November and February in favor of other priorities.  By the time Eisenhower raised the issue 
with Somervell the crisis period was almost over, but senior leaders did not know it.  UG-3 had 
delivered 4,500 2.5-ton trucks, and UG-4 delivered another 5,300.140  It was true that many of 
these vehicles were crated and required assembly, but the trained manpower to supervise this 
work also arrived with UG-4.  Regardless, Somervell promised to deliver all the items on 
Eisenhower’s new critical shortage list not later than 15 February, and both the ASF and U.S. 
 
137 CAO NA 18 Jan 43.   
138 CAO NA 21 Jan 43.  The Bone to La Calle service would come up as a problem again on 8 March, with the 
breakdown caused by the same issues with French effort and RN supervision.  Gale fixed the problem by demanding 
a daily update on the tonnage moved into La Calle for the next week, which convinced the RN to stay on top of the 
problem for the duration of the campaign.       
139 CAO NA 26 Jan 43.  Leighton and Coakley, 474. 
140 Leighton and Coakley, 474.  UGS-3 arrived just before 8 December and UGS-4 arrived in early January.  UGS-5 
was due later in January or early February. 
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Navy moved heaven and earth to pull it off.  The convoy, referred to as UGS-5.5, left New York 
on time, loaded with 6,800 vehicles, and with a new set of escorts that the U.S. Navy had 
declared were impossible to provide only a few months earlier.  Evidently the threat of dropping 
bad news near the President and Prime Minister worked miracles in expanding what seemed 
possible in providing support to an active combat theater.   
         
 Contested Air and Sea Domains 
It is important to remember that for the duration of the first half of the campaign in North 
Africa the Allies had to deal with the periodic loss of merchant vessels to submarine attack.  In 
each case this would trigger a drill to determine what the ship was carrying, if that cargo was still 
critical, and, if so, how to replace it from either the United States or Great Britain.  Allied forces 
also discovered that fighting under contested skies was an unpleasant proposition.  Headquarters 
were attacked, interrupting the efficient running of the campaign.  Truck convoys, trains, depots, 
and service units were strafed and bombed, slowing the flow of material to the east, destroying 
precious transport, and killing and wounding skilled labor.141  To offer just one example, a 
Luftwaffe air attack hit the 163th Railway Workshop Company on 18 February 1943 at Sidi 
Mabrouk resulting in sixteen casualties among the mechanics working on engines and railcars.142  
Soldiers were used to the variables that combat adds to efforts at the front, but deep attacks that 
interfered with the lines of communication, especially on the ground, were a new experience. 
 
141 During the CAO conference on 30 January the group discussed the impact of recent successful German 
submarine attacks and air raids on Allied efforts to keep supplies flowing to 1st Army. 
142 “North African Railway Operations,” Exhibit T “RE Notes on the NA Campaign,” 7, and Exhibit B 
“Chronological History of British Units.” 
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Figure 2.5: The St. George Hotel complex, Algiers; home of the AFHQ 
 
 Figuring out how to Integrate the Americans 
At the same time senior leaders worked to establish and manage a distribution system 
stretching from Morocco to Tunisia, 1st Army was struggling to integrate an expanding pool of 
American forces into the British command.  Starting in early January a major source of pressure 
on the sustainment system was the flow of U.S. forces from Casablanca and Oran to the southern 
end of the 1st Army line solidifying in Tunisia.  II Corps managed the flow of U.S. forces 
arriving from the west and relied on the British 1st Line of Communications command to bring 
their supplies up from the ports.  The 1st Army was directed to coordinate the administrative 
needs of any attached U.S. forces, supplying them with common-use items from British stocks, 
and pushing U.S.-specific requests up to AFHQ.143  To ease the burden on 1st Army and the 
British troops manning the line of communication, Philippeville would be expanded as an 
 
143 “Introduction of US Agencies into Areas Now Under British Control,” memo published by AFHQ G4 on 24 Jan 
43.  G4, AFHQ, RG 492, NARA II. 
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intermediate port supported by a direct convoy from the U.K. every sixteen days and by a ferry 
from Algiers every eight days.  The mission given to the British LoC command was to discharge 
between 1,500 and 2,500 tons daily from ships at berth and move 850 tons a day by rail and 650 
tons a day by truck out of the city.  The base commander at Philippeville was directed to 
establish covered storage for 12,000 tons of supply in the local area to handle any backlog that 
could not be moved forward -- 8,000 for the U.S. and 4,000 for the British.144  
 A few minor adjustments to the Allied command structure gave way to a flood of major 
changes in the month of February.  Mark Clark became the 5th Army commander on 4 January 
1943, surrendering his position as the deputy commander at AFHQ with the move.145  At this 
stage 5th Army was largely an administrative and rear area command, directed to secure the 
interior of Morocco and Algeria while supervising the consolidation of the western and central 
task forces and their associated base sections.  Ten days later AFHQ was forced to push a 
coordinating element forward to Constantine to protect the sensibilities of the French, who 
refused to take orders from the 1st Army. Thus, AFHQ personnel were siphoned off to a mission 
they were not sufficiently manned to perform while adding an unnecessary layer of command not 
justified by the number of combat troops present.   
In the first half of February a massive reorganization of the U.S. portion of the theater 
command structure in North Africa occurred.  On 4 February the North African Theater of 
Operation U.S. Army (NATOUSA) was activated, with Eisenhower as the commander and MG 
Everett Hughes as the deputy commander.  The new staff joined the AFHQ at the St. George 
Hotel in Algiers.  The most significant changes took time to develop, but over the coming three 
 
144 “Transit Depots, Philippeville,” memo published by AFHQ G4 on 27 Jan 43.  G4, AFHQ, RG 492, NARA II. 
145 History of AFHQ, 112. 
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months certain U.S.-only functions handled within AFHQ were transferred to NATOUSA.  The 
mission sets that were transferred tended to be routine administrative matters such as service 
record management, award processing, mail and filing operations, and non-operational 
correspondence with agencies in the United States.  Most of the G1 and Adjutant General staff 
was transferred immediately.  In other sections the same people continued to do the same work, 
but they began to divide the shop internally into an Allied operational portion and U.S. 
administrative portion.  The picture became even more complex when Hughes added 
commanding general of the new communications zone of NATOUSA to his list of 
responsibilities on 9 February.  For the first six days of its existence the COMZ had no 
subordinate organizations or units, consisted of a small personal staff for Hughes, and had as its 
sole mission the coordination of U.S. administrative support in theater.  Hughes did not work 
directly with his British counterparts in 1st LoC or 1st Army, instead coordinating through Gale 
to understand the local situation, requirements, plans, and priorities.  This arrangement applied to 
any U.S. units attached to 1st Army as well; their supply chain still flowed through 1st Army to 
AFHQ and not through Hughes’ command.  
In the middle of this period of turmoil, Gale announced that the administrative system in 
North Africa had stabilized and that is was time to scale back the CAO conferences, cutting back 
from six to three meetings weekly.146  This was probably driven by a number of factors, 
including human exhaustion.  By this point the AFHQ staff had been conducting a daily meeting 
for administrative coordination every day other than Sunday since 22 August.  Procedures and 
new organizations involved in managing sustainment were coming on line, and Gale thought that 
his staff could surrender day-to-day management and routine matters to these emerging nodes.  
 
146 CAO Conference NA 10 Feb 43. 
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He elaborated on 12 February, explaining that soon MG Hughes would flesh out his role as U.S. 
deputy theater commander and COMZ commander, Larkin would stand up a new SOS at Oran, 
and COL Pence would establish the eastern base section in Constantine.  BG Gray had arrived 
from the United States and would soon be appointed the director of military railways.  At the 
meeting on 14 February, British logisticians shared their plans to completely overhaul the 
management of British trucks in the communications zone.  The 1st LoC would be pulling back a 
couple of company’s worth of 3-ton lorries to establish a pool capable of shifting a thousand tons 
of supplies a day from base sections for delivery to 1st Army.   
On 14 February the Director General of Military Railways, BG Carl R. Gray, Jr., was 
appointed and directed to unite all military railway services (“units, resources, and facilities 
associated with civil and military rail traffic”) under his office, answerable only to General 
Gale.147  The next day a service of supply headquarters was established as a subordinate 
command within NATOUSA.  Based in Oran with BG Larkin as the commanding general, the 
senior staff started to settle into place over the next ten days.  The heads of coordinating and 
special staff sections tended to be colonels with the odd senior lieutenant colonel or brigadier 
general for critical positions like engineer or chief of military railroads.148  The demand for U.S. 
field-grade officers seemed endless as new sustainment commands sprang up in theater.  
     
 Moving II Corps to Tunisia 
We have already seen how Eisenhower directed II Corps to the front in early January, 
only to call off the projected offensive in mid-month based on the advice of Alexander.  At the 
 
147 GO 19, AFHQ, 14 Feb 43.  RG 492, NARA II. 
148 SOS, NATOUSA General Orders.  GO 1 and 2, 15 and 25 Feb 43 respectively.  RG 492, NARA II. 
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time Alexander’s recommendation was based on a fear that 8th Army could not conduct a 
simultaneous support attack to tie down German reserves, but after the fact the decision was also 
blamed on logistical difficulties.  But this was not accurate; by 15 January II Corps was making 
excellent progress obtaining their objectives to stockpile enough supplies near the front, long 
before the arrival of UGS 5.5 in mid-February.  This was an excuse generated well after the fact 
to obscure the real reasons the U.S. offensive planned for the end of January never happened.  
In early January 1943 the corps G4 logs contain daily updates on progress with the effort 
to establishing an effective base of supply around three main dumps (Tebessa, Ferrainas, and 
Sbeitla) at the southern end of the 1st Army line.149  The operation, initiated in the first few days 
of January, was called “Speedy Advance” by II Corps.  The objective was to establish a robust 
logistics network capable of sustaining two reinforced divisions east of Tebessa.  The G4 was 
directed to accumulate reserves in this base area consisting of 800 tons of food (CLS I), 2,000 
tons of fuel and oil (CLS III), and 5,800 tons of ammunition (CLS V), in addition to smaller 
objectives for individual items (CLS II) and construction and barrier material (CLS IV).150  The 
first ten days of Speedy Advance were rough; supplies issued daily tended to outstrip supplies 
received and reserves were shrinking – not getting larger.  On the 10th of January the dump at 
Tebessa issued 26.5 tons of food, bringing reserve down to 52 tons (or two days of supply).  The 
fuel situation was even worse.  No 87-octane fuel had been moved forward yet, and 75-octane 
fuel was flowing out faster than it could be replaced to the tune of sixteen tons issued versus 
eleven tons received, leaving 130 tons in reserve.  Finally, there was plenty of ammunition, with 
1,786 tons on hand (about a third of the objective) with none issued and 400 tons received on 9 
 
149 II Corps G4 Daily Journals and Files, December 1942, January 1943, and February 1943.  RG 407, NARA II.   
150 II Corps G4 Daily Status Report, 10 January 1943.   
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January.  But by 15 January the logisticians, guided by Rhe Phillipe, had turned the corner, and 
by 30 January all stated goals for reserve supplies on hand had been met and daily resupply was 
outstripping the issue rate to associated units.  The accepted historical excuse for the cancellation 
of the II Corps attack projected for late January was that 8th Army would not be ready to launch a 
pinning attack to keep Rommel occupied when II Corps attempted to penetrate into the gap 
between 5th Panzer Army and Panzer Army Africa.151  Gale states that on 17 January Alexander 
convinced Eisenhower to cancel the attack because he was not convinced the battle could be 
adequately coordinated or supported by 1st Army and the support commands.152  But as the chart 
below demonstrates, AFHQ and II Corps were making excellent progress with their logistical 
objectives by 15 January. 
 Goal 10 JAN 15 JAN 30 JAN 
CLS I 800 26.6 200 800 
CLS III  
(87 / 75 octane) 
2000 0 / 130 200 / 550 3,000 
(combined) 
CLS V 5800 1786 5500 7000 
Table 2.2: Supplies at major dumps in the II Corps area, Jan 43, in tons153 
 
This is not to say that every logistical requirement of the corps was being met.  Tonnage 
by class of supply is an inexact unit of measure.  Oil, fuel, and lubricants included over thirty 
specific sub-types tracked at the corps level.  CLS II items came in a staggering variety of types, 
and the CLS V report submitted daily by the Corps was sixteen pages long, with each page 
 
151 Playfair, The Destruction of Axis Forces in Africa, 275. 
152 Gale, War Diary, 17 January.  Gale was initially against the offensive because he believed it was logistically 
impossible to support, but he had changed his mind by 17 January.  This was in large part because of the work his 
deputy for movement and transportation, Rhe Philipe, had done to get the railroads working effectively behind the 
Americans.  
153 II Corps G4 Journal and Files, 10, 15, 30 Jan 43.  RG 407, NARA II.   
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listing approximately thirty ammunition items.  It is highly likely that the corps was running 
short on some equipment and supplies that impacted tactical options.  Yet, throughout all the 
documents coming from the corps G4 in January and February 1943, the overriding message was 
one of optimism.  Daily requirements were being handled easily while the corps was 
simultaneously building the directed reserves.  One thing that helped was the low intensity of 
combat faced by the corps in the first six weeks of 1943.  The reports of the corps ammunition 
expenditure for 28 and 29 January were extremely modest: less than 100 pounds of engineer 
demolition supplies, 1,240 high explosive and 300 anti-tank shells for the 37mm guns, 200 anti-
tank mines, and about 2000 shells for 81mm, 75mm, and 105mm mortars and howitzers.  These 
may seem to be large numbers, but this was across an organization that included two divisions, a 
field artillery regiment, about a half-dozen anti-tank battalions, and other service and support 
units. 
 One area of concern does emerge from a very careful reading of all the reports 
consolidated by the corps G4 during this period; repair parts were in short supply, and the impact 
on fleet availability rates was compounded by units ignoring directives about periodic 
maintenance.  At the end of January, the corps reported sixteen light and medium tanks (of which 
leaders were aware) down for repair at the division or corps level and seventeen replacements 
headed to their units.  The report also noted that the corps ordnance companies were at zero 
balance for halftrack, 2.5-ton truck, Jeep, and ¾-ton truck replacement engines.  To make matters 
worse, there was an unfulfilled requisition for 32 medium and 25 light tanks against the 
Mediterranean Base Section at Algiers.154  The urgency of the alarm was stepped up on 13 
February when the corps chief of ordnance pointed out that seven medium tanks were deadlined 
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for blown engines and that he expected a lot more once the 40 tanks recently received at his level 
had gone through the initial inspection process.  This same concern with parts for repairs and 
with spare major assembles was noted in the G4 roll-up for 13 February as well.  By 20 February 
the II Corps periodic administrative order noted problems with keeping the 2.5-ton truck fleet 
rolling and cautioned units to stop overloading the trucks, to watch their maximum speeds, and 
to avoid (or slow down) on bad roads whenever possible.155  By the middle of February, it 
seems, the usual wear and tear of continuous operations had reduced the readiness rates of 
tracked and wheeled vehicles to the point where corps leaders were noticing and taking steps to 
slow down the rate of attrition.156 
 Why did a maintenance issue emerge as the only problem of note in the II Corps by mid-
February 1943?  After the Tunisian campaign was finished, the II Corps ordnance section 
completed a report on their support of operations that helped clarify some of the challenges they 
faced.  The report called the period from 20 November through 5 January phase one, which 
covered ordnance activities beginning with their consolidation after landing through II Corps’ 
posting to the southern flank of the 1st Army line in Tunisia.  During this first six weeks in 
country, the ordnance battalion responsible for vehicle repairs established its base at Souk el 
Arba but was forced to send its twenty 2.5-ton trucks back to Oran to pick up repair parts and 
replacement equipment, a round-trip distance of 1,500 miles.157  Had AFHQ established a 
 
155 II Corps G4 Journal and Files, 20 Feb.  RG 407 NARA.  The corps published an admin order about once every 
two weeks with administrative, logistical, and personnel related instructions for all associated units.   
156 Operational readiness rate (ORR) is the U.S. Army term used to gauge the number of vehicles (by type) that are 
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truck companies necessary to support Overlord.  See Joseph Bykofsky and Harold Larson, The Transportation 
Corps: Operations Overseas (Washington, D.C.: Chief of Military History, 1957), 239.     
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motorized distribution system across the theater to supplement the trains, trips like this would 
have been unnecessary.  The author of the report noted that repair parts were in short supply 
across the theater.  In this same time frame II Corps worked to replace or repair the 32 medium 
and 46 light tanks of Combat Command B, 1st Armored Division, which had been lost or 
damaged while in direct support of the British 1st Army.158  Ammunition presented a second 
challenge for the ordnance service, with supplies flowing by coastal shipping or rail to Bône.  
Eventually the Royal Navy established a reliable LST shuttle service from Bône to La Calle 
(after two iterations of continuous pressure from Gale) cutting the distance that the 30 2.5s from 
the ammunition company had to shuttle the ammunition to reach the main dump at Souk el Arba 
(until the corps was redeployed to the south).  The corps just did not have enough trucks or repair 
parts for those trucks to sustain repeated trips back to La Calle, Bône, Algiers, and, in the worst 
case, Oran.   
 The challenge only got more demanding as the corps shifted its base area 100 miles to the 
south and added another two divisions to the order of battle.  The report referred to the period 
from 5 January through 1 March as phase two and described it as the most difficult period for the 
ordnance service.  One concern was the wear and tear on tanks that had been forced to move 
under their own power from the major ports to the front lines in order to join their battalions.159  
It took a few months, but eventually the corps’ request for wheeled tank transports (Diamond T 
trucks and trailers) was met by AFHQ and the ASF, allowing the creation of the Provisional 
622nd Ordnance Transporter Company in March.  In mid-February the corps was joined by 
advanced elements from the 9th and 34th Infantry Divisions, almost doubling the supply 
 
158 Ibid, 3.  The losses in CCB, 1AD occurred between 20 November and 10 December 1942.     
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requirements on the organization.  This came at almost the same time as the battles around 
Kasserine and Sidi Bou Zid, and the combination of demands was difficult to overcome.  
Combat losses from 21 January to 21 February included 21 light and 162 medium tanks, 194 
halftracks, 30 self-propelled howitzers, 80 self-propelled tank destroyers, almost 100 mortar and 
towed guns, 60 ¾-ton trucks and 143 2.5-ton trucks.160  This overwhelmed the CLS II requisition 
and distribution network in North Africa for the next two months.  Problems related to shortages 
in repair parts mounted, and prioritization between combat readiness and maintenance emerged 
as a command-level issue.  The repair battalion had replacement engines on hand, but 
commanders would not pull the tanks back from the line long enough to complete the jobs.  A 
lack of organization and coordination between the British and U.S. base sections and the tactical 
elements in 1st Army and II Corps was a problem during this period as well.  Reading between 
the lines, it was obvious that the II Corps staff was tired of having to deal directly with AFHQ, 
two American base sections, and a number of British base sections to figure out what was 
available in theater.  The corps would have preferred working with a central authority charged 
with supervising the distribution of supplies from the base areas to army- and corps-level depots.  
The authors of the report clearly indicated that they welcomed the establishment of the SOS as a 
single point of contact that could speak knowledgeably about the entire supply chain on the 
continent. 
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Figure 2.6: 1st Army composition and disposition, 14 Feb 43 
 
 The overarching impression from the detailed tactical reports logged by II Corps is that 
American forces did not experience a supply crisis in January and February 1943.  Repair parts, 
replacement vehicles, and a system to move everything forward to the combat area constituted a 
problem, but not to the point that it eliminated tactical options available to the corps commander. 
If material was not the problem, perhaps a shortage of manpower prevented a return to the 
attack?  II Corps losses from 1 January to 15 March included approximately 300 officers and 
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5,000 enlisted dead, wounded, captured, and missing.161  This was from a total authorized 
strength of 88,287 soldiers, or about 6%.  The corps received as individual replacements during 
this same window 290 officers and 6,746 enlisted soldiers, with approximately 4,000 of them for 
the infantry, 850 for armor, and 800 for field artillery.  Combat losses in the period prior to this 
report (mid-November to 31 December) were not insignificant, but they did not come close to 
those suffered by four divisions in intense combat against elite German formations in January 
through March.  It is safe to say that the replacement system was generally keeping up with 
losses from mid-November to mid-March.  What prevented the resumption of the Allied offense 
in early 1943 was a lack of divisions and air wing on the front lines, not supply shortages or a 
breakdown of the replacement system. 
 This detailed examination of their logistical reports demonstrates that II Corps could 
establish a large depot with significant reserves at the southern end of the Allied line at the very 
time Eisenhower was claiming a mobility crisis and establishing two new headquarters to 
coordinate supply in the theater.  Damaged equipment was being repaired, and destroyed 
equipment replaced.  Formations maintained their combat power.  The replacement system 
worked; II Corps lost no more than 8,000 men from mid-November to mid-March and received 
almost 7,000 replacements by 15 March 1943.  The Corps’ logistical and combat leaders did not 
raise any red flags related to logistics until after the significant losses from the Kasserine battles.  
This is not to say that everything was perfect within II Corps, or to suggest that their situation 
was identical to that faced by the British 1st Army, the XIX French Corps, or Allied air units in 
North Africa.  But II Corps could have sustained an offensive with two divisions from mid-
 
161 II Corps Report of Operations Tunisia 1 January to 15 March 1943, 2 May 1943.  Appendix C.  RG 407, NARA 
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January to mid-February without triggering a logistical crisis, and they were located at the 
toughest place on the Allied line to maintain a line of communications.  By 10 January enough 
material was reaching II Corps to enable combat operations – logistics did not fail the maneuver 
commanders, despite what Eisenhower and other leaders at AFHQ were implying at the time and 
allowed to enter the historical record.  The loss of Allied momentum from mid-April to late April 
was due several other problems, but fuel and ammunition for the units in the front line was not 
one of them. 
 
 MG Everett Hughes, NATOUSA, and its COMZ 
Despite the reality on the ground, one outcome of the Anfa Conference and Marshall and 
Somervell’s visit to AFHQ was the decision to establish a traditional theater headquarters 
structure for the U.S. Army in Africa.  AFHQ had very deliberately decided to start the North 
African campaign with no intervening U.S. administrative headquarters between themselves and 
the three task forces.162  As operations progressed the various support agencies slowly coalesced 
into two American base sections and a British line of communications command as the original 
plan had envisioned.  But Eisenhower changed his mind near the end of January 1943, resulting 
in the decision to significantly expand U.S. administrative overhead in February by adding two 
echelons between AFHQ and U.S. units.  Internal reexamination of the COMZ issue swirled 
around AFHQ during the last week of January.  Gale supported Hamblen and Sawbridge’s 
position from October; nothing significant had changed to invalidate the original concept of 
direct supervision by the senior headquarters.  Adding any additional layer of control between 
 
162 ETOUSA was theoretically in the U.S. chain of command for Operation Torch until early February 1943, but no 
one wanted or expected them to try to supervise operations in Africa.   
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the G4 and the three organizations directed to provide logistical support would undermine the 
authority of AFHQ and reduce the G4 to an irrelevant organization.  But on 29 January General 
Smith overrode Gale and his principal subordinates and announced that Hughes would soon take 
over as the deputy NATOUSA commander and activate a COMZ command with authority to 
coordinate U.S. sustainment.163  This resulted in the announcement of Hughes as the deputy 
theater commander on 4 February and then as the COMZ commander on 9 February and in the 
elevation of Larkin (the MBS commander) to SOS, NATOUSA on 15 February. 
 So, what had changed to overthrow the original concept of how best to supervise 
administrative support to the combat elements?  The chief of the U.S. Service of Supply, LTG 
Somervell, accompanied Marshall to the conference at Casablanca.  At the end of the conference, 
both leaders visited the AFHQ at Algiers.  One imagines Eisenhower pointing out the amount of 
time he devoted to logistical issues every day and noting the limitations within the distribution 
system that prevented rapid transfer of more divisions to Tunisia.  From there it was a short leap 
to conclude that the initial thrust into Tunisia in November and December had failed largely due 
to logistical problems.  The answer from Somervell’s perspective would have been easy -- just 
follow U.S. doctrine and common practice from other commands by establishing a theater and 
service of supply command.  Somervell was fighting a similar battle for control of logistics 
planning and execution with the War Department general staff and Operations Division.  
 The push to reorganize in North Africa was not an isolated development, adding 
plausibility to the idea that Somervell was trying to reorganize command and control in active 
theaters to ensure that SOS commanders could accomplish their missions.  Soon after the arrival 
 
163 History of AFHQ, Part Two, Section 1, 199.  The authors reference the minutes of the CoS meeting for 29 Jan 
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of LTG F.M. Andrews in the U.K., MG John Lee, the SOS commander within ETOUSA, 
proposed a similar reorganization.164  Lee argued that he should also be Andrews’ deputy theater 
commander, empowering him to supervise the sections charged with administrative support 
within the ETOUSA headquarters, particularly the G4.165  Lee and Somervell wanted to ensure 
that the senior commanders responsible for executing sustainment had the authority to drive 
planning and to keep the G4 out of the day-to-day business of the technical service sections.  BG 
Raymond Moses supported the suggestion that the creation of NATOUSA and Lee’s bid for 
increased authority within ETOUSA were driven by Somervell and negotiated during 
conversations held at Casablanca and his follow-up visit to Algiers.166 But LTG Andrews 
rejected the non-doctrinal suggestion that he empower a deputy theater commander (for a 
mission that was something of a backwater in 1943 to begin with) but agreed to align the chiefs 
of technical services under the SOS.167  The practical result was the addition of another layer of 
friction between the ETOUSA G4 and the technical service experts who would be needed in 
planning the invasion of France.  Lee launched a second attempt to drive home his preferred 
system when LTG Jacob Devers arrived in early May to take over ETOUSA.  Devers’ solution 
was to dual-hat Lee as his theater G4, an elegant compromise that did not work as well as it 
should have to address the legitimate concerns raised by the SOS leadership.168  A LTC serving 
in the ETOUSA G4 throughout this period observed that Lee seemed to prioritize his duties as 
the SOS commander (and the U.S. build-up in Britain) over his responsibilities to help plan the 
 
164 LTC F.A. Osmanski, “The Logistical Planning of Operation Overlord, Part 1,” Military Review 29, no. 8 
(November 1949): 33-34.  Andrews arrived on 3 February and the ETOUSA staff was partially reorganized before 
the end of the month. 
165 This was very similar to the position and authority Gale possessed in North Africa once the 1st LoC was detached 
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invasion of France.169  The real point of all of this is that developments in North Africa in 
January and February reflected the ongoing professional discussion across the U.S. Army on the 
best way to organize a theater to ensure adequate administrative support.  In February in North 
Africa, doctrine and large staffs won out over an alternative method proposed by AFHQ during 
planning in October and November 1942.    
 At first, NATOUSA did not have enough manpower or unique authority relative to 
AFHQ to provide much assistance to Eisenhower and his key lieutenants.  Standing up Larkin’s 
SOS made sense and put one organization in charge of managing the flow of supplies out of 
three ports to the front-line divisions, relieving the AFHQ G-4 of this burden.  But in many ways, 
the elevation of Hughes and the establishment of a COMZ made the sustainment chain more 
confusing and less responsive.  This was obvious, as shown by the constant calls from the field 
seeking clarification of this new and convoluted chain of responsibilities.  U.S. doctrine did not 
address the idea of a deputy theater commander, but it did mention the usefulness of having a 
COMZ commander and the traditional array of authorities granted to him.  The official history of 
the AFHQ implies that this is why Hughes was first named the deputy NATOUSA commander 
but was then appointed as the COMZ commander about a week later.170  Hughes did not have a 
dedicated NATOUSA or COMZ staff until after the end of the Tunisian campaign, limiting his 
usefulness to Smith and Eisenhower.  Hughes had only one subordinate element (the SOS 
command under Larkin, which was not established until two weeks after Hughes was appointed 
as deputy theater commander), and NATOUSA’s authority over Clark’s 5th Army was not 
 
169 This might not have been fair and LTC Osmanski was not in a great position to evaluate the totality of General 
Lee’s time management skills.  Regardless, Eisenhower removed Lee from the ETOUSA chain of authority and 
brought along Gale to continue as the CAO while retaining MG Crawford as the COSSAC/SHAEF G4.   
170 History of AFHQ, Part Two, Section 1,193. 
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clearly delineated.171  Official orders from both AFHQ and NATOUSA did establish that Hughes 
and Gale were to be considered equals.  Therefore, Hughes could not direct Gale, and 
presumably Gale’s subordinates on the AFHQ staff.  Orders also specified that 5th Army – not 
Hughes – was responsible for security in the COMZ.172  The worst complicating factor was 
Hughes’ list of authorities as the deputy theater (NATOUSA) commander.  Because some U.S. 
members of the AFHQ staff (to include the G4) were dual-hatted as NATOUSA staff, they found 
themselves with two bosses who occasionally gave them conflicting guidance.   
General Smith, as the AFHQ chief of staff, was in charge of all coordination in the 
command, and Gale was empowered to supervise the coalition G1, G4, and Movement and 
Transportation sections, as well as the special staff sections aligned under them.  Hamblen 
answered to Gale for all matters associated with field logistics, and Gale answered to Smith.  But 
now Hughes had written authority to supervise the NATOUSA staff, and, because they did not 
exist as a separate entity, Hughes could direct the Americans on the AFHQ staff, adding to their 
workload, confusing the priority of effort, and even inadvertently countermanding Smith’s and 
Gale’s instructions if he was not careful.  Two solutions were possible: either form a stand-alone 
NATOUSA staff or write out in excruciating detail the tasks exclusive to AFHQ and 
NATOUSA.  The command did neither, and unnecessary friction was the result.           
  Hughes demonstrated quickly that he did not see a problem with inserting himself into 
the U.S. G4 decision-making chain.  One of his first notes to the American G4 directed the 
officer to stop performing the function Eisenhower, Smith, and Gale had come to rely upon him 
for, without providing a viable alternative. On 17 February 1943 he sent a note to Hamblen 
 
171 NATOUSA GO 4, 15 Feb 43.  NATOUSA File, RG 492, NARA II. 
172 Which is inconsistent with FM 100-10 or FM 100-15. 
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telling him to get out of the operations function and to stick with making policy.  Hughes went 
on to inform the G4 that he should coordinate through Larkin or Hughes, and not directly with 
Gale, Smith, or Eisenhower; this would allow the two commanders to present a unified position 
on logistics to the AFHQ leaders.  This guidance was ridiculous on a number of levels, and 
Hamblen largely ignored Hughes for the duration of the campaign in Tunisia.  Gale figured out 
how to maintain an effective working relationship with Hughes, but General Smith grew more 
and more frustrated with what he saw as meddling with the AFHQ staff as operations in the 
Mediterranean continued.173  Larkin and his three base-section commanders were also frustrated 
because they believed that the relationship and division of authority between the SOS staff and 
various personnel working for Hughes and Gale were never spelled out in sufficient detail to 
prevent everyone, including II Corps and its divisions, from coloring outside the lines.  The 
strongly implied conclusion in the official history of the AFHQ was that the chain of authority 
for sustainment was very confusing and still not resolved when operations wrapped up in Tunisia 
in May 1943.174             
The battle between Hughes and Smith was almost pre-determined; even if 
different personalities had been involved, the flawed organizational structure would 
likely have produced the same need for more clearly defined boundaries.  The exact same 
situation would play out among SHAEF, ETOUSA, and the SOS/COMZ headquarters 
during operations in France.  The problem was stickier with Hughes because of his pre-
war friendship with the Eisenhower family.  They had attended the Army War College 
together and socialized during their follow-on assignments in Washington, D.C.  The two 
 
173 Hughes diary entries 12 March, 5 May, 2 and 24 June 1943.  ESHP, LoC.  Hughes records a series of 
disagreements about control of U.S. staff supporting both AFHQ and NATOUSA mission sets.   
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officers were reunited in London in the summer of 1942 when Eisenhower assumed 
command of ETOUSA; Hughes had arrived about two weeks earlier to serve as the Chief 
of Ordnance in MG John C.H. Lee’s SOS command before moving over to the chief of 
staff position at ETOUSA.  In early August Eisenhower transferred his good friend over 
to join the Torch planning team, where he worked with Gale as the “deputy chief 
administrative officer” as a colonel and brigadier general through early December.175  
Hughes did not deploy with Gale and the rest of the sustainment staff, but was led to 
believe that he would eventually deploy to North Africa in some capacity.176  On 30 
January 1943 Smith warned Hughes that the transfer was imminent; Hughes left London 
on 2 February and landed in Algiers on the afternoon of 3 February.     
Leaders emerging from the ASF community within the U.S. Army believed that 
the AFHQ had made a mistake by starting the campaign without a more traditional SOS 
and theater command relationship and tried to learn from the process how to better 
organize in the ETO.177  Hughes, Smith, and Eisenhower tried to fix the formal 
instructions and division of labor between NATOUSA and AFHQ from February to June 
before finally giving up and living with the system that had evolved on its own.   
Disagreement over the structure and division of labor between AFHQ and 
NATOUSA escalated in late April to the point where Eisenhower appointed a trusted 
intermediary, BG Clarence Huebner, to study the problem and recommend a solution.  
 
175 Hughes was only on loan to AFHQ and officially retained his position as the SOS chief of staff. 
176 Hughes diary entries 14 October and 13 November. ESHP, LoC.   
177 John C.H. Lee, Service Reminiscences, 87.  Copy of unpublished manuscript held at the Army Heritage and 
Education Center.  Lee referred to learning from the difficulties experienced by Larkin and Hughes in his own 
attempts to set up the relationship between the SOS and ETO in Great Britain.  BG Ray Moses reached out to 
Hughes at the end of 1943 to inform his own efforts to establish responsibilities between FUSAG, the SOS, 
ETOUSA, and the Allied command for Overlord.  Box I-6, ESHP, LoC.       
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Huebner’s answer would have been to create a small NATOUSA staff and wall Hughes 
off from the Americans at AFHQ, to include the special staff and technical service chiefs.  
Hughes managed to defeat this idea by going over Smith’s head to Eisenhower, and the 
subject was publicly shelved on 5 May.178  Smith tried once more to find a workable 
solution, proposing on 2 June that Hughes become the American CAO, mirroring Gale’s 
position and authority relative to British service forces in theater.  It was an elegant 
solution that would have preserved Hughes’ authority over the COMZ and SOS, given 
him direct access to the AFHQ staff, and maintained his cooperative relationship with 
Gale.  But it would have subordinated him to Smith and restricted his authority 
exclusively to issues within the COMZ.  For these two reasons, Hughes rejected the 
recommendation and Smith decided to drop the issue.179  After this last fight Smith 
dropped the issue entirely; everyone involved focused on making the system function 
rather than trying to find a perfect solution that satisfied everyone. 
Based on his diary entries, Hughes was more concerned with preserving his 
authority and defeating encroachment by Smith rather than fixing shortcomings in the 
Allied system.  In Hughes’ defense, his overriding concern was taking as much 
administrative load from Eisenhower as possible, while preserving the sanctity of 
command authority throughout the U.S. Army.180  Hughes believed in the bifurcation of 
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authority between the combat and communication zone consistent with U.S. doctrine and 
espoused by Somervell and his apostles at the ASF.  Hughes also understood how 
important it was for U.S. logisticians to get experience running a communications zone, a 
skill that might have been superfluous in North Africa, but it would be essential in 
France.181  No one allowed this professional disagreement to fester and become long-
term animosity.  Smith, Hughes, and Gale remained cordial and worked well together in 
1944 and 1945.  Most importantly, the argument over shared responsibilities between 
AFHQ and NATOUSA did not get in the way of Allied operations in North Africa 
between February and victory in May. 
   
 18th Army Group Takes Charge 
Even as the Americans were coming to terms the creation of a SOS, a new theater 
command, and exactly what power Hughes had over the AFHQ staff, the 18th Army Group was 
established with the publication of GO 21 on 18 February 1943.  It was a move that had first 
been discussed at the commanders’ conference at Casablanca in mid-January; 18th Army Group 
was officially established with General Alexander assuming command and filling the role 
vacated by Clark in early January as the deputy commanding general for ground operations 
within AFHQ.   By 20 February the 18th AG staff was running operations out of the old AFHQ 
site in Constantine trying to help with the battles around Kasserine Pass, manage the link up of 
8th Army arriving from Libya, and sort out the convoluted chain of command for tactical and 
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Larkin, Adcock, and Tate where the men discussed the importance establishing a U.S.-only COMZ somewhere in 
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administrative orders to the combat divisions.182  Alexander’s 18th AG would have operational 
authority over 1st Army, 8th Army, all U.S. ground forces in the combat zone, and the Free 
French XIX Corps.  It was decided not to change the administrative arrangements for the two 
armies; 1st Army and associated air units would requisition back through AFHQ while 8th Army 
maintained its supply relationship with Middle Eastern Command.183  Officially II Corps would 
coordinate directly with AFHQ for its administrative needs, but it was hard to cut the habitual 
relationship that had grown up between Larkin’s SOS and the II Corps staff.184  At the same time 
when Eisenhower was trying to rationalize the command structure tasked with overseeing ground 
operations and the communications zone, similar efforts were underway to consolidate and 
simplify the air and naval picture.  The overall effect was to slowly consolidate air, ground, and 
naval power into the hands of one service commander in the Mediterranean, with Spaatz and 
then Tedder in charge of air, Alexander in charge of ground, and Andrew Cunningham directing 
naval forces.185       
 One advantage of 18th Army Group was the ability to put the sustainment situation into 
perspective and to cross-level requirements between 1st and 8th Army.  The day after its official 
activation, 18th Army directed 1st Army to transfer fuel and food to the advanced elements of 8th 
Army as they arrived in southern Tunisia.186  Whatever the supply situation throughout AFHQ, 
Montgomery’s vanguard obviously had it worse.  As soon as the crisis associated with the 
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German offensive through Kasserine Pass had abated, AFHQ and the 18th AG staffs began the 
process of formalizing the division of responsibility necessary to prepare for a major offensive in 
the spring.  AFHQ hosted a meeting on 27 February to work through the details with all the key 
British and American leaders present.187  The next day a new base was activated at Tripoli under 
the command of Brigadier Brian Robertson with the mission of shortening and simplifying the 
resupply of 8th Army.  The command was fully operational by 3 March.  On 2 March, MG 
Miller, the chief of admin for 18th AG, hosted his own logistics coordination meeting to establish 
both the quantity of supplies that would have to be moved forward before the spring offensive 
and exactly how they would be moved to the front.188  The main 1st Army supply center would 
be established around Ouled Rahmoun (to the southeast of Constantine).  The goal was to 
stockpile 25,000 tons of various supplies there by 25 March.  COL Pense, the U.S. base section 
commander in the area, fired off a note to BG Larkin that evening asking for help.  The II Corps 
consumed 750 tons of supplies a day under normal conditions; to establish the directed reserves 
would require additional trains, trucks, and service troops to handle the material.  Pense insisted 
that he needed additional signal, quartermaster, depot, and port service companies and a separate 
engineer battalion to pull off the mission.  AFHQ tried to help from their end by once again 
diving in to fix a foul-up that had interrupted the ferry service between Bône and La Calle ferry 
and demanding that the Navy provide 100 tons of supplies daily through this service.189   
Gale monitored progress by insisting that unit representatives provide an update of their 
progress in building up the directed reserves.  These figures included the number of crated 
supply vehicles assembled in the last 48 hours and the tonnage of supplies on the ground at the 
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forward dumps for British and U.S. forces broken down by class of supply.  The committee 
discussed the U.S. truck shortage on 10 March; Larkin needed 1,245 2.5-ton trucks to 
supplement rail deliveries.  The II Corps could provide 650 from assigned units, but the balance 
would have to come by assembling crated trucks at the ports.  Larkin was confident he would 
find the drivers and leaders for these six new companies once the vehicles were operational.  On 
13 March the EBS representative reported local reserves of 8,600 tons at Constantine and at 
Ouled Rahmoun and the daily receipt over 200 tons of POL.  Steady progress was reported over 
the next two weeks.  By 17 March five trains arrived each day in Philippeville carrying 1069 tons 
of military cargo, 8,000 tons of POL had reached the 1st Army forward dumps, and the G4 shared 
the good news that a heavy truck company capable of carrying tanks or bulk stores would be 
available soon.190  On 24 March the stocks at Ouled Rahmoun had reached almost 15,000 tons; 
two-thirds were reserved for American use and the other third for the British.  Rail deliveries 
increased from 1,069 to 1,500 tons arriving in Philippeville daily.   
Success with generating more rail and wheeled traffic triggered a secondary traffic 
control problem, but the British line of communications command planned to establish two 
transportation sections in Philippeville to improve the flow of vehicles.  More trucks traveling 
more miles also exposed the overarching problem with repair parts within the U.S. supply 
system.  After a short tour of the administrative support areas at the end of March, Gale directed 
his staff to find or make suspension springs to keep the light truck fleet running.  Once a source 
of supply was identified, Gale worked with the air staff to organize aerial resupply directly to the 
major maintenance collection points.191  By 27 March one could conclude that AFHQ had solved 
 
190 Diamond-T trucks with trailers that could haul the heaviest Allied tanks or dozens of tons of supplies each.  This 
company would be directly controlled by 18th AG. 
191 CAO Conference NA 24 Mar 43.  This issue triggered the first conversations at the AFHQ level about centrally 
managing aerial resupply.  
176 
 
the distribution system across the theater.  Trains could deliver 2,030 tons of military cargo to 
Philippeville daily, there was a U.S. reserve of 20,000 tons in the general area of the EBS based 
in Constantine, and Gale reported continued progress by Air Marshal Tedder in setting up an 
aerial resupply coordination center at the main headquarters in Algiers.  In the last CAO 
conference in March, ordnance officers briefed that they had cracked the code on local 
manufacture of truck suspension springs and were handing the parts off to the air force for 
delivery to the forward repair shops.192  During April the issues raised in the CAO meetings 
dwindled to reports of exceeding the requirements needed to sustain the upcoming spring 
offensive and to routine administrative instructions.  On 15 April the engineer representative at 
the meeting reported that the fuel pipeline running from Philippeville to Ouled Rahmoun had 
been tested and was ready to begin transfers of bulk fuel.  The AFHQ had won the battle to 
establish a functioning theater supply and distribution network.   
                  
 An Outsider’s Impression of NATOUSA 
Appointed the new NATOUSA commander in January 1944, General Jacob Devers was 
an immensely qualified outside observer who could assess the strengths and weaknesses of the 
U.S. theater command in its mature state.  General Devers was appointed the deputy supreme 
commander for Allied forces in the Mediterranean and the commanding general of NATOUSA 
on 29 December 1943 while still serving in London.  General W.B. Smith arrived from Algiers 
the next day and helped Devers prepare for his transition in a series of short meetings over the 
next six days.193  Devers, Smith, and Gale flew from London on 4 January and landed in Algiers 
 
192 CAO Conference NA 29 Mar 43. 
193 Official Diary of General Devers, entries for 30 December 1943 to 4 January 1944.  Devers Papers, AHEC. 
177 
 
on 5 January to begin an orientation to the theater.  By 8 January Devers had already decided that 
he was not impressed with the AFHQ rear headquarters or the NATOUSA staff, noting that they 
were disorganized and needed to become an efficient, cooperative organization.194  His entry for 
9 January included a harsh evaluation of Hughes, Rooks, Sawbridge, and Adcock, as well as the 
conclusion that Hughes had to go.  He said: “We seem from preliminary survey to be extravagant 
in personnel in certain spots and very short in others.”195  The specific concerns noted were too 
many casualties due to exhaustion coming from 5th Army in Italy and Clark’s inability to 
leverage the unemployed talents of Patton and Middleton while trying to do too much by 
himself.  After a few days his opinion of his subordinates had changed a bit.  He noted that he 
had good people but the NATOUSA staff needed to be reorganized and accelerate its tempo – 
Devers felt they lacked a sense of urgency.  By mid-February Devers had eliminated Hughes’ 
position as deputy theater commander.  He also developed a habit of spending more time in Italy 
in his role as the deputy SAC for the MTO than in Algiers executing his duties as the 
NATOUSA commander.  Devers did not think much of the professional competence of Hughes, 
and he considered the two positions of deputy theater and COMZ commander redundant.  Devers 
could run the NATOUSA staff, and Larkin could supervise the large SOS organization in the 
Mediterranean.        
BG Larkin’s competence and effectiveness had caught the eye of Eisenhower.  Soon after 
arriving at SHAEF, Eisenhower wrote to Devers asking if Larkin might become available for 
reassignment anytime soon.196  Devers replied that same day to assure Eisenhower that Larkin 
would be needed for the foreseeable future but offering Hughes as unnecessary overhead that he 
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was comfortable parting with.197  It was obvious that this offer caught Eisenhower off-guard; the 
position he had in mind was very different from what Hughes had done in North Africa and the 
Mediterranean.  Eisenhower did not have any openings at SHAEF or ETOUSA commensurate 
with Hughes’ position at NATOUSA.  Eisenhower told Devers he would get back to him soon 
about the offer to transfer Hughes.198  Eisenhower probably shopped the idea around within his 
inner circle and thought it over for about two weeks, deciding on 7 February that he would 
accept Hughes if Devers would release him.199  Eisenhower decided to appoint Hughes as a free-
ranging set of eyes and ears to find and solve logistical problems over the coming nine months.  
It is interesting that he did not make room for Hughes on the SHAEF, ETOUSA, or COMZ staff, 
probably because after being the deputy theater and COMZ commander at NATOUSA, this 
would have been something of an insult to his pre-war friend.  
One can conclude from the actions and private comments of General Devers that he 
thought NATOUSA was redundant and could not justify the number of soldiers assigned to the 
organization.  Devers made it clear that his responsibilities at NATOUSA did not warrant his 
undivided attention.  His initial harsh evaluation of the command is not surprising; it was an 
organization maximized to handle routine administrative and logistical issues in the manner 
comfortable to General Hughes.  The staff was competent and full of “good people”; they just 
needed a bit of time to adjust to Devers’ preferred method of conducting business.  Without the 
massive responsibilities held by his predecessor, Devers had more time to supervise NATOUSA 
himself, rendering the deputy command position unnecessary.  Devers also quickly determined 
that NATOUSA could largely run itself, and he decided that he could make a more decisive 
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contribution to the Allied war effort by spending a good amount of his time visiting U.S. units in 
Italy and working with Wilson at AFHQ headquarters.  Devers quickly decided that NATOUSA 
was top-heavy and as a result a bit too slow.  Because it handled routine administrative 
interaction with the War Department and oversight of garrison activities in North Africa, AFHQ, 
5th Army, and SOS were more operationally relevant locations for Devers to spend his time and 
contribute to victory.  He did not abandon his duties in Algiers, but he discovered he could 
accomplish them using only a fraction of his time.  Finally, when it came time for Devers to plan 
and prepare for Operation Dragoon, he followed an organizational model favored by Bradley and 
Montgomery over the orthodox approach advanced by the ASF and practiced by Lee and 
Hughes.  Devers was a strong advocate of making his continental advanced section a subordinate 
element of the 7th Army and making his SOS command a subordinate of 6th Army Group during 
the first few months in southern France.  With these decisions Devers demonstrated that he was 
aligned with the emerging consensus among combat leaders in Europe. As a group these senior 
combat commanders had internalized a fierce desire to synchronize their own logistical support, 
rejecting the theater SOS to ASF model favored in 1942.  
 
 “Lessons” from the Mediterranean 
The Allied team that shifted from AFHQ to SHAEF brought a year’s worth of hardening 
attitudes about the right way to wage modern joint warfare.  Three assault landings on the Italian 
homeland taught not only caution and the value of overwhelming firepower during the initial 
assault but also the importance of winning the battle of the buildup in its immediate aftermath.  
The Germans could be counted on to pour in mobile reserves and launch powerful counterattacks 
within days if not hours of the Allied landing.  These counterattacks could only be stopped by a 
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combination of massive joint firepower covering the landing area, the efficient flow of 
reinforcements and supplies across unimproved beaches, and aerial interdiction that could slow 
down the arrival of German forces and supplies.   
In addition to expanding concerns about German air and ground counterattacks once 
ashore, the second major outcome of operations in the Mediterranean was increased competence 
and self-confidence within AFHQ and growing authority in their engagements with the U.S. War 
Department and specifically the ASF.  But as the nature of the sustainment challenge shifted in 
the Mediterranean, strategic logistics reemerged as the dominant concern, allowing operational 
logistical capabilities to sink to a secondary priority and dampening the imperative to prepare 
ETOUSA for that mission.  Because the Allied lessons-learned process was at best semi-
formalized, numerous insights provided by Operation Torch were missed or not acted upon with 
sufficient energy.  The U.S. Army continued to argue about the proper mix of combat and 
sustainment troops, was slow to consolidate the power of the new transportation service, and 
found itself with two competing models for how best to synchronize maneuver and sustainment 
at the theater level.  The opportunity to reevaluate the relationship between a joint-combined 
operational headquarters and the U.S. theater and COMZ/SOS structure was ignored.  The 
chance to update doctrine in order to eliminate gaps, overlapping authorities, and clearly explain 
the official position on how to fuse combat and sustainment informed by a year of successful 
operations was not exploited.200 
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 Sicily, Naples, and Rome: The Danger of German Counterattacks 
If Torch offered invaluable lessons on sustainment and a protracted joint campaign, the 
landings against Italy showed the Allies exactly what they could expect from local German 
defenders confronted by assault from the sea.   The ferocity and scope of the German response 
seemed to grow with each subsequent landing from Sicily, to Salerno, to Anzio in direct 
proportion to the strategic risk posed by Allied actions.  The other problematic trend was the 
impact that German airpower could have in all phases of an assault landing and subsequent 
ground campaign, particularly in the first phase of an invasion.  German fighters tended to 
operate from local fields while the Allies had to rely on carrier-based planes or fighters working 
at the end of their range.  Allied air leaders knew that the Germans retained a large and effective 
fighter reserve defending the homeland, and elements of that force were available to reinforce 
France or Italy during the opening moves of an invasion.  It was only in the spring of 1944 that 
the fighter strength of the Luftwaffe was broken over Germany, and most aspects of the Overlord 
plan were locked in before this shift occurred.   
One might have assumed that planning for Husky was easier or at least more efficient 
than experience of planning Torch.  But new sources of friction emerged among the different 
personalities due to the difficulty associated with getting senior leaders to pay much attention to 
something due to occur six months in the future.  It did not help that the U.S. Army thought 
Sicily was forced on them against their will by the British at Casablanca, but the strategic value 
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of taking the island was beyond question.  By eliminating the Axis air threat from Sicily, the 
Mediterranean would open to United Nations shipping, ending the need to detour around the 
southern tip of Africa.  This would have the same effect as adding one million tons of merchant 
ships to the Allied order of battle.  On 23 January AFHQ was directed to begin detailed planning 
for Husky based on a concept developed by the British Joint Planning Staff; 18th Army Group 
activated Force 141 under MG Charles Gairdner to coordinate the effort.201  Gairdner soon 
discovered that he had been handed an almost impossible task. 
Force 141 labored under three problematic conditions.  First, Washington and London 
were invested in how operational planning developed.  Second, the joint elements of the invasion 
force occupied physical locations in the Mediterranean spread out from Rabat, Morocco to 
Alexandria and Cairo, Egypt.  Finally, almost no responsible commander at AFHQ, 18th AG, or 
8th Army wanted much to do with the operation while still fighting in Tunisia.  Gairdner did have 
one advantage with the addition of BG Arthur S. Nevins.  Nevins was a U.S. officer who had 
worked with the JPS since April 1942.  He was extremely familiar with the outline concept and 
knew the critical contacts in London necessary to work out the details and secure further support 
for the planning effort.202  Despite these challenges, Gairdner managed to extract approval for his 
general concept in mid-March at a meeting attended by Eisenhower, Cunningham, Alexander, 
Tedder, and Spaatz.  Miles Dempsey seemed to suggest that Montgomery was okay with the 
draft as well.203 
This version of the plan was problematic, and it is surprising that no one raised any 
serious concerns during the meeting on 15 March.  In trying to meet the minimum requirements 
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of the naval, air, and logistical planners, Gairdner had developed a concept that Montgomery 
informed him had “no hope of success and should be completely recast.”204  One can imagine 
Gairdner’s frustration; he had provided a copy of his draft plan to 8th Army in mid-February and 
worked with Dempsey to ensure that Montgomery had seen the document and supported the 
overarching concepts.  The meeting with Eisenhower and the service chiefs had been a complete 
waste of time; the consensus hammered out since January was worthless.  To add insult to injury, 
he could not get any of his superiors to force the issue or develop a viable alternative.  Facing 
down the requirement to back brief Churchill and the British chiefs of staff on 6 April, Gairdner 
finally extracted a tentative approval from General Freddie de Guingand, Montgomery’s chief of 
staff, to a compromise the day before his travel.205  It probably came as no surprise when he was 
informed on 24 April that Montgomery had finally found the time to really study the plan for 
Husky and deemed it a recipe for a “first-class military disaster.”206  Montgomery was 
understandably concerned about the dispersion of the two landing forces; the British would land 
in the southeast followed by the Americans two days later at the western end of the northern 
coast.  Montgomery also resented meddling by Washington and London in “his” tactical plan. 
Facing a full-scale planning crisis for an operation set to kick off in two and a half 
months, Alexander called for a new meeting on 29 April attended by himself, Admiral Andrew 
Cunningham, Air Chief Marshal Arthur Tedder, Admiral Ramsay, Air Marshal Arthur 
Coningham, Patton, and the planners from Force 141.  The 8th Army was represented by one of 
its corps commanders, LTG Oliver Leese, because Montgomery was sick in bed and Guingand 
was stuck in the middle of the desert after his plane crashed in Tunisia.  The inability of the 
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largely British team to develop a mutually agreeable solution during this conference was a black 
mark against the leadership and authority of Alexander.  Cunningham and Tedder would not 
accept Montgomery’s ground plan, 8th Army sent no representative to develop an alternative on 
the spot, and Alexander refused to overrule either camp.  Patton and Nevins watched on in 
amazement and despair.207  The impasse was broken on 2 May when Montgomery offered a new 
compromise that addressed the most significant objections voiced by the Navy and Air Force.  
Finally offered a workable solution, Eisenhower quickly approved the compromise, but the 
damage had been done.  Barr argues that the methods Montgomery employed to change the plan 
and then ram his version through AFHQ and the CCS ended any hopes of maintaining a 
professional working relationship between the British air and sea leaders and Montgomery for 
the duration of the war.208      
The compromise approved by Eisenhower on 2 May and by the CCS on 12 May 
triggered a final battle over Allied organization for the coming battle.  Now three U.S. divisions 
would land in the Gulf of Gela, while to their right four U.K. divisions landed in the Gulf of 
Noto.  At its peak the campaign called for thirteen divisions ashore, which was well within the 
span of control of a single army.  As a result, Montgomery recommended, and Alexander 
approved, that 8th Army would control the entire operation, with Patton leading a corps under his 
command.  Patton and W.B. Smith got word of these developments back to Marshall, who 
decided that a better solution was to expand Patton’s I Armored Corps into the 7th Army once all 
six division equivalents were ashore.209  Recent British behavior had driven Marshall and Smith 
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to the conclusion that U.S. divisions and corps would not serve under British control and that 
unnecessary overhead was a small price to pay to avoid being treated as second-class soldiers. 
In hindsight, Allied operational planning for Husky was a complete mess.  Patton and 
Marshall both considered the final invasion scheme too cautious, too risk adverse, and unlikely 
to finish the battle quickly or to hurt the enemy to the maximum extent possible.210  Interference 
by Washington and London in the planning process provided a sense of urgency that 18th Army 
Group seemed to lack.  Specific guidance from Washington also prevented Eisenhower from 
accepting one too many compromises by subordinating Patton to Montgomery.  Alexander failed 
the AFHQ team by allowing British business to spill over into a public forum, forcing 
Eisenhower to do his job for him while ruining the relationships among Tedder, Cunningham, 
and Montgomery in the process.  The entire episode captured Allied joint-combined operational 
planning at its low point.  In the ultimate act of injustice, MG Gairdner, who had worked so hard 
to develop a functional plan acceptable to all the egos involved in the process, was sent back to 
London at his permanent rank of colonel, where he learned of the successful invasion of Sicily 
from the BBC.211   
Sicily was defended by eight Italian coastal divisions, four infantry divisions, and two 
German armored formations with about 150 tanks and assault guns.  Field Marshal Kesselring, 
the German theater commander, directed that reserve divisions would be scattered along the 
entire coast, ready to launch immediate counterattacks before any invaders could establish a 
secure hold on the shore.212  The Allies landed seven assault divisions supported by three 
airborne brigades on the first day of the operation, and met almost no resistance from the Italian 
 
210 Atkinson, The Day of Battle, 55.     
211 Barr, 258. 
212 Thomas B. Buell, et al, The Second World War: Europe and the Mediterranean (Wayne, N.J.: Avery Publishing 
Group, Inc., 1984), 229. 
186 
 
garrison divisions.  The Allies landed 150,000 men supported by 4,000 aircraft on 10 July; the 
total force committed on Sicily eventually reached 478,000 troops.  The Italian Livorno and 
German Hermann Goering divisions attacked the Americans coming ashore at Licata and Gela 
on the first day of the invasion but did not make much of an impression.   
But on the second day problems developed around Gela on the U.S. 1st Infantry Division 
front.  The official history of the U.S. Army operation in Sicily noted: “The delay in the arrival 
of the 1st Division’s supporting artillery and armor could be traced to enemy artillery fire, 
particularly in support of the various counterattacks, to enemy air raids against Allied shipping 
lying off the Gela beaches and to the poor beaches themselves.”213  At one point on 11 July, 
three of four beaches belonging to the 1st ID were shut down by enemy artillery fire.  Allied 
leaders worried because they knew from Ultra intercepts that the German and Italian armored 
formations, which threw over a dozen Tiger tanks and somewhere between 50 to 100 medium 
tanks against the beachhead on 11 July, were due to be reinforced by two additional divisions.214  
The battle on the 1st ID front was touch and go up until mid-afternoon on the 11th as the Livorno 
and Herman Goering divisions got within eyesight of the beaches only to be stopped by infantry, 
naval gunfire, less than a dozen U.S. medium tanks, and howitzers operating in direct-fire 
mode.215  Failure on the 11th convinced the defenders to conduct a delay across the island, 
resulting in the last mobile formations crossing over the Strait of Messina on 17 August. 
Success at Salerno hung in the balance during the initial Allied landing.  Five U.S and 
U.K divisions numbering 55,000 men landed on 9 September divided into three divisions in the 
assault wave and two follow-on divisions.  This force was met by the 16th Panzer Division in 
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prepared defenses, which slowed the penetration inland to a crawl.  By 12 September Kesselring 
had massed elements from four mechanized formations and launched a furious counterattack.  
On the first night after the American and British landings, enemy air activity picked up and 
armor was heard moving into position.216  The Germans did heavy damage to three cruisers and 
one battleship during this action, employing radio-controlled glide bombs for the first time.217  
On 12 September the British and Americans lost 1,500 prisoners and General Clark was 
seriously worried about the level and composition of the resistance on the American front.  
Furthermore, according to historian Martin Blumenson, “German pilots sank 4 transports, 1 
heavy cruiser, and 7 landing craft, and scored a total of 85 hits on the Allied fleet.”218  This is 
how Eisenhower described Salerno four years later: 
The landing and succeeding operations developed almost identically to the G-2 
predictions…. The enemy, as was his custom, immediately began to counterattack 
and by the thirteenth had gathered up sufficient strength to make a major effort to 
throw us into the sea.  The greatest pressure of the German attack came in the 
center and pushed forward to within two or three miles of the beach. The outlook 
became somewhat gloomy….219 
 
 By 1800 on 13 September, a mixed German force was about four miles from the beach, 
opposed by only two American field artillery battalions and headquarters troops from Fifth Army 
while the British were pinned down by effective air attacks, artillery against the port at Salerno, 
and additional armored probes.220  The Germans enjoyed overwhelming tactical success on the 
13th of September, convincing both the 10th Army and Army Group South commanders that the 
battle was won and the Allies would reembark soon.221  General Clark adjusted his lines and 
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added a few thousand men from the 82nd Airborne Division with a combat drop onto the thin 
strip between the American front line and the sea and managed to drive off the few weak 
German attacks on the morning of the 14 September.  The defensive battle on 13 and 14 
September was admittedly a close-run affair that got all the senior Allied leadership’s attention.  
An effective German pattern for dealing with expeditions from the sea had emerged, and Allied 
leaders considered it a realistic possibility that the Wehrmacht could throw anything but the most 
carefully prepared and resourced amphibious assaults back into the ocean. 
 Even though most of the Overlord command team had left the Mediterranean by the time 
it was executed, the landing at Anzio reinforced the emerging pattern of German reaction and 
Allied concerns with staying ashore once landed.  MG John Lucas’ VI Corps landed about three 
divisions of infantry on 22 January 1944 in his assault wave with two more divisions arriving 
over the next week.  Kesselring cobbled together six divisions from Rome and the Gustav Line 
to hold the beachhead while three divisions rushed down from northern Italy.  By 26 January 
elements of nine German divisions under the command of 14th Army confronted Lucas, with 
three more on the way from other theaters.  General Alan Brooke and Churchill had first noted 
problems at Anzio on 28 January 1944, and by the 31 January Brooke was convinced that Lucas 
was being too cautious and that the Germans were reinforcing very quickly and decisively.222  
Lucas’ careful probes on 30 and 31 January met fierce resistance, and by 4 February local 
German counterattacks had forced Lucas back into his original beachhead.223  General 
Mackensen, the 14th Army commander, launched a major counterattack on 16 February with 
over seven of the thirteen divisions available, including three mechanized formations.    
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Mackensen enjoyed limited tactical success through the morning of the 18 February and inflicted 
5,000 casualties on the Allies, but the integrity of the beachhead itself was never in serious 
danger.224  A second German attempt from 28 February to 3 March was also unsuccessful. 
Eisenhower, Bradley, and Patton were aware of the operation, tracked its progress, and 
worried about its implications for Overlord.  In his memoirs, Bradley mentioned the “…landing 
at Anzio on January 22, 1944, to which the Germans had reacted with astonishing fierceness,” 
and the battle was obviously on Eisenhower’s mind as well.225  In a 12 February 1944 diary 
entry, Patton mentioned that Eisenhower brought up the difficulties that the corps commander, 
MG John Lucas, was facing at Anzio and how it was affecting Mark Clark’s Fifth Army and 
Alexander’s Fifteenth Army Group.  Patton’s recorded response was: “I hope I don’t have to go 
back and straighten things out.”226  General Alexander had other plans.  By this time, he was in 
something of a panic and on 16 February word reached Patton that he was to be sent to take over 
the beachhead and restore the situation.  Eisenhower directed Patton to pack and board a special 
plane to do just that, only to have the request and order cancelled on the 17th.227   
Anzio offered plenty for the Allied leadership to think about, reinforcing again the pattern 
that might be expected in France.  The Germans had a large army scattered across Europe and 
available for almost immediate transfer to a threatened sector.  Local reserves would pin an 
invasion while an armored strike force assembled beyond the range of naval gunfire and artillery.  
The Germans demonstrated at Anzio that they could move enough divisions to form an army 
with a dozen divisions in less than a week, and they could move supplies enough for a major 
offensive in two or three.  Therefore, the first priority for any assault on France was to establish a 
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secure lodgment packed with artillery, armor, and infantry, backed up by formidable aerial and 
maritime combat elements.  Anything that could slow the German build up and wear down those 
forces before reaching the battle area would be critical to an eventual breakout.  Operations on 
the mainland of Italy suggested this would all be a slow and dangerous process, at least at the 
operational level.  After the beachhead was secure, there would be plenty of time to bring ashore 
service forces and repair the transportation infrastructure.   
 
 Official and Unofficial Lessons from Torch 
After the war, LTG Leroy Lutes (the senior operations officer for the Army Service 
Forces command during the war) pointed out the similarity between the sustainment problems 
associated with Torch and those experienced in Overlord.228  At a speech delivered at the Army 
War College in January 1951, Lutes noted the fact that Torch provided an excellent preview of 
the headaches associated with supporting a large combined and joint force at the end of a long 
and problematic line of communications.   Few ports far from the tactical front, long lead times 
associated with moving supplies from the United States and the United Kingdom by sea, 
aggressive enemy air defenders, not enough roads and rail capacity, and tough weather that 
favored the enemy all put in their first appearance in Algeria and Tunisia.  The race to the plains 
west of Tunis was a close-run affair.  In a reaction that would become a trend in all future Allied 
landings, the Germans managed to scrape together enough forces and put them on the right 
terrain in time to stop strung-out Allied forces that were suffering from rising logistical 
challenges.  Despite the rapid provision of 5,000 trucks directly from the United States, 
Eisenhower could not maintain the momentum of his advance and accepted the need for an 
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operational pause to move up forces and work out his line of supply in order to deal with 
worsening weather and stiffening resistance.229  The insights Lutes shared in 1951 were correct, 
but had Allied leaders come to the same conclusions in 1943?    
After the fact, numerous participants implied that the first setbacks in Torch were largely 
tied to logistical challenges.  The official history of the campaign cited a report coming out of 
AFHQ near the end of the campaign: “The disproportionately low ratio of service to combat 
troops with which early operations in NW Africa has been undertaken was raised during the first 
four months of 1943.”230  Providing more service troops was only a part of the solution; the 
author of the official chronical of the campaign also suggested that a massive influx of trucks 
was necessary to fix the logistical imbalance in the Allied force in North Africa.  “A special 
convoy arriving on 6-7 March 1943 brought more than 4,500 two-and-a-half-ton trucks into 
Casablanca and Oran.  Other convoys brought more than 2,000 per month.”231  Finally, rail lines 
were put into action to move bulk quantities of supplies from the three major ports to the depots 
immediately behind the army rear boundary.  According to the author of the U.S. Army official 
history of the campaign: 
A very large requisition for railroad rolling stock which was made when the 
Allied drive on Tunis failed in December began to be filled in March…. Before 
the end of April, forty-three trains, averaging over 10,700 tons daily, were passing 
through Constantine toward the combat zone.  Expanded highway transport was 
essential for the accumulation of material for the Allied campaigns of the 
spring.232 
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General Anderson, the British commander of 1st Army, reinforced the message 
that logistics was a major factor in slowing the defeat of the Germans in Tunisia.  
Eisenhower later recalled: “The second difficulty was our great shortage in motor 
equipment, which was rendered all the more serious because of the very poor quality of 
the single-line railway running eastwards from Algiers to Tunis, a distance as great as 
from New York to Cleveland.”233  There was a truck shortage because senior 
commanders prioritized combat troops, tanks, and weapons for the French over service 
vehicles in the first four convoys arriving in North Africa.  There was a service troop 
shortage because the ASF had not generated enough yet, and the British could not fill the 
gap.  Both decisions were made at the highest levels of the Torch command group in   
September and October, and the implications should not have come as a surprise in 
January and February.  Despite being a largely self-inflicted wound made much worse by 
the freeloading of the U.S. Army and the two air forces, the British Army claims they 
learned from the experience and prevented the reoccurrence of a major truck shortage in 
future campaigns.  The official conclusion captured in 1954 was that: “The desert war 
was essentially one of rapid movement over great distances, and the core of its 
administrative problem was the provision and organization of adequate transport.”234  
The official history of British logistical support in the West claimed: “Lessons learnt in 
the Mediterranean theater where shortage of transport had been experienced in the early 
stages of the invasion of Sicily, had duly been applied in the planning [of Overlord], and 
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a great many general transport companies RASC phased in early soon accumulated in the 
restricted bridgehead area.”235    
Leaders seemed to be comfortable acknowledging the distribution problem but 
not in getting to the bottom of why it existed and its impact on the campaign.  
Oversimplifying logistical problems, perhaps hoping to deflect attention from 
questionable decisions and tactical shortcomings, made it harder to figure out what really 
went wrong and how to fix it.  Even if this deflection was not deliberate, it hampered the 
search for better information, an understanding of what went wrong when, and the impact 
on operations.  This sort of understanding is the result of a deliberate lessons-learned 
program; it doesn’t happen by accident, and it takes time and effort.  The Allies had some 
blind spots when it came to collecting lessons from the battlefield that made a difficult 
process that much harder.  
The campaign in North Africa was an experience that should have offered data 
and validated procedures that might be helpful in future campaigns – not just lessons 
applicable for logisticians.  AFHQ followed good bureaucratic procedure and passed 
along courtesy copies of important documents to their subordinates, fellow Army theater-
level commands, and superiors in Washington and London.236  The problem was that the 
training memoranda published by the senior headquarters in the theater were focused at 
the most minute level.  They tended to be written by external agencies or attached 
observers, not gathered from within the organization itself.  Training memoranda 44 and 
 
235 Carter and Kann, 285. 
236 Decimal File, Lessons Learned, and CAO Meeting Notes, AFHQ.  RG 492, NARA II.  The lessons learned files 
were always provided to the War Department, Army Ground Force, Southwest Pacific Area, U.S. Army command 
in China, and each staff section within ETOUSA, among others. Official lessons from the Mediterranean were made 
available to the rest of the U.S. Army.  
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50, covering the Tunisian campaign and Sicily, were thorough and professional attempts 
to share critical training deficiencies with the training base back in the United States and 
the United Kingdom, but there was no similar effort to assess performance at higher 
echelons.237  These collections of lessons were split into two stand-alone references, one 
from British authors and the other gathered from American sources.  They provided a 
very brief overview of planning and operations before examining the tactical details.  
Comments were broken down by branch and covered individual and low level (squad and 
platoon) collective tasks that were essential to success or poorly performed. 
In the few examples where the subject was higher-level planning or execution, the 
quality of assessment suffered due to limited access to senior leaders, insufficient rank 
and experience, or a focus on too small a time window.   A British observer sent into 
theater by the British Combined Operations Command bounced from 15th Army Group to 
7th Army to 3rd Infantry division in the months before the invasion of Sicily.  Since he 
spent most of his time with a division, the focus of his lessons was at the tactical level. 
Admiral Cunningham endorsed a six-page assessment of Torch from his headquarters, 
but the staff limited their focus to the beach assault and dismounting efforts, ignoring 
naval support to the campaign after that point.     
Lessons applicable to higher headquarters or sustainment were sprinkled 
throughout these documents.  COL Ramsey offered “that there should be included in staff 
manuals (after further study) a clearer delineation of functions partially outlined in [the] 
attached Functional Chart.”238  The functional chart was not included in the file copy of 
 
237 MTO Lessons Learned File.  RG 492, NARA II.  Training memo 44 was published on 4 August 1943 and 
training memorandum 50 was published on 20 November 1943.    
238 NARA, RG 492, Memo from HHC Commander to AFHQ CoS, 3 Feb 1943. 
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his memorandum, but one can guess that the division of labor, both at AFHQ and 
between AFHQ and subordinate organizations in theater, could have benefited from 
additional detail.  The report submitted by 18th Army Group at the end of the Tunisian 
campaign addressed army group-level lessons learned, to include the value of a deputy 
commander for administration to work the seams between the AFHQ staff, the army 
group staff, and the various base sections providing logistical support in North Africa.  
The 18th AG also pointed out the value of adding a statistics group within each Q branch 
(G4 or logistics) to at least the army level, to track historic consumption rates and 
maintain accurate inventory of supplies on hand.  
A similar report by 1st Army, published in July 1943, validated just how important 
logistical considerations were to the success of combat operations and how necessary the 
strength and ratio of service troops was to support a base and enable inland penetration.  
The Army benefited from assigning small liaison teams to each British base and sub-base 
command, but it realized that AFHQ should have taken over direct management of the 
LoC well before 1 January.  The 1st Army lacked the resources and authority to 
synchronize the traffic on the line of communications generated by French, RAF, Navy, 
Army, and civilian-focused units.  The report implied that the two most significant 
challenges to sustainment in the 1st Army area were a massive breakdown in long-range 
communications and poor supply discipline by front-line units.  Looting, hoarding, and 
inaccurate reporting caused more headaches than any overall shortages.239  Challenges 
with distribution were much harder because the Army could not figure out what critical 
 
239 1st Army, “Administrative Lessons of the Campaign in North Africa”, 5, 6-7. 
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shortages existed among the combat units and then convey those needs to their higher 
headquarters or their liaison teams in each base command.   
Other lessons could be extracted if one knew where to look.  The British observer 
assigned to 3rd ID noted how effective the DUWKs were at unloading assault and cargo 
ships across assault beaches, forecasting a day when ports might not be necessary to 
sustain a large ground force, at least under favorable weather and sea conditions.  The 
U.S. 2nd Armored Division commander pointed out concerns over the lack of organic 
truck companies within the division near the end of the campaign when the division was 
140 miles from its supporting depot.  Patton, while commanding II Corps and Seventh 
Army, learned that he needed his own transportation service section at the army level.   
Patton’s staff submitted a formal request through the MTOUSA staff up to the ASF at the 
end of the Sicilian campaign asking for this authorization.  The ASF and War Department 
denied the request, and Patton resourced a transportation section by robbing personnel 
from other offices across his staff.  Almost ritualistically 5th and 7th armies would 
resubmit the request at the end of each amphibious operation in theater, only to be shot 
down each time by ASF and the War Department.240  Fifteen officers and 24 enlisted 
personnel were evidently too steep a bill; they would have to be found from within the 
command by merging with liaison elements pushed forward from the SOS or COMZ.     
This battle over adding a transportation staff section at the Army level marked a 
new reality that was obvious to those in combat in the Mediterranean, but harder for the 
War Department to understand.  The requirement for transportation experts, a new 
 
240 Request “Transportation Staff Requirements for Field Armies,” 3 June 1944.  Transportation Section, MTOUSA, 
RG 492, NARA II.  Attached to the latest request were references to the same request stretching back approximately 
fifteen months, to include detailed descriptions of the duties performed by the ad hoc transportation section in 5th 
Army since the invasion of Italy.     
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service activated in the U.S. Army in late July 1942, had become clear by the end of the 
Tunisian campaign.  The scope of the mission to synchronize all transportation, but 
especially wheeled transportation, was massive even in the relatively modest enterprise of 
Operation Torch.  While preparing General Gale for a press conference in May 1943, the 
command produced a sobering set of figures for quick reference that demonstrated just 
how far the Allies had come since 8 November.241  After fighting over virtually every 
truck loaded on the assault convoys, AFHQ eventually unloaded over 100,000 vehicles of 
all types at the three major base areas, with 57,000 discharged at Algiers alone.  Over the 
duration of the campaign the Allies moved a daily average of 3,342 tons of POL products 
representing 60% of the total weight of supplies imported into the theater.  When fully 
established the supply distribution system relied on 1,200 trucks working in the base 
areas, 1,800 shuttling along the line of communication, and 1,750 moving between the 
sea and rail heads and the forward tactical dumps, in addition to the 6-8 trains per day. 
Finally, U.S. forces alone were equipped with 21,000 trucks pulling 6,977 trailers, 1,100 
tracked armored vehicles, and 1,666 half-tracks and reconnaissance vehicles.   
These figures spoke to both the scale of modern combat and the disconnection 
between Allied capabilities during the first month of the campaign compared with what 
was required for victory.  The U.S. Army landed twelve truck companies, or about 600 
vehicles, at both Casablanca and Oran between D+3 and D+11 to accomplish all port, 
depot, and line of communications work for the WTF and CTF.242  They were followed 
 
241 One-page fact sheet included in a file gathered to help LTG Gale prepare for a press conference in early May 
1943.  CAO files, AFHQ, RG 331, NARA II. 
242 Dworak, 91.  Weller, 273.  200 trucks were dedicated to clearing the docks, but many of the first trucks to arrive 
were broken due to faulty waterproofing procedures.  Two battalions of the 28th QM Regiment landed at Oran and 
two battalions of the 22nd QM Regiment supported the WTF at Casablanca.   
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by thousands of crated trucks in subsequent convoys, but there was no associated supply 
of drivers, mechanics, or command and control elements to supervise their work and 
coordinate their support.243  Provisional companies and battalions were formed from 
available, if untrained, manpower.  One positive outcome of the experience in Torch was 
the discovery that battalion and regimental headquarters organizations for the QM truck 
companies were unnecessary.  The platoons and companies tended to be attached to and 
work for other organizations, rendering the battalion and regimental personnel redundant.  
In 1943 the U.S. Army decided to eliminate higher headquarters and just stick with truck 
companies that could be assigned to base commands or coordinated by Transportation 
Corps staff sections located throughout the force.244  
The one-year anniversary of the SOS / ASF letter written and distributed by LTG 
Somervell in March 1943 captured the major issues the command was trying to tackle.245  After 
enumerating accomplishments of the Service of Supply during its first year, Somervell turned to 
five areas of concern and focus for the command.  Challenges associated with maintaining a 
massive fleet of vehicles scattered around the globe, combined with an immature spare parts 
system, were the most pressing issue facing the ASF.  Other concerns included simplifying and 
unifying both the paperwork and procedures associated with inventory visibility (“stock 
control”) as well as management techniques and methods in general.  Because it seemed that 
global shipping would never keep up with operational demands, Somervell counselled leaders to 
think through how they could balance the doctrinal preference for push-based logistics with a 
greater appreciation for critical requirements.  How could service-force staffs and commanders 
 
243 Weller, 275-276. 
244 Weller, 280, 375. 
245 Message from LTG Somervell to SOS Leadership, 10 March and distributed on 16 March.  SOS, NATOUSA, 
MG Larkin File, RG 492, NARA II. 
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improve estimates of consumption, understand what was already in or headed to the theater, and 
cut back on the flow of routine shipments to prioritize only what was necessary?  Finally, 
Somervell cautioned all his commanders to watch the growth of service troop requirements and 
billets on staffs, especially when they produced unnecessary replication and overlap with other 
sections or forces.  Every officer or soldier who was in the ASF was a man not available to fight 
the enemy.  AFHQ felt the impact of all these issues in 1942 and 1943, and most of the same 
problems would plague SHAEF and ETOUSA in 1944.  The ASF did not use the November 
1943 update to FM 100-10 as a tool to share these insights and establish methods to deal with 
them.  New doctrine could have played a role in clarifying exactly who was responsible for what 
in the administrative realm, and the detailed relationships between sustainment nodes in the 
combat zone, the communications zone, and the theater headquarters.  As we have already seen, 
the 1940 version of FM 100-10, and the update published in late 1943, actually recommended 
three or four headquarters with similar if not identical jobs while avoiding any discussion of how 
all the centers listed in the manual related to one another.   
 
 Striking the Right Balance of Service Forces in the Mediterranean 
Going into the campaign, Eisenhower and Somervell knew that too few service troops 
were available to support the operation.  As the communications zone normalized from February 
to April 1943, ASF headquarters sought a better appreciation of what arrangements had worked 
themselves out in theater.  The flurry of messages among ASF and AFHQ, NATOUSA, and 
MTOUSA demonstrated that the theater had not been tracking numbers to a level of detail 
helpful to ASF.  Three data points, captured in the chart below, were provided to ASF before 
MTOUSA gave up and ignored further requests.  The report provided on 2 October 1943 is 
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helpful because it demonstrated a close approximation of what the right ratio of combat, aviation, 
and service troops should be to support future planning.  It is highly likely that even the 
aggregate numbers were inaccurate; the figures provided for the ground troops most likely 
include service forces at the division level and below and ignored the fact that combat troops 
were often impressed as improvised drivers and ammo handlers.  Regardless, a 3:1:1 ratio began 
to emerge as a realistic planning figure for what it took to run a large-scale theater.          
 23 Jul 43 2 Oct 43 18 Oct 43 
 AF Gnd SOS AF Gnd SOS  
ABS    2.3k 2.2k 12k 46,000 
MBS    18k 83k 72k 178,000 
ESB    60k 45k 37k 35,000 
IBS    29k 150k 3k 25,000 
Italy    4.4k 80k x  
DUKO       277,000 
OHAM       57,000 
Total    113.7k 360.2k 124k  
Total 421.4k 604, 515 618k 
Table 2.3: G-4 MTOUSA estimates of U.S. personnel in theater by base provide support 
ABS – Atlantic Base Section, Casablanca 
MBS – Mediterranean Base Section, Oran and Algiers 
EBS – Eastern Base Section, Constantine, Tunis-Bizerte 
IBS – Island Base Section - Sicily 
DUKO – port in Italy 
OHAM – port in Italy 
 
This second table reinforces the conclusion that service forces, by necessity, formed a 
large portion of the U.S Army overseas.  By 23 July the invasion of Sicily was well underway, 
once again hampered by a disproportionate number of combat troops relative to service troops 
deployed.  The ratio in theater was probably 2 to 2.5:1 in July, and probably a better estimate of 
the proper ratio than the table above.  The essential point is that expeditionary warfare demands 
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large numbers of service forces and personnel.  It is also interesting to note that the ground forces 
would have plenty of professional logisticians and service officers available for consultation.  
The same cannot be said of the SOS’s access to combat branch officers.  It would be almost 
impossible to prevent two very different cultures emerging between more balanced headquarters 
and those dominated almost exclusively by service officers and NCOs.  
 Branch Officers Service Officers Branch EMs Service EMs 
Ground Force 13.4k 2.99k 235k 160k 
SOS Formations 32 9,379 
Table 2.4: Distribution of combat vs support personnel, 23 Jul 43 
Branch – combat arms;  
Service – supporting units such as quartermaster, transportation, ordnance, medical, etc.    
 
 Extracting and Disseminating Lessons 
Informal lessons facilitated by open lines of communication among senior leaders were 
helpful, but the Allies also established organizations and observation missions to collect and 
disseminate data collected in the field.  Very similar to the training circulars issued by AFHQ 
after Torch and Husky, documents with tactical lessons learned were published periodically by 
many different sources in the Mediterranean.  The Long Committee was one such effort.246  The 
report was written by staff at the Combined Training Center (North Africa) and published in 
October 1943.  It was a professional effort overseen very closely by the center’s commander, 
Brigadier H. Long.  Husky and Avalanche drove the Long Committee to examine all amphibious 
operations as two equal and linked endeavors: One was to land in the face of enemy resistance 
and then survive local counterattacks, and the other was then to win the race to build up heavy 
 
246 “The Long Committee Report” October 1943.  Operational Lessons Learned, Commander’s File, RG 492, 
NARA II. 
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equipment, supplies, and additional combat power to ensure that the lodgment survived and then 
became capable of breaking out.  The term adopted by the British for this second phase was 
“transit and maintenance.”  Experience in over a dozen amphibious assaults convinced them that 
meticulous organization, specialized equipment, and unique engineer and fire support units were 
the key to winning it.  Worth special mention were the engineer “beach groups” that combined 
the ability to clear obstacles, to communicate with all elements of the joint team, and to direct 
traffic on the beach and immediately inland.   
The contrast between the Long Report and the official lessons document for Shingle – the 
landings at Anzio – could not be more pronounced.  An unidentified observer, but clearly a 
junior officer, produced a five-page memo that managed to say almost nothing of substance.  In 
the author’s defense, the limits of his mission did not help; he was present for only the first two 
days of the operation and watched an administrative disembarking of two Allied divisions along 
undefended beaches.  One finds plenty of evidence of the effort to embed observers and gather 
lessons, but most of the Allied observer reports sent from North Africa and the Mediterranean 
focused at the tactical level.  Some were very well written and offered deep insights.  Others 
were superficial.   
The lessons process consisted of two distinct tasks – to extract, collect, and publish 
validated lessons from the combat theater, and to disseminate those lessons to both the training 
base and units already deployed to operational theaters.  There is ample evidence that both the 
British and the Americans did well with the first task, at least at the individual and lower tactical 
level.  But interviews, diaries, and unit historical records have led one researcher to conclude that 
front-line units were oblivious to anything other than TO&E changes and training circulars from 
their higher headquarters.  Professional journals, updated manuals, regulations, or compilations 
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of lessons learned did not penetrate down to the level of the commander of a truck company.247  
Officers did remember being interviewed by or seeing observers from the ASF and AGF, and the 
Army succeeded in rotating seasoned leaders from combat zones back to the training base, but 
these were strictly one-way endeavors.  This problem was compounded by the fact that very few 
service units, and no truck companies, were transferred from NATO or MTO to the ETO before 
Overlord.  Sharing successful techniques could only happen by word of mouth, personal and 
official correspondence, and the transfer of senior officers into new positions.     
The British benefited from an organizational norm that encouraged periodic self-
evaluation at the army and army group levels.  There was a series of dual reports, one focused on 
operations and a second on administrative procedures, compiled by British commands to capture 
insights at a higher level of responsibility.  We have already examined the notes published by 8th 
Army in February 1943 covering administrative support to the army during the pursuit from 
Alamein to Mareth.  It is important to remember that it was paired with a similar document 
covering tactical and operational combat lessons and that both papers were briefed during a 
three-day conference in Tripoli with AFHQ and probably 18th Army Group and 1st Army 
participation.  AFHQ published a short training circular on 19 March 1943 titled “Administrative 
Training” aimed at replicating the reality of resupply in small combat-arms units, advising units 
to practice the steps necessary to request and distribute supplies and recover damaged vehicles.  
The real purpose of this directed activity was to restore confidence in the responsiveness of the 
theater supply system and thus to reduce hoarding among front-line units.248  The AFHQ 
 
247 Weller, 383-384, 401. 
248 “Administrative Training” AFHQ Training Memo 21.  AFHQ File, RG 331, NARA II. 
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published training guidance frequently, conducted retraining on a regular basis, and realized that 
resupply and recovery were critical combat enablers.   
The 1st Army published its own “Administrative Lessons of the Campaign in North 
Africa” on 27 July 1943, followed two months later by “Notes on the Administration of Armies 
in the Field” from 15th Army Group.  In a cover letter to the second document, MG C.H. Miller, 
the deputy commander for administration in the Army Group, explained that the command had 
distilled lessons from North Africa from 1940 to 1943. General Miller hoped it would be of use 
in updating doctrine and training in the United Kingdom, and distributed copies to the Ministry 
of War and U.S. War Department.  Approximately 1,000 copies of “Lessons from the Tunisian 
Campaign” produced by 18th Army Group on 6 August 1943 were distributed to about one 
hundred organizations.  For all three documents, General Gale demanded a written reply from 
every staff section under his supervision, due in no more than three weeks.249  We know the task 
was accomplished because the responses are saved in the CAO records from AFHQ.  The 
responses from the AFHQ sections are helpful because they demonstrate where 1st Army or 15th 
AG (18th AG at the time they interacted with AFHQ) got their facts wrong or recommended 
solutions that were impossible under prevailing conditions, but they also show where the sections 
agreed or could offer or refine proposed solutions.  These responses demonstrated that AFHQ 
was reading the input from the field and adopting changes they considered logical and necessary.  
It is fair to say that the British had a reliable system for producing periodic higher-level 
assessments of recent operations and that they expended the energy to ensure that their superior 
headquarters were aware of their conclusions.   
 
249 “Notes on the Administration of the Armies in the Field”, CAO Files, AFHQ, RG 331, NARA II.  Copies of the 
15th AG report are followed by the tasking letter from General Gale and then a collection of staff responses.  The 
microfilm collection of the AFHQ documents maintained at NARA is poorly organized and labelled, and many 
individual sheets are illegible.   
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The American approach was different, and it produced two distinct types of publications 
intended to be released on dissimilar time horizons.  As shown earlier, the U.S. Army tended to 
rely on observation teams from the AGF embedded for a short tour that then produced detailed 
notes on training deficiencies broken down by branch and service.  The products were 
comprehensive, but they tended to focus on individual, squad, and platoon tasks.  An example of 
this process within the logistical realm was the report “Administrative Lessons of Operations in 
Sicily,” published around 2 November 1943 by AFHQ, but edited by the ASF liaison to 
NATOUSA, COL H.W. Bolan.  The document was dominated by a discussion of the challenges 
presented by mounting the assault force and unloading supplies across the beaches during the 
first few days of the campaign while ignoring sustainment planning and execution above the 
army level.  The second process institutionalized in large units of the U.S. Army was the ongoing 
preparation of official histories, often written by professional military historians attached to the 
command.  The quality of these documents tended to be excellent, but they did not dwell on 
capturing successful techniques and procedures.  The other problem with trying to substitute unit 
histories for a lessons-learned program was that the documents were not finished quickly enough 
to permit distribution before the next operational cycle.  This is not meant as criticism of the unit 
history program but as a statement of the fact that documents written for one purpose were 
insufficient to drive rapid organizational change.  For whatever reason, the U.S. Army wrote 
great unit histories but did not generate higher-echelon campaign assessments to be shared in 
official channels.250  
 
250 One cannot find official campaign assessments for II Corps, 5th Army, or 7th Army, endorsed by General Patton 
or General Clark.  Nor do such documents exist for the base commands, SOS, or NATOUSA itself.  There are 
official histories published within a few months of the end of the campaign that contain an element of self-
evaluation, but they are very different from, and less helpful than the British lessons written at the army and army 
group level. 
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Perhaps because of the nature of published U.S. lessons-learned documents, Eisenhower 
took steps to ensure that his team had frequent access to first-hand witnesses from recent 
operations whenever possible.  In March Eisenhower asked Marshall and Devers if MG Lucas 
could swing through the U.K. on his way back to the United States.251  Lucas had just been 
relieved of his command of VI Corps in the Anzio beachhead and was being transferred back to 
a training command within the Army Ground Forces.  Eisenhower wanted to ensure that he and 
his staff heard firsthand the latest tactical developments associated with amphibious assault 
landings and the subsequent German reaction.  This request demonstrated that, even if the Army 
did not publish critical self-assessments at the higher levels of command, Eisenhower valued the 
thoughts of his professional associates, especially face to face and after a bit of time for 
reflection.  Lucas doubtlessly reinforced SHAEF concerns with the speed and ferocity of German 
counterattacks and may have contributed to the idea that pushing them back was a slow process 
that had more in common with France in 1918 than with the armored thrusts of the first three 
years of World War Two.      
Larkin, the SOS commander of NATOUSA, traded periodic cables with MG Leroy 
Lutes, the chief of operations for ASF.  His update in October 1943 assured Lutes that he had his 
staff working on improved logistical planning factors and consumption rates, but it also showed 
him that the field needed help with better systems to manage repair parts.252  Larkin also 
admitted that he had mountains of unnecessary supplies scattered across North Africa and was 
working to catalogue and offer it up for distribution back to the U.S., other theaters, or allies as 
directed.  Lutes had written Larkin earlier, explaining the logistics situation in other U.S. theater 
 
251 Cable, Eisenhower to Devers, 4 March 1943, SGS Cables, Commanding General, MTOUSA.  RG 492, NARA II. 
252 Letter from MG Larkin to MG Lutes (ASF), 24 Oct 43, MG Larkin File, SOS, NATOUSA.  RG 492, NARA II.   
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commands, pointing out the priorities and challenges unique to each and common to most.  Lee 
watched NATOUSA and tried to learn from their mistakes, seeking to organize ETOUSA to 
avoid the difficulties faced by Larkin and Hughes.253  He prioritized attending the Casablanca 
conference in January 1943 and maximized the potential of the trip by visiting Patton and 
Montgomery to listen to their observations and recent experience.  Senior leaders maintained 
written contact, tried to share lessons learned, and visited the front when they could find the 
time.  It was obvious that leaders in the U.S. Army logistics community understood the 
imperative to constantly seek improvement and benefit from the experiences of their peers and 
subordinates.  
 There was one overarching trend observed in amphibious operations throughout the 
Mediterranean that was not explicitly stated by any of the senior participants, and this is 
surprising.  The Long Report provided a useful framework that most Allied leaders adopted, 
even if they did not know the original source.  But the authors of the Long Report, or some other 
committee, should have noticed the third and fourth phases of Allied amphibious operations: 
attrition and breakout.  In Tunisia, southern Italy, and Anzio the Allies eventually won the race 
to build up the beachhead, often by simultaneously interdicting the German sea-, air-, and land-
based lines of communication.  Slow, steady attritional warfare accelerated the collapse of the 
Axis defense, and a successful Allied breakout was the result.  This successful formula was not 
explicitly described by any senior officers in the Allied command but had to be obvious by early 
June 1944.  Their preference for attritional warfare, if widely understood, would drive 
commanders to focus on interdiction of German supply lines, and tactical methods designed to 
inflict disproportional casualties during ground combat.  In Normandy, SHAEF expended a lot of 
 
253 Lee, “Service Reminiscences,” 87. 
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airpower trying to isolate the Germans and prevent the arrival of reinforcements and supplies, 
and the British (especially Montgomery) continued to favor the short, set-piece battle that used 
artillery, airpower, and overwhelming numbers to inflict disproportionate casualties.254  These 
two techniques were part of the orthodoxy carried to France from the Mediterranean, if perhaps 
only subliminally.  
 Conclusion 
By May 1943 AFHQ was well on its way to becoming an effective joint-combined 
operational headquarters.  In many ways this process was sped along by the operations planned 
and conducted between June and December 1943, but it was also overshadowed by the criticality 
of the initial beach assault and the need to weather the inevitable German counterattack.  As the 
Allies restored and improved the infrastructure in the Mediterranean, the memory of just how 
difficult it had been to move and sustain forces in Tunisia faded.  Before combat operations 
wrapped up in Africa, the Allies had managed to organize their forces logically in three service 
commands that were capable of planning, executing, and sustaining campaigns within their own 
domains.  If properly led by AFHQ, they were capable of synchronizing among one another.  
Problems existed within the ground command due to the unique personality of General 
Montgomery and the accommodating leadership style of both General Alexander and General 
Eisenhower.  This increased the difficulty of synchronizing ground operations and integrating 
them with naval and air actions in a timely fashion.  This was compounded by the growing 
 
254 I would argue that Montgomery’s method of 1942 to 1945 was really the modern application of Monash’s 
method from the Western Front in 1918.  The way Montgomery managed the battle around Caen in June and July 
1944 compares remarkably well to the British limited offensives of the last few months of World War One on the 
Western Front.  See Jonathan Boff’s Winning and Losing on the Western Front: The British Third Army and the 
Defeat of Germany in 1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) for an excellent assessment of how and 
why the British succeeded.  Chapter five addresses the final tactical methods adopted by the British as the ideal for 
the offensive.    
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realization that keeping U.S. and U.K. tactical units separated at the corps level and below made 
life considerably easier. 
AFHQ was considerably more effective as a senior-level staff themselves.  Its British and 
American service members had learned to work together and had grown to the point where it 
could perform its critical functions as a joint and theater command.  The existence of three 
consolidated service commands and two national administrative commands meant that the 
headquarters could concentrate on a narrow range of activities that they were uniquely 
empowered to address, while supervising their five subordinate organizations as necessary.  The 
experiment in managing logistics at the senior headquarters level had failed, replaced by a more 
conservative approach centered on control by the army group staff on the British side and by the 
formation of a SOS under NATOUSA control on the American side.  Regardless, Eisenhower 
and his subordinates had learned that one ignored logistics, strategic and operational, at great 
peril.  Once fully matured, NATOUSA removed a large administrative burden from AFHQ, but 
most of the important functions of a U.S. theater headquarters were carried on at the joint-
combined level, even when they exclusively involved American organizations.  Routine matters 
flowed through the SOS, NATOUSA, and the ASF, while issues of great consequence flowed 
through AFHQ to the OPD, British ministries, and combined chiefs of staff.  Between Husky and 
Shingle AFHQ planners matured to the point where they no longer needed War Department or 
Joint Planning Staff assistance with campaign plans and tactical orders, but strategic direction 
and operational objectives still flowed from London and Washington to the field command post.   
The Allied lessons-learned process was complex and effective in accomplishing some of 
its goals. It tended to do a better job finding problems with individual and small-scale tactical 
tasks that were reported back to the British Home Army and AGF to influence future training.  
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The British Army had a strong tradition of periodic self-assessment at the highest levels of 
command that produced a professional and well-distributed product.  U.S. reliance on embedded 
historians compiling unit histories generated a more thorough picture of exactly what happened 
and why, but these documents took months to write and did not focus on capturing 
organizational techniques so they might be shared across the force.  They were unit histories, 
which could not completely cover the gaps within the lessons-learned system of the U.S. Army.  
In both systems some problems were overlooked, incorrectly diagnosed, or left as unsolvable 
with the time and resources available at the time.  Perhaps the greatest shortfall of the Allied 
lessons-learned system was its absence of meaningful effect on capstone doctrine and cross-
theater sharing of detailed SOPs.  AFHQ and its subordinates had come a long way by the end of 
1943, but that knowledge tended to stay contained within the Mediterranean and make little 
impact upon the organizations planning and preparing to return to France.  But NATOUSA 
would benefit from its combat experience, and Devers and Larkin would see the benefits in 
southern France while leading the 6th Army Group.  
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Chapter 3 - Trying to Define Roles within the ETO 
This chapter tackles two major subjects.  The first half addresses the evolutionary arc of 
thinking within the Army about control over logistics and its integration with the other functions, 
but primarily maneuver, as it unfolded in the European theater.  At the beginning of the U.S. 
Army’s involvement in World War Two, senior leaders in the War Department shared a 
consensus based on one interpretation of the lessons distilled from the interaction among 
Washington, Pershing’s theater headquarters, and his service of supply under its final 
commander, MG Harbord.   But two-and-a-half years of practical experience resulted in a revolt 
against the concepts governing sustainment that had been adopted in the summer of 1942.  By 
the end of the war there was a general agreement that U.S. command and control in the ETO had 
been problematic, but no consensus on exactly what should have been done differently.  Only by 
combining the official and private assessments, suggestions, and alternative systems offered by 
almost a dozen well-placed observers can one gain an appreciation of the overall problem and 
viable solutions.  Just knowing that there were so many different ideas about what was wrong 
and how to fix them is illuminating.  The first step in solving a complex challenge is to define the 
problem, and the second step is to build consensus on the nature of the issue and the best way to 
tackle it.1  Because the U.S. Army did not accomplish this first step in the ETO during World 
War Two, constructive adaptation in the Mediterranean, U.K., and France was that much harder. 
 After establishing a baseline understanding of the two philosophical approaches to 
command and the proper agency to integrate logistics, the chapter moves on to a chronological 
 
1 Horst W.J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,” Poly Sciences 4 (1973): 
161.  Defining the problem in this context means isolating the independent variables that are producing the 
undesired result, while also fleshing out a theory on how to change those independent variables to generate a new 
result.   
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narrative of the U.S. Army theater-level agencies charged with synchronizing the American 
effort in the U.K.  Understanding the intellectual debate within the U.S. Army over command 
and control and synchronizing logistics at the theater-level reveals the scale of periodic changes 
to ETOUSA’s role and formal authorities.  The story of ETOUSA is also the story of the two 
commands that preceded it, and the three joint-combined headquarters with which it cooperated. 
ETOUSA emerged from the U.S. Special Observer Mission (SPOBS) and the U.S. Army Forces 
in the British Isles (USAFBI) and inherited much of their culture.  At various stages ETOUSA 
coordinated its activities with AFHQ, COSSAC, and finally SHAEF, and it had a convoluted 
subordinate relationship with the commander of each unit.  ETOUSA did not just appear on the 
stage with complete freedom to determine how it would operate.  Even as it began to evolve, the 
organization was forced to make major adjustments to conform to the personality of new 
commanders or redefined relationships with new superior headquarters.  ETOUSA emerged from 
bureaucratic irrelevance to play an important role in preparing the Allies for Overlord in the 
summer of 1943, only to be subsumed again by the rise of COSSAC, SHAEF, and the U.S. First 
Army Group (FUSAG) staff in the last quarter of 1943.  ETOUSA was boxed in by a theater 
joint-combined operational headquarters above and large tactical formations below, and the U.S. 
Army acknowledged its redundancy by merging it with SOS on 17 January 1944.   
ETOUSA’s lifecycle illustrated perfectly the gaps in logic in U.S. doctrine and the 
structural implications of ongoing theater-level combat operations.  The reorganization of the 
War Department that was completed in the spring of 1942 created strong subordinate 
organizations that would unsurprisingly seek to undermine the authority of theater commands as 
they oversaw air and administrative operations overseas.  The growth of ETOUSA from SPOBS 
and USAFBI meant that the organization inherited much of the culture and reputation of its 
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predecessors.  MG Chaney and his staff were perhaps a bit too close to their British partners; 
some could conclude they had gone native.  The USAFBI’s staff was too aware of the realities 
associated with moving men and equipment into the U.K. by May and June 1942 to quietly 
accept some of the more fantastic proposals emanating out of Washington, D.C.  Their 
skepticism was validated by the difficulties encountered while trying to mount the American 
forces already in the U.K. for their participation in Torch.  Establishing a base area in a foreign 
country while simultaneously outfitting and supporting an amphibious assault force was 
evidently harder than it looked to the War Department. 
 Over the next eighteen months ETOUSA struggled to define its role under a succession 
of three commanders.  U.S. doctrine and War Department guidance had little to say about a 
theater command focused on a troop buildup, long-range planning, and integration of U.S. assets 
into the British air campaign rather than active ground combat.  Even Eisenhower and Andrews, 
men with solid reputations in Washington and good relationship with Marshall, struggled to be 
more than unnecessary middlemen between the OPD, ASF, and AAF and VIII Bomber 
Command, Lee’s SOS, and the British.  But this began to change with the arrival of General 
Jacob Devers and the corresponding emphasis on Roundup and the strategic bomber offensive, 
which in turn demanded a powerful arbiter among the three components of ETOUSA necessary 
to establish theater priorities.  Devers had the experience and personality necessary to lead 
ETOUSA through a critical period while also recognizing the need for FUSAG.  Devers also 
foresaw how ETOUSA would revert to a bureaucratic backwater once FUSAG and SHAEF were 
fully functional.  Eisenhower agreed with this assessment, merged the ETO and SOS in January 
1944, and rejected a recommendation originating from within SHAEF to pull major ETOUSA 
functions to the senior headquarters level.   
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This sequence of events illustrates the intellectual journey taken by the U.S. Army 
fighting in Europe and North Africa, where pre-war certainty about how to set up and run a 
theater was slowly undermined and a new system much closer to Pershing’s preferences from 
1918 was established in in its place.  By July 1944 a few powerful American logisticians in the 
ETO were unhappy with the situation, but they could not convince their superiors to make 
decisive changes.  The result was a three-way battle for control over logistics among FUSAG, 
Lee’s SOS, and SHAEF on the eve of Overlord.  Often presented as an appeal to clear up 
confusing zones of responsibility, the fundamental issue was about determining who was 
qualified to synchronize and integrate logistics within a campaign.  Experience in the 
Mediterranean demonstrated that maneuver and sustainment were inseparable, and only field 
force commanders could combine a holistic understanding of all aspects of the problem with the 
authority to match tactical objectives to logistical realities.  Only after they had been “let down” 
by the semi-autonomous logisticians a few times did maneuver commanders realize they needed 
to get more intimately involved in the process and consider physical limitations before they 
lunged too far into enemy territory.2 
The history of ETOUSA provides what was chronologically the first example of the U.S. 
War Department’s attempt to compartmentalize and separate ground combat operations and 
operational logistics in a theater of war.  ETOUSA preceded NATOUSA by about seven months, 
influenced the scope of responsibility of MG Hughes’ command, and learned from the 
bureaucratic struggles occurring in North Africa.  Both ETOUSA and NATOUSA shared the 
challenge of defining a distinctive mission, securing a capable staff, and defending their turf 
 
2 The logisticians would have framed this using very different language, pointing out the ways in which their advice 
and warnings were repeatedly ignored.  The real point was that the two communities needed to listen to one another 
and work together to develop realistic campaign plans. 
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from subordinates, peers, and the War Department.  U.S. doctrine had not foreseen the 
emergence of joint-combined operational headquarters, or the key role this organization would 
play in campaigning.  The formation of AFHQ and SHAEF demonstrated the redundancy of the 
associated U.S. Army theater headquarters.  ETOUSA also suffered from the direct access 
maintained between SOS and ASF and between VIII Bomber Command and the AAF.  Rather 
than preserving the authority of the theater headquarters, the War Department accelerated the 
independence of these two subordinate organizations by allowing Somervell and Arnold to 
dictate staff and force structure, basing decisions, and the missions of air and support units 
stationed in the United Kingdom.  ETOUSA was born already at a grave disadvantage to its 
SOS, air component, and the War Department.  The one bright spot was a long history of 
effective planning and coordination with the British government. 
Working through the problems between ETOUSA and its subordinate commands was the 
first step on the long road to a more realistic and mature understanding of modern operational 
warfare in the U.S. Army.  Upon its creation, ETOUSA was hamstrung by the War Department’s 
unrealistic goal of separating ground combat from logistics and by its dismissive attitude towards 
the complexity and criticality of their careful integration by some superior headquarters.  
Marshall and Somervell hoped that the largely autonomous SOS would free the ETOUSA 
commander to focus exclusively on combat tasks.  As a result of the written instructions that 
created both SOS and ETOUSA, the theater headquarters found itself in direct competition with 
SOS for the final say on theater technical and logistical support for most of its existence.  Their 
relationship was complicated and intertwined for two reasons.  First, both organizations had 
virtually identical missions, at least for the first year of their existence, which was to build up 
and sustain U.S. forces in the British Isles.  Planning for and conducting combat operations 
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would not impact either the ETO or SOS to any great extent until the early fall of 1943.  Second, 
as purposely established by Marshall and Somervell, SOS commander had oversight of the 
theater service chiefs; General J.C.H. Lee hand-selected his team and brought them with him to 
London in the summer of 1942.  An argument about the physical location, authority to publish 
guidance on behalf of the ETOUSA commander, and independent power of these officers and 
their supporting staffs would dominate the relationship between the two organizations for the 
first two years after their creation. 
Similarly, General Arnold took measures to retain operational control over U.S. airpower 
deployed to the U.K.  As a result, ETOUSA emerged from its precursor, the U.S. Army Forces in 
the British Isles (USAFBI), as a headquarters that was irrelevant to its American subordinate 
organizations.  At the heart of the problem was the struggle to man ETOUSA with officers 
sufficiently experienced to hold their own against powerful subordinates, such as the 8th Air 
Force, LTG Lee’s SOS, and eventually the First U.S. Army under Bradley, and to define a 
meaningful and unique role relative to its subordinates.   Walling ETOUSA off from effective 
control over its SOS and air component established the precedent for actively resisting any 
attempt at close integration of maneuver, sustainment, and air-delivered firepower.  Eisenhower 
and SHAEF would inherit this dysfunctional relationship among SOS, First U.S. Army Group 
(FUSAG), and the U.S. Strategic Air Force (USSTAF) and would have very little time to 
reestablish primacy of the theater headquarters before operations on the continent began. 
By the time the American team destined to run Overlord began to assemble in the fall of 
1943, U.S. appreciation of the need to closely synchronize maneuver and operational logistics 
had advanced to a new level of maturity and sophistication.  Exposure to British organizational 
and logistical methods helped AFHQ, NATOUSA, and American corps and army commanders 
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become better planners and more effectively coordinate operations.  Bradley and Eisenhower 
were beginning to comprehend that command at their level demanded intense supervision over 
logistics, and, unlike what had happened in 1942, SHAEF and ETOUSA had moved beyond the 
War Department and ASF in their mastery of theater warfare.  Crawford, Bradley, and the corps 
of staff officers and commanders that Eisenhower brought with him from the Mediterranean 
would radically challenge SOS/ASF vision of how theater-level logistics could be planned and 
supervised.  Between October 1943 and June 1944 Lee lost almost all his authority over planning 
operational sustainment as well as the responsibility for integrating logistics into the theater 
campaign plan to the SHAEF and FUSAG G-4.  All that remained was the core mission of 
COMZ, which was to synchronize support for the armies through the rear area, and that would 
come under increasing attack in the second half of 1944.  By early 1945 COMZ had been 
stripped of its authority over anything beyond the most routine missions, displaced by the 
strongest technical service sections, SHAEF, and the two army groups.  Pre-war U.S. doctrine 
covering administrative control at the theater level had been rejected in the ETO. 
What had gone wrong?  There are dozens of opinions, and each starts with a few 
unspoken assumptions about the proper role of three layers of the chain of command.  Talking 
about the failures of COMZ and its base sections is almost meaningless without doing so in the 
context of SHAEF, the U.S. Army theater command, and the army groups, but few observers 
practiced that self-discipline.  One must sort through the written record of experts located in the 
right places to provide valuable insight and then build up a holistic appreciation of how COMZ 
could have become effective in interacting with SHAEF, the army groups, and the technical 
special staff.  Eventually an observation emerges; there were numerous systems that would have 
worked, but each required arriving at a consensus and full cooperation in its implementation.  
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But there was too much debate and too little command participation and decision-making in the 
process to pick a system and stick with it.  Moreover, doctrine abjectly failed to capture mid-war 
consensus, best practices, and validated lessons from the Pacific and Mediterranean theaters.  In 
the late summer of 1944 SHAEF was in the final stages of a transition in its approach to 
synchronizing maneuver and logistics.  Between May and September logisticians at SHAEF and 
12th Army Group realized that COMZ was incapable of performing the task and slowly 
convinced their commanders of the same.   The U.S. Army pre- and early-war desire to strictly 
divide combat and sustainment at the theater level proved unworkable.  Many of the sustainment 
problems encountered in France in August and September resulted directly from the U.S. Army 
finding itself stuck in the middle of two radically different approaches to logistical command and 
control at the worst possible time. 
 
 The Two Approaches to Synchronizing and Integrating Theater Logistics 
These early attempts to wall ETOUSA off from significant portions of what doctrine 
asserted as the legitimate role of a theater headquarters were in keeping with contemporary 
thought in the War Department.  Chaney was the victim of two reinforcing ideas that held sway 
in Washington at the time.  First, the newly reorganized War Department and two of its three 
major subordinate commands wanted to direct the war effort centrally from Washington, 
dismissing or minimizing the operational role of theater commands.3  This preference was 
reinforced by the Department of the Navy, which would agree to any argument that prevented 
 
3 See Somervell’s bid to gain control over the War Department G1 and G4, and this staff’s attempts to retain direct 
control of SOS within each theater in The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces.  The AAF was an 
independent service in everything but name; see Richard Anderson’s “Special Observers: A History of SPOBS and 
USAFBI, 1941-1942” for the story of how Arnold outmaneuvered Chaney and the British Air Ministry to ensure 
that his vision for the 8th AF was successful. The massive capital Eisenhower had to expend to gain tactical control 
of the heavy bombers in support of Overlord is common knowledge.    
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theater commanders with an air- or ground-force background from having any authority over 
fleet elements deployed overseas.4  Based on a desire to prevent the misuse of special assets, or 
to prevent bad organization getting in the way of their subordinates’ efforts, the AAF and ASF, 
enabled by OPD and the War Department, tried to cut ETOUSA out of the loop.    
Second, the U.S. Army began World War Two believing in a system that formally 
divided responsibility for operations into two equal spheres – combat and sustainment – each of 
whose parameters were set in U.S. doctrine.    Captured in that doctrine was the idea that 
commanders at every level – including the War Department, theater, and army echelons – had a 
responsibility to integrate combat and logistics.  Both Marshall and Somervell agreed with the 
idea that combat and sustainment were two distinct fields that each deserved focused staff 
attention and adequate resources, but Marshall also believed that senior field commanders should 
focus on combat while a trusted peer or subordinate handled as much of the sustainment and 
administrative burden as possible.  Somervell seemed to take this one step further, wanting to 
centralize global and theater logistics through the ASF and theater SOSs that were only loosely 
coupled to a superior operational commander.   
Marshall seemed to be of two minds on the more radical approach favored by Somervell.  
He consistently advised his theater commanders to focus on combat operations and to delegate 
all other non-essential functions to the staff and subordinate commanders.  But he also 
understood that a commander remained responsible for everything that did and did not happen 
within his organization and that some higher authority had to synchronize the interaction 
between combat and logistics.  Perhaps Marshall had a blind spot for the significant limitations 
 
4 Walter R. Borneman, The Admirals (New York: Little, Brown, and Company, 2012), 284.  The Navy might have 
been a bit more open-minded in a theater where ground combat predominated, but it remained very independent and 
aloof if confronted by anything beyond the vaguest strategic and operational suggestions by an Army superior 
officer.   
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that logistics could place on maneuver, or perhaps he underestimated the importance of 
grounding the maneuver plan within a reality painted by professional logisticians.  Regardless, 
he remained dismissive of the need for senior commanders to spend equal time on maneuver and 
sustainment at the operational level.5   
It is possible that Marshall, like most other senior U.S. leaders at the beginning of the 
war, did not grasp how complex and important operational logistics was to modern warfare.  The 
French historian Nicolas Aubin referred to operational logistics as the task of integrating various 
distribution networks radiating overland from ports to deep into a continental interior.  Critical 
aspects of that layer of authority included repairing and operating rail, motorized, coastal and 
inland shipping, and aerial LOCs; arraying and shifting depots; inventory management; and 
maintaining close coordination with combat units to identify and move their priorities.  Just 
understanding what equipment and supplies were in the theater inventory was a monumental task 
given the technology available at the time.  Leaders understood the advantages of 
decentralization in fluid conditions, yet items in short supply but high demand required careful 
centralized management.  A critical mission for COMZ was to know where those bottlenecks 
were and to show a firm hand in the efficient management of these nodes.  Examples that 
eventually caused major problems in France included specialized truck companies, C-47 cargo 
planes, artillery ammunition, spare truck tires, and bulk fuel.  The trick was establishing a 
command structure supported by sufficient communications gear to centrally manage resupply 
under special circumstances while relying on routine push systems for everything else.  Just as 
 
5 Marshall did not dismiss the importance of integrating combat and logistics operations, but he seemed to believe 
that the chief of staff and sustainment commander could handle the task without overburdening the commander.  
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the combat commander must sequence battles and recovery periods in time, the logistician had to 
sequence LoC repair, shifting depots forward, and surging to cover critical shortages at the front. 
Marshall understood what Aubin called strategic logistics, which was the science of 
shipping, ports, and discharge tonnage, and he expected his theater commanders to be equally 
conversant.  Planning global and theater operations with the U.S. Navy and the British in 1941 
and 1942 had rapidly taught Marshall that viable offensive options for the U.S. Army depended 
on strategic logistics.  Allied efforts to secure the Western Hemisphere, garrison and 
counterattack in the Pacific, maintain the approaches to Great Britain, and then mount Operation 
Torch exposed a large body of senior staff officers and commanders to strategic logistics.  But 
Marshall seemed to retain a blind spot when it came to the continental aspect of the problem, 
specifically how hard and important it was to develop distribution chains that could move 
massive quantities of supplies over very long distances on land.  Because of his isolation from 
the details of day-to-day management of a combat theater, it took him longer to recognize the 
importance of these overland lines of communication.  This in turn made him dismissive, at least 
during the first half of the war, of protecting his theater commanders from the War Department 
and its more aggressive subordinates, and of the commander’s essential role in integrating 
operational maneuver and logistics at the combined, joint level.    
But out in the field, a suspicion that U.S. doctrine and War Department guidance calling 
for a division in control over combat and sustainment might be out of touch with battlefield 
reality set in very quickly.  It helped that the British had a more mature appreciation of the 
importance of lines of communication in expeditionary operations and empowered their 
commanders appropriately.  This in turn provided a concrete model which the Americans could 
observe and from which they could learn.  The experience in North Africa lent Eisenhower, 
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Clark, Bradley, Smith, and Hughes great insight into strategic and operational logistics.  At first 
there was no U.S. theater or SOS command to manage logistics, so AFHQ was forced to 
synchronize and integrate sustainment themselves.  Once NATOUSA and 18th Army Group were 
established, Smith and Gale were very careful about what authority they surrendered to Hughes 
and Alexander.  Picking up on these trends and based on frustrations of their own, powerful 
factions within ETOUSA and FUSAG openly rebelled against the idea of blindly outsourcing 
operational logistics to SOS, even if they were technically a part of the theater staff.  Eventually 
the combat commanders in Europe completely rejected the notion that the ASF and the theater 
SOS could handle logistics in a vacuum.  FUSAG fought for and won the right to control 
logistical planning and operations on the continent until SHAEF had deployed and was ready to 
take up control.  After the logistical challenges faced from August to October, SHAEF took 
much firmer hand with the inner workings of COMZ.  By the end of the war, every major 
combat headquarters in the ETO and MTO had relearned that logistics had to be considered 
equal in importance to firepower and maneuver and that logistics was too important to be left to 
the professional logisticians.   
There was no consensus among Army leaders that pre-war logistical doctrine had gotten 
this wrong.  After the war Lee insisted, in dozens of interviews and official documents his 
command helped prepare, that the ETOUSA/COMZ staff had done an admirable job that 
validated the concept of a separate sustainment command only loosely supervised by a theater or 
combined operational headquarters.  Senior leaders at ASF probably agreed that the ETO COMZ 
could have put in a better performance in 1944 but also that it was an issue of poor execution by 
mediocre officers rather than a fundamental flaw in the concept and system of command.  The 
issue was serious enough that it played a prominent role in half a dozen of the USFET General 
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Board reports; the debate on controlling logistics dominated the report addressing supreme 
command in the theater.  A group of influential men in the Army realized that the problem had to 
be solved before the lessons of the war receded to a comfortable distance.      
BG Raymond Moses was directed to supervise the preparation of about half a dozen of 
the one hundred and fifty-odd reports created by the U.S. Forces European Theater (USFET) in 
the summer and fall of 1945.  The purpose of these General Board reports was to capture the 
lessons learned from the campaign in Europe, make recommendations for permanent institutional 
changes, and identify unresolved issues that the U.S. Army needed to study further.  BG Moses 
was the G4 for 12th Army Group in May 1945 and transitioned to the G4 of USFET during the 
period in which all the reports were written by the General Board.  He could draw on almost two 
years of experience in the ETO when it came time to write the various reports he was tasked to 
supervise.  Moses was heavily involved in planning for Overlord and had supported operations 
on the continent at the army, army group, U.S. theater, and combined headquarters levels.  
Moses was passionate about what he saw as mistakes in the organization of the ETO staff and in 
its scope of responsibilities relative to SOS/COMZ.  While remaining professional, Moses made 
it clear throughout General Board Report Two, “Organization of the European Theater of 
Operations,” that he believed the command structure in Europe was a mess. 
 Moses boiled the issue down to two competing theories on how to organize a command 
and empower its staff.  The first theory was the consensus prevalent in the War Department at 
the beginning of the war, and the one that the ASF still believed to be the superior method.   The 
second theory encapsulated the view of ETO combat leaders by the end of the war.  Military 
operations included two main functions: combat and administration.  At the theater level, the 
field forces and air forces would focus predominantly on combat, with some administrative 
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responsibilities, while the service of supply or communications zone command concentrated on 
sustainment.  Balancing the needs of the combat elements with those of the service units was 
complex; SOS had to do its job, while ensuring that it did “not infringe on the responsibilities 
which of necessity must be carried by the tactical commander…  Their activities will conflict 
only to the extent that, when personnel and facilities are limited, each will be bidding against the 
other for what it considers necessary to enable it to perform its mission.”6  Moses offered that the 
U.S. military had two historical models for addressing this dilemma: the “traditional point of 
view” and the “Army Service Force Theory.”  The traditional approach included the need for a 
commander to have “complete authority over administrative means required for the 
accomplishment of his mission, and over his staff which acts for him in planning and 
coordinating the use of those means.”7  The traditional approach relied on two supporting 
concepts: that a superior headquarters would not meddle in the details of execution developed by 
subordinate headquarters without excellent reasons, and that component elements within an 
organization must not interfere with the command authority of their peers by consciously or 
unknowingly forcing decisions on the whole.8  Pershing won the fight to directly supervise his 
 
6 USFET General Board No. 2, “Organization of the European Theater of Operations,” 63-64.  Moses goes on to 
point out that there are almost never enough resources to meet all desires, and therefore peer organizations will 
battle over priorities constantly; if the SOS commander doesn’t fight for his fair share of resources, he is doing a 
disservice to his unit, and thus the theater and war effort.  At the heart of Moses’ perspective is a disbelief that the 
CG of SOS can do his internal job but then be a fair and balanced adjudicator at the theater level where he balances 
the needs of SOS against those of the field and air forces.  Pitfalls include a bias for SOS, the perception of a bias for 
SOS among the AGF and AAF, or a tendency to be too generous to the combat elements at the risk of SOS mission.  
It is a logical argument, but one that seemed to gain no traction with Hughes, Lee, Smith, or Eisenhower.  Dual-
hatting one leader to serve at multi-levels in the chain of command was common practice in many theaters in WW II 
and in the modern U.S. military.  Moses seemed to be on more solid ground with the argument that no one really 
knew who was in charge of what decision-making based on the smashing together of SOS, ETO, and SHAEF 
responsibilities and personnel, a problem that also occurred in North Africa after the creation of NATOUSA.    
7 USFET GB 2, 64. 
8 Ibid, 64.  Both assertions are problematic.  The principle of leaving the details of execution to subordinate 
commands was labelled “mission command” within the U.S. Army in WW II (and it still is).  But in order to 
synchronize arms and services, a higher headquarters has to understand those details, and sometimes modify them 
based on information or priorities only understood by the higher organization.  Eisenhower’s tendency to not 
“meddle” with execution at the army group level, or override his subordinates, is often criticized by historians.  The 
225 
 
own communications zone in France in 1918, rather than surrender some control to Washington, 
because Americans generally preferred this traditional approach to command.  But by the 
beginning of World War II there were many senior leaders in the U.S. Army who believed that 
this decision had been a mistake and that Harbord’s SOS needed autonomy from the GHQ in 
order to properly do its job.  This concept evolved into what Moses labeled the “ASF Theory” of 
organization.  
 Moses’ “ASF Theory” was dominant in Washington at the beginning of the war and 
contributed to the final organization of the War Department after its restructuring in the spring of 
1942.  Three powerful functional commands emerged from this process: the AAF, the AGF, and 
SOS (renamed the ASF about a year later).  With this development the desire to divide 
responsibility for combat and administrative activities reached its greatest extreme.  Marshall 
expected commanders to focus on combat and to mentally if not physically position themselves 
near the frontlines, while Somervell wanted to secure a prominent role for the ASF and theater 
SOS commands in running strategic and operational logistics.  The WD and ASF operated under 
the idea that “…all service activities could be handled either by the ASF, or in the field by 
establishments organized along similar lines and having similar functions.  An integrated service 
organization is charged with the control of all administration from the War Department down to 
include the largest units having tactical functions.”9   
 
second point is harder to understand and regulate.  An example might be helpful.  The 9th AF could not decide on its 
own to blow up all the bridges across the Seine one day, because that decision would make it impossible for the 
army groups to cross the river, and for COMZ to push LOCs across that barrier.  A second example would be a 
decision by the theater chief of transportation insisting that all truck companies operate only during hours of 
daylight.  Both decisions might be right, but they would have to be underwritten by the superior headquarters, and 
only after consulting with each subordinate component to fully understand the implications of that decision.  A 
“win” for the 9th AF or the theater chief of transportation might very well result in a major loss for the theater 
commander based on his immediate priorities.             
9 Ibid, 64. 
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Moses thought that the division of a theater into a combat zone and a communications 
zone was dangerous, and limiting special staff authority to a discrete territorial area sounded 
reasonable, but it was almost impossible in practice.10  The need for base sections to interact with 
one another, for the combat and communications zones to coordinate and compromise, and for 
the theater to speak with one voice to the War Department made it obvious that a central 
coordinating authority was necessary.  The ASF model did not dispute the need for a final 
authority, but it specified only the War Department as qualified to referee between a theater 
GHQ and its associated SOS.  Marshall was a bit more flexible, admitting that a trusted theater 
commander could and should have this power.  But he did not want it to get in the way of 
synchronizing air and ground maneuver.  Under the ASF model, the traditional role of the G1 
and G4 in a combat organization or at the theater level became not only unnecessary but 
potentially harmful. The only way a theater or joint-combined G1 and G4 could assist COMZ 
under the ASF theory was if they were provided by, and answered to, COMZ chain of command.   
Moses went on to make it clear that he was a traditionalist and that the U.S. had made a 
mistake in not resourcing a fully empowered ETOUSA from 1943 to 1945.  If not ETOUSA, the 
U.S. Army needed some headquarters capable of planning and synchronizing the interaction 
between logistical support and ground and air operations (based on broad policy and objectives 
assigned by SHAEF).  Barring that solution, COMZ should have been made subordinate to and 
answerable to Bradley and the 12th Army Group staff.   That Moses was so adamant about the 
need for a U.S. Army theater headquarters between SHAEF and the major subordinate 
commands is odd and out of touch with the post-war consensus that joint combined headquarters 
made them redundant.  In other documents he admitted that SHAEF eventually filled the gaps 
 
10 Moses was referring specifically to the various base areas and COMZ vice the combat zone.   
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that ETOUSA or COMZ failed to address.  What Moses learned through practical experience 
was that maneuver and logistics had to be integrated and synchronized within one headquarters 
that had complete mastery over both spheres.  Maneuver objectives had to guide, but also be 
tempered by, logistical priorities and forecasts.  This demanded that both staffs collocate based 
on the limited technology available in 1944 and that the commander had to expend considerable 
personal effort to impose his will on both combat and sustainment subordinate leaders.         
 Moses knew that the ETO had problems as soon as he reached the theater in September 
1943.  One of his first attempts to explore viable options was to get the thoughts of MG Hughes 
at NATOUSA about strengthening ETOUSA or FUSAG at the expense of SOS.  Moses wrote to 
Hughes after spending two months in England working with the ETOUSA, COSSAC, and 
FUSAG staff getting ready for Overlord.  He already had strong opinions about what the primary 
shortcomings were in the current setup.  Moses asked about the proper size and location of 
technical service sections at various levels of the chain of command.  Moses also wanted to 
know what Hughes believed was the right balance between SOS and theater headquarters 
oversight of logistics and what the relationship between the theater G4 and SOS commander 
should be.11  Moses was probably hoping that Hughes would second his own belief that the 
theater needed a strong commander and staff with clear control over SOS operations and 
decision making.   
Interestingly, Hughes refused to address the two specific questions put forward by Moses.  
Instead, he emphasized that the most important issue would be the personality of the commander 
and his chief of staff (almost assuredly Eisenhower and Smith by the time these letters were 
 
11 Letter Moses to Hughes, 22 December.  General Correspondence, Box I-6, MG Everett Hughes Papers, LoC 
Manuscript Division.  
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written) and their preferences on how to run large organizations.12  Hughes refused to name 
Eisenhower and Smith as the likely key personalities – perhaps he hoped Moses could read 
between the lines.  Hughes disagreed with Moses on the need for a strong and independent U.S. 
theater commander – based on his experience with AFHQ, he believed that the combined 
operational headquarters, or SHAEF in this case, would fill that role.  His time in NATOUSA 
working for AFHQ had convinced him that two theater operational commands were redundant, 
and this attitude demonstrated the emerging gulf between veterans of operations in the 
Mediterranean and officers in the War Department.  Working under a powerful combined 
headquarters, the next U.S. commander in the chain should be in charge of running COMZ.  
Hughes felt strongly that Eisenhower would never delegate the integration of theater land 
combat, including tactical air support, to a subordinate American general.   
Leaving the topic of senior level headquarters, Hughes advised Moses to ensure that there 
was an ADSEC ready to deploy to the continent as quickly as possible.  The ADSEC could then 
quickly transition into the first base section, and it could also help COMZ get established once it 
moved to France.  Hughes saw the way in which the early deployment of Larkin and his SOS 
command with the Central Task Force had eased the establishment of a theater SOS two months 
later and advised Moses to take along a similar capability embedded in the 1st U.S. Army.  
Beyond these two points, Hughes refused to go into further detail or to bemoan his own battles 
with Smith and the AFHQ staff over the last year.  Moses wrote back on 5 January, taking 
another swing at the need for a strong theater G4 to adjudicate between COMZ and the combat 
zone, but he left it at that.  Hughes did not reply to this second letter. 
 
12 Letter Hughes to Moses, 28 December 1943.   General Correspondence, Box I-6, MG Everrett Hughes Papers, 
LoC Manuscript Division.  Hughes shared with Moses that he had just seen Beedle off the day before writing his 
reply and must have envisioned Smith as the CoS of SHAEF and ETOUSA.  He already knew where Smith stood on 
the issue of a strong and independent U.S. theater deputy commander or COMZ commander.  
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 As seen in his exchange with Hughes, Moses was swimming against some strong external 
currents.  The authors of General Board Report Two acknowledged that the written instructions 
provided by the War Department, as well as oral and written guidance from Marshall to his 
theater chiefs, tended to reinforce the idea that senior commanders should delegate as many 
administrative tasks as possible to allow them to focus on what was really important – combat.13 
As we have already seen, FM 100-15 and FM 100-10 captured the same organizational construct 
and division of labor.  The War Department would synchronize strategic sustainment and theater, 
army, and army group commanders would integrate tactical logistics.  Just as American doctrine 
and recent practical experience did not delineate an operational level of war, it also did not 
envision “operational logistics” that required careful synchronization with a campaign plan.14   
Even though Moses lost his argument about the need for a strong U.S. theater command, 
he agreed fully with the growing realization that combat commanders had to take full ownership 
of the integration of maneuver and sustainment.  As Allied operational commanders gained 
battlefield experience, they adopted a language that effortlessly blended sustainment and tactical 
reality, in essence refuting the doctrinal separation of the two.15  By 1944 and 1945 Moses, 
 
13 USFET GB 2, 65.  The authors of the report cited the 14 May 42 circular and 14 Sep 43 letter issued by the Office 
of the Chief of Staff, War Department, covering the organization of the ETO for this conclusion.    
14 Nicolas Aubin, Liberty Roads: The American Logistics in France and in Germany 1944-45, trans. Lawrence 
Brown (Paris: Histoire & Collections, 2014), 189.  Aubin adopts this taxonomy to help differentiate and explain the 
new logistical capability developed by the United States by the spring of 1945.  Operational logistics was short-hand 
for two key ideas: long-distance supply lines fed primarily by road-bound trucks, and logistics conducted at a scale 
and level of integration with combat operations to support mass mechanized warfare.  Strategic logistics was already 
established and well understood from World War One.  It linked industrial production in the zone of the interior 
with international shipping routes to deliver this material to a number of combat theaters.              
15 This will be illustrated in future chapters.  The MTO files contain great examples in the cables between senior 
military leaders discussing the landing at Anzio and Anvil.  By the winter of 1944 Alexander, Clark, Devers, 
Wilson, and Eisenhower had achieved mastery over a lingo that translated troop and cargo convoys, LSTs, and port 
tonnage into combat-capable divisions, with supporting aircraft, available at the front lines.  All that was missing 
was an appreciation of the variable introduced by long overland lines of communication, and Torch provided one 
example of the challenges associated with that environment.  Osmanski argued that by the fall of 1944, SHAEF and 
its subordinates developed the same appreciation of operational logistics, or the number of divisions that could be 
sustained in contact with the enemy based on the distance from the closest port and truck companies available to 
support the LOC.   
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Bradley, Montgomery, Alexander, Devers, and Wilson were experts on the linkage among port 
tonnage, distribution networks, and the operational reach of a force based on the distance to the 
closest port.  This in turn explains why these commanders were not comfortable turning the 
details over to Lee and SOS and why Bradley had fought so hard to maintain authority over 
COMZ until SHAEF was up and running on the continent.  General Board Report Two 
illustrated the fact that the war in Europe generated a reaction that shifted control of theater and 
tactical logistics back to the maneuver commanders, and it recommended that this be 
incorporated in future doctrine and professional education.   
General Lee strongly disagreed with the overall conclusions in Report Two.  Wisely, he 
advised the General Board to look at how other theaters had tackled the issue of theater 
organization among its top-echelon headquarters; perhaps a wider view would present patterns 
leading to more meaningful and generally applicable lessons for the U.S. Army.  Lee assumed 
that future conflict would doubtlessly place a premium on the ability to synchronize air, land, 
and sea combat with logistical support, and he projected that commanders would never have 
enough trained staff officers to fill every desired position and capability.16  Adding more layers 
to the chain of command, or expanding the size of each staff, was not a long-term solution.  He 
did not draw the direct linkage, but he was correct in asserting that no theater really needed, nor 
could it properly man, a COMZ, Army theater, and joint-combined headquarters.     
Lee circled back to a personal principle of his: One person must combine authority for 
planning with responsibility for execution in the realm of logistics, rejecting the “…discredited 
French General Staff doctrine of anonymous planning with no responsibility for results, of 
 
16 Appendix 30 to GB 2, 2. 
231 
 
functional coordination in the name of the commander.”17  The best practical solution for this 
desire to centralize the authority for planning and execution with one person was to provide 
senior-level commanders two executive deputies – one for operations, and one for support.  In 
his response to Lee’s rebuttal, Moses acknowledged that this concept of twin deputies was a 
close fit with the British system with its established positions for a MG(A) or CAO and that it 
might have worked better than the various American solutions tried during the war.18  Lee also 
emphasized that advances in inter-Army logistical synchronization achieved during the war 
would have to be expanded to include service-level (Army, Navy, Air Force) integration in the 
future.  The Allies had made progress integrating joint capabilities during the war, notably so 
during amphibious assault operations, but logistics remained stove-piped within each service.  
This inefficiency would be an exploitable weakness in future conflicts.  Not only did Lee reject 
the idea that senior logisticians needed more oversight from combat leaders.   He also insisted 
that sustainment issues must be given more consideration while considering the overall direction 
of the campaign.   
In his rebuttal to the conclusions and recommendations offered in General Board Report 
Two, Lee was arguing for more centralized authority and power to plan and execute logistical 
support to the armies.  This individual would have to direct the G1, G4, and technical service 
sections, support area commanders, and would answer to only the theater commander.  It was a 
construct likely to result in friction between the two deputies and the chief of staff – a structure 
that would benefit from having an integrator positioned between the commander and his three 
 
17 Appendix 30, GB 2, 2.   
18 Appendix 31, GB 2, 2.  Moses was not as familiar with the British system employed in North Africa, as opposed 
to the system used by 21st AG, as some of his peers and could not understand the power of the system as exercised 
by Gale in the Mediterranean.  His rebuttal to the idea contains a few assumptions (presented as facts) that were 
disproven by British organization in North Africa.  Lee benefited from a wider lens and more meaningful interaction 
with Hughes, Gale, Lutes, and Somervell on alternative approaches to theater and combined command.      
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principal advisors.  Lee might not have realized it, but he was generally describing what Gale’s 
position had been at the height of the CAO’s power during the first half of the campaign in North 
Africa before the establishment of NATOUSA and its SOS.  The AFHQ solution was more 
effective because Gale, in his role as a staff officer, answered to Smith.  This allowed the chief of 
staff to screen and eliminate maneuver or sustainment options that put combat or sustainment 
organizations in an impossible position. 
It is important to understand the two competing approaches for the control and 
integration of logistics that existed in the U.S. Army during the Second World War.  Upon entry 
into the war, the prevailing attitude supported a powerful theater SOS that answered to the ASF 
as much as or even more than to its regional commander.  Because operational control tended to 
gravitate away from the U.S. Army theater command and towards joint-combined headquarters 
(even in the Pacific), theater headquarters found themselves under-resourced and largely ignored, 
both by their subordinates, the War Department, and the supreme operational headquarters in the 
region.  Allied planners believed that service organizations would need to be tightly controlled to 
ensure that they adequately supported maneuver and the delivery of firepower.  Once again, the 
center of gravity for this activity tended to be located at the joint-combined headquarters, armies, 
and army groups, undermining the authority of U.S. theater commands.  By the end of the war 
both camps agreed that the theater headquarters was at best a second-class citizen, but neither 
side could agree who should fill the vacuum.  The argument would spill over to the USFET post-
war General Board process, professional journals, official histories, and memoirs over the next 
decade.  The following section will summarize about a half dozen schools of thought that 
emerged from that discourse. 
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 Defining the Role of ETOUSA and its SOS: A Range of Opinions  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The entire debate around the right way to structure and empower ETOUSA, and any 
theater command for that matter, tended to go off course in two ways.  The first tendency was to 
dive too quickly into details without stepping back and first tackling the fundamentals.  The 
second was to generalize about a philosophy of command and about organizational principles 
without going into details or considering the three major pieces of the puzzle as a whole.  If in 
practice senior Army leaders did not agree with FM 100-15, or if that document had become 
outdated, then what was the unique and fundamental role of a theater command, and thus its role 
relative to a SOS?  If Marshall wanted his commanders to focus on the big picture, and 
specifically on combat, what was their role in a theater that did not have an operational mission 
or where a long period of buildup and planning was necessary before fighting kicked off?  If a 
theater commander discovered Arnold or Somervell meddling in his business, or his subordinate 
commanders cutting him out of the loop in their dealings with the AAF and ASF, what did 
Marshall expect them to do about it?   
By late 1943, U.S. Army theater headquarters had become redundant and unnecessary in 
those locations where a joint-combined command structure already existed, at least for any tasks 
Joint C2 
Coord. w/DC Integrating  
Six Functions 
Figure 3.1: The three potential roles of a U.S. Army theater command 
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beyond the most routine bureaucratic recordkeeping.  NATOUSA was never called upon to do 
anything more, and ETOUSA fulfilled its envisioned purpose for about eight months until it was 
displaced by FUSAG, SOS, and SHAEF.19 Once ETOUSA merged with SOS, it was treated as a 
COMZ command in waiting.  Because the War Department failed to address the difference 
between pre-war doctrine and reality, Army theater commands struggled to define their role on 
their own.  They tended to be boxed out of combat operations by the AAF, Department of the 
Navy, or a joint-combined headquarters.  Routine interaction with the AAF and ASF was 
handled by the organic SOS and senior air headquarters.  The major unclaimed role, at least in 
Europe, was planning long-range operations and producing a consolidated, prioritized troop basis 
and material shipping list.  In both tasks, to some extent, ETOUSA and SOS existed as 
bureaucratic rivals for most of their history.   
Functional overlap and a lack of clear guidance from Washington drove both ETOUSA 
and SOS to gravitate towards the role that their commanders preferred.  ETOUSA under 
Andrews and Devers conducted operational planning with the British, accelerated the Combined 
Bomber Offensive, and improved ground combat training.  SOS under Lee mastered the 
downloading, dispersal, and billeting tasks demanded by Bolero, while simultaneously 
attempting to retrain service units and to establish all-service geographically aligned support 
commands.  At least during their first year of existence, ETOUSA and SOS coexisted as uneasy 
peers, to the detriment of planning for Roundup.  This unhealthy relationship also retarded the 
 
19 It could be argued that Devers made ETOUSA relevant as something more than the American portion of the 
Roundup planning team during a short window from around July to November 1943.  Devers drove the process that 
produced the final list of units necessary for Overlord, a compromise worked out between 8th Air Force, FUSAG, 
SOS, and the War Department.  Devers also spent a lot of personal and staff energy inspecting and improving U.S. 
and combined training in the U.K. during his eight months in command.  The meaningful supervisory authority 
Devers had carved out for ETOUSA was largely surrendered during the fall of 1943, passed on to FUSA/FUSAG, 
USSTAF, and a more powerful COSSAC.      
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development of SOS and the theater staff into organizations focused on operational sustainment, 
with the chiefs of the various technical services suspended between two superior officers, each 
with very different priorities.   
Anyone that entered the orbit of NATOUSA or ETOUSA, or the major headquarters 
around them, detected quickly that something was off.  They inevitably came up with 
suggestions on how to fix parts of the problem but they were seldom positioned to see the whole.  
As a result, their ideas too quickly degenerated into various command-and-control wire 
diagrams, staff organization charts, and lists of tasks and authorities rather than lead to a 
comprehensive rethinking of required functions over time.  Or they took a command and 
organizational template, or a leadership philosophy, and tried to make the model work in the 
situation under discussion.   
Because the argument typically became a comparison between ETOUSA and SOS prior 
to Overlord with the shortfalls of COMZ in France, would-be reformers failed to talk about how 
these organizations needed to change over time.  None of the revisionists tackled the subject of 
transitions; ETOUSA and COSSAC were essential before SHAEF was activated.  They 
conducted the first ten months of operational planning, built the list of troops to deploy in 
support of securing the lodgment, and amassed the special materials for projects on the continent.  
But once SHAEF was up and running, it made perfect sense to merge them with SOS.  Most 
authors did not address exactly what COMZ had failed to do in France and how to fix it.  Lee 
failed to transition SOS into a field command that could communicate and coordinate with its 
ground and air peers through mechanisms at SHAEF and the two U.S. army groups.  To do this, 
SOS would have needed to dominate operational logistical planning, develop close relationships 
with combat headquarters well before the invasion, and organize and practice for conditions in 
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France and not those found in the U.K.  When COMZ did not take ownership and provide 
sufficient support some other agency eventually filled the void.      
U.S. Army theater headquarters played a key role during World War Two, but it was 
nuanced and evolved in accordance with the critical task facing the command during each stage 
of a campaign.  Theater commands tended to think on a longer time horizon than joint 
operational headquarters and take a more holistic view to developing infrastructure and a well-
rounded force that balanced combat forces with service units.  The nature of a theater command 
tended to change significantly once active combat began to consume the other operational 
headquarters.  The flood of written material produced at the end of the war seemed to miss the 
impact of that inflection point, when combat took over as the key activity occurring in the 
theater.  Aspiring reformers struggled to see the problem as a multi-year whole with shifting 
requirements and priorities throughout that period.  In order to come up with a holistic solution 
that might have been applicable for the entire life cycle of a combat theater, one has to stitch 
together all of the partial fixes offered by various observers.   
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Figure 3.2: U.S. theater C2 structure, before and after formation of a Joint Combined HQ, 
based on U.S. doctrine and what eventually transpired in ETOUSA; dashed lines represent 
coordinating authority only 
 
In the debate captured in GB Report Two, Lee and Moses were really talking about the 
degree of supervision necessary over theater logistics, not the optimal way to organize a theater 
staff.  This was a trend repeated by almost every “expert” who wanted to reorganize the ETO.  
Because no one defined what the unique role or roles were for the theater staff, during 
preparation for and then during combat, there was disagreement over what to fix, much less how 
to go about it.  Even when the Americans reached a consensus on who should be in charge of 
what during the war, the same issue reappeared periodically with the rotation of senior-level 
leaders, changing operational priorities in Europe, and the realization that there were not enough 
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trained staff officers to man three layers of headquarters.20  The optimized ETOUSA built for 
General Devers in the summer of 1943 was the wrong instrument to support Eisenhower in the 
fall of 1944.  One of the reasons that organizing and running a senior-level headquarters for the 
U.S. Army was so hard was because it was so dependent upon the personality and preferences of 
the senior leaders in charge. 
The writings of senior observers and participants in this evolutionary process revealed 
what they believed the fundamental mission of ETOUSA and its SOS was and what they 
considered the best way to organize in order to accomplish that mission.  Some of the authors 
focused on how to improve some aspect of logistical support and theater management, while 
others advanced a generalized philosophy with few concrete examples or recommendations.  It is 
informative to compare these opinions on exactly what was wrong with ETOUSA, and the 
headquarters around it, and on the best way to go about fixing it before trying to understand why 
ETOUSA evolved and performed the way it did. 
 Each person who wrote about the topic was heavily influenced by his own previous duty 
assignments within the U.S. military; where one stood very much depended upon where one had 
most recently sat.  A large body of written work on the subject was produced immediately after 
the war, informed by the entire campaign across France and Germany and not just by the first 
two years of the buildup in Great Britain.  The arguments contained in these documents provide 
a deeper understanding of what a wide range of participants came to consider to be the core 
problems, solutions, and improvements for theater and sustainment organizational and staff 
structure, and high-level command during war in general.    
 
20 Which has probably been the case in every U.S. war in the 20th and 21st centuries.  The only way to lock in 
agreement is through doctrine that then forms the basis of professional education.  U.S. doctrine has done a 
commendable job of this at the tactical level, but not so at the operational and strategic level, for better or worse.   
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It was obvious that the AEF’s experience in World War One had a massive impact on 
how the U.S. Army thought about lines of communication at the beginning of World War Two.  
Based on their personal experiences and the influence of their mentors, Marshall and Somervell 
issued some very specific instructions governing staff structure that limited the flexibility of their 
subordinates.  Marshall did not want his commanders getting bogged down with what he 
considered secondary issues, which was likely to happen if he did not have good people with 
clear command authority overseeing the communications zone.  From Marshall’s perspective, 
Pershing had been let down by his logisticians in France, and the AEF staff had been forced to 
spend too much time and attention on sustainment until SOS was properly organized and led by 
its third commander, BG James Harbord.  Internalizing this lesson about delegation and 
empowering subordinates, Marshall decided to reorganize the War Department in March 1942. 
His objective was to delegate the power necessary to generate trained and equipped forces for 
service in a half-dozen theaters to his key lieutenants.  This would allow Marshall to focus on the 
President, his fellow chiefs of staff, and the strategic and operational big picture.   
Somervell’s touchstone was the AEF experience in France, and, from his perspective, the 
mistake of inadequately resourcing the support command to allow it to do its job.  Marshall 
believed Pershing should have delegated more authority to a trusted subordinate; Somervell 
internalized the counterargument that the AEF would have been better served by an independent 
command focused solely on sustainment answerable directly to the War Department and zone of 
the interior.  There was a consensus among the ASF leaders that the AEF staff was focused on 
combat operations and as a result failed to properly supervise and coordinate the various 
functional service chains that were supposed to support the army.  This was in conformance with 
the idea that the independent power of the bureaus (as the branches and services within the U.S. 
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Army were known during World War One) had to be slashed, and that their leaders, both in the 
United States and in active theaters, subordinated to geographical commanders.  Officers within 
the ASF also believed that Pershing had been too quick to reassign leaders, men, and equipment 
from COMZ for service in the combat zone.  
It was natural for Eisenhower to pick up the preferences of Marshall and Somervell 
during his time in the War Department.  Eisenhower agreed with and implemented Marshall’s 
advice on delegation and the importance of empowering subordinates.  Eisenhower also valued a 
strong chief of staff who would free him from daily routine, paperwork, and endless meetings at 
the headquarters.  Based on what he had learned from Marshall and Somervell and on his own 
preferences, Eisenhower was perfectly comfortable turning sustainment over to Hughes, Gale, or 
Lee and expected Smith to work out any troublesome issues that bubbled to the level of 
combined headquarters.  Eisenhower did not want to deal with individual instances of logistical 
or organizational shortcomings, relying on Smith and Lee to fix problems.  Unfortunately for the 
Allies, this attitude undermined Eisenhower’s campaign strategy twice, once in North Africa and 
a second time in France. After the near collapse of Allied logistics in October and November 
1944 Eisenhower was forced to pull back a large measure of Lee’s autonomy, drive the SHAEF 
staff to take a more hands-on approach, and look much more favorably on Bradley’s interest in 
having a greater say in how COMZ did business.    
As Eisenhower’s chief of staff from mid-1942 to the end of the war in Europe, Bedell 
Smith was the officer charged with making Eisenhower’s preference for decentralized structure 
produce results across the various U.S. commands.  As we have already seen in his relationship 
with Gale during the planning for Torch, and in the friction that emerged with Hughes in North 
Africa, Smith was comfortable leaving the detailed control of logistics to the experts.  But Smith 
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did demand that his subordinates keep him informed, warning him when logistics requirements 
ran headlong into some other priority, such as the allocation of shipping space between crated 
aircraft for the RAF and cargo trucks on the third U.K. convoy into North Africa. Smith also 
demanded control over his people and their time, even if they answered to two bosses as was 
often the case in 1943 in the Mediterranean.   
General Smith said it himself in his memoir written in 1956; one of his critical 
responsibilities as a chief of staff was to supervise the logisticians.  It was up to the G1 and the 
G4 and to the service chiefs providing detailed technical projections to “estimate the supplies 
necessary to bring the commander victory in the field.  It is the duty of the staff to anticipate all 
foreseeable problems which the armies may meet and to recommend solutions.”21  In his memoir 
Smith took about twice the space to explain the details of the G-4’s responsibilities compared 
with those of  the other member of the staff, making it clear that sustainment was one of the most 
important functions of a large headquarters.  Smith’s battles with Hughes and to a lesser extent 
with Lee to exercise that oversight on behalf of his commander, as both the chief of staff of 
NATOUSA and ETOUSA, were counterproductive to effective work.  Eisenhower seemed to 
learn from the experiment of injecting Hughes into the staff chain of authority at AFHQ and 
ensured this dual control did not happen again with Lee at SHAEF.  The right personality could 
overcome problematic organization; Gale found a way to work effectively with Smith from 
August 1942 to May 1945.  But as one reads the written critiques prepared by a few U.S. senior 
logisticians soon after the war, it is striking how many seemed to resent Smith’s attempts to 
adequately supervise sustainment and integrate it with other priorities at SHAEF. 
 
21 Walter Bedell Smith, Eisenhower’s Six Great Decisions: Europe, 1944-1945 (New York: Longmans, Green, and 
Co., 1956), 7. 
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It is worthwhile to examine General Jacob Devers’ opinion on supervision and 
integration of logistics because of the wide breadth of positions he held during the war.  Devers 
directed the Armored Force within the AGF, spent eighteen months as the ETOUSA and then 
NATOUSA commander, was the deputy commander at AFHQ, and ended the war in charge of 
6th Army Group.  This wide range of positions ensured that he had practical experience with 
every aspect of strategic and operational logistics and the opportunity to synthesize an 
appreciation of the subject.   
Devers was a frequent lecturer at the Armed Forces Staff College in 1947 and 1948 
where he talked about combined planning at the theater level.  Two of the six lessons that he 
liked to share with his audience concerned logistics.  Devers claimed that “a combined theater 
commander should take five looks to the logistics of each of the armed services – to each of the 
allied powers under [his] command, for each look he takes to the front.”22  He was talking about 
his experiences as the deputy commander in Italy and commander of 6th Army Group, which 
included the French First Army.  Detailed implementation of any support plan was the role of the 
national service command.  But the theater commander had to establish priorities to drive that 
implementation.  In order to do this, the joint commander had to maintain, with the help of his 
staff, a detailed understanding of the logistics picture.23  The example Devers used to illustrate 
his point drove home the idea that decisions made in the realm governing maneuver always had a 
logistical component, and the commander could only make an informed decision if he 
understood all the variables.  During the recent war, this integrated assessment had come from 
his army group staff, Larkin’s SOS, or a combination of the two, but he needed the assessment to 
 
22 Jacob Devers, “Problems of Combined Planning” (lecture, Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk VA, 10 May 
1948), 9.  Devers File, AHEC. 
23 Ibid, 10, 13.   
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be accurate, integrated, and timely.  Logistics also impacted flexibility at the tactical level, where 
different ammunition, repair parts, fuel types, and even culinary preferences made it very 
difficult to mix nationalities at the corps level and below.24  If the operational situation 
demanded units of mixed nationality, the staff would have to understand and manage the 
resulting friction very carefully. 
Devers also explained some aspects of his philosophy of command that shed some light 
on why Lee and SOS failed to exploit the formal authority over logistical planning that they 
secured on three different occasions and why they were eventually displaced by SHAEF and 12th 
AG.  Devers was trying to make a point about what tasks leaders can and cannot delegate, 
pointing out that a theater commander has a large and seasoned staff, a wealth of personal 
experience, and formal and informal authority to tackle complex joint combined operations.25  
Tactical formations are not as well-resourced and face more time-sensitive concerns, and they 
have less access to political and military leaders from other nations and services.  Devers also 
made it clear that he was talking about the influence and drive that only the commander could 
lend to any effort.  He believed that this was especially important during the early phases of any 
new endeavor.  Devers did not explicitly call out SHAEF or Lee, but he made it clear that he 
believed SHAEF had to retake control over logistics at the operational level logistics.  SHAEF 
was the only headquarters with the resources and authority to maintain a comprehensive 
appreciation of the current situation and enforce strict priorities across joint and national lines.  
Devers’ philosophy of leadership also suggested that SOS would have benefited from a more 
hands-on approach to operational planning by Lee.  In Devers’ construct, if Lee had spent more 
 
24 Ibid, 14-15.   
25 Ibid, 18. 
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time in London coordinating with ETOUSA and COSSAC, his organization would likely have 
followed his lead. 
Another advocate of tight integration between maneuver and sustainment under the 
direction of combat commanders was BG Moses.  It is worth mentioning that Moses was an 
engineer, like so many of the officers working on logistics in the U.S. Army.  He had been 
exposed to long-duration and complex projects as a junior officer, but he was not a technical 
expert on how requisition and distribution worked.  Moses’ perspective was shaped largely by 
his experiences while working out the details for Overlord under the direction of British officers, 
when he was frustrated by what he saw as a lack of support from SOS and adequate supervision 
by ETOUSA.26  Due to his experiences as the 1st Army and then 12th Army Group G4, Moses 
thought that Bradley and his staff were forced to shoulder too heavy a load coordinating air 
support, sustainment, and combat operations in France.  His preference would have been a fully 
staffed and deeply involved ETOUSA that could have shouldered some of that burden.  Barring 
that solution, SHAEF needed to fill the gap.   
Moses admitted that, after a rocky start, SHAEF was doing an admirable job by 
December 1944.27  With the insight provided by a year of operations on the continent, Moses 
argued that U.S. forces desperately needed an unbiased, influential, and well-connected referee 
to make tough choices, especially during the supply crisis of September and October 1944.28  He 
never explicitly said it, but it is obvious that he thought Lee’s COMZ had dropped the ball, and 
that SHAEF had allowed it to happen.  If either of the headquarters had been more involved, they 
 
26 Hughes was assigned as the ETOUSA G4 for less than a week before being reassigned to FUSAG.  He worked 
first with the COSSAC and then the 21st AG staffs to integrate U.S. logistical support into the overall campaign plan 
for Overlord.   
27 General Board Two, 71-71, 75-76.  
28 General Board Two, 76-77. 
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could have prioritized the allocation of transportation and the distribution of critical supplies, and 
they could have held combat commanders accountable for unauthorized “raids” back into the 
communications zone.  Moses acknowledged that the SHAEF G4 section had eventually 
provided this service, but he also noted that it had required a few months, from September to 
December, for the section to evolve to the point where they could perform this function.  It took 
that long because SHAEF was not deeply engaged in the earliest and most detailed planning for 
Roundup, assumed SOS and ETOUSA staff were doing the job for them, and then needed a few 
months to get personnel and reporting procedures in place to address the shortfalls of COMZ 
staff.  A less charitable conclusion would be that the SHAEF G-4 did not realize they would have 
to take over many of the functions they assumed COMZ could handle, and they only recognized 
their mistake when Lee’s command stumbled that autumn. Moses was also frustrated by the 
inflexibility of the automatic or push supply system and thought he should have been able to 
slow down the flood of marginally important and even trivial supplies to get more of his critical 
shortages filled during the fall of 1944.  In this he echoed the opinion of others that COMZ 
handled the routine well but that it struggled to establish similar systems for non-routine support 
and to achieve a balance between the two requirements.   
In the conclusion of General Board Report Two, the committee wrote that the American 
team at SHAEF should have been split into two sections, one of them focused on filling the 
ETOUSA role.29  This staff element could have been supervised by a deputy chief of staff or led, 
along with all U.S. Army forces in the theater, by a deputy theater commander.30  Both possible 
solutions addressed what the writing team thought to be the three critical considerations.  First, 
 
29 This is what MG Lord and his team collocated at SHAEF were supposed to do.  Moses does not address why they 
were insufficient, but one can infer that Moses found the requirement to answer to two bosses (Lee in one camp, 
Eisenhower and Smith in the other) disagreeable.   
30 General Board Two, 78-82. 
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there would be a clean division of responsibility for work between the two wings of the staff, 
ensuring clear lines of supervisory authority over each staff.  The goal was to limit if not 
eliminate situations where the G4 had two or three bosses and to align the priorities and focus 
areas of each leader with his associated staff team.  Second, placing the staff at the same physical 
location would make sharing information easier, allow quick consultation to determine which 
half of the American staff would handle tricky problems that did not fit neatly into one bin or the 
other, and exploit the efficiencies associated with those duty positions that supported both 
aspects of the staff equally.  Finally, the recommended model ensured a unified chain of 
command for all matters at the SHAEF and ETOUSA level with no disproportional loyalties to, 
or additional duties within, a subordinate organization like COMZ.  Moses and his team foresaw 
and countered the principal argument against a robust ETOUSA staff with the assertion that 
enough personnel had always been available in Europe and just needed to be consolidated under 
one leader at the theater level. 
By the end of the war, General Everett Hughes might have agreed with Moses’ 
conclusion that the senior operational headquarters needed to be deeply involved in theater 
logistics.  Hughes came from a field artillery background but developed a reputation as an expert 
in ordnance early in his career.  He served as the chief of ordnance and then as deputy chief of 
staff at ETOUSA in the summer and fall of 1942.  There Hughes helped plan Torch, working 
closely with Gale at AFHQ.  Then he served as Eisenhower’s theater deputy and COMZ 
commander in North Africa and the Mediterranean.  Hughes matured as a leader and manager 
throughout the war, a process illustrated by his diary entries and contributions to the theater and 
combined headquarters around him.  During the early planning for Torch Hughes fought the War 
Department to gain more input over shipments coming out of the port of New York, arguing that 
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the theater and not SOS in Washington should establish priorities and planning figures for 
combat forces in North Africa.31  As we have already seen, he fiercely defended his authority as 
a deputy theater and COMZ commander and the vehicle this provided to transfer administrative 
functions from the operational headquarters to the theater and logistical staffs.  Like Lee, he 
believed that the senior logistician had to control sustainment planning and execution and thus 
directly supervise the G1 and G4 at the highest levels.  Although he kept it to himself, he did not 
appreciate how the Corps of Engineers came to dominate senior sustainment positions 
throughout the Army, blaming them for establishing a mutual protection and career advancement 
network.32   
Near the end of the war, Hughes had come to believe that requisition-based (pull) 
systems sounded good but were just as inefficient as a system based upon historical consumption 
data (the automatic push method).33  The problem was the gap in time between identifying what 
was really needed and its delivery.  At the tactical level, a lot might change in the days, weeks, 
and months between figuring out the critical shortage of today and its eventual arrival in a local 
depot. 34  Having refined his thinking since his days as the chief of ordnance at ETOUSA, 
Hughes now believed that the only workable system was to push people, equipment, and supplies 
 
31 “Supply from the Rear”, unpublished manuscript, probably written in the second half of 1943 or early 1944.  Box 
I-2, MG Everrett S. Hughes Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division.  Hughes makes the same point in his 
diary; in message traffic between ETOUSA, AFHQ, and the War Department; and in his replies to internal memos 
moving throughout AFHQ prior to the invasion.  Hughes did not care if it was SOS or ETOUSA that did the detailed 
work – but he did believe that the theater needed more control over supply priorities relative to the ASF.  He carried 
the same attitude forward to NATOUSA and tried to control Larkin’s SOS with what he believed was the right 
balance of trust and supervision.        
32 “Chapter VI – Engineer Influence,” unpublished manuscript.  Box I-2, MG Everett S. Hughes Papers, Library of 
Congress Manuscript Division.  He felt they had formed an engineer protection society to cover up one another’s 
mistakes, secure key positions for the community at the expense of more qualified technical service officers and that 
they tended to sugar-coat or hold back professional criticism of one another.  Aurand harbored the same concerns.   
33 These consumption rates were based largely upon data from World War One and published in service and Army 
doctrine.  When these figures proved to be out of step with the combat experience gained in North Africa, 
NATOUSA and ETOUSA tried (unsuccessfully) to have the tables updated. 
34 Hughes was talking specifically about personnel replacements by skill type, but the same logic applied to all 
supply issues.   
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forward to the combat zone based on historical consumption data.  There were mismatches and 
inefficiency, but in the long run the system would produce a better result.  Large logistical 
commands could mitigate tactical disasters or exploit rapidly changing conditions by maintaining 
a small reserve of critical supplies and equipment in theater.   
Hughes and his peers struggled to reconcile the inefficiency of combat with the demand 
from the ASF for precision out in the active theaters.  Aurand noted that almost half of the 240 
mm artillery ammunition delivered to the ETO was never fired; Hughes complained that the U.S. 
Army wasted ammunition and did not exploit the opportunities it provided.35  In both 
observations there was the veiled criticism that commanders seldom used everything they 
insisted was necessary, wasted material resources, and tended to rely too much on firepower to 
reduce casualties or the risk of casualties.  Hughes, Lee, Lutes, and Aurand understood that 
senior logisticians were trapped in a Catch-22 of unrealistic and rapidly shifting demands for 
items that might be misused or never used at all.  The result was a system that had to be 
inefficient in order to function – you had to maintain more supplies than you would realistically 
use, just in case.  As a result you would tie down more transportation, storage, and handling 
capability than senior leaders at the War Department were comfortable with.  Because combat 
commanders demanded a surplus of readily available fuel, ammunition, and replacement 
equipment, logisticians needed more trucks, trains, and service units to move everything forward.  
What was frustrating was that the War Department demanded efficiency in the second half of the 
equation while ignoring the unpredictability of the first set of variables.  Combat and sustainment 
 
35 “II – Ammunition Expenditure,” unpublished manuscript.  Box I-2, MG Everett S. Hughes Papers, Library of 
Congress Manuscript Division.  It is helpful to remember that both Hughes and Aurand had field artillery 
backgrounds, lending a bit more credibility to these observations.  Ruppenthal, Vol II, 444, 448-449.   
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really were two entirely different worlds, and it required a sophisticated commander and staff to 
integrate them. 
Hughes’ service in North Africa made him an organizational realist.  After arriving in 
Algiers in February 1943, he spent the first two weeks trying to figure out the responsibilities of 
his new position and the organizations associated with it.  This culminated in the reorganization 
project headed by Huebner in late April, which advanced a few proposed changes that Hughes 
felt were unnecessary and which Hughes contrived to get shot down by Eisenhower.  The almost 
daily conflicts between Hughes and Smith over control of the AFHQ staff that filled May gave 
way to an uneasy peace for the duration of operations in the Mediterranean.  Hughes managed to 
develop a system that worked with the personalities and organizational structure of the theater 
while keeping friction at a manageable level.  He got along well with Gale, patched up his 
differences with Smith, and got on with the job.  The official history of the AFHQ and 
NATOUSA admitted that the division of responsibility was unclear and unorthodox, but in the 
end it worked well enough.  Hughes’ written response to Moses at the end of 1943 showed that 
he had internalized the lesson that all organizations are unique, retain aspects that seem illogical 
or vague to outsiders, and in the end are answerable only to the commander and his principal 
assistants.  Nothing would be perfect in the eyes of all inside and outside observers, and the real 
priority was to build something that worked for the commander, his chief of staff, and the senior 
logistics commander.  This was a conclusion Hughes took with him to SHAEF and implemented 
as a roving observer and troubleshooter for Eisenhower for the rest of the war.  It is perhaps an 
oversimplification, but at NATOUSA Hughes had learned to stop worrying about building a 
perfect wire diagram with associated duty descriptions and got on with identifying the skills 
necessary to provide theater-wide logistics.  He was intensely loyal to Eisenhower, worked well 
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with Gale and Larkin, and learned how to tolerate Smith.  It was an attitude that might have 
solved quite a few problems in the ETO.     
 
Figure 3.3: Hughes' sketches during the reorganization debate in Feb 43 
 
The most influential actor in the process of establishing the mission and structure of 
ETOUSA may have been its SOS commander, LTG John C. H. Lee.  LTG Lee was another 
engineer who crossed over from the command track into the sustainment world late in his career.  
Lee had served as a staff officer with two different divisions in France in 1918 and was the 
commander of 2nd Infantry Division in 1942 when he was selected to head SOS for ETOUSA.36  
As a former combat leader, Lee was a strong proponent of geographical command authority 
(what Aurand would refer to as “line” command or authority) at the expense of functional or 
service chief chains of authority.  Lee empowered strong base section commanders in Britain and 
France and fought to protect their authority from any encroachment by theater technical service 
 
36 BG James Harbord, the third and last SOS commander for the AEF, also commanded this division for a short 
time. 
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chiefs.  Lee believed that the most important criterion for a successful sustainment operation was 
the combination of authority over planning and execution.  Lee and the Somervell clique at the 
ASF believed that the senior commander who would execute the sustainment scheme must also 
drive if not control the planning process that produced it.  Lee was perfectly willing to occupy 
two or three positions within the chain of command, or to provide senior deputies from his 
organization to do so, in order to unify planning and execution under one person.  Lee felt 
professionally satisfied with the structure that emerged by July 1943 in which his deputy, MG 
Crawford, was simultaneously the ETOUSA G-4 and senior U.S sustainment planner on the 
COSSAC team.37   
By the end of the war, Lee argued that COMZ had accomplished its mission and that no 
change in process or organization was necessary.  Senior leaders from the ASF, SHAEF, and 
combat formations disagreed, but Lee stuck to this position in every document produced under 
his supervision.38  Lee argued that SOS and then COMZ did as well as could be expected with 
the resources provided in an inherently unpredictable endeavor.   Preserving two principles was 
essential to success: dividing battlefield responsibilities into a combat and a sustainment sphere, 
and allowing the senior sustainment commander to influence theater operational planning to the 
maximum extent possible.  The significant responsibilities of the theater headquarters were close 
enough to those of COMZ to make the two entities redundant; Lee believed the most efficient 
and effective solution was for SOS chief to perform both roles on behalf of the combined 
operational commander.  Lee retained the purist position throughout the war, never bending in 
 
37 Technically Lee was the ETOUSA G-4 between July and October 1943, but he stationed Crawford in London and 
told him to focus on the operational planning and support mission with ETOUSA and COSSAC. 
38 Perhaps this was because the only way Lee could have successfully argued his innocence was by placing blame on 
his peers and superiors, a solution he was not interested in exploring.  This project will demonstrate that some 
“failings” of COMZ were due to circumstances well beyond the control of LTG Lee, and in many cases he or his 
staff tried to fix them, unsuccessfully, before operations in France began.     
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his conviction that vesting more power and authority in SOS/COMZ, not closer integration with 
the fighting Army, was the solution to any logistical shortcomings.  In his defense, Lee remained 
loyal to his various superiors; although he maintained a frequent working dialogue between 
himself and his staff with the ASF, he never used this outlet to try to undermine decisions with 
which he disagreed. 
MG Henry Aurand served as the ETOUSA chief of ordnance and then as the Normandy 
Base Section commander during the campaigns in France and Germany.   He managed to 
sabotage his influence with the SHAEF and COMZ staff with his abrasive personality and 
caustic method of writing and speaking, coming across as the logisticians’ Montgomery.  It was 
a shame, because Aurand seemed to have worked out a system to improve COMZ services with 
little to no need for additional resources and only by using a different organizational approach.  
Often insightful and sometimes compelling in his written observations, Aurand phrased them in a 
manner sure to make enemies and miss the opportunity to effect constructive change.  A draft 
article written by Aurand in 1947 started out  by stating that “…an analysis of World War II 
leads to the inescapable conclusion that those charged with its conduct either lacked knowledge 
of the logistic art, and the basic principles of organization; or they chose to disregard one or 
both.”39  Evidently this critique was aimed primarily at the U.S. Army.  “While the failure to 
properly organize for operations in Europe may have been due in large part to the efforts of the 
British to stack the command cards in their favor, their success was due in no small part to the 
ignorance on the part of the U.S. high command of the logistic art.”40  Blunt statements like these 
obscured the value of some of this underlying observations.   
 
39 Aurand, “SHAEF-ETOUSA-COMZ”, unpublished article, 1.  Henry Aurand Papers, Box 64.  DDE PL.   
40 Ibid, 4. 
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Aurand blamed the blind spot for logistics among combat arms officers on the poor 
education they had received on this subject at their branch schools.  He believed that an 
appreciation for logistics among line officers was indispensable because it informed what was 
possible in the realm of strategy and tactics.  Like Somervell, Aurand insisted that “[t]he 
logistician must precede the strategist, just as the strategist must precede the tactician.”41  LTC 
Osmanski, who had served on the logistics planning staff with COSSAC and SHAEF, agreed 
with this idea.  It was his observation that, as the SHAEF planning staff gained combat 
experience in the fall of 1944, their understanding of the interplay between maneuver options 
and logistical constraints matured.  As the staff reached the highest stages of professionalism in 
the early winter, planning sessions would begin with the question “what is logistically feasible” 
and then try to build a scheme of maneuver within that framework.  Earlier efforts had started 
with the desired movement and tried to reverse engineer enough support to make the maneuver 
feasible. 42   
Aurand had started his military career in the coastal artillery, but like Hughes, he soon 
transferred to ordnance.   During World War Two, he worked at ASF headquarters, directed a 
service command in the United States, and acted as the deputy chief of ordnance for ETOUSA 
prior to taking over the Normandy Base Section in November 1944.  He was frustrated with the 
organization of ETOUSA and the prominence of engineer officers in command and staff 
positions throughout the sustainment community.  He made a passionate argument in an article 
written in 1947 that men with more practical experience in logistics and greater familiarity with 
detailed service doctrine would have helped SHAEF, ETOUSA, and SOS/COMZ immensely.  
 
41 Ibid, 2.   
42 LTC F.A. Osmanski, “The Logistical Planning of Operation Overlord, Part 3,” Military Review 29, no. 10 
(January 1950): 59.   
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Like Moses, Aurand believed that Bradley should have been given formal authority over Lee, as 
either the 12th AG or ETOUSA commander.  He strongly opposed functional chains of command 
in any form, either in the control of air or naval units, technical services, or special capabilities 
within the combat branches.43  Like Lee and Eisenhower, Aurand was a champion of line or 
territorial authority and of the curtailment or even elimination of functional authority exercised 
on behalf of far-removed senior commanders.  Aurand acknowledged that Lee had tried to 
establish the primacy of his base and advanced section commanders (geographical authority) 
over chiefs of service (functional authority) in both the U.K. and France.   But by establishing 
too many base sections in France, Lee ensured the need of some higher-level organization to 
coordinate their interaction and any activity that had to cross from one to another.  These were 
the tasks for which the technical service sections had been created and manned in the first place.  
Aurand presented an alternative solution that would have preserved the authority of the base 
section commanders while moving the burden of coordination down to their level and out of the 
hands of COMZ and technical services.44   
Aurand hammered home the point that his alternative structure was based on well-known 
quartermaster and ordnance doctrine, sources unfamiliar to the engineers and infantrymen who 
 
43 This was something of an obsession with Aurand, one that he tackled in “SHAEF-ETOUSA-COMZ” and in a 
series of lectures delivered while he was assigned as the commanding general of U.S. Army Pacific in the early 
1950s.  Functional command grants control over one type of equipment or service throughout the entire command, 
including the authority to override subordinate commanders deep within the overarching command.  The alternative 
is geographical or mission-based, mixed-composition organizational command.   A functional commander or special 
advisor to the commander might exist for artillery, tanks, air, or transportation assets across the width and depth of 
the command.  Functional commanders or special staff for combat branches had largely been phased out of the U.S. 
Army by the end of 1943.  The technical services retained functional authority through the chief of service positions 
in senior commands.  By 1944 the Army Air Force was for all practical purposes its own separate military service; 
to preserve the illusion that it was just another part of the Army, it was controlled along functional lines.  Functional 
authority existed in order to advise infantry officers on the proper employment of new technology and capabilities, 
to help commanders train and administer those specialized units, and to mass their effects on the battlefield when 
necessary.        
44 Hughes noted Aurand’s critique of the ETOUSA C2 structure in November 1944.   
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tended to call the shots at COMZ and 12th AG.  Whether Aurand’s solution would have eased or 
prevented the supply crisis of September 1944 will be taken up later, but he could see 
alternatives and mistakes that his engineer peers missed.  His comments are unique because they 
focused on what COMZ could do internally to improve support.  Aurand was an insider from the 
ASF who came to realize that an operational commander needed to synchronize logistics and 
maneuver; he offered an approach to structuring COMZ that would have reduced the burden of 
that task. Without clearly saying it, Aurand realized that the quasi-command authority of 
technical special staff chiefs was a part of the problem, and he believed that this function had to 
be absorbed by a more dynamic COMZ organization. 
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Figure 3.4: European Theater COMZ, Nov 44, from Medical Department, Organization 
and Admin in WW II 
 
 Learning from the British 
Like the AEF, the British had problems with their lines of communications in France 
during the Great War.  From 1914 to 1916 the British War Ministry managed the L of C, not the 
commander of the BEF, and this arrangement failed to meet the needs of the British force.45  
Near the end of 1916 more control over supply on the continent was shifted to Haig’s 
 
45 Neumann, 366. 
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headquarters, followed by control over the resources necessary to make the L of C work.46  The 
British finally acknowledged that horse-drawn carts and trucks could only do so much and that 
they would have to build a new light-rail network to move, from ports to the front line, the 
massive quantities of artillery ammunition used prior to offensives.47  Because all British 
production associated with the railroad sector was already committed to contracts with the 
French, they were forced to buy material from the United States.  The British also created a large 
labor force in France which they manned with civilian Chinese, Indian, and Egyptian porters 
recruited from across the Empire.  Skilled train operators and line repairmen remained in short 
supply, forcing Haig to discharge infantrymen with rail experience to work in the zone of 
communications in mid-1918.  Although the British operated their LoC over a much shorter 
distance than the Americans did, they emerged from the war with a trusted system that had 
successfully sustained mass modern warfare.  Taken in context with the foundational role of 
logistics and distribution in other British combat theaters, the British Army learned a very 
different set of lessons about theater organization and the proper supervision of sustainment. 
When Americans first encountered British field logistics in North Africa, they were 
impressed.  Field force and theater commanders paid attention to logistics, and they phased 
campaigns based on the timelines and objectives that governed strategic and operational 
logistics.  Army and theater headquarters were filled with administrative experts, support staff, 
and service troops.  U.S. officers who served under Alexander or Gale, or who saw 8th Army and 
the Western Air Force in action, were impressed.  They appreciated the dedicated and powerful 
 
46 LTG Humfrey Gale, interview by Forrest Pogue, January 27, 1947, 3.  Pogue interview transcripts collected for 
The Supreme Command, maintained at AHEC. 
47 Mark Whitmore, “Transport and Supply During the First World War,” Imperial War Museum, 
http://www.iwm.org.uk/history/transport-and-supply-during-the-first-world-war (accessed April 12, 2019). 
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staff role reserved for the administrative expert at the army level and above and the dual nature 
of his authority over both planning and command of troops in the field.  Gale’s position at AFHQ 
was the example that the largest number of Americans witnessed firsthand, most closely 
approximating what Lee envisioned for SOS and COMZ in the ETO. 
Replicating Gale’s performance at AFHQ would not be easy.  Gale was a graduate of 
Sandhurst and a professional logistician.  He had four years of experience as the deputy assistant 
director of transport for the BEF during World War One.  Between the two wars he served in the 
Quartermaster General’s office and was the assistant director of shipping and transport in the 
War Office.  He was the chief administrative officer in III Corps, deployed to France in 1940, 
and then served as the Major General/Admin (MG/A) of the Scottish Command and then Home 
Forces before joining AFHQ.   
The structure he established at AFHQ was unique, yet similar to that of a MG/A for a 
corps, army, or territorial command.  Anderson’s 1st Army would have its own MG/A; with no 
army group or regional command above him, Gale had to fill the role of both.  Rather than saddle 
Anderson with the responsibility to control the line of communications command, Gale took on 
that responsibility.  Gale was also the senior staff advisor and coordinator for administrative 
functions at AFHQ, answerable to Smith as the chief of staff and to Clark and Eisenhower as the 
deputy and commander.  Gale prioritized his role as a staff officer, placing himself at AFHQ, 
first in London and then in Algiers.  He was secure enough to submit to the authority of Smith, a 
man junior in both rank and operational experience, and wise enough to ensure that his less 
experienced bosses never made a terrible logistical decision.  Gale was also wise enough to avoid 
public confrontation with the chief of staff.  Gale carefully balanced operational planning, field 
inspections, and current operations at the theater level, leaving the daily affairs of the 1st Line of 
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Communications to its commander.  As AFHQ’s span of control grew and new British and U.S. 
intermediate headquarters formed, Gale worked hard to minimize overlap and eliminate gaps 
among combat commands, two national communications zone commands, and the combined 
headquarters.   
In Normandy the British used a more traditional approach, where the line of 
communications command was placed under the army group commander.  This was also the 
relationship between Devers’6th Army Group and Larkin’s SOLOC in southern France from 
mid-September 1944 to early February 1945.  It would have been Aurand’s preferred solution, 
and Moses’ second choice for the relationship between 12th AG and Lee’s COMZ.  In hindsight 
Gale agreed that Lee should have answered to Bradley as well.48  Regardless, transferring 
supervisory responsibility from the CAO to Montgomery simplified Gale’s responsibilities at 
SHAEF when compared with his role in AFHQ.  Crawford was more combative with Gale in 
preserving his autonomy as the G-4 than had been the case in North Africa, and his relationship 
with Lee was one of informal coordination and cooperation only.49  Because of the scope of the 
operation and the layers of command between him and the executors on the ground, Gale was 
not nearly as effective at SHAEF as he had been at AFHQ at identifying and solving the 
command’s major problems with logistics, at least until he convinced Eisenhower to make 
significant changes in September.  
Either British model, paired with the right personalities and positioning of the staff on the 
battlefield, offered viable solutions to everyone’s key concerns.  Aurand believed that 
subordinating Lee to Bradley was the most logical and simplest solution to the ETOUSA 
 
48 Gale, interview with Pogue, 3. 
49 Gale, interview with Pogue, 1. 
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organizational dilemma.  Curiously, the British did not feel compelled to establish a separate 
theater commander below AFHQ or SHAEF in either the Mediterranean or Europe to supervise 
the various services or independent ground commands.  When Alexander’s Middle Eastern 
Command linked up with AFHQ, he and his component commander were subsumed under 
Eisenhower.  The service components of the Home forces produced the units and headquarters 
that invaded France, but their authority ended halfway across the Channel.  The British felt no 
need to preserve three semi-autonomous command organizations for each theater; they were 
content to turn logistics over to the army group and operations to the joint-combined 
headquarters.  
The British did understand the need for national joint planning teams, combined planning 
teams, and a role for national service commands to generate and prepare forces for combat.  The 
responsibility for planning Roundup was transferred from the various ministries and staffs to 
COSSAC around March 1943.  Home forces continued to train invasion units and supplement 
planning efforts until new field formations could pick up the slack, but, once 21st Army Group 
and the AEAF were formed, they gracefully surrendered that authority.  Compared with the U.S. 
Army, the British benefited from two deep traditions: empowering theater commanders who 
were accustomed to operating while disconnected from London, and putting one commander in 
charge of expeditionary forces, where victory depended upon effective logistics and functioning 
lines of communication as much as they did upon successful battles.  They did not have powerful 
functional commands in London that tried to undermine the authority of a distant theater 
commander.  (Churchill was more than capable of this on his own.)  The RAF was already its 
own service with separate and distinct commands in Great Britain that allocated resources to 
specific tasks.  It did not need an internal referee to prioritize resources between itself and the 
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Army.  There was no British Somervell, and Harris had control over his heavy bomber force 
without having to negotiate their employment with a bunch of theater commanders, apart from 
his unsuccessful battle with Eisenhower during the few months before and after Overlord.  There 
was a natural resistance to following the British lead throughout the war, but the United States 
Army would have benefited from copying a few of these approaches to senior command and 
synchronizing logistics from the U.K.    
 
 The Limits of a Theater Sustainment Command 
There was a concerted effort among U.S. senior logisticians at the beginning of the war to 
consolidate command and planning authorities.  They were not deliberately trying to copy the 
British system, but, if they had been successful, the effort would have created a position similar 
to the CAO at AFHQ.  The ETO got very close to achieving this goal by July 1943; LTG Lee 
believed that SOS and ETOUSA reached its most efficient organizational structure with the 
expansion of his authority to include appointment as the ETOUSA G4.50  It had taken fourteen 
months to get there, but Lee had finally managed to combine command of SOS, supervisory 
authority over the ETOUSA technical service chiefs, and his appointment as the theater G4.  But 
unlike Gale in North Africa, Lee and SOS did not inspire confidence among his peers and some 
superiors.51  
General Board Report Two disagreed with this consolidation of power in the hands of 
one man, an assessment seconded by LTC Osmanski, who was the ETOUSA deputy G4 in 1943.  
Osmanski thought that the growth of SOS power at the expense of the ETOUSA staff had made 
 
50 Ruppenthal, Vol I, 166. 
51 Ruppenthal, Vol I, 264-265.   
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it harder and harder to conduct essential operational planning with their British counterparts.  
The special staff representatives seconded from SOS to COSSAC steadily lost their independent 
authority to make decisions, provide recommendations, or even seek timely guidance from SOS 
headquarters, reaching a low point in their relevance by September 1943.52  Osmanski contrasted 
the balance maintained first by Eisenhower and then by Andrews with the situation approved by 
Devers soon after his assumption of command at ETOUSA.  The environment established under 
Eisenhower from July 1942 to February 1943 had allowed the ETOUSA G4 to fulfill his 
operational planning responsibilities with the British, but the American staff lost both raw 
numbers and talent when AFHQ deployed to Algeria.53   
After the arrival of Andrews and the resulting minor reorganization that followed, it 
became harder to coordinate with the technical services.  Osmanski noted that the “…ETOUSA 
G-4 could contact the Theater Services only by writing formally through the [SOS] Adjutant 
General.”54  This trend intensified after the arrival of Devers in May 1943.  Devers agreed to 
make Lee the ETOUSA G-4, a development that Osmanski believed should “…have seemed to 
effect a closer tie between the theater strategic logistical planners and the Technical Services, but 
which actually served only to put greater emphasis on planning the buildup (Bolero) in the 
theater than on planning for logistical operations on the Continent.”55  The situation came to a 
head in September when the British head of COSSAC, LTG Freddie Morgan, insisted that he be 
given more support and coordinating authority to prepare for the Overlord operation.  Osmanski 
summarized the period before the creation of SHAEF thus: “…relationships between the 
logistical planners at COSSAC and the theater Technical Services under SOS might have been 
 
52 Osmanski, Part I, 37-38. 
53 Ibid, 34. 
54 Ibid, 34. 
55 Ibid, 36.   
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effective had it not been for the interposing Office of the Chief of Services (really G-4, SOS) 
with which there was from the start a lack of mutual understanding.”56   
Regardless how rosy any leader or historian painted the relationships within ETOUSA by 
the fall of 1943, at least one staff officer found them less than optimal.57  Consolidation of 
logistical authority seemed to work within the British system as executed by Gale during Torch.  
For the Americans, however, empowering Lee at the theater level while allowing him to retain 
command of SOS did not work.  Lee and his key subordinates could not strike the balance 
needed to administer the American buildup in Great Britain while planning combat operations on 
the continent.  Gale had prioritized operational planning and control by positioning himself at 
AFHQ while trusting subordinates to run the base sections and LoC command.  He had a firm 
grip on the combined G1, G4, and service sections, personally chaired a daily administrative 
meeting, and worked closely with Smith and Hughes.  In North Africa Gale got out of the 
headquarters to inspect battlefield conditions himself, but he managed to strike the balance 
between command and delegation.  Finally, he seemed to find a way to work with the people 
who ended up in his sphere; missing are the rotating cast of subordinates one saw in SOS 
headquarters during its first eighteen months of existence.   
In contrast, Lee spent most of his time emphasizing his command position, visiting 
service troops across Great Britain and supervising his team at Cheltenham.  SOS was blessed 
with extremely competent chiefs of services, but the chief of staff and G-4 position at SOS saw 
non-stop rotation until Lord and Stratton managed to earn Lee’s confidence.  In contrast to Lee, 
few other senior logisticians thought much of the SOS staff; Lutes believed that Lee should have 
 
56 Ibid, 38. 
57 LTC Osmanski was a pretty special officer.  He graduated from USMA in 1935 and branched field artillery.  He 
held duties of great responsibility in ETOUSA and SHAEF as an LTC and would go on to serve as the MAC-V J4 
from 1962 to 1965.  Frank Osmanski retired as a Major General.   
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replaced both Lord and Stratton before Overlord.58  Lee could not maintain an effective working 
relationship with Hughes or Crawford when they were his subordinates, and he tended to have 
frosty if professional interactions with Moses.  Friction developed between SOS and the 
operational U.S. planners at ETOUSA and COSSAC and between Lee and his peers in FUSAG 
and 8th Air Force during the second half of 1943.  As a result, Lee and SOS were not capable of 
effectively employing the power they had fought to consolidate.  Lee and SOS remained at heart 
an administrative support command that struggled to connect with the fighting commands or 
contribute to operational planning.  Gale had demonstrated that preference among senior U.S. 
leaders for a powerful sustainment organization that combined staff and command authority 
could work, but only under a seasoned officer with just the right approach, attitude, and 
personality.  General J.C.H. Lee’s strengths lay in other areas.        
Just as was the case in North Africa, constant tweaks to the chain of command did not 
help matters.  Almost every author who addressed the perceived weaknesses and shortcomings of 
ETOUSA acknowledged that frequent changes made those problems much worse.  In hindsight, 
some observers concluded that a less elegant solution, well understood and followed by all, 
might have produced better results in France.  Just looking at U.S. efforts in Europe and Africa, 
the Army seemed to experiment with a bewildering number of approaches in establishing 
relationships between the four types of headquarters.59  On one hand this was a practical 
manifestation of the shortcomings of U.S. doctrine.  It was understandable that the U.S. Army 
had failed to solve the puzzle of running theater logistics and integrating them with combat 
during the interwar period.  But by the time new additions were published in 1943 and 1944, it 
 
58 Ruppenthal, Vol I, 262-263.   
59 Sustainment, combat, U.S. theater, and joint-combined. 
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seems logical that recent experience could have provided insight on effective methods, key 
considerations, and mistakes to avoid.  If doctrine could have presented a unifying vision with 
some definitive guidance on how to implement that concept, combined with consistent 
application of those principles by the War Department, it might have ended the calls for 
reorganization and focused everyone on making the proposed system work.  On the other hand, 
American doctrinal flexibility and the experimentation it permitted ensured that one bad solution 
was not crammed down everyone’s throat.  Commanders tried different approaches and adjusted 
as they gained experience.  In each case the solution was a distinctive one that conformed to the 
priorities and style of the senior American leader, the particular challenges of his theater, and the 
strengths and weaknesses of his team.  An opportunity was missed when some of these emerging 
lessons and insights were not captured in the 1943 and 1944 versions of FM 100-10 and FM 100-
5, but obviously the War Department had other priorities. 
 
 The Impact of SPOBS and USAFBI on ETOUSA 
 Any theater headquarters would have struggled to define and protect its role in early 
1942, but ETOUSA found it uniquely difficult because of the bad reputation of its precursor, 
USAFBI.  As noted in chapter one, the U.S. Army had empowered the chief of staff and a semi-
autonomous theater communications command at the expense of the expeditionary headquarters 
after World War One.  This alone would have made life at ETOUSA very difficult, undermining 
the theater commander’s authority to plan, prepare, and conduct operations.  But ETOUSA also 
inherited the relationships and institutional norms of the SPOBS and USAFBI, which contributed 
significantly to the troubled relationship between themselves, the War Department, and the 
commands assigned to ETOUSA.  But that same institutional legacy ensured that ETOUSA was 
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the only American military organization that had an effective working relationship with a wide 
range of British counterparts, both military and civilian.  A feeling that USAFBI was out of the 
loop, or had become too British, contributed to the decision to limit the authority of ETOUSA 
and the relief of its first commander, MG Chaney, a few weeks after the command was 
established.  By May 1942 many in Washington, D.C. considered USAFBI a backwater, out of 
touch with current War Department thinking and manned by a tiny staff.  ETOUSA was 
established during a period when Chaney and his staff were considered irrelevant or incompetent 
by Marshall, Arnold, and Eisenhower.  The conditions surrounding the birth of ETOUSA 
seriously undermined the credibility of the command for the first year of its existence, thus 
delaying its evolution into a synchronizing agency between the support and combat elements 
under its control.     
ETOUSA was a third-generation descendent of the special observer mission (SPOBS) 
established by the U.S. Army in London in the fall of 1940.  This was a small group of officers 
and enlisted soldiers in civilian clothes working out of the U.S. embassy at Grosvenor Square 
under the direction of an Army Air Force officer, MG James E. Chaney.  Officially known as the 
Special Observer Group (SPOBS), their purpose was to learn as much about modern warfare as 
possible from the British.  After March 1941, the command added the responsibility to supervise 
Lend-Lease in the U.K.  SPOBS/USAFBI spent the last twelve months of its existence 
conducting contingency planning with the U.K. government and military, supervising the 
transfer of British overseas bases to American forces, and establishing the framework necessary 
to deploy, station, and sustain a large U.S. force in Great Britain proper. 
When in the summer of 1941 the primary mission of USAFBI was expanded to include 
the deployment of U.S. forces to the British Isles and their integration into the joint defense plan, 
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the first steps towards Bolero and Overlord were taken.60  To accomplish this mission the team 
visited potential air and naval bases in Northern Ireland and Scotland; the guiding concept was 
that the U.S. Navy and Army Air Forces would operate from these bases and the Army garrison 
would defend them from the Germans.61  In addition, as discussed at ABC-1 from February 
through March 1941, the U.S. would garrison Iceland as soon as possible to release British land 
and air units for more pressing duties elsewhere.  Early in the process American planners 
gravitated towards bases in the north and west of the British Isles for several reasons.  Should the 
United States enter the war upon short notice, or before the summer of 1942, the most relevant 
element available and the one easiest to deploy would be the U.S. Navy.  Operating from the east 
coast of the U.S., eastern Canada, Iceland, Northern Ireland, and Scotland, the U.S. Navy would 
provide immediate help in securing the northern convoy routes to the U.K. and U.S.S.R.  Picking 
potential U.S. airbases was as simple as identifying the ones recently vacated by the British as 
they shifted forces to the Middle East and southern and eastern England.  Northern bases were 
relatively empty, and the American heavy bombers had the range to reach occupied Europe from 
those locations.  The U.S. Army would be placed out of harm’s way, occupy empty barracks and 
underutilized training areas, and stay close to the other U.S. services in order to simplify the 
logistical challenge.62  As early as the summer of 1941 the American forces tended to be 
clustered in western and northern Great Britain.  This preference was driven by the location of 
the closest ports, empty facilities, and security from German air and maritime attack.   
 
60 Ruppenthal, Vol I., 16.   
61 Niall Barr, Eisenhower’s Armies: The American-British Alliance During World War II (New York: Pegasus 
Books Ltd., 2015), 134. 
62 Barr, 134.  Initially the United States committed to providing a regimental-sized combat team, called the “Token 
Force,” to help defend the United Kingdom from invasion in 1941.  This force was to be based in Kent, or almost 
directly opposite Calais on the Channel.  Soon after U.S. observers examined the state of the defenses in the spring 
of 1941 the idea was shelved.  Once the Germans invaded Russia in June 1941, British concerns with an invasion 
faded and the Americans were free to station troops in the northern and western corners of Great Britain.   
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It is difficult to understand how simple decisions made years earlier took on a life of their 
own and slowly eliminated future options.  Without some massive external pressure to rethink 
the U.S. ports of entry and footprint in the U.K., the gradual deployment of Army forces made 
significant change in the future harder and harder.  The tipping point was probably reached in the 
summer of 1943 as airfield, barracks, warehouse, and headquarters construction shifted to high 
gear.  From that point on it was virtually impossible to relocate the U.S. Army to southeastern 
Great Britain.  By default, it would make much more sense to land the Americans in the west and 
form the right wing of the Allied Army in France.  Perfectly logical preferences developed in the 
summer of 1941 exerted an irresistible force two years later, convincing COSSAC planners it 
would be too much hassle to shift the Americans over to the left flank in Normandy.63  It is 
worth remembering this example when evaluating how realistic some suggested solutions to 
Allied mistakes were.  Logistics often drove what was considered in the realm of the possible 
and reasonable among Allied planners, and logistical preparation required much longer lead 
times than most people realized. 
The work accomplished by the SPOBS in 1941 was essential to what eventually became 
Operation Bolero, and influenced Torch, Roundup, and Overlord.  By the spring of 1942 
SPOBS/USAFBI knew virtually everyone in the U.K. government involved in the steps 
necessary to receive, disperse, house, and sustain U.S. air and ground units.64  But the mutual 
defense of Great Britain contemplated in Rainbow-5 also forced Chaney and his staff to examine 
joint and combined warfare to a level of detail and complexity that the U.S. military was 
unprepared to handle.65  Early work by the SPOBS working hand in hand with their British 
 
63 Richard H. Anderson, “Special Observers: A History of SPOBS and USAFBI, 1941-1942” (PhD diss., University 
of Kansas, 2016), XX.     
64 Anderson, 323-330. 
65 Anderson, Chapter 5. 
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counterparts exposed shortcomings in U.S. doctrine, which forced the War Department to refine 
some of its procedures as early as September 1941.  What emerged over the next five months 
was a widening gulf among SPOBS and the GHQ, AAF, and War Department over the proper 
way to distribute and employ U.S. forces in the United Kingdom.  Chaney prioritized the 
guidance contained in ABC-1 and Rainbow-5 while the War Department tended to skip ahead to 
conditions well beyond the short-term defense of the Western Hemisphere and British Isles.  The 
War Department was beginning to have buyer’s remorse in the agreements contained in the two 
plans even as Chaney felt compelled to stick to the formal agreements accepted by the British.  It 
was a short leap from there to rumblings that the SPOBS had gone native by December 1941.66  
Regardless, by May 1942 USAFBI was the American organization in London with the contacts, 
experience, and deep and nuanced understanding of joint and combined operations.  That they 
understood the issues better than the War Department and were willing to point out the resulting 
problems did not endear them to various leaders in Washington.67        
Obviously, the mission of SPOBS was complicated by the fact that the United States 
remained a non-belligerent until December 1941, limiting what SPOBS could accomplish during 
its first fifteen months in the U.K.  Things began to change, slowly at first, but then very quickly, 
after the bombing of Pearl Harbor and U.S. entry in the war.  On 8 January 1942 SPOBS was 
renamed the U.S. Army Forces in the British Isles (USAFBI) and given expanded authorities to 
coordinate combined operations to accomplish the mission.  Over the coming months the 
 
66 Anderson, 245.  The most contentious issue between SPOBS and the War Department by the winter of 1941/1942 
was the employment of American air power in Great Britain.  It was the most significant cause of Chaney’s 
downfall and the move to sideline ETOUSA at its inception.   
67 Anderson, 359-360, 380.  Forced to try to sell Arnold’s plan for stationing 8th Air Force in Britain as an 
autonomous organization with no responsibilities to contribute to sector air defense, Chaney had to repeatedly pass 
along the stinging British criticism of Arnold’s ideas.  During Marshall’s April 1942 trip to London, the USAFBI 
provided frank feedback on why they believed Sledgehammer and Roundup were impossible in 1942 or 1943.  
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command was overwhelmed trying to manage the flow of U.S. units to the U.K. and to 
coordinate travel for the host of delegations moving between Washington and London.  Reaching 
consensus on the first Allied offensive priority was impossible at this stage, but everyone could 
agree that basing U.S. forces forward in Great Britain would generate more options than leaving 
those forces in the Western Hemisphere. Once shifted to the U.K., American forces could be 
used in Gymnast or Sledgehammer in 1942 or in Roundup in 1943.68 
Visits by three senior leaders and the arrival of MG John Lee with his SOS staff in late 
May set the conditions for the transition of USAFBI into ETOUSA between April and June 
1942.69 A general perception that USAFBI was out of touch, too soft, or too close to the British 
reinforced the pre-existing tendency for the War Department to undermine the authority of 
ETOUSA from the moment it was created.  Marshall left London in April 1942 convinced that 
he needed a more forceful personality running the theater, one better in tune with current War 
Department thinking.  Eisenhower seconded this opinion at the end of his own visit to the theater 
in late May.70  General Arnold contributed to the erosion of the reputation and authority of 
USAFBI with a short visit of his own.  Arnold spent a few days in London at the end of May, 
managing to work out a compromise with Portal on the employment of 8th Air Force in Great 
Britain, but fatally undermining the credibility of the USAFBI in the process.71  After this 
 
68 Gymnast was the code word for existing British plans to land in North Africa.  The Allies completed a draft 
concept for Gymnast (later Torch) by March 1942.  Sledgehammer was the emergency invasion of France in 1942, 
and Roundup was the code name for a more deliberate and larger invasion of France sometime in 1943.   
69 This is covered in commendable detail and clarity in Chapter 11 of Richard Anderson’s “Special Observers: A 
History of SPOBS and USAFBI, 1941-1942.” 
70 Anderson, 375, 377. 
71 Anderson, 361-362.  Arnold managed to set up the meeting with the British Air Ministry while keeping it a secret 
from Chaney.  The Americans were represented in the meeting by Arnold, Eaker, and two relatively junior members 
of Chaney’s staff (Lyon and Snavely).      
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meeting, it became obvious to the British that only Eaker and Arnold could talk authoritatively 
about what the USAAF would and would not be willing to compromise on.   
USAFBI suffered a second stinging defeat only a few days prior to the incident at the Air 
Ministry.  Immediately after Marshall’s visit in April, Chaney had realized that he needed his 
own SOS organization to accomplish his expanding mission.  On 2 May Chaney cabled the War 
Department asking for authorization to establish a SOS with five functional departments: depots, 
transportation, construction, administration, and replacements and evacuation.72  At the same 
time, Somervell had taken the steps necessary to establish and man an SOS for ETOUSA with 
assets from within his own headquarters.  MG John C. H. Lee was hand-selected by Marshall 
and Somervell and pulled out of command of the 2nd Infantry Division at Fort Sam Houston 
Texas to lead this new organization. 73  Lee spent from 5 to 19 May selecting his general and 
special staff chiefs from the cream of Somervell’s department heads, drafting lines of authority, 
and visiting key members of the theater supply system charged with sustaining the effort in 
Europe.74  Lee’s team arrived in London on 24 May with very specific instructions, signed by 
Marshall, outlining how SOS was be organized and its responsibilities relative to ETOUSA and 
the War Department.  These instructions were problematic, undermined the command authority 
and reason for the existence of ETOUSA, and triggered an eighteen-month battle to arrive at a 
workable compromise.   
 
72 Ruppenthal, Vol I, 33.  This was based on the functional arrangement of the sustainment command supporting the 
AEF in World War I, and not the reorganization of SOS at the War Department engineered by Marshall and 
Somervell two months prior.   
73 Somervell had briefly worked for Lee in France in 1918 where Lee was chief of staff of the 89th Division and 
Somervell the G3. 
74 Ruppenthal, Vol I, 35.  Lee Service Reminiscences, 81-83.  Lee also visited MG James G. Harbord, Pershing’s 
chief of supplies at the end of World War One.   
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The issue perfectly encapsulated a debate going on at the highest levels and throughout 
the U.S. Army over control of logistics in theaters of war, echoing the same issue Chaney had 
faced in his dealings with Arnold.  In two months, the credibility of Chaney and his staff was 
significantly eroded, and the theoretical authority of a theater of war relative to the War 
Department, and more importantly its three subordinate commands, was gravely undermined.  
The only positive development of the three visits in April and May, at least from the perspective 
of USAFBI, was the fact that the staff finally convinced the War Department that they needed 
not just more resource but more formal authority as well.  On 8 June the War Department issued 
an order to this effect, creating ETOUSA and (temporarily) retaining Chaney as its first 
commander.  But by the summer of 1942 the U.S. War Department had clearly signaled that it 
was willing to allow Arnold and Somervell to undermine and override a theater commander.  
When ETOUSA was established, it was difficult to perceive exactly what Marshall expected 
Chaney, or any theater commander for that matter, to accomplish.  
 
 The Evolving Relationship among ETO, SOS, and Allied HQ 
 The story of ETOUSA from June 1942 to its merger with its SOS on 17 January 1944 
mirrors the dawning realization of the irrelevance of a U.S. Army theater headquarters within a 
setting dominated by joint combined operational headquarters on one hand and by the powerful 
subordinate commands within the War Department on the other.  ETOUSA, handicapped by a 
commander and staff who had fallen out with the War Department by the time it was created, 
had almost no authority over its two most significant subordinates, the 8th Air Force and its 
Service of Supply.  ETOUSA remained a backwater until two almost simultaneous 
developments: the arrival of General Jacob Devers as its new commander, and the renewed 
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commitment to a combined bomber offensive and Roundup at the Trident conference.  For the 
next six months ETOUSA functioned more as doctrine directed, driving two of its subordinates 
to accomplish theater objectives and working cooperatively with the British to plan the return to 
France.  It was only during the aftermath of the Quadrant Conference in late August that Devers, 
working in close concert with Marshall, began to realize that ETOUSA was an organization with 
no future after the operational headquarters for Overlord were established.  Starting in early 
October the best personnel were transferred to COSSAC and the newly activated U.S. First 
Army Group (FUSAG) to conduct detailed planning and preparation for the invasion.  
Eisenhower would complete this process in January by merging the ETOUSA and SOS staff and 
leaving Lee effectively in command of the combined organization.  But just as ETOUSA lost its 
role as the theater synchronizer, SOS saw a significant reduction in the scope of its duties, and 
the emergence of rivals in FUSAG and SHAEF.  The history of ETOUSA and its SOS between 
the summer of 1942 and the summer of 1944 captures in miniature the U.S. Army’s evolving 
approach to theater-level command and maneuver and sustainment integration.  
Phase Dates Commander / Lead 
HQ 
Focus Areas and Key Documents 
I-A 24 May 42 – Feb 
43 
Chaney    -20 Jun 42 
Eisenhower   24 Jun- 
Creation, Friction, Normalization 
8 Jun – ETOUSA activated; GO 19 20 Jul; 
move to 
Cheltenham; Torch; Bolero planning and 
execution 
-B 9 Feb – Sep 43 Andrews   Feb - May 
Devers      8 May- 
NATOUSA breaks away; Bolero slows; May – 
COSSAC; May – Bradley and 1st AR; max SOS 
authority  
-C Sep 43 – Jan 44 Devers Rise of COSSAC and Overlord planning; SOS 
weakened 
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Sep – Marshall and Devers on GHQ/AG for 
France* 
19 Oct – FUSAG; 8 Oct – ETO G4 
-D 17 Jan - 6 Jun 44 Eisenhower 
  Smith 
ETO and SOS staffs merged; rise of SHAEF 
Staged planning: 1st AR, FUSAG, 21 AG, SOS, 
SHAEF 
II-A 6 Jun – 27 Jun 44 1st AR 1st Army and 21st AG responsible for 
sustainment in France 
-B 28 Jun – 17 Jul 1st AR (21 AG in 
COMZ) 
1st AR with ADSEC administering a COMZ 
21st AG coordinating authority 
-C 18 Jul – 1 Sep 44 12th AG 12th AG responsible for sustainment in France 
Assisted by ADSEC / FECZ in COMZ area 
-D 1 Sep 44 - Feb 45 SHAEF Projected Activation of COMZ and SHAEF in 
France 
6th AG Activated/Attached to ETO on 15 Sep 
-E Feb to VE Day SHAEF SOLOC consolidated with COMZ/ETO 
Table 3.1: The various phases of ETOUSA’s history 
*Assumed Marshall would command Overlord as the SAC 
 
 The War Department Agrees to Establish ETOUSA 
In mid-May 1942 the War Department published very specific guidance, over Marshall’s 
signature, directing how the ETO and SOS would be set up and run, a document subsequently 
referred to as the “14 May directive.” In this message, Chaney was directed to set the ETO up 
with three major subordinate commands (air, ground, and SOS) and a headquarters with a 
“minimum of supply and administrative services”; these instead would be grouped under Lee.75  
The guidance in the directive on how SOS would be structured was very precise and restrictive: 
 
75 Office of the Chief of Staff, “Organization Services of Supply” 14 May 1942, Appendix 22 to USFET General 
Board Report 2, 1.   
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“It is . . .  desired that such administrative and supply officers as are now serving at your 
headquarters be made available for assignment to your services of supply in conformity with the 
organization adopted.”76  In the official history of logistical support in the ETO, Ruppenthal 
argued that Marshall wanted to replicate his just completed reorganization of the War 
Department out in the various theater commands.  The very organization of the theater staff 
would force commanders to focus on policy, long-range planning, and operations while 
delegating routine matters to others.  It would consolidate all administrative support in one 
organization modelled on Somervell’s SOS in D.C.77  Ruppenthal also suggested that Somervell 
had manipulated the 14 May directive to assign as much power as possible to Lee, and thus to 
the WD SOS, at the expense of the theater commander, Chaney.  The document pointed out 
some small measure of flexibility in the final arrangements – the table of organization of SOS for 
the War Department was provided, but it “need not be slavishly followed at your headquarters, 
[although] it will, in the main, be the pattern for similar organizations of the Services of Supply 
in the British Isles.”78     
On the whole, Marshall tended to allow his senior subordinates more latitude when it 
came to setting up and running their own affairs, and the 14 May directive seemed out of step 
with this habit.  On one hand, Marshall had probably already decided to replace Chaney with 
someone whom he trusted to drive home the planning and preparation for Bolero and Roundup, 
and it is likely that both he and General Smith only glanced at this document, leaving the specific 
language to Somervell and the WD SOS.  Once appointed and settled in, Chaney’s replacement 
would be free to work out minor changes as he saw fit.  Somervell wanted to ensure that SOS in 
 
76 Ibid, 1. 
77 Ruppenthal, Vol I, 36. 
78 “Organization Services of Supply”, 1. 
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the ETO mirrored his organizational structure as much as possible, thus simplifying direct 
coordination between the two entities and ensuring that the technical services remained under the 
firm grip of General Lee.  The document set a bad precedent because it limited the authority of 
the ETOUSA commander to organize and directly supervise his team as he saw fit, at least until 
someone convinced Marshall to make major changes to the original guidance. 
General Chaney faced a difficult position.  On one side he was constrained by clearly 
written instructions from the Chief of Staff of the Army, instructions reinforced by the arrival of 
MG Lee with his staff on 24 May.  Lee landed in London with a mandate from Somervell to run 
sustainment in the ETO in accordance with the War Department SOS model and with the 14 
May directive.  But the USAFBI staff understood the two fundamental problems that following 
this guidance to the letter would entail.  First, the mission of USAFBI, now and into the 
foreseeable future, consisted almost exclusively of tasks that SOS claimed for themselves.  With 
no combat operations to plan or synchronize beyond the buildup of forces, the USAFBI staff 
would be reduced to a liaison element with their British counterparts under the Somervell model.  
Second, as the buildup progressed, only the ETOUSA staff would have the perspective and 
authority to adjudicate among the Eighth Air Force, V Corps (the original senior ground combat 
headquarters in the U.K.), and SOS, and daily access to their British counterparts.  The USAFBI 
G1, BG John E. Dahlquist, touched on the heart of the matter in a memo to his chief of staff 
written on 1 June 1942.79  Dahlquist feared that SOS would be perceived as a biased 
organization – even if they could remain impartial, the air and ground elements would not see it 
that way.  Only the USAFBI/ETOUSA staff had the authority to set priorities among subordinate 
elements and then enforce those decisions.  In order to understand the situation and publish 
 
79 Ruppenthal, Vol I, 38. 
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appropriate instructions, ETOUSA required its own general and special staff, and control of the 
theater special staff was the most important aspect of the emerging battle for control.  Lee 
brought his own chiefs of service from the United States, highly qualified experts hand-picked 
by him and by the WD SOS leadership, based on the assumption that they would serve within 
SOS.  Chaney and his staff were asking that these men be shifted up to ETOUSA or that he be 
given a duplicate set of equally qualified men at both commands, all the while trying not to 
overtly violate or explicitly challenge the clear guidance issued by Marshall in the 14 May 
directive.80   
Chaney’s position was slightly strengthened by the official activation of ETOUSA on 8 
June, which had the implied task of planning for and eventually controlling combat operations on 
the continent.   Trying to redress the imbalance between ETOUSA and SOS created by the 14 
May directive, Chaney cited the inherent authority of all commanders.  Historically, American 
Army commanders had been given formal authority over every element critical to the 
accomplishment of their service missions and the freedom to organize their staffs and execute 
operations as they saw fit.  Hoping to draw on this traditional authority, Chaney attempted to 
make minor modifications to the 14 May directive.  ETOUSA issued orders on 8 and 13 June 
directing a reorganization of the theater special staff, but Chaney could not finalize the issue with 
Lee and Marshall before his relief and replacement by Eisenhower.  The 13 June proposal issued 
by ETOUSA attempted to split the baby: most (11 of 15) special staff sections would locate with 
 
80 A special staff divided into two logical elements: technical service chiefs and policy advisors to the commander.  
Most agreed that the inspector general, adjutant general, provost marshal, judge advocate general, chemical warfare, 
and air-defense artillery chiefs needed to reside at the theater headquarters or be represented at both theater and 
SOS.  Most observers also agreed that transportation, quartermaster, ordnance, engineer, finance, medical, and 
signal chiefs could perform their theater duties working for SOS commander.  Most of the arguments over 
organization in the coming three years would revolve around nuances in these two positions, and the relationship of 
technical service chiefs to regional sustainment (base section) commanders.    
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and work for SOS while maintaining planning and liaison elements at the theater headquarters in 
London.  SOS could direct and coordinate routine administrative and technical matters to their 
peer commanders (V Corps and Eight Air Force) and the departments and ministries but would 
not “interfere with ‘inherent command responsibilities of other force commanders.’”81  The 
document issued on 13 June spelled out in detail what SOS could and could not do, including a 
list “a” to “t” of its specific authorities.  The guidance published by ETOUSA in June illustrated 
potential friction points but offered no viable solutions because the instructions contained in the 
document did not survive the transfer of authority between Chaney and Eisenhower at the end of 
the month. 
Eisenhower took over as the commander of ETOUSA on 24 June; Chaney left Great 
Britain on 20 June, without the chance for any sort of face-to-face discussion or formal 
handover.  Eisenhower knew of the ongoing debate over the structure and authority to be vested 
in ETOUSA from letters he had received from the USAFBI chief of staff, BG Bolte, at the end of 
May.  Ike’s interim solution to the division of labor between ETOUSA and its SOS was 
explained in General Order 19, which was published on 20 July.  Eisenhower enjoyed three 
advantages over Chaney that contributed to his freedom of action: he enjoyed the complete trust 
of Marshall, he understood that Marshall’s one number one priority over the next six to twelve 
months was to get an American army ready to invade France, and he had a deep contextual 
understanding of how Marshall approached command, management, and delegation.  The 
 
81 Ruppenthal, Vol I, 42-44.  This is incredibly confusing to anyone who is not an expert on how the Army shares 
authorities and responsibilities.  Technical service troops were assigned at every level from division to COMZ.  The 
ordnance company in a U.S. armored division followed day-to-day instructions from the division chain of command.  
The methods of conducting ordnance repair work were established by the service chief of ordnance (and his 
representatives throughout the chain of command) and the base section or COMZ regional commander.  The overlap 
should be minimal and center around relatively insignificant issues that can be easy deconflicted when discovered.  
But there will almost always be an exception or two complicating these rules of thumb.    
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general orders published on 13 June and 20 July were so similar that they were almost 
indistinguishable; Eisenhower granted Lee additional authority over two areas that Chaney had 
wanted to retain for ETOUSA.  Under Eisenhower’s plan, Lee and SOS gained responsibility for 
theater-wide sustainment planning in support of combat operations, and SOS was authorized 
direct access to department and ministry representatives for all administrative, logistical, and 
technical matters.82  Lee could not publish directives that would infringe on the inherent 
authority of ground or air force commanders, and any chief of service had to submit theater-wide 
guidance to ETOUSA for Eisenhower’s approval first.  This insured that the ETOUSA chief of 
staff would remain informed and could modify special staff instructions as necessary before they 
reached the commander.  Eight special staff sections would collocate at Grosvenor Square with 
the rest of the ETO staff, while the other ten joined Lee at his new headquarters at Cheltenham 
(about 90 miles to the northwest of London).  Even then these ten sections were directed to 
maintain a liaison element in London.83  Round one had gone to ETOUSA; SOS would not 
independently run the special staff for the theater.   
 
 Torch and Bolero 
A few weeks after the official reorganization of ETOUSA, preliminary planning for 
Torch began, a process that had accelerated into full gear by mid-August.  Some observers 
claimed that there was too much compartmentalization among SOS, ETOUSA, and AFHQ 
headquarters, which tended to leave Lee and his staff out of the loop; given the participation of 
 
82 Ruppenthal, Vol I, 44. 
83 Ruppenthal, Vol I, 44-45.  Eisenhower kept the SJA, PM, AG, IG, Chaplain, air technical service, and AA section 
in London and allowed Lee to take the ordnance, transportation, medical, quartermaster, signal, engineer, surgeon, 
finance, chemical warfare, depot services, and exchange service sections to Cheltenham.     
280 
 
the theater technical service sections in the Torch planning process on a daily basis, this is hard 
to believe.84  It is fair to assume that SOS staff was focused on other duties that fall, including 
the search for and move to a new headquarters at Cheltenham, integration of tens of thousands of 
desperately needed U.S. service troops, and searching for equipment critical to the success of 
Torch that had disappeared into the British depot system.  In the first four command and staff 
meetings held by SOS since its arrival in the United Kingdom, no operational issues relevant to 
supporting the AFHQ in North Africa were discussed.85  Lee opened the session on 9 November 
by providing a short summary of the events from the following day.  He also reminded them that 
the command had to learn from difficulties encountered while trying to get the expedition 
launched, calling everyone’s attention to the deficiencies at the ports noted by COL Ross during 
his deployment to Algiers.  As already noted in chapter two, ETOUSA struggled to stay relevant, 
persisting in holding a daily CAO coordination meeting in the gap between Gale’s departure and 
his resumption of control in Algiers, but with no understanding of how they could contribute to 
the operation.  Both ETOUSA and SOS had been largely boxed out of Torch once the assault 
convoy left the U.K., and Lee was fine focusing on other priorities.      
Busting the seams of the office space available around Grosvenor Square, SOS was 
offered a custom-built command and control installation recently completed at Cheltenham.86  
 
84 USFET General Board 128 “Logistical Build-Up in the British Isles”, 10.  The senior author was MG Royal B. 
Lord, chief of staff of SOS/COMZ, and deputy chief of staff, ETOUSA.  SOS chief of transportation and ordnance, 
Colonel Ross and Colonel Hughes, were both attached to the Torch planning staff.  Larkin, SOS chief of staff for 
most of the planning phase, was present at Gale’s first CAO conference on 22 August, and almost every meeting 
thereafter.       
85 SOS C&S Notes, 2 and 24 Oct, 2 and 9 Nov 42.  RG 498, UD 578, Box 3882, ADM 453, NARA II. 
86 Ruppenthal, Vol I, 83.  The site was a set of alternative offices for the senior civilian and military headquarters 
located in London.  Had the Blitz made these offices impractical the government would have displaced to 
Cheltenham.  Lee looked at the facility for the first time in early June 1942, and the move was complete by 25 July.  
The new location placed SOS staff closer to the major ports, bases, and lines of communication that the U.S. Army 
would use to build up its footprint in Great Britain, and there was plenty of room for expansion.  It was a much more 
austere location than central London – Lee could hardly be accused of seeking excessive comfort and diversion after 
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By the summer of 1942 the British government was convinced that the fear of invasion or aerial 
destruction of the infrastructure in London had receded sufficiently to loan the facility to the 
Americans.  Interestingly enough, LTC Osmanski thought that Eisenhower’s first stint as the 
ETO commander resulted in the most productive and effective relationship between the theater 
staff and the service sections, making it relatively easy to coordinate with the British to plan 
Torch and Bolero.87  But the transfer of a significant percentage of SOS and ETOUSA staff to 
AFHQ and their subsequent deployment to Algiers meant that the system that had evolved in the 
fall of 1942 could not be sustained into 1943. 88  The staff officers left behind in ETOUSA could 
not fill the gap by themselves, and SOS would have to pick up some of the slack.  It would take 
time to restore the efficiency at ETOUSA and rebuild personal relationships with the British 
operational planners in London.    
SOS demonstrated admirable professionalism in addressing the shortcomings that had 
made the mounting and sustainment of Torch from the U.K. so difficult.  A survey conducted by 
SOS showed that in the first quarter of 1943 only 46% of the ships bringing U.S. equipment to 
Britain met the standard of providing a manifest five days prior to docking.  Almost a quarter of 
the ships arrived with no manifest at all; this equated to about 25 large cargo vessels that had to 
be unloaded, their container unpacked and sorted, and the contents labelled and redirected to the 
appropriate depots.89  It was a problem that SOS, ASF, and the chief of transportation for 
ETOUSA demanded be fixed in the United States.  April saw delivery of accurate and timely 
 
duty hours.  The only disadvantage was the distance from the ETOUSA and AFHQ staff, 90 miles away through 
potential bomb-damaged routes and city traffic for about half the distance.   
87 Osmanski, Part 1, 34.  SOS was too new and too distracted to attempt to get involved.  This transferred the 
responsibility for synchronizing and coordinating all technical service support to the ETOUSA staff with no 
preliminary shaping by the leaders at SOS.  This transferred a considerable amount of work from SOS to ETOUSA 
and AFHQ, a problem Osmanski did not address. 
88 Ibid, 34.  Ruppenthal, Vol I, 46.  General Board #2, 42. 
89 General Board 128, 25. 
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manifests 80% of the time, and by May they had reached and then stayed at 90% or better.  To 
fix the problem with manifests, the U.S. military had to develop a standard labeling system for 
all U.S. cargo, called the UGLY-ISS” coding system.  Figuring out the best way to label every 
box shipped to the United Kingdom was part of a year-long undertaking driven by theater 
leaders.  To ease the burden of ensuring that every box reached the right place, the command 
also divided Great Britain into first two, and then three, regional zones.  The objective was to 
break up the mountain of supplies at the port in New York City into smaller, regional piles and to 
load each ship only with supplies for that region.  This in turn would cut down on the amount of 
sorting and long-distance overland transportation needed to distribute the items once in the U.K.  
Working from accurate manifests delivered at least five days in advance, U.S. branch and service 
representatives coordinated with the British port authorities and transportation chiefs to plan 
exactly how to unload, sort by delivery location, and move supplies to the appropriate depots.  
The final link in the chain was to contact the depot command center when the train or convoy 
departed the port area, ensuring that they would be ready to receive the supplies and turn around 
the transportation assets as quickly as possible.  SOS was refining a system in the United 
Kingdom that would pay dividends after the landing in France, a system that prioritized 
efficiencies in handling items as few times as possible while tying down transportation assets for 
as short a period as possible.  This new process shifted the burden of pre-sorting material 
destined for ETOUSA to the port of New York and added the burden of publishing new 
procedures and retraining workers assigned to the department of the interior to the ASF.  The 
ASF initially resisted the proposed changes for those reasons, but other theaters recognized the 
value of the new system and the ASF was forced to make the adjustments.90  
 
90 Ruppenthal, Vol I, 145-146.   
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A second factor that distracted SOS from planning for Torch, in addition to the move out 
to Cheltenham, was the quickening pace of planning for Bolero, the operation designed to 
control the buildup of U.S. manpower and equipment in Great Britain prior to their employment 
in Europe (or Africa).  There were two Bolero committees – a small one in Washington, D.C., 
and a much larger one in London that started work at the end of April.  The British hosted the 
first combined coordination meeting in London on 4 May.91  MG Richard Wootten, the chief of 
the new Q Liaison office within the War Office’s Q Branch, was the driving force behind the 
British Bolero committee.  It was his committee that produced the series of key plans governing 
the reception and staging of U.S. forces and supplies across Great Britain.92  The first key plan, 
developed in a logistical vacuum and published on 31 May 1942, allocated the western British 
ports and surrounding areas to the Americans. 93  Wootten was working without much guidance 
in a time-constrained environment, and the physics were irrefutable.  The urgent need for some 
centralized concept was driven by the explosion of U.S. personnel in Great Britain, rising from 
35,000 men in May to 81,000 by the end of July and cresting at 228,000 in October.94  The snap 
decision by the British planners made sense based on geography and the limitations of the 
English rail system, but, once the decision was made, planners from both sides never seemed to 
step back and reconsider the logic.  The longer Bolero conformed to the first two key plans, the 
harder it would be to reorient the U.S. Army in Great Britain and thus change the scheme of 
maneuver for Overlord. 
 
91 Ruppenthal, Vol I, 54, 62.     
92 The overall concept for supporting an operation or expedition is referred to as the maintenance project, and the 
key plan addresses the division of the base area out to various users.  Manual of Movement, 1933.   
93 Ruppenthal, Vol I, 65.  General Board 128, 6-7.  The second, heavily modify key plan for Bolero was published in 
25 July, the third on 11 November 1942, and the fourth on 12 July 1943 (which was amended on 30 October 1943).  
Listed in each key plan was the desired U.S. end strength and the planning assumptions associated with ports, rail 
support, depot requirements, and labor distribution between the U.S. and U.K. 
94 Ruppenthal, Vol I, 75, 99.   
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 Efforts to rebuild an effective working relationship among the British, ETOUSA, and 
SOS were complicated by two factors.  First, SOS general staff had two non-traditional 
positions, complicating the effort to determine exactly who was in charge of what within the 
organization.  In addition to the usual G-1 to G-4, SOS also included a requirements branch and 
a procurement branch that overlapped traditional duties performed by the G-1 and G-4.95  What 
other organizations referred to as operations were performed by the technical service sections 
and the G-4 within SOS, and the G3 was eventually renamed the “training and security” section 
to avoid confusion.  Second, Lee employed between three and five base-section commanders 
responsible for geographical sub-sections of Great Britain throughout the buildup for Bolero.  
This triggered an ongoing debate over the division of authority between the various base section 
commanders and almost a dozen special staff chiefs who were accustomed to exerting technical 
supervision over their associated personnel and units.  The problem manifested itself in the 
management of hospitals, depots, transportation units, and engineering projects, to include 
construction methods and priorities.  When base sections were first established in the summer 
and fall of 1942, the commanders had very little operational control over the most important 
technical services within their areas of responsibility, but over the coming year this shifted 
further and further in their favor, at the expense of the chiefs of services.96  Lee, like Aurand, 
was a big believer in line or territorial command over functional authority.  Ignoring Aurand’s 
preference for one to two very large base sections, Lee divided Great Britain, and COMZ in 
France, into five or six geographical entities that would fit together like puzzle pieces as the size 
of the rear area grew.  This rapid expansion in the number of base commands in France created a 
 
95 Ruppenthal, Vol I, 78. 
96 Ruppenthal, Vol I, 87, 170. 
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requirement for someone to coordinate their interaction, a task the COMZ staff proved unable to 
accomplish.  The informal agreements that had been worked out in the U.K. among SOS, the 
ETOUSA special staff, and the base sections were not universally understood or accepted in 
France.  With the addition of SHAEF, 21st, and 12th Army Groups to the organizations COMZ 
needed to routinely coordinate with, expedient compromises were upset and replaced with 
confusion often followed by resentment. 
 
Figure 3.5: Base section and regional boundaries of SOS in the UK 
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The predominance of base section leaders over chiefs of services made sense in Great 
Britain.  Supplies and troops arriving from the United States disembarked at English ports, 
traveled by rail to a nearby bases or depots, and remained in those general areas until it was time 
to deploy overseas for combat.  The need to move personnel or equipment across base section 
boundaries was minimal.  There was no demand on SOS or ETOUSA staff to supervise detailed 
synchronization among the various base sections and the sharing of common support from the 
technical services.  Each base section could afford to be an independent operator that required 
very little help from SOS staff as long as the commander had control over everything he needed 
to accomplish his mission and did not need to synchronize his efforts with those of his neighbors.  
This was a model that would not work in France, but because it was used in the UK for over 
eighteen months, SOS failed to develop and practice effective ways to coordinate the activities of 
the base sections before Overlord.   In France, especially after the breakout following Operation 
Cobra, tight coordination of theater assets temporarily assigned or transiting base boundaries was 
a critical skill.  The lack of practice with shifting material across up to a half-dozen base 
sections, combined with the resulting need to shift coordinating authority away from the base 
sections to either COMZ or SHAEF, presented a significant challenge at just the wrong moment 
in the campaign.  The solution that had made perfect sense in Great Britain during Bolero meant 
that COMZ never had to practice its role as a central coordinating authority, a skill they 
desperately needed in August and September 1944. 
 
 ETOUSA Cycles Through Commanders 
 Lee continued to supervise SOS under what he considered to be a sub-optimal structure 
until the departure of the AFHQ to North Africa, a move he used to justify a new attempt to pull 
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all the theater service chiefs under this direct supervision at Cheltenham.  Defeated in this effort 
by Smith in November, Lee introduced the same proposal to LTG Frank Andrews upon the 
latter’s arrival as the new ETOUSA commander in early February 1943.  Andrews was a 
cavalryman who had switched to the Air Corps near the end of World War One.  Between the 
wars he gained management experience in the War Department and commanded the GHQ Air 
Force, which included all air force elements in the Caribbean. Before his assignment to the ETO, 
Andrews commanded all U.S. Army forces assigned to the Middle East.  Andrews had worked 
closely with both MacArthur and Marshall, had impressed both men, and understood Marshall’s 
approach to delegation and the proper relationship between a theater and the War Department.  
Andrews supported Lee’s request to consolidate all aspects of technical service coordination 
under his direct control, eliminating the need for liaison elements at ETOUSA, but in turn he 
demanded that SOS reestablish a permanent footprint in London.  SOS referred to this as “the 
elimination of the special staff at ETOUSA,” a decision made in March 1943. 97  The ETOUSA 
special staff would be replaced by the forward element of SOS’s G-1, G-4, and special staff; 
chiefs of these sections were to rotate between Cheltenham and London periodically as their 
duties demanded.  Lee had finally won the battle to consolidate the theater special staff under his 
control.  It was yet to be determined if SOS could adequately handle their increased role in 
planning for Roundup that the change would entail.       
 The USFET board that studied the history of SOS in Great Britain concluded that the 
decision to split the headquarters between two locations was a significant mistake.  The team that 
had prepared the document, which was doubtlessly approved for release by LTG Lee himself, 
 
97 USFET General Board 128, “Logistical Build-up in the British Isles, 4-5.  The senior member of the writing 
committee was MG Royal Lord, an officer with senior responsibilities in SOS and COMZ from 1943 to 1945.   
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thought that the staff did not have the numbers and experience to spread themselves across two 
locations and to focus effectively on operations, planning, and coordination with the British.  The 
senior author of that report, MG Lord, was fully qualified to comment on the issue, because he 
served as the chief of the London branch of SOS from March to August 1943.  The report 
offered no practical solution, making no recommendation of which mission should have taken 
priority. Surprisingly, the report concluded this particular section by stating that the 
consolidation of SOS and theater special staff and Lee’s assumption of the role of theater G-4 
resulted in a “definite improvement in overall efficiency.”98  It seems that as first-hand witnesses 
Lord and his co-authors realized that SOS staff could not fill both roles adequately, but they were 
stuck supporting Lee’s preference to do just that.  One is left with the impression that Lord and 
SOS would have preferred to carry on in splendid isolation at Cheltenham, leaving ETOUSA and 
COSSAC to conduct operational planning with whatever excess capacity Lee might 
magnanimously provide.  More distressing was the discontinuity of criticizing the decision to try 
split-based operations while in Great Britain without acknowledging the importance of being 
able to run two or three headquarters in a combat environment.  Only a few sentences after 
stating that SOS did not have the resources to operate in two locations in Great Britain, Lord 
acknowledged how it important it was to be able to conduct split-based operations in order to 
phase COMZ and base sections into France during Overlord.  In one section of the report Lord 
criticized the decision to split SOS staff in two and questioned their ability to perform their job in 
such a configuration.  But in later sections of the same document, in capstone U.S. command and 
control doctrine, and in the memoirs of most of the sustainment leaders in the theater, the ability 
 
98 General Board 128, 2. 
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to split a headquarters into two pieces and project an advanced section closer to the action was 
given as a fundamental requirement for any headquarters at the division level and above.   
 The formal relationship established in March 1943 between SOS and ETOUSA staff was 
modified again only a few months later, triggered by the arrival of a new commanding general.  
After LTG Andrews died in a plane crash in Iceland in early May, LTG Jacob Devers was 
appointed as his replacement.  Lee saw this as another opportunity to consolidate the last of the 
theater special staff under his control.  Lee quickly discovered that Devers was an experienced 
and self-confident theater commander who had strong ideas about his primary mission and how 
best to accomplish it.   
Devers had come from a traditional field artillery background, but a series of assignments 
during the early years of World War Two quickly broadened his base of experience.  Between 
1939 and 1941, Devers worked in the Panama Canal Zone, commanded a provisional brigade in 
the Washington, D.C. area, and commanded the 9th Infantry Division at Fort Bragg NC, a job 
which included supervising a massive expansion of the base and its training facilities.  In August 
1941 Devers became the second chief of the Armored Force and worked with the Ordnance 
Department to accelerate the development of the M4 and M26 tanks.  Devers learned how to 
operate at a bureaucratic fusion point that combined advocacy of the proper training and 
employment of armored forces with some measure of fiscal authority over procurement and the 
development of future equipment.  Devers balanced the need to maintain a working relationship 
with his peers and with his boss while trying to develop the best armored force possible.  This 
resulted in frequent professional, but never personal, clashes with his nominal boss, LTG Leslie 
McNair, over the proper role of the tank, the best composition of an armored division, and the 
appropriate scope of tank destroyer formations.  Devers’ diverse experiences and background 
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made him an excellent choice for theater command; his lack of combat experience was a 
limitation that Marshall was comfortable accepting at the time.  ETOUSA was not going to play 
a significant role in ground combat on the continent any time soon.  
 It did not take Devers long to agree in principle with Lee’s argument that the commander 
for sustainment in ETOUSA should supervise logistical planning.  ETOUSA General Order 33, 
published on 27 May 1943, made Lee the theater G-4 in addition to his duties as SOS 
commander.99  Devers stopped short of Lee’s full recommendation, shelving the idea of also 
making him the deputy theater commander.  Interviewed immediately after the war during the 
preparation of General Board Report Two, Devers explained that his small and relatively junior 
ETOUSA G-4 section was overshadowed in rank, experience, and size by SOS staff.  But the 
SOS staff were prevented from accomplishing their full potential because they remained cut off 
from direct access to the ETO commander and his chief of staff.  Once Lee became the theater 
G-4, SOS commander was free to assign the full complement of available administrative staff 
officers throughout Great Britain as he saw fit.  Devers obviously thought that Lee would 
position himself and his team in the best locations to advance the theater-wide mission of 
ETOUSA.  But both General Board Report Two and LTC Osmanski’s post-war comments 
suggested that SOS staff struggled to adopt a theater-wide perspective at the expense of their 
SOS duties.  SOS staff seemed distant, preoccupied with Bolero at the expense of planning 
Roundup, and more concerned with building a supply base in Britain than with supporting the 
ongoing strategic bomber offensive.100  Everyone who studied command arrangements in the 
U.K. agreed that the fundamental problem revolved around the location, authority, and 
 
99 General Board Two, 65-66.   
100 Osmanski, Part One, 35-36.  General Board Two, 67. 
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independence of the special staff sections, especially with planning and sustaining combat 
operations.  Most observers seemed to want two fully-resourced special staffs – one at ETOUSA 
and a second at SOS.  In addition to demanding twice the number of competent staff officers, 
this approach would also have necessitated a division of labor between the two organizations for 
a collection of tasks that did not lend themselves to artificial barriers.   
Despite ETOUSA GO 33 and the decisions reached at the Trident Conference, very little 
seemed to change at SOS headquarters.  In June and July work on “projects for a continental 
operation” (PROCO) and revisions to the troop basis consumed a lot of energy, but U.S. 
personnel strength remained stagnant between January and the end of May.101  Lee did not even 
address his expanded scope of responsibilities with his staff until 26 July, when he concluded 
that the combination of planning and executive authority into one position was a unique event in 
the history of the U.S. Army; finally, they had achieved the proper organization for running 
theater logistics.102  It took time for both the demands of operational planning, and the resources 
to supervise that activity to emerge. 
Lee’s victory in May triggered a minor reorganization of SOS staff structure to ensure 
that they could fulfill these new requirements.  SOS G-4 was retitled the chief of services, with 
the G-1 becoming the chief of administration.  In theory both the G-1 and the G-4 were given 
supervisory authority over associated special staff sections, but the reality was that the stronger 
chiefs of services were not going to defer to less experienced and in some cases junior 
officers.103  COL Royal Lord was appointed as the first chief of services under this new 
 
101 PROCO will be explained in great detail below.   “Troop basis” was a term used throughout the U.S. Army as 
shorthand for the very detailed list of units necessary to conduct a specific operation.  Overlord had a troop basis for 
the first 90 days, with a supplemental troop basis out to D+270.  
102 SOS C&S Notes, 26 Jul 43.  RG 498, UD 578, Box 3882, ADM 455, NARA II.   
103 Most chiefs of service at ETOUSA were at least brigadier generals by the summer of 1943 and would be major 
generals by the following summer.  Lord graduated from USMA in 1923; most of the service chiefs were 
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configuration, but spent most of his time in London where he could coordinate with ETOUSA, 
deferring operations at Cheltenham to his deputy.  It quickly became obvious that Lord did not 
have the rank or experience to hold such a key position.  As planning for Roundup began to heat 
up that summer, MG Robert Crawford was transferred from his position as the commander of 
SOS at USAFIME to become the chief of services and deputy CG of SOS in Great Britain on 24 
July 1943.  By this point SOS staff was dealing with the reality of executing three critical tasks, 
each clustered around a different location in south-central England.  A small planning team was 
at Norfolk House working with COSSAC on Roundup planning, a second team supported the 
theater commander at Grosvenor Square in London, and most of the general and special staff 
were still located at Cheltenham.  Crawford assigned Lord to the team at Norfolk House as his 
lead logistics planner.  Crawford preferred to spend most of his time at the ETOUSA 
headquarters to fully support Devers and backstop Lord if needed.  Lee felt that the quality of 
personnel, the breadth of his authority, and distribution of SOS staff reached their most effective 
configuration around late August as a result of these changes.104  Unfortunately from Lee’s 
perspective, these command arrangements were to change again in less than three months. 
 
 COSSAC, PROCO, and Early Roundup Sustainment Planning  
 It took about four months for the renewed emphasis on planning Roundup that emerged 
from Casablanca to bear any practical fruit.   Led by LTG Fredrick E. Morgan, COSSAC held its 
first official combined plans meeting on 17 April 1943.105  COSSAC was organized along 
 
commissioned in the 1910s.  Even Stratton, Lord’s eventual replacement, was three years his senior when it came to 
time in service.   
104 Ruppenthal, Vol I, 163-166. 
105 General Board Report Two, 2.   
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traditional staff lines, with sections dedicated to operations, administration (sustainment), and 
intelligence and a central secretariat to catalogue and share resulting products.  U.S. support for 
this effort was significant, but it came largely from a tightknit group from ETOUSA with 
assistance from the theater service chiefs.  Eventually dozens of subcommittees existed, studying 
every conceivable technical problem.  Because COSSAC did not have a projected date, location, 
or even size of force to drive operational planning, it was limited to studying weather, terrain, 
German dispositions, and the steps associated with amphibious landings and securing a 
lodgment.  Included within this scope of work were the tasks faced while landing on a defended 
beach, ferrying supplies across that beach for weeks on end, and rebuilding French infrastructure 
smashed by combat and sabotage.  All these projects, linked together, might then help ETOUSA 
draw up a list of required material and service troops needed to successfully pull off such an 
operation.  A document that linked discrete tasks on the continent to the resources necessary to 
carry them out was exactly what ETOUSA needed to justify their requests to the War 
Department.  
ETOUSA started this process by publishing the seven-page document “Projects for a 
Continental Operation” (PROCO) on 24 June 1943.  It offered a set of planning assumptions 
about the scale and pace of initial ground combat operations in France and directed SOS and 
technical services to submit their requests for material and forces to support these actions.  The 
document was important because it linked an official, best-guess relationship between 
sustainment tasks that would have to be performed on the continent and the materials and units 
necessary to execute them.106  The document specifically addressed:   
 
106 General Board 128, 18. 
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1. How many divisions, by type, would flow to France during the first 90 days of 
Overlord.107 
 
2. The monthly rate of force buildup on the continent and UK over the following twelve 
months. 
 
3. The number and characteristics of the main lines of communication, including the 
motor transport assets necessary to operate them. 
 
4. The number of ports (major and minor) to be rehabilitated in France. 
 
5. An estimate of the scope of airfield construction and repair, and the timeline of 
projected deployment for aircraft that would subsequently operate from those airfields in 
France. 
 
6. Authorized levels of emergency supplies on the continent (the objective size of 
material reserves expressed in days of supply and units of fire). 
 
7. Assumptions about the level of damage the Germans (and Allies) would inflict on 
ports, bridges, rail equipment, communication networks, and French industry. 
 
 In hindsight, Lord acknowledged that the consolidated estimate should have also 
projected basic civilian needs in liberated territory and general suggestions as to when and at 
what rate supplies would flow from the United States directly to France rather than through 
Great Britain.108  Regardless, PROCO was a powerful tool to ground the next round of 
sustainment planning.      
 This centrally endorsed document was powerful because it enabled each chief of service 
to create a supporting plan with a list of special projects or activities that their organization 
would have to accomplish to achieve the overall scheme of support.  These “PROCO Projects” 
were fleshed out between July and September 1943, each job receiving a projected allotment of 
technical labor, material, estimated completion time, and relative prioritization.  The ETOUSA 
 
107 ETOUSA used numbers provided by OPD, the Imperial General Staff, and COSSAC, so they could not be called 
into question, despite their tentative nature.  These figures were primarily governed by the number of amphibious 
assault craft and cargo ships and by the earliest guesses about daily combat tonnage requirements versus discharge 
projections across beaches, minor ports, and one to two major ports.    
108 General Board 128, 19. 
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Quartermaster submitted almost 100 projects alone, joined by Signal, Ordnance, Medical, 
Transportation, Engineer, and Chemical Warfare inputs that pushed the ETOUSA total to around 
a thousand individual requests.109  The paperwork that was generated and the staff energy 
expended on this effort were significant.  The QM files from ETOUSA contain boxes of 
messages traded back and forth between London and the Port of New York, each tracking the 
progress of filling the order.110   
Defining the scope of these various projects was necessary to justify the most recent 
troop basis submitted to the War Department.  If the command could figure every component 
task and item of supply associated with Roundup, they could figure out how many service troops 
were necessary to move and use them.  The special staff at SOS acknowledged the most 
significant shortcoming of the process – that there was no collaborative planning with the units 
projected to do the fighting and sustaining on the continent.  In September 1943 COSSAC lacked 
the technical and tactical depth to enable it to dig into the details with each service, the U.S. 
Army ground commands were just being stood up, the Navy and AAF support to Roundup was 
still very vague, and the various base sections that would deploy to France and direct activity in 
the communications zone had not yet been created.  This led to no end of trouble in September 
1943 and again in the spring of 1944 as first the War Department and then SHAEF questioned all 
the planning assumptions used by ETOUSA, but there was practically no solution.  Frequent 
changes to the scheme of maneuver, air plan, and planned projects resulted in a series of 
 
109 PROCO Files, Office of the Quartermaster, ETOUSA.  RG 498, UD 1107, Box 5299-5301.  Individual projects 
included projections of rations, replacement clothing, office furniture, dozens of construction plans, packing 
material, and items to protect facilities and supplies erected in field conditions.   
110 The variety of items is staggering, most of the documents are classified secret, and the purpose of the items 
quickly disappeared into the bureaucratic method used to handle the requests.  It doubtlessly required a small army 
of experts to keep the process functioning, and there was no easy way to sort requirements between essential items 
and those that were just nice to have.  SOS and ETOUSA screened each project but did not try to consolidate like 
items or prioritize projects against one another.   
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refinements to the initial estimates well into the summer of 1944.111  The process was far from 
perfect, but it had energized the ASF in time to make the adjustments needed to provide a large 
majority of the equipment and material needed in France.  
 The SOS staff had full access to the various technical service experts, both at Cheltenham 
and in London, as they worked on this massive endeavor.  The team was producing very detailed 
scopes of work for hundreds of projects.  Once collected at the theater level, these technical 
reports provided a list of material and equipment ETOUSA needed for Overlord the following 
summer.  The process illustrated the difference between logistical and tactical planning.  The 
interrelated, technical, and detailed work done by the logisticians had to be accomplished almost 
a year in advance, when no concrete operational plans were available to use for reference or 
justification.  The U.S. industrial base needed these requests in order to modify production 
schedules, so that supplies and equipment would be finished in time to ship them to Great Britain 
or directly to France for consumption.  It was impressive that SOS provided such a 
comprehensive resourcing request nine months prior to the invasion, but this did not mean that 
the ETOUSA wish list directly corresponded to the global priorities established by the War 
Department or that the industrial base could produce everything on the necessary schedule.   
Maintaining visibility in filling these requests was hard work that tied down a significant 
portion of the special staff.  As services began to realize they were not going to meet important 
goals, the shortfalls they projected triggered a search for alternative solutions.  Across the board 
it had become obvious that the Allies were facing major shortfalls against PROCO requirements 
by March 1944.  This drove ETOUSA to enact a compromise on 3 April.  The ETOUSA G-4 
 
111 Memo from Chief of Supply Branch ETOUSA QM to Chief P&T Division, 14 Jul 44.  This letter confirmed that 
all requirements for D to D+90 had been validated on 18 March 1944.  It also addressed changes to the projections 
for D+90 to D+240.  In general, the changes were minor (an increase in no more than a third of the original requests) 
beyond a few exceptions; two exceptions were doubled requests for office equipment and vomit bags.     
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wanted to pool all the material on hand for PROCO and then issue the equipment as prioritized 
by General Lee.112  One major disadvantage of the initial approach to PROCO was that the 
requests had been submitted exclusively for SOS units and projects, and the vast majority of the 
material was reserved for their use.  Because FUSAG and USSTAF had submitted their requests 
months after SOS, their requisitions were near the bottom of the prioritized list, even though they 
would need the items months before COMZ.  If Lee approved Stratton’s recommendation, this 
material would be issued while still in the U.K., with the first wave of invading and supporting 
forces moved to the front of the line.  Furthermore, units would be able to confirm the exact 
contents of mission packages and have time to familiarize themselves with specialized tools.  
Stratton’s solution presented the risk that the cupboard would be empty by the time SOS arrived 
to start its work, but it also bought another two months to receive replacement supplies from new 
production.  The recommendation was approved by General Lee, and that summer and fall 
ETOUSA received unit support requests and allocated material and transportation assets based 
on the results of their recurring prioritization board.113   
In hindsight ETOUSA should probably have consolidated all the various project material 
requests into one massive supply list to support the invasion.  This would have required a lot of 
work on the front end, but it would have simplified reconciliation of partial shipments against the 
overall theater requirements.  This alternative method would have consumed fewer staff 
personnel at ETOUSA and provided a better overall feel for how well production was meeting 
theater requirements on a monthly basis.114  It probably would not have accelerated the delivery 
 
112 COL Donald R. Neil, “Issuance of PROCO Equipment” 3 Apr 44.  Memo from ETOUSA G-4 to Chief 
Quartermaster, FUSAG, and USSTAF.  RG 498, UD 1107, Box 5301, NARA II. 
113 General Board 128, 20.   
114 As executed, Lee would have to talk about the percentage fill for each project across over a thousand projects.  
None of this data would allow the command to project which projects it could and could not support.  Knowing that 
project GS 20 was only 35% filled in April 1944 was not helpful, particularly if material that could have taken the 
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of critical equipment, but ETOUSA would have realized that they had an unsolvable resourcing 
issue much sooner, allowing the command to look for other solutions to accomplish the same 
purpose.     
Most crucially, as COSSAC formed and as the PROCO initiative emerged, ETOUSA’s 
focus changed accordingly.  Casablanca led to the formation of COSSAC.  Trident led to a 
renewed commitment to offensive actions against Germany from the U.K., which started the ball 
rolling with PROCO and the troop basis it required.  A new emphasis on operational planning 
called into question the organization, location, and priorities at ETOUSA and SOS.  In June, U.S. 
troop numbers in the U.K. began to climb for the first time in six months.  After almost a year of 
settling into a comfortable routine, the writing was on the wall that major change was on its way.    
 
 Reorganizing ETOUSA after the Quadrant Conference 
It was during the late summer of 1943 that the primary mission of ETOUSA began to 
shift away from Bolero and tilt towards a greatly expanded strategic bomber offensive and 
intensified planning for the invasion of France. Obviously, this change was driven by CCS 
decisions made at Trident in May and Quadrant in August, which in turn drove renewed interest 
in the tentative troop basis for Roundup.  As a result of renewed planning for offensive 
operations in Europe, the U.S. War Department realized that they had two related problems on 
their hands by mid-August.  First, they had promised to provide forces to the various theaters that 
were just not available.  Second, Roundup suddenly was high on the priority list and would 
consume a lot of resources – troops and equipment that would require many ships, and therefore 
 
project to 90% was available but earmarked against a lower-priority project.  Knowing that the theater only had 10% 
of its total heavy truck requirement was much more useful information. 
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much time, to move across the Atlantic.   If the U.S. was going to assemble 1.4 million men in 
the U.K. by 1 May 1944, it needed to begin deploying forces quickly.  The natural reaction was 
to push back on the ETOUSA troop basis offered at Quadrant, especially for those forces in high 
demand among four theaters, which tended to include many of the service units.  ETOUSA 
developed its estimates that summer based on PROCO, historical data, and planning factors 
established within each technical service, but the forecasts were not justified by an overarching 
logistical concept of support linked to Roundup or Overlord.  The War Department G-4 declared 
these estimates insufficient, refusing to validate support requests without “an administrative plan 
to back up SOS troop requirements.”115  By mid-August 1943 ETOUSA could make no further 
progress fulfilling one of their most essential tasks. 
There is reason to believe Devers knew that planning logistical support at the operational 
level was not a strength of the ETOUSA staff before he departed Washington to assume 
command in London.  Upon his arrival in London Devers decided to see if Lee and SOS could 
fill that gap.116  Devers’ initial impressions of his own staff were not especially favorable.  He 
conducted his first staff meeting on 11 May and the roster of department heads was uninspiring; 
doubtlessly honorable, professional, and hard-working officers, they did not seem to have the 
spark necessary to generate confidence for promotion or assignment to key positions.117  On 18 
May Devers wrote Marshall asking that Bradley be transferred from North Africa to give V 
 
115 Letter, COL Edwards (OPD) to MG Edwards (ETOUSA), 15 Aug 43.  RG 498, UD 578, Box 3854, ADM 345 – 
Troop Basis.    
116 Devers Diary, entries for 7 to 9 May 1943.  Devers Papers, AHEC.  Devers met with Somervell and Moses on 8 
May, the day before he started his flight to London.  Moses Diary, entries in August and September 1943.  Moses 
Papers, AHEC.  Writing in August, Moses claims that Devers had warned him back in May that he would become 
the ETOUSA G-4 as soon as practical.  
117 Devers diary entry for 11 May lists the attendees, to include the key staff officers from ETOUSA: chief of staff: 
MG Edwards, G-1: COL Edwards, G-2: COL Black, G-3: COL Layman, G-4: COL Longino, AG: COL Pulsifer, G-
5: COL Morrill.  Devers does not question the capabilities of these men in his diary, but none of these individuals 
was destined for promotion or transfer to key positions in SOS, COSSAC, or SHAEF in the coming months, and 
Devers moved quickly to upgrade his G-3 and G-4 that summer.       
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Corps a combat veteran to help with planning, noting that Morgan’s major generals were paired 
with American planners ranking from captain to colonel.118  Devers asked that an army 
commander with a skeleton staff be assigned to ETOUSA sometime in July.119  Writing to 
Eisenhower in December 1943, Devers called his chief planner Barker “weak.”  When he 
assumed command, Devers said, he had “found a weak staff organization and a dissatisfied 
command due to the fact that there seemed no objective outlined.”120 Obviously, Devers had 
little confidence that ETOUSA could fulfill its end of operational planning for Roundup without 
outside assistance.  
By August the major subordinate commands of the ETO consisted of the Eighth Air 
Force, V Corps with three infantry divisions and a special engineer brigade, and SOS.121  As the 
command became more involved with pre-invasion training and planning, it became apparent 
that the staff sections were unbalanced, with too many service and air officers and not enough 
ground combat branch representatives.122  Developments immediately after Quadrant seemed to 
convince Devers that he needed to accelerate the sustainment planning that was already 
happening by bringing in a few more trusted associates to man key administrative posts.  U.S. 
staff manpower already available in the U.K. did not seem capable of building a joint theater-
level concept of support.  ETOUSA suddenly needed to expand vastly its operational planning 
capacity at the same time Devers was beginning to realize that he did not have enough 
sufficiently capable staff officers in his own headquarters to do so.  He also seemed to concede 
 
118 Devers to Marshall, 18 May 43, box 11, DP, in Wheeler, 231.   
119 Devers to Marshall, 19 May 43, box 11, DP, in Wheeler, 231. 
120 Devers to Eisenhower, 27 Dec 43, box 12, DP in James Scott Wheeler, Jacob L. Devers: A General’s Life 
(Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2015), 242.  Devers, “Memorandum for COL W.A. Ganoe”, 1 Jan 44, 
box 12, DP in Wheeler, 243. 
121 General Board Two, 39. 
122 General Board Two, 65. 
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that Lee and his SOS were not capable of pulling together an operational logistics plan on their 
own, something Devers realized during the preparation for Quebec. 
The short-term solution was to pull in external talent; Crawford arrived in late July, 
transferred from USAFIME, and Moses was informed by General Marshall in early August that 
he was to report to ETOUSA within a month.  In addition to adding a few trusted officers to the 
team, Devers also made it clear that SOS had to do more to support operational planning.  
During his first official visit to Cheltenham on 23 August, Devers directed Lee to shift a 
significant portion of his headquarters back to London, a task which was accomplished over the 
next two weeks.123  Lee also began spending more time at ETOUSA and COSSAC, partly to 
cover for COL Albrecht (the primary logistics planner attached to COSSAC from SOS) who was 
in the United States working with the Quadrant team, but also because of the increased emphasis 
on Overlord planning in general.124  
While Devers was gearing up ETOUSA to address the implications and shortcomings 
identified at Quadrant, he also had his key planner visit Washington, D.C. after the conference to 
feel out the War Department and, more particularly, General Marshall.  It seems that during his 
preparation for the conference Devers had decided that the next logical step was to establish a 
U.S. army group headquarters in the U.K.  This was one of the issues MG Barker was directed to 
explore at Quadrant and during his follow up visit to the capital afterwards.  Writing to his boss 
on 30 August, Barker reported that Marshall and the War Department were not ready to commit 
to the idea of an army group staff yet but that Marshall was ready to name Bradley as the 1st 
 
123 SOS C&S notes, 23 and 30 Aug 43.  RG 598, UD 578, Box 3882, ADM 455.  By October SOS had half of its 
officers permanently stationed in London. 
124 Ibid, 30 Aug 43. 
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Army commander.125  Barker went on to recommend that Devers appoint Moses as an army 
group G-4 and acting chief of staff until they could convince Marshall to authorize and resource 
the new command.  In the interim, Moses could flesh out the U.S. team working with Morgan at 
COSSAC.  Barker finished his letter by reporting that he intended to remain in Washington in 
hope of ensuring the draft troop basis submitted before Quadrant made it smoothly through the 
War Department staff. 
About a week later Barker gave an update, sharing some breaking news and offering a 
fascinating recommendation.  “Newspapers have just announced…that SAC is to be GEN 
Marshall and suggests that GEN Eisenhower may be Chief of Staff.”126  Barker told Devers that 
the JCS had asked him for his opinion about how to address the issue of a SAC and a ground 
force commander with the British.  Both parties agreed that the SAC was a foregone conclusion; 
the position would be filled by an American with no pushback from the British.  Barker felt 
confident the British would want to establish an overall ground commander, and that they would 
recommend Montgomery or Alexander for the job.  Barker believed that the JCS should counter 
by insisting that the position go to an American, since the U.S. would eventually provide most of 
the strength on the continent.  After establishing the idea that the overall ground commander 
should be an American, the chiefs could win their argument and look very reasonable by offering 
an initial compromise -- the British would command on the ground until it made sense to shift to 
an American.  The JCS would get what they wanted without offending British sensibilities.  The 
British promptly followed Barker’s script, proposing in September that a British army command 
the initial assault and then an army group direct the ground campaign until the Americans 
 
125 Letter, Barker to Devers, 30 Aug 43.  RG 498, UD 578, Box 3854, ADM 345.  Barker to Devers, 24 Aug 43, box 
12, DP, in Wheeler, 233. 
126 Letter, Barker to Devers, 7 Sep 43.  Ibid.  It is unclear if Barker meant Eisenhower would serve as chief of staff 
for Marshall or would replace Marshall in D.C. 
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secured the Brest peninsula or a U.S. army group was active on the continent.127  The obvious 
compromise was two national armies commanded by the 21st AG until a second army group 
headquarters became necessary.       
Early in September the first concrete signs of major change at ETOUSA began to be 
noticed, marked by the transfer of BG Moses into the command.  The first day after his arrival in 
London, Moses shared a short memo with his new boss, the ETOUSA chief of staff, MG 
Edwards, pointing out the pressing need for an administrative support plan for Overlord.  He was 
just repeating what Devers and his trusted agents already knew, but Moses wanted to ensure that 
the entire U.S. sustainment establishment in the U.K. was notified, in writing, of just how 
important Washington considered this task.  Furthermore, Moses advised Edwards that SOS was 
the wrong organization to create such a plan – only ETOUSA was a neutral party that could 
credibly prioritize between SOS, field force, and Army Air Force while retaining a reputation for 
impartiality.128  Obviously it was a document that Moses had written before his arrival and one 
that represented his personal opinions about the flaws of relying on a subordinate command 
within a theater to apply constraints on its peers, but he also seemed to be aligned with Devers’ 
thinking on the subject by early September.      
Behind the scenes, Devers took more decisive steps to extract from Marshall exactly what 
he wanted done with the command structure in the U.K.  Devers knew he needed to resource an 
operational command to bring a sense of drive to U.S. planning for Overlord, but he did not want 
to guess incorrectly and put his strongest officers in an organization that was eventually destined 
for irrelevance.  First, he pressed Barker to force the issue immediately after Quebec; when this 
 
127 Wheeler, 232.   
128 Memo, Moses to Edwards, 8 Sep 43.  Moses Papers, AHEC.    
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did not work, Devers wrote Marshall himself on 13 September to exact concrete guidance.  
Marshall rejected Devers’ first proposal, which was to reorganize ETOUSA as an operational 
headquarters that would move over to France as soon as there was sufficient room, with Lee 
serving as both the commander of COMZ and as the theater G-4 and deputy chief of staff for 
sustainment.129  In his first response sent on 18 September 1943, Marshall explained that he 
wanted both an army group headquarters and a separate U.S. Army theater headquarters; the 
army group would eventually take its operational direction from the Supreme Allied 
Commander.  As we will see below, this message was enough to trigger the movement of Moses 
to FUSAG and the elevation of Crawford to ETOUSA on 19 September.  But on 24 September 
Marshall sent a long and detailed cable to Devers that left little room for interpretation and 
solidified the ETOUSA commander’s thoughts on the best way to generate an operational 
concept of support.130 
It is helpful to remember that when Marshall wrote his detailed instructions on how he 
wanted Devers to set up an array of headquarters in the U.K., he did so under the impression that 
he himself would serve as the Supreme Allied Commander for Overlord.  He might also act as 
the theater commander for American forces or else appoint some other officer to this position.  It 
is also logical that Devers would react to these instructions in order to preserve a meaningful 
position for himself in the coming campaign, either by shoring up the capabilities of ETOUSA or 
by creating a new organization where he would fit well. 
On 24 September Marshall’s letter was dispatched – three pages of dense and well-
organized text, tackling the joint-combined theater structure, composition of the Allied staff, and 
 
129 General Board Two, 46. 
130 Cable, headquarters, ETOUSA, W-4763, 21 Sept. 1943 and Letter, Marshall to Devers, 24 September 1943, 
Marshall to Devers (personal) from General Board 2, 46-47.  Two additional cables are referenced in these two 
documents: Devers to Marshall on 13 September, and Marshall to Devers, 18 September.   
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then the status of the European Theater of Operations.  The ideas captured in the first two major 
sections indicated that Marshall had embraced the importance of a joint and combined command 
structure and associated staff for each theater.  The last section, covering the senior U.S. Army 
headquarters, showed that his ideas about logistics and about the relationship between a national 
and combined operational headquarters were still rather vague.   Marshall envisioned a relatively 
conventional joint command structure with two exceptions.  First, the supreme commander 
would directly supervise two national army groups; Marshall told Devers that it was “not 
advisable to introduce the idea of an Allied Army (ground force) commander at this time.”131  
Second, Marshall wanted to split the air component of the expeditionary air arm into tactical and 
strategic commands, hoping to appoint an American commander to the strategic portion since 
Leigh-Mallory had already been named for the tactical organization.  The idea that the British 
would surrender some control over their strategic bomber fleet to an American air general in 
support of tactical objectives seems a bit naïve in hindsight.   But the concept Marshall proposed 
made it clear that he and Eisenhower were on the same page when it came to insisting that the 
heavy bombers directly support the campaign plan in France. 
Marshall addressed the composition of the Allied staff assigned to the supreme 
commander, and it was obvious that he appreciated what Eisenhower had accomplished with 
AFHQ.  Assuming the SAC was an American, Marshall was comfortable keeping LTG Morgan 
as the chief of staff and accepting a British G-4 for the early stages of Overlord.  Once convoys 
were sailing directly from the United States to France, he would move up the American deputy 
into the primary slot at G-4.  Marshall did not address the division of duties between the Allied 
G-4 and the U.S. SOS, but he clearly wanted one on his general staff.  Marshall agreed with 
 
131 Letter, Marshall to Devers, 24 Sep 43, 1. 
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Devers’ comments from 21 September that the Allied joint staff needed a small naval and air 
force component but that the naval presence at headquarters could be scaled back significantly 
once the ground forces were secure in their lodgment on the continent.  
After so clearly demonstrating the maturity of his views on the joint and combined nature 
of modern theater warfare, Marshall seemed incapable of appreciating the implications for a 
national general headquarters.  Marshall wanted a new U.S. general headquarters to direct 
operations in France, superior to the numbered air forces and FUSAG, but distinct from 
ETOUSA.  This GHQ would receive operational guidance from the SAC but have access to the 
JCS for routine administrative duties.  Marshall agreed with Devers that ETOUSA needed to 
divest itself of some major responsibilities once FUSAG was established, and it would be 
expected eventually to close out its mission in the U.K and merge with the GHQ in France.132  
The exact phrasing of Marshall’s comments about the future of ETOUSA implied that he saw the 
organization as a means to appeal directly to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and War Department 
if things changed and a British officer received appointment as supreme commander.  If the SAC 
was American, ETOUSA would surrender the authority to engage directly with the War 
Department and JCS.  Marshall was obviously not interested in a subordinate commander who 
could appeal his decisions to the War Department, the ASF, or the AAF.  A second puzzling 
directive issued by Marshall was that he wanted all field force commanders “relieved of as many 
administrative responsibilities as possible.”133  Field force commanders included the SAC, any 
U.S. army groups, and numbered air forces, and administration included the duties associated 
with the G-4 and G-1.  Despite pointing out that the Allied staff needed a G-4 and considering 
 
132 Ibid, 3.  Marshall is agreeing with a comment made by Devers in his 21 September cable. 
133 Ibid, 2.   
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when to rotate from a British to an American chief logistician, Marshall still imagined that a joint 
theater commander might be protected from having to worry too much about sustainment.   
Remaining consistent with guidance issued on 18 September, Marshall wanted a separate 
army and army group established quickly under the temporary command of General Bradley.  
These organizations should physically and mentally distance themselves from ETOUSA and 
London; in the field they would answer to a new operational U.S. GHQ and the SAC, not 
ETOUSA.  Marshall made it clear that he had not decided who would be the final army group 
commander, and he made it clear he was interested in Devers’ feedback about the reorganization 
of U.S. headquarters.  Marshall closed the letter with two imperatives: give Morgan your 
complete support in the difficult task of forming a combined staff, and fill American staff 
positions with “strong, able men.”134  To make this happen, Marshall promised his full support; 
he would send some of his best officers from the War Department to meet these requirements.  
Devers had obviously made it clear that he did not have the talent on hand in the U.K. to meet his 
expanding duties. 
While engaged in exchanging letters with General Marshall, Devers was forced to leave 
the newly arrived Moses unassigned to any specific duty for a few weeks.  But on 19 September, 
having received confirmation that Marshall supported forming a new army group, Devers began 
to share some of his thoughts about future options with Moses.  It seems that a wide range of 
options were on the table, with Lee, Lutes, Crawford, and Moses considered as the chiefs of 
logistics at COSSAC, ETOUSA, and a new army group headquarters.135  One possibility was 
that Crawford would replace Lee at SOS, with Lee shifting to COSSAC or back to ASF 
 
134 Ibid, 5.   
135 Moses diary, 19 and 20 Sep 43.  Moses Papers, AHEC. 
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headquarters.  But late on 20 September Devers decided that his first priority was to send a 
strong G-4 to the new army group staff; Moses was told he would work out of the ETOUSA G-4 
office until the new command was announced.  Moses provides different dates in different 
documents as to when he was notified of this development, but he is consistent in claiming that 
he and Crawford were briefed together.  Crawford was to be transferred from SOS to ETOUSA 
and Moses would help stand up FUSAG.136  Devers made this change official on 5 October in a 
30-minute meeting with Lee followed by 15 minutes with Crawford and Moses together.  In his 
diary Devers recorded that Lee had argued that the CG of SOS should remain dually responsible 
as the theater G-4 as established back in July.  Devers countered by saying he had given that 
solution an honest try but now thought it “necessary to have a disinterested party to weigh the 
demands of the troops as well as SOS and AF.”137  Crawford and Moses were told to report to 
their new positions and to see Devers again on 7 October to confirm the move and raise any 
initial concerns.  The experiment with delegating all aspects of logistics to SOS was over.     
Devers decided to use outsiders to fill what he considered the key operational logistics 
positions in the ETO; obviously Moses and Crawford made stronger positive impressions than 
the other flag officers within SOS.  Moses would stay as the G-4 for 1st Army and FUSAG for 
the duration of the war, attending his first FUSAG staff meeting with General Bradley on 9 
October.  Crawford was officially assigned to ETOUSA for about two months before being 
transferred to COSSAC.  In reality, however, he spent most of his time at Norfolk House once 
assigned to Devers’ command.  Royal Lord backfilled Crawford as the chief of services and 
deputy commander for SOS.  Devers had moved Crawford to ETOUSA to free him from any 
 
136 “Organization and Command in the ETO,” paper sent from Moses to Coakley, undated, Section Two, 2.  Moses 
Papers, AHEC.   
137 Devers diary, 5 Oct 43.  Devers Papers, AHEC.   
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obligations to Lee and SOS, to help finalize a draft troop list for submission to the War 
Department on 1 November, and to provide an authorized billet facilitating interaction with 
COSSAC until more combined slots were established.  Devers was under no illusions about the 
future importance of ETOUSA in planning or executing Overlord and no longer trusted Lee to 
drive operational planning for logistical support on the continent.   
Writing after the war, Devers claimed the move had been motivated by the need to 
establish an arbiter among Bradley, the numbered Air Forces, SOS, and the ETOUSA chief of 
staff, who was being pulled into too many arguments involving billeting and supply issues.   As 
we have seen, however, this was a cover story designed to cushion the blow to Lee’s ego.138  
Crawford left ETOUSA after less than two months in the job, moving to the COSSAC planning 
team on 1 December.  From there he would transition into and remain the SHAEF G-4 for the 
duration of the war.  When Crawford left for COSSAC, Devers decided to reinstate Lee as the 
theater G-4.   
Ruppenthal attributed this shuffling of positions to an emerging clash of personality 
between Crawford and Lee; Moses believed Devers was preparing ETOUSA for the day when it 
would have to make tough choices in combat.  If he had been able to answer with complete 
honestly, Devers probably would have said he was putting his strongest logisticians in the two 
commands prioritized by Marshall in his 24 September letter.  After the completion of the draft 
troop basis in early November, the balance of power rapidly shifted to COSSAC and FUSAG.  
These were the organizations that would write the concept of support for Overlord, complete 
preparations for the invasion, and direct service troops in the coming campaign.  As outlined by 
Marshall, ETOUSA was earmarked to shrink and then merge with a new general headquarters on 
 
138 General Board Two, 69. 
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the continent.  The U.S. Army needed strong logisticians in Great Britain, but by the winter of 
1943 Marshall and Devers believed that the important work would occur at the combined theater 
and army group headquarters, not at ETOUSA.    
The First U.S. Army Group (FUSAG) was activated on 19 October 1943 and was 
sufficiently manned and oriented to begin detailed planning for Overlord by 29 November.139  
As this organization formed, Lee had offered to fill out the logistics planning team with a deputy 
chief of staff and deputy service section chiefs from SOS, but Bradley insisted on retaining 
control of his own administrative team.140  When Devers explained to Marshall how he would 
stand up and support the FUSAG staff he said that he would attach a small liaison team from 
Lee’s SOS to coordinate logistical planning, but this would not bear fruit until early February 
1944.141 Perhaps for the long-term good of ETOUSA Devers or Lee should have pushed the 
issue a bit harder, but Bradley got what he wanted.  FUSAG divided responsibility for 
developing the logistics plan for Overlord between themselves and the 1st Army staff.  The 1st 
Army would handle all planning for Neptune, or the landing and expansion of the lodgment 
through about D+14 to D+21; FUSAG would cover the period from D+22 to D+90.   
Just as the creation of FUSAG removed a large burden from ETOUSA and SOS for 
developing the ground scheme of maneuver and support plan, a second new headquarters was 
activated to assume greater responsibility for air planning.  The U.S. Strategic Air Forces 
(USSTAF) was activated on 1 January 1944 with LTG Carl Spaatz transferred from the 
Mediterranean to be its commander.  This organization was created to coordinate the efforts of 
 
139 Ibid, 47.   
140 Ibid, 69. 
141 Devers to Marshall, 21 Sep 43, Moses Papers, AHEC, in Wheeler, 234.  Devers promised to have the new 
headquarters established by 1 October, but with no special staff sections, and thus the need for support from SOS 
and theater chiefs of services.   
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the 8th and 15th Air Forces in the bombing campaign against Germany and provide administrative 
and logistical support to 9th Air Force.  USSTAF provided a team of experienced veterans who 
could help plan and execute shaping operations for Overlord and provide technical expertise to 
COSSAC and the Allied Expeditionary Air Force commander while allowing the 8th Air Force to 
concentrate on ongoing operations.   
These two new major organizations reduced the planning burden on ETOUSA 
significantly. The reputation and authority enjoyed by Bradley and Spaatz ensured that Lee 
would take any requests or complaints about preferential treatment for SOS seriously.  Following 
up on the agreement reached between Marshall and Devers in late September, ETOUSA had 
outsourced two of its critical operational missions.  The residual ETOUSA staff no longer had 
the power necessary to effectively manage its three subordinate commands.  Spaatz was 
comfortable running the strategic air war in cooperation with the British Bomber Command.   
Bradley had his own team imbedded at COSSAC and 21st Army Group to plan and prepare for 
Overlord.  Lee was approaching eighteen months in his position as SOS commander, which 
afforded him a wealth of experience managing logistics and force deployment into and out of 
Great Britain.  Devers was a lame duck – he would soon be overshadowed by Eisenhower and 
SHAEF.  Eisenhower confirmed as much when he suggested that Marshall transfer Devers to 
NATOUSA, as “it would appear that he will be superfluous in [the] U.K.”142  Devers and 
Marshall had foreseen that ETOUSA would be displaced by a combination of a new joint-
combined theater headquarters and a U.S. army group.  Rather than fight this development, 
Devers had confirmed what his boss was thinking and then acted to transform ETOUSA to 
enable that vision.  It is not unrealistic to assume that Devers hoped he was helping to create a 
 
142 Eisenhower to Marshall, 21 Dec 43, Eisenhower Papers, vol. 3, message 1440, in Wheeler, 241. 
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new organization that he would command in combat, or a joint operational staff where he could 
serve in a key position.  In December he would ask both Marshall and Eisenhower for command 
of FUSAG.143  Once Devers realized that Marshall saw ETOUSA as irrelevant to the fight in 
France, he threw all his energy into resourcing its replacements. 
One side effect of this transformation was that, from September until the end of 
November, there was a loss of momentum and direction in the sustainment plan for Overlord.  It 
took until the end of November for FUSAG to find its rhythm, and COSSAC required an 
infusion of combat veterans in order to evolve into an effective operational headquarters.  It is 
conceivable that if Lee had made operational planning his number one priority, SOS and 
technical services might have made significant progress in framing a support plan for Overlord 
between early September and early February.  In addition to having an additional five months to 
write an array of plans, SOS would have been directly involved in the process and thus gotten to 
know their counterparts at COSSAC and 21st AG.  As it was, they did not join the process until 
directed to do so in early February, and then in such a compartmentalized manner that the main 
SOS staff at Cheltenham had almost no familiarity with the plan.  SHAEF was surprised at how 
little planning had been done before February beyond the work completed by FUSAG, which 
was largely focused on the first forty days of operations on the continent. 
 
 
143 Devers to Marshall, 13 Dec 43, box 11, DP, in Wheeler, 237.  Marshall passed along to Eisenhower his 
recommendation of Devers or McNair to command FUSAG on 21 Dec.  On 27 December Devers wrote Eisenhower 
directly stating: “I am delighted to serve under you and believe I can be of most use as the commander of the First 
Army Group.”  See Wheeler, 242.   
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 The Return of Eisenhower 
 Eisenhower arrived in Great Britain on 16 January 1944, and the following day he 
published guidance aimed at clarifying the mission of ETOUSA and its relationship with 
SHAEF.  Eisenhower finalized the process started by Devers and killed one unnecessary major 
headquarters in the U.K.  Acting in his role as the ETOUSA commander, Eisenhower issued a 
general order on 17 January that officially merged the ETO and SOS staffs into one organization, 
with Smith as the chief of staff, and Lee the deputy theater commander. 144  This setup was 
almost identical to how Eisenhower had structured NATOUSA and the preferred solution from 
the perspective of Lee and Somervell.  Lord, acting as the deputy chief of staff for ETOUSA, 
served as the major conduit between Smith and Eisenhower and the ETOUSA/SOS staff.  The 
merger produced a surplus of personnel; most of the ETOUSA G-2 and G-3 sections and the 
commander’s personal staff migrated to COSSAC/SHAEF while the G-1, G-4, and service 
section representatives stayed put.   
 
144 General Board Two, 50.  Appendix 24 contains the majority of the General Order. 
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Figure 3.6: ETOUSA on 17 Jan 44 
 
The authors of General Board Two argued that this placed too great a burden on what had 
been SOS staff; Eisenhower obviously disagreed, at least when he first made the decision.145  It 
is worth noting that GO 5 made no mention of any theater planning responsibilities for 
ETOUSA; subsequent developments demonstrated that Eisenhower expected the SHAEF and 
FUSAG staffs to carry the majority of that burden, assisted by technical experts from the chiefs 
of services and SOS.   
Nothing changed with the relationship and location of the chiefs of service relative to the 
old SOS staff except perhaps an acceleration of the shift in priorities to operational planning 
centered on London and Bristol.  The technical services and the newly consolidated ETOUSA 
 
145 Ibid, 50.   
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staff continued to maintain a presence in both Cheltenham and London.  A few weeks after the 
publication of GO 5 Lee activated both an ADSEC and FECZ to consolidate his operational 
planning teams working with 1st Army and 21st AG.  Meanwhile, what had been SOS operating 
headquarters at Cheltenham and the five base sections remained focused on absorbing the wave 
of men and material pouring into the country, supporting exercises and rehearsals, figuring out 
the mounting plan for Overlord, and working out how to consolidate the U.S. footprint in the 
U.K. after its launch.146     
This concentration on continued operations in Britain conformed to the mission SHAEF 
had assigned to what would become COMZ.  Eisenhower understood that SHAEF and ETOUSA 
had to manage two very distinct logistical missions.  In Great Britain, ETOUSA was in charge of 
detailed coordination with the zone of the interior, both in the United States and the United 
Kingdom; this was a critical and full-time mission that had consumed SOS for the last two 
years.147  But once the Allies had landed in France, SHAEF added a second critical sustainment 
mission centered on the repair and use of the transportation infrastructure of western France.  
The primary mission of SOS prior to the landing in France was to “mount the invasion, funnel 
supplies from the UK and the USA to the front, and prepare to jump to the continent and 
establish a COMZ.”148  Wearing their ETO hats, this same staff would supervise FUSAG and 
USSTAF as they planned, prepared, and conducted combat operations from the British Isles, at 
least in theory.  But ETOUSA was not manned to perform this function, nor did they have the 
clout to do so.  Only SHAEF could realistically fulfill this function, and, they eventually tried to 
 
146 U.S. troop strength in the U.K. exploded between August 1943 and June 1944, ranging between 100,000 to 
200,000 men a month.  Cargo delivery peaked from November 1943 to April 1944.  See Ruppenthal, Vol. I, 232 and 
ETOUSA monthly strength reports, RG 498, UD 578.   
147 General Board Two, 9-10. 
148 General Board Two, 52.  ETOUSA General Order 5, 17 Jan 44.  Summary of changes included as appendix 24 of 
General Board Report Two.   
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delegate most of this responsibility to Montgomery and the 21st Army Group.  ETOUSA could 
virtually ignore planning operational logistics because the system that had evolved throughout 
the first half of 1944 divided responsibility for the mission across three or four headquarters 
broken up by different time horizons.149  COMZ would not assume any formal responsibilities 
until the last stage of this process, reinforcing the idea that it could remain a secondary priority 
until after the troop and supply flow into France was running smoothly.   
The U.S. 1st Army, assisted by a planning element from the advanced section (ADSEC) 
of what would become COMZ, was responsible for planning and controlling logistics from the 
landing up to the establishment of an army rear boundary, an event projected to occur between 
D+14 and D+21.  In the earliest versions of the sustainment plan, COMZ would be activated as 
soon as 1st Army established a rear boundary.  Logistical support to 1st Army, Army Air Forces 
operating in France, and COMZ would be synchronized by ETOUSA (which was really the SOS 
commander and his staff).  FUSAG, attached to 21st Army Group, was tasked with planning 
operations out to D+90, when the Allies hoped to reach the Seine and then take a short 
operational pause to organize a robust base area in Normandy and Brittany.  The relationship 
among FUSAG, 21st AG, and COMZ throughout Overlord in the first version of the plan was 
hazy to say the least.  Gale took the issue on in early February, gathering Crawford, Brownjohn 
(the British deputy G4), Lee, Lord, and the 21st AG MG (A) Graham and chief quartermaster BG 
Fielder to work out the details of the various relationships involved.  The result was a tentative 
memorandum of agreement published on 9 February that formalized the sustainment procedures 
 
149 There was considerable confusion among the participants as to exactly who was in charge at what time.  SHAEF 
and ETOUSA tried to clarify the issue by publishing numerous written orders throughout the spring and summer, 
but General Board Report Two made it clear that not every relevant headquarters agreed on exactly who was calling 
the shots at each stage of the campaign.  COMZ was very reluctant to admit formal subordination to 21st or 12th 
Army Group at any point in the process.   
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between FUSAG and 21st AG while it was a subordinate unit.150  Despite Gales’ effort, 
professional disagreement persisted about the issue, especially with the relationship between 
FUSAG and any components of COMZ (other than the ADSEC) working in France prior to the 
arrival of SHAEF.      
In a late attempt to keep his team involved in operational planning for the earlier stages of 
Overlord, Lee stood up a forward echelon (FECZ) staff on 7 February. Their mission was to 
coordinate with SHAEF and FUSAG while preparing to be the lead logistics headquarters in 
Normandy (at first supervising and then absorbing the ADSEC attached to 1st Army).  The FECZ 
initially focused on fleshing out the sustainment plan for the period of D+41 to D+90 and 
supervising and integrating a similar effort by the ADSEC to cover D+20 to D+41.151  The FECZ 
was warned that it would deploy to the continent between D+21 and D+41 to supervise 
operations in France; but this never happened and the FECZ was disbanded and its personnel 
returned to COMZ in July.  MG Lord himself admitted: “It [the FECZ] was detrimental to the 
overall planning effort to the extent that it placed an additional planning echelon between the 
Continental Base Sections and Headquarters SOS (COMZ) and drew its staff from the key 
personnel…of Headquarters SOS.”152   
The ADSEC was formed in February, developed the D+20 to D+41 support plan in 
concert with 1st Army and FUSAG, and had reached its fully manned, operational configuration 
by April 1944.  This headquarters did deploy to France and would be active as a coordinating 
authority off and on throughout the balance of the war against Germany.  As employed to 
conduct operational planning and rear area control in Normandy, the ADSEC performed more as 
 
150 Moses, “Organization and Command in ETO,” undated paper sent to R. Coakley, 7-8.  Moses Papers, AHEC. 
151 General Board 128, 13. 
152 Ibid, 13.  This document was prepared in the fall and winter of 1945. 
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a true forward echelon of COMZ.  It did not have the resources to perform the traditional, 
doctrinal mission of an advanced section while also serving as a FECZ, which produced two 
negative effects.153  First, COMZ was forced to adopt a scheme of logistical support that was 
planned and implemented, for almost three months, by a subordinate echelon that did not have 
the rank and experience to do so.  Second, since they were busy accomplishing the mission of the 
FECZ, ADSEC had to take shortcuts in the execution of their more traditional function.  In U.S. 
doctrine an advanced section existed to reconfigure bulk supplies into unit packages ready for 
easy distribution and use.   For example, ammunition was shipped in very large, carefully 
packaged lots separated by caliber.  It was the responsibility of ordnance units working for the 
ADSEC to break these packages down and reconfigure them into mixed loads for a division, 
regiment, or battalion for all the weapon systems in the unit.  Overwhelmed with two distinct 
missions, the ADSEC had no choice but to shift some of their coordination and supervisory 
responsibilities to 1st Army and its constituent divisions.       
 To some extent SOS leaders blamed their isolation from early operational planning on the 
deliberate compartmentalization of the effort within ETOUSA and COSSAC.  The ETO G-5, or 
plans section, was created in April 1943, allowing ETOUSA to establish a well-rounded team 
with the COSSAC planners at Norfolk House.  As ETOUSA transferred much of its 
responsibility for planning over to FUSAG in the fall, the G-5 was abolished in October.  Staff 
members who suddenly found themselves unemployed were transferred into newly authorized 
positions at COSSAC and FUSAG, or else they made their way back to the ETO G-3.  The 
official history of SOS admitted that the staff allowed themselves to be overwhelmed with 
 
153 Aurand, 16-20.  Aurand explains the doctrinal employment of base, intermediate, and advanced sections; how 
COMZ did business in France and Germany; and his alternative solution.   
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current sustainment operations at the expense of operational planning; only the technical services 
contributed much to the preparation for Roundup/Overlord in 1943.154  Just figuring out which 
staff section at Cheltenham had primary responsibility for operational planning was a challenge; 
the task bounced from the G-3 to the G-4, but Lord admitted that “actually no-one really 
assumed it.  Among the unfortunate consequences was the persistent lack of official troop 
forecasts, essential to proper planning….it was not until the second quarter of 1944 that an 
overall COMZ plan for the entire Overlord Operation existed.”155  
SHAEF published new orders on 10 March attempting to clarify command relationships 
through the various transitions projected to occur during the upcoming campaign.  COMZ would 
still be activated once 1st Army established a rear boundary, a development projected to happen 
sometime between D+14 and D+21.  SHAEF modified the original plan by directing COMZ to 
take direction from Montgomery and the 21st Army Group during this phase.  FUSAG would be 
activated when there was room for 3rd Army in France and the Allies were ready to advance on 
Brittany and the Seine, conditions projected to occur somewhere between four to eight weeks 
after the start of operations.  FUSAG would then serve as the coordinating agency, or supported 
command, among U.S. elements operation on the continent until SHAEF relocated and took over 
as the senior U.S. headquarters.156  In isolation each of these transitions made sense.  There was 
nothing wrong with 1st Army giving way to FUSAG (or 12th AG which displaced 1st AG as the 
principal U.S. operational headquarters for Normandy), and 21st AG giving way to SHAEF as 
the ground campaign coordinator.  It was also logically possible for 1st Army to direct 
sustainment, then FUSAG to supervise COMZ, and finally ETOUSA/SHAEF to integrate 
 
154 General Board 128, 12. 
155 Ibid, 12-13. 
156 General Board Two, 54. 
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combat operations with logistical support.  The problem is that each headquarters had planned, 
and continued to plan, these processes in isolation, and notably so for the sustainment mission.  
The second critical problem was that every written reference to SOS, COMZ, ETOUSA, or U.S. 
portion of SHAEF might be referring to the same officer, staff section, or organization.  The 
responsibilities for certain duties were so jumbled together it was almost impossible to sort it all 
out. 
  
 SHAEF’s Bid to Replace ETOUSA 
The situation was so confusing and frustrating by the end of May that a few key leaders 
at SHAEF decided ETOUSA needed to publish a definitive order to address the phasing of 
command and control on the continent.  At the same time, they mounted one final attempt to pull 
U.S. Army theater administration up to SHAEF before the invasion started.157  ETOUSA’s 
reaction to this process offered great insight into what SOS and chiefs of service saw as the 
strengths and weaknesses of the organization over the last two years.  In general, there was very 
little reaction to the division of Overlord into three overarching stages and the elaboration of who 
worked for whom when.  All SOS’s organizational energy was applied to preventing the transfer 
of logistical coordinating authority to either the SHAEF or FUSAG level.   
Lee’s immediate, and arguably correct, response was to engage Eisenhower directly, to 
confirm that he knew about this initiative and see if he could head it off and prevent a bunch of 
unnecessary staff work.  His letter from 29 May captured what seemed to be his traditional 
approach, which was to outline his own thoughts on a subject without specifically addressing the 
 
157 Ibid, 75.  Crawford shared a draft of the document with Lee and ETOUSA and it therefore was labelled as his 
idea.  See RG 498, UD 578, ADM 238 – Organization, NARA II.     
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questions or issues raised by the other parties.  After denouncing the draft order shared by 
Crawford and assuring the boss that the ETO staff and service chiefs were completely against its 
proposals, Lee reiterated his two basic principles of organization, neither of which had much 
bearing on the issue at hand.158  He thought it was helpful to remember that “[c]ontrol and 
responsibility for the logistical support of all combat forces must be established at the highest 
U.S. level.  This basic principle is contained in FM 100-10 and is a major lesson learned during 
the last war.”  His second basic principle was that the highest U.S. administrative headquarters 
must have authority over the service chiefs, which entailed supervising the work of 21,000 
officers and 435,000 men. SOS enjoyed the advantage of two years of practicing this task, and 
all the associated duties were well scoped and understood by everyone involved in the process.  
The implication was that SHAEF would be starting over from scratch while accepting a massive 
amount of work from SOS days before the start of the campaign in France.  Lee went on to 
explain that daily interaction with the War Department, and more specifically the ASF, required 
the exchange of 1.7 million words a day to manage an Army supply inventory consisting of 
700,000 individual line items.  Lee did not address this issue, but he must have realized that 
some staff officers at SHAEF were dissatisfied in some way with ETOUSA.  His solution, 
however, was not reorganization, but better cooperation and coordination.  Lee ended his letter 
by offering to expand his team under Lord working at SHAEF “to more effectively address any 
questions about U.S. administrative issues relevant to combined operations” picking up on a 
suggestion offered by MG Lutes in the first week of May.159 
 
158 Letter Lee to Eisenhower, 29 May 44.  RG 498, UD 578, ADM 238 – Organization, NARA II.   
159 Ibid.  Secret Memo, Lutes to Somervell, 8 May 44.  MG Leroy Lutes Papers, DDEPL.  This memo is discussed 
in greater detail at the end of this chapter.   
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Either Lee’s letter was not enough to kill the issue or perhaps it did not reach Eisenhower 
in time to stop the completion of a second draft of the proposal on 3 June and a solicitation for 
feedback by 4 June.  The feedback coming from ETOUSA originated with two groups: SOS 
general staff and the various technical service chiefs.  Stratton prepared the draft for Lord 
outlining the definitive ETOUSA response to the topic, incorporating feedback from the G-3 and 
adjutant general.  After the obligatory references to Harbord and Hagood and the sins of the 
GHQ during the Great War, Stratton noted the hostility and interference by SHAEF and FUSAG 
G-4 that had surfaced in recent months.160  Stratton was worried that once ETOUSA 
compromised with SHAEF or FUSAG it would start a trend.  Stratton wrote that you “cannot 
trust them to stay in their lanes, they will interfere in the exercise of the powers delegated to the 
CG COMZ.”  Stratton also mentioned that he was working with MG Hughes on revision to the 
proposed order, exploiting his operational experience and the clout of his name among 
Eisenhower’s inner circle.  Not addressed was what events might have generated the “hostility 
and interference that had surfaced at SHAEF and FUSAG in recent months” or what the 
command could do to resolve it. 
Seven special staff sections at ETOUSA submitted responses that were very different in 
tone and substance from the SOS note.  In the main they were ambivalent as to where theater 
authorities ended up as long as the technical services had access to Eisenhower through his staff 
and permission to coordinate directly with the ASF.  In addition, SHAEF must remember to 
consult with their office prior to making a recommendation or decision.  The head of the CWS 
thought that the draft order was still too vague and needed to state clearly what the relationship 
was between FUSAG and COMZ throughout the three stages.  The engineer and quartermaster 
 
160 Draft rebuttal Stratton to Lord, 4 Jun 44.  RG 498, UD 578, ADM 238, NARA II. 
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went a bit further in their criticism of the proposed elevation of War Department coordination 
authority up to SHAEF.  Both men dreaded a return to the conditions they had faced before the 
merger in January, when any recommendation or decision required routing paperwork through 
two general staffs, each with different procedures, standards, and personalities.  Moore, the 
engineer, noted that ETOUSA had been quick to make decisions without consulting his office 
under the old system.  Littlejohn feared the emergence of friction between the staff teams 
working at SHAEF and COMZ because of the similarity and overlap of their responsibilities. 
Littlejohn did not want to return to the days where his physical and mental distance from the 
senior U.S. commander reduced his ability to do his job.  When forced to work that way, his 
“estimates for personnel have been reduced all along the line.  When I had to go through ETO 
there was always considerable delay, and subsequently the action taken was unsatisfactory to me.  
The only way I began to find a solution to my personnel problems was to go direct to General 
Devers over the head of his staff.”161  The only way to avoid these problems under the proposed 
restructure would be for the service chiefs to move to SHAEF, undermining the purpose and 
function of COMZ headquarters.  Across the board the service chiefs recommended that the best 
solution was to retain the current structure. 
ETOUSA published a final version of these instructions signed by BG Lord on 6 June 
1944.162  Eisenhower decided not to move any significant duties up to the SHAEF level, but he 
did agree to eliminate the position of deputy theater commander as soon as COMZ was declared 
operational on the continent.  In a concession to the concern expressed by all the service chiefs, 
the order reinforced the authority of the special staff and directed they position themselves at 
 
161 Rebuttal comments on draft proposal for reorganization, Littlejohn to SOS Staff, 4 Jun 44.  RG 498, UD 578, 
ADM 238, NARA II.     
162 Lord, “Organization and Command of US Forces,” 6 Jun 44.  RG 498, UD 578, ADM 238, NARA II.   
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COMZ headquarters.  There were no substantive changes to the phasing of command and 
control.  The operation would have an initial, transition, and final stage, each with its own 
associated decision points.  Still confusing was the period when COMZ and FUSAG would both 
control terrain in France but when SHAEF was not yet in charge of coordinating the ground war.  
The wording in the paper implied that the two organizations were equals working directly for 
21st AG.  Expecting Montgomery to adjudicate between Lee and Bradley in any important issue 
was probably asking for too much.  It was a topic that would continue to resurface during the 
first two months in France and eventually resolve in Bradley’s favor.  The most important point 
was saved for last – Eisenhower retained the right to exercise any of his theater functions using 
the U.S. staff at SHAEF and to communicate with the War Department accordingly.  If some 
U.S. administrative issue was important or time sensitive to the commander, SHAEF reserved 
the right to bypass ETOUSA and handle it themselves. 
The 6 June clarification was a sufficient stopgap, but by 19 July ETOUSA felt compelled 
to issue a short corrective, this time signed by LTG Smith.163  It was a short document, one full 
page of text, which reads like an itemized list of problems that had emerged since in combat.  It 
was surprisingly detailed, illustrating just how complicated this reoccurring problem was.  
Eisenhower thought it necessary to point out that every commander was “responsible for all 
administrative matters pertaining to their command, and such units as may from time to time be 
attached.”164  This might also include the temporary delegation of authority associated with 
theater command.  Read in context with the rest of the document and the current operational 
situation, Eisenhower’s note reinforced Bradley’s authority over all matters on the continent and 
 
163 One suspects that the signature of Lord rather than Smith lessened the authority of the 6 June document in some 
eyes.   
164 Smith, “Organization and Command of US Forces,” 19 Jul 44.   
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was an attempt to establish boundaries for ETOUSA.  Eisenhower thought that the theater 
commander should only weigh in on those matters involving broad policy, objectives, or 
priorities when two or more major commands were affected.165   
Evidently disagreement had emerged about who was allowed to represent SHAEF among 
various agencies in the U.K. and U.S., so ETOUSA authorized USAAF in Europe and COMZ to 
work directly with British agencies and the War Department on technical and routine matters; all 
non-routine issues would flow through ETOUSA and then to London or to Washington.  It also 
seemed that special staff sections were wrestling to maintain a balance between responsibilities 
at SHAEF and COMZ.  Smith stated that “theater chiefs of administration and supply and special 
services” should position themselves as directed by the CG of COMZ and that they should 
balance their doctrinal responsibilities of advising the theater commander with the requirement to 
execute the sustainment plan.  This seemed to imply that someone at COMZ was not satisfied 
with the quality or number of service staff left to supervise execution compared to the number 
directly supporting SHAEF.  Remaining consistent with past guidance, the document ended with 
a reminder that when executing his duties as the theater commander, Eisenhower would consult 
senior Americans at SHAEF and chiefs of services as he saw fit. 
Eisenhower thought that this new memorandum might generate as much confusion as 
clarity among the SHAEF staff, which drove him to write a one-page memo for that body on 21 
July 1944.  One detects a note of exasperation as Eisenhower wrote to explain the “procedures to 
be followed in carrying on so-called American administration in this Allied [emphasis in the 
 
165 Those commands listed were ETOUSA, FUSAG, 12th AG, COMZ, USAAF in Europe, and any future major 
commands that might be created.  Since Eisenhower was the theater commander, he was trying to warn his 
subordinates of the issues he would get directly involved in.  He was also providing boundaries for his ETOUSA 
deputy theater commander (Lee) and deputy chief of staff (Lord).  
326 
 
original text] theater of operations.”166  Eisenhower acknowledged the need to respect Lee’s 
authority and to avoid dictating methods or directly engaging or directing his subordinates, who, 
in this case, were the chiefs of service.  But Eisenhower knew he would turn to the officers 
closest at hand for advice and direct them to take follow-up action on issues that caught his 
interest, making it imperative that they maintain good ties with their counterparts at ETOUSA.  
Finally, SHAEF and ETOUSA had to speak with one voice to the War Department; any 
significant topic involving all three organizations required especially delicate handling.  It seems 
that Eisenhower had reached the point where he realized that he had two inefficient and 
overlapping organizations, but he could not come up with an elegant solution that preserved 
Lee’s authority.  Eisenhower was clearly not happy with the division of labor between SHAEF 
and ETOUSA near the end of July, but he could not figure out how to quickly fix it. 
By July 1944 the ETOUSA / COMZ staff was an organization with a dwindling 
reputation that was under extreme scrutiny.  The great test for COMZ was just over the horizon, 
but already there were half a dozen senior detractors who worried that they would not be up to 
the task.  Bradley and Moses wished to retain resources and authority as long as they could.  
Crawford suspected that Lee and Lord did not have a firm grasp of the fundamentals underlying 
the campaign plan and the associated support plan.  Crawford also suspected that they did not 
know how to prioritize and then drive the various technical services that represented the effective 
strength of COMZ.  SOS had done a magnificent job running the mounting operation for 
Overlord, a thankless but critical task.  How well they could repair the infrastructure on the 
continent and run the LoC running from ports to the combat zone remained to be seen, but there 
 
166 Eisenhower, “Memorandum to the Chief of Staff, SHAEF,” 19 Jul 44.  RG 498, UD 578, ADM 238, NARA II.  
The obvious implication was that it was almost impossible to divide issues into Allied and American categories to 
order to determine which staff should tackle them.   
327 
 
already were unhealthy cracks in the relationship among COMZ, SHAEF, and 12th AG on the 
eve of Cobra.  
These developments would have been difficult to predict two years earlier, especially in 
the case of SOS.  From its inception ETOUSA suffered from a poor reputation, was poorly 
resourced with personnel, and had little to do that their subordinates were not better positioned to 
accomplish through more direct ties with the AAF and ASF.  The fortunes of the headquarters 
revived under Eisenhower, Andrews, and Devers, but ETOUSA was always at risk of being 
eclipsed by an operational joint-combined headquarters or U.S. army group staff or of being 
bypassed by its two most independent subordinates.  The one niche ETOUSA successfully 
carved out for itself during its first year of existence was combined operational planning with the 
British, largely focused on Torch and then on Roundup.  By the summer of 1943 SOS and 
ETOUSA had evolved and established norms to govern which staff was responsible for what 
processes – Cheltenham focusing on Bolero and Grosvenor Square dedicated to maintaining an 
operational dialogue with the British and the OPD at the War Department.   Trapped in the 
middle, the offices of the technical services struggled to maintain the balance between these two 
different physical locations and organizational priorities.   
If Bolero dominated the activities of ETOUSA during its first year of existence, Roundup 
rose to prominence during the second.  Strangely, rather than increasing the authority of 
ETOUSA or pushing SOS to become a more operationally focused headquarters, the decisions at 
Trident and Quadrant seemed to shift the balance of power to FUSAG, COSSAC, and eventually 
SHAEF.  By the time Eisenhower returned to London in mid-January 1944, it made perfect sense 
to merge SOS and ETOUSA, since both had divested themselves of anything beyond the 
garrison and buildup mission in the United Kingdom.  The fatal step that initiated this decline 
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was Lee’s failure to take charge of operational logistics planning in the summer of 1943.  Rather 
than insisting that SOS staff lead sustainment planning for Overlord, he was happy to allow the 
ADSEC and FECZ to serve as the primary interface with FUSAG, ETOUSA, and COSSAC 
beginning in October 1943.  As a result, the core staff at SOS did not understand the details of 
the concept of support, could not justify and integrate the estimates generated by the technical 
staff sections, and failed to make the personal relationships at FUSAG, COSSAC, and SHAEF 
that would have allowed the command to work through rough patches and recover from mistakes 
without a complete loss of confidence in their competence.  Because others could plan and 
coordinate better than SOS, COMZ had already surrendered one of the two pillars underlying 
Lee’s philosophy of a successful theater sustainment command.  Operations in France would 
determine if they could successfully synchronize logistics in execution. 
 
 Conclusion 
 This chapter illustrated how the impact of intellectual trends, organizational culture and 
reputation, and decisions made at a higher level limited the options available to various 
commanders of ETOUSA.  These factors also shaped how ETOUSA received and implemented 
lessons emerging from the Mediterranean, the Pacific, and the China-Burma-India (CBI) 
theaters.  Devers and Eisenhower did not have a clean slate, and lessons that reinforced pre-war 
assumptions were more likely to gain purchase than those that undercut how Marshall, 
Somervell, and Lee wanted to operate.  The new systems extant in the ETO by the summer of 
1944 represented a partial win for the combat-seasoned commanders and logisticians, who 
managed to wrest back control over maneuver and logistical planning from the OPD, ASF, and 
theater SOS.  But this happened late in the game, and the consequences of mistakes made by 
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COSSAC, ETOUSA, or its SOS before FUSAG and SHAEF gained their balance would be very 
difficult to overcome.  Furthermore, ETOUSA / COMZ would theoretically take over logistical 
planning for the post-Overlord period around D+90, and they still had primacy for synchronizing 
logistics in the communications zone.  Many with first-hand experience doubted that Lee’s SOS 
could handle either responsibility effectively, but they were not in a position to force change 
before the crisis arrived in August.  
 Operational experience in 1943 and the first half of 1944 illustrated the long time-horizon 
associated with organizational change, and the evolutionary nature of improvement.  ETOUSA 
cycled through four different commanders and half a dozen operational priorities between May 
1942 and July 1944, and each commander had his own opinions about the best way to manage 
large organizations and the importance of administrative support in relation to a campaign plan. 
External conditions mattered.  The ETO was virtually a backwater for the first six months of 
1943, but it took center stage after the Allies committed to Overlord and to a combined bomber 
offensive at Trident and Quadrant.  It took time for combat commanders and logisticians to fail 
while trying to make doctrine and higher-level guidance work, experiment with alternatives, and 
develop their own methods of conducting modern mechanized warfare.  What worked in combat 
provided the final measure of value, but it was tough to overcome intellectual baggage from the 
First World War, problematic doctrine reinforced by professional education, and the implications 
of the War Department reorganization of March 1942.  By VE Day leaders in the ETO thought 
they had figured out how to conduct theater campaigns, but they would admit in hindsight that 
they had landed in France with critical flaws in capability, equipment, and organization.     
Three developments were needed to complete the shift to a more effective structure.  
First, the U.S. Army had to experience modern theater-level combat and the existential linkage 
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between maneuver and sustainment in a joint operation.  This occurred to a limited extent in 
North Africa and Italy, but France took the scale and scope of the experience to an entirely 
different level.  Second, the predominance of power and authority for campaign planning had to 
shift from Washington, D.C. to field commanders, a transfer that was directly tied to the 
competence and confidence of Eisenhower and his key lieutenants.  Third, the idea of a U.S 
theater command as the supreme synchronizing agency had to give way to its joint-combined 
equivalent.  The U.S. experience in France during the Great War had not prepared the Army for 
the dual dynamic of combined and joint operations displacing a national theater command, and 
Washington was slow to respond to early developments during World War Two in a holistic and 
formal manner with these insights captured and promulgated in updated doctrine.   
It took time for the people building the structure to recognize that problems with 
ETOUSA or SOS were merely facets of a larger process.  By the end of the war, most officers 
serving in the ETO or MTO had learned that the combined headquarters was the appropriate 
integrating agency for joint theater warfare.  Washington needed to follow the reasonable lead of 
the theater staff and not the other way around.  Finally, it took time for senior combat 
commanders to realize how fundamental it was for them to drive the process to synchronize 
maneuver and sustainment and then to learn how best to accomplish this task.  Lee’s heart was in 
the right place, but his headquarters did not have constant access to the latest operational 
concepts and estimates from supporting agencies with which to refine their own concept of 
support on a recurring basis.  Even if they had possessed this capability, Lee could neither order 
nor convince combat leaders to curtail their schemes of maneuver to conform to the physical 
limitations imposed by logistics.  Only the commanders held responsible for combat outcomes 
had the authority to tie realistic objectives to the resources available. They also had the most 
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pressing incentive to shift more weight to providing service troops, seizing objectives that 
improved the ability to land and distribute supplies, and to minimize unnecessary destruction to 
the existing infrastructure.  COMZ might have developed to the point where they could develop 
a magnificent plan, but only SHAEF or the army groups could decide to agree with its objectives 
and limitations. 
 The next chapter picks up this theme by exploring what SOS was consumed with during 
its two years in the U.K.  SOS was a large and effective organization, dedicated to learning and 
getting better, but working under tremendous handicaps.  In the end, the command was fully 
consumed executing Bolero, and it could not envision, much less organize for and practice, the 
tasks that would make a key difference during mobile warfare.  This was linked to, and to some 
extent resulted from, their failure to embrace operational planning for Roundup.  Small pockets 
of ETOUSA and the special staff at SOS worked with COSSAC to plan the return to France.  As 
a result, problems emerged in preparing and defending a troop basis, special equipment lists, and 
recommendations to modify or field new organizations.  This friction further undermined the 
reputation of SOS and accelerated the transfer of power to SHAEF and FUSAG, not only for 
operational planning and interaction with the ASF and OPD on administrative issues, but even in 
the control of service units once on the continent.  ETOUSA / COMZ slowly lost their vote on 
theater logistics not only because of redundancy among them and SHAEF and FUSAG but also 
because experienced veterans began to question the professional competence of the staff.  
Unfortunately for the preservation of the authority of SOS staff, better alternatives existed, to 
include officers with significant operational experience in North Africa, the Middle East, and 
Italy.  As we have seen in this chapter, U.S. pre-war thinking had been largely invalidated by the 
hard school of war in North Africa and the Mediterranean.  Power shifted to the joint-combined 
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headquarters, experienced combat commander-logistician teams, and the technically competent 
special staff sections, but this did not happen soon or decisively enough to avoid a major 
breakdown in France in August and September
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Chapter 4 - Preparing SOS for Roundup 
Lee’s Service of Supply was a disciplined and functional organization, committed to 
learning their craft, getting better, and integrating honest feedback.  The organization found it 
profoundly difficult to get a system up and running upon its arrival in the U.K.  It seemed as if 
everything it was trying to accomplish had never been done before, and officers assigned to SOS 
looked in vain to doctrine, their pre-war professional education, and historical experiences from 
the last three decades to provide clues on how to set up and operate the organization.  
Frustratingly, the U.S. War Department seemed as lost as SOS – they could not help SOS move 
through its initial teething period any faster and sometimes made things much worse during the 
early days of Torch and Bolero.  SOS suffered from a shortage of service troops, and the men 
that were assigned were only partially trained.  Getting the invasion force for Torch out of the 
U.K. provided a wakeup call and pointed out a few essential tasks SOS and the ASF would have 
to master, but also did damage to Lee’s professional reputation among his peers and superiors.  
But Lee and his command emerged from the experience committed to learning from and fixing 
their mistakes, and realized that the British could help accelerate this process.  One of the most 
challenging tasks was to reconcile the independence and authority historically wielded by 
technical service staff sections with new concepts advanced by Somervell.  Lee had to set up a 
new system to regulate interaction between his staff, the theater special staff, and regional base 
section commanders.  Lee also understood that he needed a powerful transportation staff section 
well before the ASF established the Transportation Corps, and SOS was innovative in its early 
and expansive empowerment of a strong movement staff.  By late 1943 Lee’s SOS had mastered 
the skill set required by Bolero and was pushing the ASF to match his effectiveness, but the day 
to day management of the buildup in the U.K. left very little energy for any other tasks.  As the 
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focus at ETOUSA shifted from Bolero to Roundup in the late summer of 1943, Devers 
discovered that SOS could not expand its scope to provide a similar quality of support to 
operational planning.  By early fall Devers was forced to create two alternative sources for 
operational logistical support, organizations that would go on to challenge Lee’s primacy over 
theater logistics throughout 1944. 
Because the inner circle of senior leaders at SOS was not intimately familiar with the 
details of the sustainment mission in France, they struggled to convince the War Department of 
the validity of the service unit portion of the troop list for the coming invasion.  SOS could not 
articulate the linkage between the critical tasks they would perform during Overlord and the 
equipment and material requested to perform them.  This emerging lack of confidence in Lee and 
SOS staff was compounded when FUSAG and SHAEF discovered critical shortages two months 
before the landing.  SHAEF found itself dragged into arguments between SOS and the War 
Department, injecting a third party into what was already a complex relationship.  Rather than 
sending a unified logistical perspective back to Washington, Eisenhower found himself asked to 
adjudicate between two competing groups seeking to represent the ETO with the ASF and OPD.   
Despite a lack of unity and an imperfect grasp of how Overlord would play out over its 
first 90 days, SOS and ETOUSA produced a troop basis that in retrospect was almost perfect.  
SOS also managed to collect all the equipment and supplies necessary to move, outfit, and 
maintain a million Americans in Normandy.  The only failures were either completely beyond 
their control, such as artillery ammunition, or associated with special projects (PROCO) above 
and beyond unit T&O requirements.  Two shortfalls proved to be particularly problematic in 
France in August and September: heavy equipment to reconfigure LoC truck companies, and 
material to build, maintain, and operate POL pipelines.    
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   After a two-week external evaluation conducted by an ASF team led by MG Leroy Lutes, 
SOS remained something of an enigma.  Lee and SOS got results but in the process they made 
enemies.  They excelled at Bolero, but they failed to establish the credibility and relationships to 
shape the sustainment plan for Overlord.  SOS seemed to lack a central voice for conveying their 
plans and progress to FUSAG.  Poor relationships allowed doubts, resentment, and questions 
about the professional competence of SOS to fester.  Eventually this friction would cost SOS its 
preeminent position as the agency charged with planning and managing logistics for the theater 
commander.  By June Lee was barely trusted with long-range resource planning, routine 
coordination with the War Department, and supervision and management of the communications 
zone; elements of this portfolio were already under attack.  The gaps among U.S. doctrine, the 
ASF method, and what was actually happening in the ETO were growing wider and wider.  
Unfortunately for SHAEF, the theater command and control metamorphosis was still in progress 
when the logistics crisis occurred in August, when none of the three competing sustainment 
agencies were capable of rising to the occasion. 
 In order to understand why COMZ struggled in France in August and September 1944, 
one must understand what consumed most of the time and attention of ETOUSA and its SOS in 
1943.  First, SOS tried to balance its efforts between executing Bolero and preparing for 
Roundup / Overlord.  This included the significant expansion of the Office of the Chief of 
Transportation (OCOT).  Second, ETOUSA and its SOS built the troop basis for Overlord and 
then secured the material necessary to make the plan happen.  Third, ETOUSA and Lee created a 
half-dozen new agencies to plan Overlord.  By examining these developments an honest 
contemporary assessment of the relevant weaknesses that still existed in SOS just before 
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Overlord begins to emerge, as well as an appreciation for how the rest of the theater viewed 
SOS, and how accurately SOS saw themselves. 
It is important to understand the challenges and priorities of SOS, especially during the 
period of their ascendancy from January to October 1943.  Things had been simpler during the 
first six months because of the imperative to get the forces associated with Torch ready for 
combat and deployed out of the country.  During the operational lull that followed Torch, Lee 
had more latitude to select his own priorities, but found it harder to justify his requests for 
resources from the War Department.  In early 1943 SOS threw itself into trying to create an 
effective organization with new people, command structure, and two radically different missions, 
all while adjusting to life in a foreign country.  Lee had to create new teams from the district, 
region, base, and SOS levels using half-trained personnel who had never worked together and 
using doctrine that offered few techniques for integrating services and functions.  As a result, the 
command spent inordinate amounts of time and energy just figuring out how to work together, 
cooperate with the British, and train their personnel.   
Finding a focus for SOS was complicated by the elephant in the room, Lee’s supervisory 
control over the theater technical staff.  This placed the chiefs of service in an almost impossible 
position.  One of their two major responsibilities was to advise the theater commander and help 
with planning how to sustain operations.  Their second major function was to direct service 
forces in the efficient execution of that plan.  These men found themselves trapped between SOS 
and ETOUSA staffs, needing to maintain a footprint in London and Cheltenham and execute two 
missions simultaneously.  At the same time, Lee was trying to develop base section commanders 
who would replicate his authority over the technical services one layer down the chain of 
command.  It was a great idea that had to be implemented in order to conduct decentralized and 
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flexible operations in France, but it flew in the face of tradition, doctrine, education, and the way 
U.S. logistical functions were organized.  Lee was correct in concluding that the day of stove 
piped technical support was over and that logisticians needed to create effective combined-
services organizations just like in the process occurring in maneuver formations, but this was a 
massive leap for which the U.S. Army was not quite ready.   
In his favor, Lee was quick to recognize the mistake made by the U.S. Army in 
disbanding its motorized transport service and ignoring the need to integrate trucks with more 
traditional forms of transportation, two lessons that had been learned during the Great War.  He 
and Frank Ross acted decisively to enlarge and empower the ETOUSA OCOT.  However, 
because this was a theater initiative and not comprehensive reorganization from the center, it 
would face a lot of bureaucratic resistance from the War Department.  Lee, Ross, and the theater 
transportation staff foresaw a couple of critical problems and how to solve them.   But they could 
not break through inertia quickly enough to solve the transportation problem that was expected to 
arise near the end of Overlord.   
The reputation of SOS was directly linked to how well it accomplished two linked tasks.  
First, ETOUSA had to produce an approved troop list for Overlord; linked to that, SOS had to 
amass the equipment and supplies necessary to establish a secure lodgment.  Success with both 
demanded a deep understanding of what service troops would have to accomplish in France and 
familiarity with new techniques emerging from other theaters.   
A major burden faced by ETOUSA was the requirement to determine the right ratio of 
ground, air, and service troops to support theater-level expeditionary warfare and then to provide 
these troops for Overlord accordingly.  Because the U.S. Army had little operational experience 
and could not agree about these percentages at the highest levels, ETOUSA labored under a 
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heavy burden.  Working with an overall force cap driven by what could be shipped across the 
Atlantic in a set amount of time, Devers authorized percentages of this force to the field force, air 
force, and SOS to scope their estimates.  Working without a final scheme of maneuver and 
having no direct historical examples from the modern period, SOS did remarkably well in 
building the troop basis to support Overlord for its first ninety days.   
With the benefit of hindsight, we know that motorized transportation proved to be the one 
critical material shortfall in COMZ in August and September 1944.  Ross anticipated this 
problem in August 1943 and asked for additional truck companies and heavy equipment to 
support an advance to the Seine and beyond.1  Like his peers, Ross was forced to operate under a 
force cap and decided that heavy equipment could make up for a shortage of truck companies.  
Ross worked with various agencies within the ASF and together they convinced the senior 
leaders that heavy trucks were a production priority for 1944, but somehow this never translated 
into new heavy truck companies in the order of battle in the ETO.  By the time ETOUSA, 
SHAEF, and ASF realized that they were not going to get these heavy trucks before the invasion 
began, it was too late to get the program back on track.   
The effort to justify an overall troop basis and the motor transport required in the theater 
illustrated weaknesses within SOS.  It demonstrated that the command did not understand the 
logistical tasks it would have to perform in France, and did not recognize the importance of 
reconciling the various planning assumptions and consumption estimates floating around in the 
dozen organizations building the multi-stage concept of support.  Discovering no uniform 
concept of support to justify the ETOUSA troop basis, Devers moved responsibility for this 
 
1 There is one requirement document in the ASF records that states the ETOUSA OCOT request was to support an 
advance to the Westwall, but that portion is marked out and does not appear in the final justification.  RG 160, 
Director of Plans and Operations, Planning Division, Theater Branch, Box 52. 
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product to other organizations.  When it discovered in March and April that the command still 
faced significant material shortages, SHAEF got directly involved in reviewing the planning 
assumptions behind those requests.  Both of these events damaged the reputation of SOS and 
contributed to the tendency of SHAEF and FUSAG to get involved in SOS’s business.  By late 
May 1944, SHAEF and FUSAG were well along in the process that would transfer responsibility 
for logistical integration and synchronization away from COMZ to the joint-combined and 
ground combat commanders. 
In late April and early May, three or four incidents suggested that ETOUSA was not up 
to the challenge presented by Overlord.  Small procedural issues implied more significant 
problems with establishing and enforcing standards across the technical services and five base 
section commands.  Already there was friction between support and combat staffs up and down 
the chain of command.  There were also complaints about a lack of transparency in making 
decisions and allocating resources.  One had to pull information from SOS and its subordinate 
structures rather than receiving freely offered periodic updates.  Evidently SOS staff had a hard 
time envisioning what skills and processes would be important in France and developing 
streamlined methods for handling them.  The command had largely mastered routine supply 
procedures in the U.K. by May, but critical items could not be located and rushed through the 
system.  SOS had figured out how to operate in the U.K., where timeliness was not such a big 
deal, but three or four warning signs pointed to flaws that would be exposed during more intense 
operations.  It did not help matters that MG Lutes considered the persons filling two most critical 
posts on the SOS staff, Lord and Stratton, unqualified for their positions.   
For complex reasons Lee’s SOS lost the authority needed to drive logistics planning and 
its integration into the campaign plan over the winter of 1943 and 1944.  Rather than lead this 
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process, Lee was directed to provide augmentation to 1st Army and FUSAG to develop the 
campaign plan for Overlord.  By May 1944 ETOUSA had in effect been eliminated.  SOS was 
reduced to an organization charged with routine coordination with the War Department, and it 
had an uncertain role in long-range logistics planning.  Lee retained his role as COMZ 
commander and overall theater logistics integrator, at least once his headquarters reached the 
continent and took over from the ADSEC.  It was the one mission area that Lee and SOS 
managed to retain in accordance with pre-war doctrine.  It would also prove to be a task for 
which COMZ was not prepared, exposing the remaining gaps among COMZ staff, the technical 
services, and the base sections.  Lee’s struggles to run COMZ in August and September also 
revealed his staff’s inability to coordinate and cooperate fully with SHAEF and 12th Army 
Group.  
 
 SOS in Operation  
What prevented SOS from focusing more on operational planning?  What did it do to 
prepare for Overlord while managing Bolero?  Like most organizations, SOS focused most of its 
energy on the mission at hand. They did not ignore the future, but they did not make it a top 
priority either.  It is too easy to fault Lee for sweating the simple stuff and postponing serious 
thought about Overlord, but this is not fair.  Everything SOS did in the United Kingdom was new 
and unproven.  Lee had to build a general staff for SOS and special staff for the theater from 
scratch, find a headquarters complex, and deploy his own service troops while simultaneously 
supporting Torch during its first seven months in country.  These tasks were complicated by the 
fact that no organization in the U.S. Army really knew how to do its wartime job.  What would 
become the ASF struggled to gather and load men and equipment for the U.K. and North Africa.  
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AFHQ did not know how to plan expeditionary campaigns, a problem complicated by having a 
new team, a tight timeline, and an exceedingly complex scheme of maneuver and support.  
Nothing was labeled properly, packaging fell apart, and equipment disappeared into British 
warehouses never to be found again.  Establishing the SOS footprint across the U.K., supporting 
Torch, and fixing the glaring problems exposed by that operation required Lee’s full attention 
into the spring of 1943.   
 In hindsight, SOS was overwhelmingly consumed with executing Bolero during its time 
in the U.K.  Oversimplified, Bolero required SOS to unload, move, and house or store or house 
all the personnel and material necessary to conduct strategic bombing, launch an amphibious 
invasion of Europe, and sustain the infrastructure needed to make these tasks happen.  In practice 
this meant moving hundreds of thousands of Americans to Great Britain and then building the 
cities needed to allow them to work.  Not only did the U.S. Army have to build housing, 
hospitals, factories, warehouses, training areas, and airbases. It had to do so using untrained 
service troops who were often in short supply and using material that had to be imported from 
the United States.  Executing Bolero and addressing training shortfalls among service troops 
demanded most of SOS’s attention. 
The act of executing the Bolero mission strengthened SOS in many ways, helping it 
prepare for its combat role in France.  But the danger was that Bolero was so different from the 
operational mission of running a COMZ that SOS was unprepared to execute critical aspects of 
the mission it had fought so hard to retain against all other claimants.  The command became 
expert at mounting an invasion force, coordinating with the U.S. War Department and various 
British ministries to prioritize and sequence a massive buildup in the United Kingdom, 
distributing troops and supplies from ports to depots and camps across the country, and running 
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the routine business of garrison life and sustainment in a highly developed nation.  But the 
intellectual distance maintained between SOS staff and the combined Roundup planning team 
translated into a mental break between executing the immediate mission while preparing for a 
very different role in future operations.   
The role of COMZ in France would emphasize a different set of capabilities.  There SOS 
would have to repair and operate a rail network and port facilities massively degraded by both 
friendly and enemy combat action, using trucks and planes to bridge the gap until those repairs 
were complete.  Unlike what had to be done in Great Britain, managing the COMZ in France 
was about synchronizing the activities of base commanders and technical services.   Base section 
boundaries in the U.K. were specifically arranged to link ports to depots and camps by rail lines, 
with little to no traffic flowing across the boundaries of some other base section.2  Because of the 
volume of activity at ports, on rail lines, and along roads, the transportation section learned to 
master controlling traffic to avoid congestion and shifting supplies from one means of transport 
to another.  But they did this without the complications associated with doing so across base and 
army boundaries, where the service troops involved might answer to two or three different chains 
of command.  
In addition, in France SOS would have to communicate with the armies to determine 
what they had on hand and what they desperately wanted delivered as an immediate priority.  
Yet they would do so with no precedent established on who would be the arbiter setting priorities 
between Army ground and air commanders.  Whether it would be Bradley, Spaatz, or 
 
2 This approach was only possible because the U.S. had access to four clusters of ports, one for each base section.  
This was not an option in France until Marseilles and some of the Channel ports opened in September.  The only 
practical solution before late September was to land all supplies in Normandy and then carry them across anywhere 
from two to five section boundaries.  Coordinating the flow of these supplies across those boundaries was something 
SOS did not practice in the U.K.   
343 
 
Eisenhower, the procedures were not developed and practiced while SOS was in the United 
Kingdom.  Finally, a critical weakness of SOS that would need to be fixed before they took over 
sustainment on the continent was their unfamiliarity with the campaign planning that had 
occurred to date.  SHAEF would direct air and ground maneuver, but Lee needed to ensure that 
there were trusted and informed agents presenting the reality of logistical constraints to the G-3 
and commanders.  Lee’s organizational abdication of the planning process for sustainment for 
the first 90 days in France meant that the primary staff did not have the details committed to 
memory.  Nor had they established the reputation and personal contacts at SHAEF or within 12th 
AG to decisively influence decision making in August and September.   
It is easy to recognize these two distinct missions in hindsight and to realize that SOS was 
not as prepared for conditions on the continent in August as they should have been.  But did they 
recognize the nature of the problem at the time before the invasion?  If they did, why didn’t they 
do a better job getting ready to perform the key tasks listed above?  The answer to the first 
question is a qualified yes; elements within SOS staff realized what tasks would be important in 
France and took steps to prepare for them.  There were residual shortfalls because it is very 
difficult to execute one complex and challenging task while preparing for another, all the while 
trying to overcome serious shortfalls in manpower and equipment. It is one thing to talk about 
and to train for a task, but it is something else entirely to practice it every day for weeks on end.  
SOS and ETOUSA had little opportunity to gain practical experience supporting major ground 
combat in the United Kingdom and had few opportunities to exchange personnel with AFHQ or 
NATOUSA.  Finally, Lee and SOS were involved in planning Roundup to the maximum extent 
that Crawford, Bradley, and Moses would allow.  But this was insufficient to involve the 
majority of the staff at Cheltenham, and Lee did not push the issue with Devers or Eisenhower 
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during the last nine months before the invasion.  It is fair to say that Lee thought that he had 
detached enough of his people to support logistics planning and had more than enough critical 
work to keep the rest fully engaged.  In his defense, Lee tried to ensure that SOS was a learning 
organization that devoted time and resources to training and seeking out the latest developments 
from other theaters.  
 
 The Role and Functions of SOS in Great Britain 
SOS kept meticulous notes from the command and staff meeting held every week 
between October 1942 and September 1944, notes that provide fascinating insight on the 
priorities and function of the organization across this period.  They confirm how much effort was 
devoted to learning and trying to prepare for combat operations.  Base section commanders 
attended every other meeting; SOS and ETO special staff attended weekly.  Chiefs of services, 
general staff directors, and commanders attended meetings themselves, sending deputies only 
when they were traveling on business, sick, or detained in London working with the ETOUSA 
staff.  After a few months of conducting the meeting at the restricted level, it was upgraded to 
secret level in the first half of 1943, allowing the audience to discuss operational issues freely 
and in great detail if necessary.  Attendance grew over time and eventually included a senior 
LNO from the British Q Branch, 8th Air Force, and the U.S. naval command in Europe.  After 
February 1944 the group was joined by the ADSEC and FECZ commanders and COL Whipple, 
the chief of logistics plans at SHAEF.  Any American or British distinguished visitors were 
invited to sit in on meetings, and Lee tried to ensure there was a guest briefer or two to share 
recent combat experience or explain the role of the organization and its relationship with SOS.  It 
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was a powerful group of individuals who had their fingers on the pulse of everything concerning 
logistics and deployment in Great Britain. 
Lee clearly valued information-sharing and embraced opportunities to learn from others.  
Once things settled down a bit after the initial surge associated with standing up SOS and getting 
Torch launched, the command took measures to ensure that sections remained abreast of official 
updates.  The SOS staff memo published on 16 December 1942 pointed out the existence of a 
War Department incoming messages file in the Adjutant General’s office that was required 
reading for all officers assigned to the command.3  A week later the Office of the Quartermaster 
General announced that it had formed a reference library and placed a call for donations of 
material that the staff had in their possession that might be of use.4  These actions demonstrated 
that SOS understood the value of staying abreast of official publications from the United States.  
The team at Cheltenham was aware of publications coming out of the War Department and other 
theaters; the quality of those documents was beyond their control. 
Another indicator that Lee was committed to creating a learning organization was the inclusion 
of a guest lecturer or the screening of new training films at the weekly command and staff 
meeting.  Guest speakers ranged from visitors from the United States, typically from the War 
Department, British officers working closely with ETOUSA, or personnel with recent 
operational experience traveling through the country.  In July the group received a briefing by an 
engineer colonel who had supported the landing at Attu, and MG Crawford described his 
 
3 SOS AG Staff Memos, 16 Dec 42, RG 498, UD 402, Box 2606, NARA II.  This library included circulars, 
regulations, field manuals, and tables of organization published by the War Department.  The AG maintained a 
master file and passed copies from office to office to encourage currency.   
4 SOS OCQM Circular Letter 34, 23 Dec 42.  RG 498, UD 1089, Box 5122, NARA II.  The circular announced that 
the library contained seven volumes of reference data, technical manuals for various equipment, and FM 100-10 
Quartermaster Service in Theater Operations and that it was in the process of collecting more material for the 
command. 
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experiences in the Middle East, going into detail about how his command had supported 9th Air 
Force covering Montgomery’s pursuit from El Alamein to Mareth.5  Chiefs of services tried to 
visit active theaters for anywhere between ten days to three weeks, and they provided a detailed 
out brief upon their return that generated a lot of interest and follow-up questions.6   
One of the most popular guest lectures was the 29 November 1943 appearance of LTC 
Eymer, the G-4 of 1st Infantry Division.  The SOS staff was shocked by a few of his comments, 
caught by surprise by the friction he described with logistics up at the frontlines.  Eymer’s most 
passionate point, and the one that seemed to resonate with the room, was his dissatisfaction with 
daily consumption planning figures currently in use.  Eymer pointed out that a division ended up 
with too much small-arms ammunition, not enough artillery ammunition, the wrong fuses and 
propellant charges, and a drastic shortage of spare parts, particularly for weapons and trucks.7  
This had driven the division to develop its own planning figures for combat that the G-4 
promised to mail to BG Weaver upon his return to the division compound.  Eymer explained that 
combat introduced friction that was hard to forecast; units broke and ran under enemy attack, 
leaving behind equipment in the process.  Ships were damaged and sunk and the cargo lost with 
them, and the procedures explained in the plan for rapid replacement of major Class II items did 
not work during the Sicilian invasion.  Brand new equipment issued for the invasion did not 
work; twelve 57 mm guns had to be modified by division workmen to fire.  Luckily the unit had 
decided to test-fire the guns before loading them for the trip to Sicily.   
The fact that leaders in SOS were surprised by these statements and did not realize the 
most fundamental figures used in planning were so inaccurate is illuminating.  Their interest in 
 
5 SOS C&S Notes, 5 Jul 43.  RG 498, UD 578, Box 3882, ADM 455, NARA II. 
6 Ibid, 19 Jul and 16 Aug 43.   
7 Ibid, 29 Nov 43. 
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the topic, the intensity of their questions, and their sincere desire to get their hands on all the 
written material Eymer could share demonstrated their professionalism and commitment to 
winning the war.  Their ignorance of the reality of logistics at the infantry division level was not 
an indictment of the professionalism of the officers at SOS or ETOUSA.  It was a reminder of 
the barriers that existed in sharing hard-won operational experience.  The 1st ID and the corps and 
armies to which it had been attached had evolved after two campaigns.  LTC Eymer believed 
that the lessons derived from North Africa and Sicily would apply during Overlord.  In his 
opinion, they were validated lessons learned that should impact future planning and execution.  
And they were lessons learned that SOS did not know.  That was because building an effective 
process for identifying lessons is incredibly difficult.  Despite the huge effort expended to extract 
and share combat experience outlined in chapter two, and the willingness of SOS to learn from 
others, the reality was that a huge barrier existed between NATOUSA and ETOUSA.  It is hard 
enough to learn new tasks when that is the daily mission; it is almost impossible to evolve and to 
develop when getting just the occasional oral or written summary from observers while 
simultaneously doing a full-time job.   
Keeping ETOUSA, and really the entire Army, abreast of effective techniques developed 
within the elements assigned to NATOUSA and at AFHQ was a complex and resource-intensive 
process.  The AGF did better at it than the ASF did.  On 6 December 1943 the special guest at 
SOS command and staff meeting was LTC Allen from the ASF Military Training Division at the 
Pentagon under BG Weible.  He had been sent to Europe to extract practical experiences that 
should be folded into “ordnance, signal, chemical warfare, engineer, and [other] services” 
training.8  Miller was aware of the training observations and circulars coming out of North 
 
8 SOS C&S Notes, 6 Dec 43.   
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Africa, but “…practically a hundred percent of everything that comes back is applicable 
primarily to the Ground Forces and there are no lessons in there for the Service Forces.”  Miller 
was hoping to fix that by talking to service units in recently transferred divisions and corps.  The 
fact that little of value had come out of North Africa, despite the number of observer team visits 
and despite the long-term assignment of an ASF LNO to the NATOUSA staff, indicated ASF 
had not placed any formal demands on the folks it was sending into the theater.  It also seems 
that December 1943 was a bit late in the game to get serious about doing something to address it 
and that it was probably beyond the capacity of one lieutenant colonel.  No wonder SOS was so 
surprised by the conclusions shared by LTC Eymer, and no wonder that it would be 
overwhelmed by the pace and volume of work in August 1944.  The ASF failed to develop a 
system to extract detailed lessons learned, integrate them into new unit and leader training, and 
develop a retraining program for forces already deployed overseas. 
 Miller was outlining the traditional, or institutional, approach to a professional lessons-
learned cycle, one that relied heavily on formal education, training, and retraining in the field.  A 
second approach, by no means an either/or proposition, was the organizational method, which 
emphasized cross-pollination through a structured individual and unit rotation policy to 
disseminate combat experience.  The most effective approach would have been to pursue both 
with equal vigor.  In North Arica the Allies put a lot of energy into their institutional approaches 
to learning with mixed results.  It was characterized by the formation of teams within the War 
Department tasked to observe, distill, and integrate lessons from active theaters back into the 
training base, which included an impact on professional education and the revision of doctrine.  
AGF put more resources into the task in North Africa and produced better results than the ASF, 
but they overemphasized individual, squad, and platoon skills at the expense of higher-echelon 
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collective tasks.  Training and officer professional education improved, but capstone doctrine 
changed very little during the war. 
 Because the ASF did not invest as heavily in institutional feedback loops as the AGF, 
service organizations had to rely more upon learning by doing, informed by informal unit AARs, 
histories, and summaries from units supporting combat operations in the Pacific or in North 
Africa.  Service units could become more effective by doing their job in Bolero or Torch, but the 
U.K. did not perfectly replicate a combat theater.  The tempo and sense of urgency were greater 
in an active combat theater, and the need to interact with and compromise among air and ground 
maneuver headquarters was a major aspect of the mission that SOS could not adequately practice 
in the U.K.  Finally, the distribution of men and material in North Africa and the Mediterranean 
relied on a blend of rail, sea, and motor transport over much greater distances than those faced in 
the United Kingdom, and domestic factors limited how much SOS could recreate those 
conditions for training. 
SOS understood what they were missing, thanks to the reports they read and the visitors 
they welcomed to their weekly command and staff meetings, but the final steps to integrate this 
experience eluded them.  ETOUSA and NATOUSA, with the cooperation of the War 
Department, could have leveled the operational experience between the two commands with a 
deliberate and carefully managed personnel transfer policy between the two theaters.  The U.S. 
Army recognized the importance of shifting veterans from the Mediterranean back to the training 
base and the War Department, but no one insisted on a similar cross-leveling between active and 
quiet theaters.  SOS, ETOUSA was constantly losing officers to AFHQ and new logistical 
commands forming in North Africa, but it was largely a one-way street.  Only in January 1944 
when Eisenhower returned to ETOUSA did the theater experience an influx of combat-seasoned 
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sustainment personnel, but most of them were sent to SHAEF, FUSAG, and the 1st Army staff.  
The few senior officers who did deploy to the Mediterranean and then return to ETOUSA played 
a prominent role in getting SOS ready to succeed in France.  The experience of MG Frank Ross 
demonstrates very well just how helpful it was to serve in a combat theater for a few months 
prior to resuming duties as the chief of transportation at ETOUSA.  
A second method in an organizational approach to integrating validated lessons learned 
during ongoing operations is to divide the command into an operating section and a 
planning/preparing section.  SOS was responsible for a massive range of activities associated 
with Bolero that had to be managed on a day-to-day basis.  That was the purpose of the staff at 
Cheltenham, which Lee called his operational headquarters.9  A second major function of SOS 
was to support ETOUSA, which included sustaining 8th Air Force in its strategic bombing 
offensive, planning and preparing for Roundup/Overlord, and fighting for resources for the 
theater in their interactions with the War Department.  This was the role of SOS element 
reestablished and then reinforced in London in March and then August 1943.   
Through the process of conducting operational planning, the Americans working at 
COSSAC learned what forces, equipment, and supplies would be necessary to secure a lodgment 
in France.  These details gave more authority to their appeals to the War Department for 
resources.  It was essential for the sustainment planners at COSSAC to integrate everything they 
could learn from their peers fighting in the Mediterranean and to secure the right mix of 
capabilities and to combine them at the right time and place.  The various amphibious assaults 
offered a gold mine of lessons at the tactical scale, while AFHQ and the two service commands 
 
9 SOS C&S Notes, 9 Aug 43.  This operational headquarters was at Cheltenham under Weaver, and the planning 
headquarters operated out of the Selfridges Annex under Lord, then Crawford, and then back to Lord. 
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in the Mediterranean were learning how to conduct joint theater-wide sustainment at the 
operational level.  In a perfect world, Lee could have formed a planning and study group, located 
in London working with COSSAC, with the sole mission of studying, visiting, and integrating 
techniques emerging from NATOUSA into the Roundup plan and the troop basis associated with 
it.  An associated task would be to determine how to reconfigure and run SOS and its base 
sections in order to accomplish the mission in France. 
 Lee understood the importance of his planning headquarters in London and resourced it 
appropriately, but never to the level that would have allowed such a precise focus on studying 
other theaters and preparing to operate under combat conditions.  He assigned Crawford and 
Lord as his personal representatives to ETOUSA, and he split the 1,424 officers assigned to SOS 
in August 1943 equally between Cheltenham and London.10  Approximately 60% of enlisted 
personnel served at Cheltenham with the balance, around 1,500 men, working in London.  
Recognizing that some experts were needed at both locations, Lee took steps to make it easier for 
officers to travel between the two headquarters.  SOS coordinated a special overnight train 
service with sleeper cars providing one-way passage in each direction on alternating nights.  This 
train was especially helpful for the chiefs of the services who tended to spend a lot of time in 
London working with ETOUSA and COSSAC.  The system was not perfect; if called away on 
short notice to support ETOUSA, SOS staff officers found it impossible to get official travel 
orders, and without orders, getting lodging and meals in London was problematic.  The London 
Base Section, headquarters commandant, and service chiefs found workarounds, but the 
difficulty associated with getting official travel orders in a timely manner created an additional 
source of friction that made supporting the efforts in London that much harder.  Ross and 
 
10 SOS C&S Notes, 25 Oct and 15 Nov 43. 
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Littlejohn understood the problem and could offer various solutions; when mentioned at an 
August 1943 staff meeting, the whole issue came as a surprise to Lee.11   
 SOS did a great many things right in trying to establish a planning headquarters that 
could focus on future operations, so why were they not more effective in recognizing and 
rectifying those challenges that would cripple COMZ in September?  First, very few of the over 
2,000 soldiers working in London were directly involved in operational planning throughout 
1943.  The majority of Americans working with the British at Norfolk House on the Roundup 
plan came mainly from the ETOUSA staff from a few technical service sections.  COL Traub, 
chief of the planning division within the ETO transportation section, wrote in his portion of the 
official history of the service that operational planning within SOS virtually ceased from Torch 
to the formation of the ADSEC in February 1944; only the transportation corps with a small 
group of five officers continued to work with their British counterparts on Roundup.12  This is 
neither fair nor completely accurate, but it echoes a similar sentiment expressed by LTC 
Osmanski and even by the internal report submitted by COMZ after the war.  Very few among 
SOS staff were focused on detailed planning for Roundup, and therefore they did not have the 
time or passion to learn everything they could about relevant lessons emerging from the 
Mediterranean and other theaters.  
 
11 SOS C&S Notes, 16 Aug 43.   
12 COL Hugh A. Murril and COL D.W. Traub “Control and Planning Division”, History of the Transportation 
Section, ETOUSA, 1942-1945.  RG 498, UD 1210, Box 5981, 2.  Traub’s three pages are appended to Murril’s 
much longer report.     
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Figure 4.1: Troop and tonnage flow to the U.K. during the peak of Bolero13 
 
SOS priorities during the summer and fall of 1943 can be explained by the increase of the 
work load associated with Bolero and the simultaneous renewed focus on planning for Overlord.  
 
13 Ruppenthal, Vol I, 232 and 237. 
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The number of soldiers arriving monthly doubled from August to September 1943 and had 
quadrupled by November.  Receiving and billeting soldiers continued to be a significant task for 
COMZ and U.K. Base Section until troop convoys could be sent directly to France with the 
opening of Cherbourg.  The tonnage of cargo arriving monthly exploded from 87,000 tons in 
May 1943 to 350,000 tons the following month, gradually climbing to almost a million tons in 
October.14  SOS received and dispersed more troops and equipment between January and June 
1944 than it had handled in the first eighteen months of its existence combined.  This flood of 
men and supplies was rushed to the U.K. at what could realistically be described as the last 
minute.   Because these last-minute arrivals included the engineers and material necessary to 
build the billets and warehouses required, there was a mad scramble to find alternative facilities.  
On 22 July 1943 Lee had written directly to the Secretary of War to point out that the command 
was 100,000 men behind schedule in what was needed to support a troop basis of 1.1 million 
men. 15  The critical shortage was in construction engineers, men needed to build the facilities for 
follow-on units.  As a result, Lee reported that he had no choice but to lower standards on the 
quantity and quality of covered storage, hospitals, and airfields.  The appeal worked; Stimson 
directed that the next troop convoy headed to the U.K. replace 12,700 Canadians with service 
troops for SOS.  The real point is that SOS was living hand-to-mouth during the summer of 
1943, and it took Lee’s constant attention and intervention at the highest levels to secure the 
resources necessary to make Bolero happen.   
 As a result of the work associated with integrating arrivals, managing PROCO, and trying 
to get the troop basis finalized, Cheltenham remained the center of gravity of SOS activity in 
 
14 Bykofsky and Larson, 104. 
15 Lee to Stimson, 22 Jul 43.  RG 489, UD 578, Box 3854, ADM 345 – Troop Basis. 
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1943 and up to August in 1944.16  The London headquarters found itself doing a lot of non-
operational work – revising and executing Key Plans, conducting routine correspondence with 
the War Department, operating the Joint Q Planning Course, and facilitating traffic between 
ETOUSA and the primary staff out at Cheltenham.  New projects continued to emerge, many 
associated with skills and capabilities that would be essential in France.  General Sayler, the 
chief of ordnance, established an assembly line for crated vehicles in August, and he began work 
on developing mobile-tire retread stations at the same time.   In November his priority shifted to 
a massive armor modification project involving every Sherman tank, 3-inch self-propelled gun, 
and halftrack in theater or projected to arrive over the next three months.  By mid-month his 
shops were processing 120 armored vehicles a week, but that rate would have to be doubled to 
complete the project before May.  Sayler and his peers tried to manage this workload while 
absorbing a mandated 20% cut to the troop basis for all technical service announced in 
November.   
In hindsight, it is difficult to determine SOS’s priorities from July to December 1943 
based upon the transcripts from the weekly command and staff meeting.  The range of topics, 
tasks, challenges, and procedural questions dealt with on a monthly basis was staggering.  Often 
the work was not glamourous.  The command spent as much time talking about reducing 
venereal disease and about increasing the percentage of pay put in long-term savings as anything 
else.  The perceived requirement to segregate Negro troops, WACs, and officers and enlisted in 
 
16 Lee attended almost every weekly command and staff [NOUN] held at Cheltenham from July 1943 to August 
1944; Ross made only about 25% of the meetings, and the other service chiefs with major planning responsibilities 
averaged appearing in person about 66% of the time.  If a service chief was absent, it was typically because he was 
working with ETOUSA or COSSAC in London.  Until July 43 Lee frequently left Cheltenham to inspect units 
across SOS, but after his appointment as theater G-4 he delegated this responsibility to BG Weaver.  This was 
supposedly to allow Lee to spend more time in London, but the arrival and assignment of Crawford to working with 
ETOUSA made this less critical. 
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billets, mess halls, and hospitals complicated the mission.  Lee spent a lot of his time trying to 
improve adherence to standards of personal appearance and other outward manifestations of unit 
discipline.  In hindsight Lee’s attention seemed to have been focused on banalities, but this is 
unfair.  Lee tried to build the systems necessary to keep routine matters running routinely, from 
scratch, in a country where the U.S. Army had to conform to a number of British conventions.  
Building and running garrison facilities and linking them with a distribution network is not 
exhilarating work, but if SOS had failed at this fundamental task everyone else would have 
suffered.   
It was probably unrealistic to expect a theater SOS to execute Bolero, inform the service 
unit portion of the troop basis, and develop the joint concept of support for Overlord.  General 
Lee did everything in his power to try to build an organization committed to learning from the 
experiences of others.  As hard as it may seem based on his reputation today, Lee welcomed 
frank feedback and demanded that his people challenge incorrect information.  SOS found itself 
consumed with executing Bolero at the same time when they needed to shift significant resources 
to Overlord, and their reputation suffered when they prioritized running COMZ over planning 
future operations.  Lee was not helped by the lackluster ASF lessons program, stale capstone 
doctrine on logistics, and unenlightened personnel rotation policies between ETOUSA, 
NATOUSA, and the ASF.  In the end, the one valid criticism of Lee and SOS is that, despite 
generous resourcing with senior officers, they failed to create a subordinate organization solely 
committed to operational planning and then to optimize that organization to function in France 
rather than the U.K. 
 
357 
 
 Training the Service Troops 
One of the most significant tasks that consumed much of SOS’s effort in 1942 and 1943 
was individual and collective training.  Lee was forced to accept partly-trained units and 
individuals in 1942 in order to accomplish the mission, a problem that would reoccur 
periodically through the summer of 1944.  One advantage that SOS had over the air and ground 
components of ETOUSA was that, unlike combat units, sustainment organizations did not 
require active combat to practice essential skills, learn from the experience, and develop into an 
effective body.  During their two years in Britain, SOS had the opportunity to practice almost 
every skill that would be essential to sustain the effort in France.  Senior staffs needed time to 
figure out how to operate under conditions in the U.K. and to flesh out detailed procedures and 
techniques that were not provided in Allied doctrine.  A lack of practical experience with modern 
conditions throughout SOS made it harder to identify and correct mistakes in training, education, 
and doctrine.  Almost no one on SOS staff had planned or supported an amphibious assault or 
deep mobile warfare before Torch, and very few in the command were directly involved with 
that operation.  Building and running an effective organization in the United Kingdom was a tall 
order, but that alone was not enough.  Lee’s challenge was to anticipate the conditions under 
which the command would be forced to operate in France as well.   
In an environment in which resources were limited, Lee would be under a lot of pressure 
to be efficient, and he met with skepticism when he argued that the command needed to prepare 
for combat and be resourced accordingly.  To get ready for operations in France, the command 
needed the time, people, and redundant capabilities available for training.  But personnel 
remained in short supply until the summer of 1943, and service units presented a challenge right 
up to D-Day.  Even if SOS had tried to train to the conditions they would face in France, they did 
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not have the personnel to practice high-level staff coordination until late summer of 1943 and to 
engage in mixed-service collective training until the fall.  Lee prioritized training and put a lot of 
resources into programs designed to improve individual and collective skills, but SOS tended to 
do better with small-scale units and individuals at the expense of the collective tasks critical to 
SOS and base section success in combat.  SOS, like the rest of the U.S. Army, lacked the 
techniques to execute effective collective training at an operational level.17  They fell into the 
trap of believing that if they could conduct routine garrison operations, the same skills and 
procedures would see them through in combat.      
 
Figure 4.2: Personnel strength of SOS in the U.K. through Dec 43 
 
17 The U.S. Army did not frequently conduct what the German Army called wargames or map exercises in its 
overseas commands.  The Americans conducted large-scale maneuvers before the war and held full force rehearsals 
at the corps level in Great Britain in the spring of 1944 that helped train the Southern Base Section and the OCOT.  
Replicating the volume of work and frantic pace of operations that would confront the COMZ in August and 
September was beyond the training capabilities of the U.S. Army at the time. 
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SOS labored under a manpower crunch for most of its time in Great Britain, due to a lack 
of either numbers or skills or else a combination of the two.  Lee was forced to take whatever 
service troops were offered during his first year in command, and he consistently waived their 
basic-training requirements to get them to Britain as quickly as possible.  The average technical 
service soldier reached ETOUSA having completed only three to thirteen weeks of training in 
the United States.18  During the first six months of its existence, SOS prioritized on-the-job 
training aimed at the technical skills of the soldier’s MOS.  Secondary concerns such as field-
craft and basic self- and unit-defense would have to wait.19  Confronted by a majority of service 
troops who did not have the skills necessary to accomplish their primary job, SOS leaders knew 
they would have to develop a system to fix these training shortfalls.  Trainers, teaching material, 
classrooms, and dedicated periods for instruction had to be resourced and coordinated internally.   
This effort was also required at theater and base section headquarters, general depots, and any ad 
hoc collection of support troops from more than one service.20  
To help with these requirements, SOS and ETOUSA worked together to stand up the 
American School Center in Shrivenham, a small town located between Cheltenham and London, 
in late 1942.  This school ran an officer candidate course and the Supply Specialists School, 
which trained students in subjects such as firefighting, vehicle maintenance and repair, operation 
 
18 General Board 128, 31. The U.S. Army believed six weeks was the minimum time required to prepare a civilian to 
function as a basic soldier prior to moving on to MOS-specific training.  The goal for phase two was another eleven 
weeks, or about 17 weeks in total.  During various manpower crises, basic training might be shortened to as little as 
eight weeks.  See The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops by Robert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley, and 
William R. Keast.  The topic is not addressed in any detail in The Organization and Role of Army Service Forces, 
but the Technical Services series cited various service timelines for basic and specialty training similar to the goals 
maintained by the AGF.     
19 Ibid, 32.  The report shows a strange preoccupation with basic combat skills among service troops, a skill set they 
were not called upon to use in Europe, or a shortcoming that negatively impacted Allied operations there.   
20 Ibid, 32.  This was required in combined-service organizations because each service taught slightly different 
methods, and combined doctrine did not explain how to mesh these various techniques together in larger or more 
diverse organizations.    
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of radio equipment, mess management, and unit administration.21  Both schools were 
discontinued or repurposed after about a year of classes.  Thousands of new officers and 
specialists were trained, and others developed a secondary skill beside their designated military 
occupation specialty.  Beyond the formal school system, retraining at the unit level was a 
continual process, as new units and replacements arrived from the United States, and improved 
procedures were disseminated by the ASF or shared among the active theater support commands.  
The flood of new soldiers who started arriving during the second half of 1943 were much better 
trained than the first wave of troops assigned to SOS, reducing the demand for remedial technical 
training upon arrival.22  But the manpower crisis at the end of 1943 drove the pendulum in the 
other direction in the spring of 1944 when the ASF had to shorten the training courses and lower 
the standards for medical, truck, and port-operating units headed to ETOUSA.23     
 Training was an immediate priority for General Lee once SOS had weathered the chaos 
associated with standing up the command in the U.K. and deploying the Central and Eastern 
Task Forces.  In the first few days of November 1942 the command published its first training 
guidance and then devoted half of the command and staff meeting on 9 November to discussing 
the topic.  The command did not emphasize service technical training; Lee acknowledged that 
chiefs of service would supplement the skills learned during basic training or carried over from 
the civilian sector.  He emphasized basic soldier skills such as marching, saluting, and how to 
properly wear a uniform, subjects that had evidently been shortchanged during basic training.  
Based on Lee’s comments at this meeting, base section commanders and primary staff officers 
 
21 Ruppenthal, Vol I, 336. 
22 Comments of COL Plank, Eastern Base Section Commander, SOS C&S Notes, 9 Aug.  Plank was talking about 
construction engineers recently assigned to his command.  BG Rumbough, ETO Chief of Signal Corps, SOS C&S 
Notes, 30 Aug 43.     
23 Memo, 15 Apr 44, RG 160, Dir of P&O, File 73 (Troop Basis), Box 6, NARA 2.   
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might have concluded that unit level retraining needed to focus on the inspection of uniforms, 
living areas, camp security, and mess hall management.   
Lee claimed that he was reaching for deeper objectives by emphasizing basic soldier 
tasks and enforcing discipline.  First, his argument went, you had to convince draftees 
performing civilian labor in the U.K. that they were soldiers performing essential duties that 
would help win the war.  You had to teach them how to look and act like soldiers before they 
would believe they were soldiers; and, by trying to achieve these goals, young NCOs and 
officers had to learn, teach, and enforce standards.  Second, you needed to inculcate an intuitive 
commitment to frugality while maintaining the idea that you might pick up and move to a new 
duty location at a moment’s notice.  This would demonstrate good stewardship of resources, 
reduce wear and tear on British facilities, and remind the men that victory lay in France and 
Germany and not the United Kingdom.  It is hard to judge if this was all a cover story to justify 
Lee’s personal preferences when it came to outward appearances, but he always explained the 
underlying principles behind his focus on neatness. 
 More disturbing was an early emphasis on defense of fixed sites against air and ground 
attack.  By November 1942 the idea of a ground attack against a U.S. installation in the United 
Kingdom was ridiculous, and SOS had no resources with which to detect or defend against air 
attack.  If these tasks had been explained as skills that would be necessary once the command 
had shifted to the continent, they would have made perfect sense and could have been judged a 
logical use of available time.  But Lee framed the air and ground threat as ever-present in Great 
Britain, and he demanded the completion of thorough plans for base defense over the winter of 
1942/1943.  One wonders how well soldiers were motivated to practice base defense after 
parachutists, infiltrators, and saboteurs failed to materialize month after month.  It was also 
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surprising that Lee provided so much detail on the individual and common tasks he wanted 
soldiers to cover, yet he had practically nothing to say about the technical skills the command 
needed to work on or about how to conduct the coordination he anticipated would be required for 
success in combat.24  Later developments suggested that Lee trusted his service chiefs to figure 
out how to improve technical skills, but the command never figured out how to conduct exercises 
to practice coordination and synchronization at the base section and SOS headquarters. 
 Leaders within ETOUSA understood that they needed to train inexperienced personnel 
and units while working out systems that would function not only in Britain but also under 
combat conditions in France.  General Ross, the ETO chief of transportation, asked for engines 
and flatcars for his men to use in Great Britain.  The Americans would use them to execute 
Bolero; then they would turn around and ship them to France to reconstitute a working rail 
system there.25  Ross also insisted that U.S. soldiers help operate, maintain, and control rail 
distribution in the U.K. despite initial British resistance to the idea.  During the first eighteen 
months of Bolero the British tried to rely exclusively on rail to distribute American cargo inland, 
but the accelerating pace of deployment eroded resistance to motor transport during the fall of 
1943.  The Allies had not wanted to rely on trucks to deliver supplies inland because of concerns 
for the safety of civilians on the crowded and narrow British roads, but the surge of U.S. men 
and material during the first half of 1944 forced a reassessment.  Ross started using trucks to help 
disperse the flood of American units and equipment; the added benefit was extra driver training 
for the truck companies and more experience coordinating movements in the transportation 
 
24 In all fairness, in November 1942 there was no officer on active service in the U.S. Army with a practical 
understanding of how to run a zone of communications in combat.  As an engineer, Lee was not a master of how 
requisition and distribution were supposed to work at the tactical level, much less at the scale of a theater of war.  
Experts would emerge from North Africa, the Mediterranean, the Pacific, and the CBI over the next year to eighteen 
months.        
25 Ruppenthal, Vol I, 150.  General Board 128, 7.     
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offices.  Between October 1943 and May 1944 U.S. trucks moved 1.1 million long tons, or a 
third of the total cargo delivered during this period, from the ports to the depots.26 As an added 
benefit, U.S. drivers gained experience working on narrow and congested roads in bad weather, 
and U.S. truck units practiced large-scale traffic control procedures. 
 Throughout the months leading up to the invasion of France, SOS needed to train and 
integrate labor from a wide range of sources.  By late 1943 it was estimated that 80,000 British 
civilians and military personnel were working alongside SOS.  Lee was also allocated general 
support labor, men above and beyond the command’s authorized strength, who could come from 
any MOS or organization, triggering the need for another round of on-the-job training.  By 1 
March 1943 these surplus personnel numbered 1,905 officers, 149 warrant officers, and 5,942 
enlisted men, amounting to almost 90% of manpower above authorization allocated to 
ETOUSA.27  They were eventually joined by 7,800 labor troops provided by the new Italian 
government; these troops tended to be relatively well trained and often included experienced 
veterans, but they were restricted to serving only in the British Isles.  Although British civilians, 
Italian POWs, and borrowed manpower helped SOS accomplish its mission, borrowing 
manpower was a flawed compromise because these men and women could not accompany the 
command to France.28  When SOS deployed to the continent, they left behind almost 100,000 
trained personnel who had to be replaced by soldiers unfamiliar with the tasks they had to 
shoulder. 
 Lee deserves recognition for helping to establish a new course designed to redress a 
significant gap in planning among Allied logistics officers that became apparent during the 
 
26 Ruppenthal, Vol I, 152. 
27 General Board, 128, 33.   
28 There was also a legal opinion that using enemy prisoners of war to directly support the Allied war effort violated 
the Hague Conventions. 
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preparations for Torch.  Ruppenthal addressed the Joint Q School at some length in Volume I of 
Logistical Support of the Armies, but he was a bit too diplomatic in explaining why Lee wanted 
to establish the course.29  The idea for this course, which was suggested by British Quartermaster 
General LTG Riddell-Webster, endorsed by Lee, and passed along to the ETOUSA 
commander.30  Eisenhower approved this recommendation without comment, but what was more 
impressive was General Lee’s personal commitment to this project over the next year.  He 
assigned COL George A. Lincoln as the first U.S. co-director.  Lincoln was a Rhodes Scholar 
and, until recently, a professor of economics and government at West Point.31  Lee recognized 
that the course needed to have a combined and joint faculty and student body, and he followed 
up to secure the right instructors and applicants himself.  Before the trial run of the course, Lee 
wrote a private letter to the VIII Bomber Command CG explaining that he would reserve two of 
the fifteen U.S. slots for Air Force personnel and hoped they would exploit this recurring 
opportunity.  Lee encouraged his own staff to attend the course and reinforced that message 
when he publicly praised his Inspector General for doing so in the fall of 1943.  When Lincoln 
was transferred to work for Marshall in April 1943, Lee appointed Colonel Royal B. Lord, his 
chief of operations, as his replacement.32  The school eventually occupied two buildings with on-
site billeting and dining capabilities, and it had eight faculty members, with an administrative 
 
29 Ruppenthal, Vol I, 337-338. 
30 Letter, Letter Lee to Eisenhower, 7 Oct 42. Endorsement of a British offer to establish a joint-combined logistics 
planning course and enlarge the concept by offering to add Americans to the faculty.  RG 498, UD 578, Box 3818, 
ADM 181, NARA II 
31 Ibid. 
32 Letter, Lee to Lord, 8 May 43.  The letter appointed Lord as the U.S. director of the Joint Q School, explained the 
mission and purpose of the course, and elaborated on Lord’s duties as the U.S. director.  When not working at the 
school, Lord remained the chief of operations for the London-based portion of SOS staff.  When Lord moved up to 
become the chief of staff for SOS, he was replaced by Stratton in late November 1943. 
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and support staff of approximately 50 U.S. personnel.33  During the school’s one-year existence, 
classes were conducted monthly, and the class size grew from 30 to 70 officers.  The U.S. Army 
had 470 graduates, the British 492.  Most of the students came from SOS, the technical services, 
V and VII Corps, FUSA and FUSAG, SHAEF, and the 8th Air Force.34  The only organization 
that seemed to be underrepresented in the fourteen class cycles was the headquarters of 
ETOUSA.35   
 The rank and experience of the instructors at the school were impressive.  The key British 
instructors were a brigadier and lieutenant colonel from Q Branch joined by a host of expert 
guest lecturers.36  The British colonel assigned as the principal LNO to SOS was assigned 
additional duty with the faculty at the Q Course.  The school director attempted to bring in 
outside lecturers with recent operational experience to maintain currency and to help keep 
students’ attention.37  Lee asked for the permanent assignment of a naval officer and for a 
representative from ETOUSA in January 1943 as the course evolved beyond its original scope.38  
 In its final version, the Joint Q Planning Course was a twelve-day event divided into 
three major parts.  The first two days were committed to a detailed orientation of both militaries, 
including air and naval assets, combat and support unit composition, and the structure of the 
 
33 Orientation Letter for COL Stratton, 14 Dec 43.  This letter was written by the school staff to bring Stratton up to 
speed on the course and its history.  Stratton took over in the middle of what proved to be the last standard class.  
There was a final class in January 1944 dedicated exclusively to SHAEF, which sent about 50 officers to the course.   
34 “Roster of U.S. Attendees from Jan 43 to Jan 44 Sorted by Major Command.”  RG 498, UD 578, Box 3818, ADM 
181, NARA II. 
35 It is possible that some officers credited to the technical services were actually working at ETOUSA.   
36 Copy of the schedule, curriculum, syllabus, and reference material, first Joint Q Planning Course, Jan 43.  RG 
498, UD 458, Box 3818, ADM 181, NARA II.  In this first iteration, many topics were covered by LTCs, COLs, and 
BGs. 
37 Letter assigning Stratton as the U.S. director of the school, Nov 43.  The statement implies that one of Stratton’s 
key responsibilities is to find these experts and enlist their aid. 
38 Letter Lee to Eisenhower, 4 Jan 43.  In this same letter Lee informed Eisenhower that the location of the course 
was shifting from Camberley to Norfolk House, to make it easier on the faculty, guest lectures, and majority of the 
students.  
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senior headquarters of both militaries in the U.K.  The second part of the program explained 
doctrine, technique, and best practices associated with amphibious assault operations.  There was 
special emphasis on mounting the assault force, planning logistical support, and organization of 
the beach area for the build-up phase.  The last phase, lasting approximately five days, saw the 
class prepare a number of staff estimates and plans to cover all aspects of an expeditionary 
operation at the task-force level.39  Lee pointed out that one goal of the school from its inception 
had been to study certain aspects of amphibious operations in isolation, work out the best 
methods of solving problems noted in the Mediterranean, and to feed techniques back out to 
COSSAC and the operating forces.  One repercussion of the strict focus on the assault landing 
phase of amphibious operations was that very little time was available to discuss what the course 
referred to as the maintenance project for the second phase.  This block was allocated two hours 
of the eleven-day schedule.40  This made sense, and it spoke to fierce prioritization enforced by 
the co-directors.  The course was designed to train amphibious planners in the nuts and bolts of 
loading, unloading, and sustaining a task force overseas, not to prepare them to replace a base 
sector or COMZ command.  The Joint Q planning course was, by all accounts an excellent 
program that helped train almost 1,000 operational planners for many of the critical tasks faced 
by SHAEF between April and July 1944.  
 
 
39 This task force included a naval component of combatant and landing ships, air units, and multiple brigades and 
divisions of ground elements with follow-on sustainment forces.   
40 This decision was perfectly logical.  The Joint Q Course was designed to address the shortcomings observed 
during planning for Torch.  Once ground forces were ashore, larger standing organizations would take over the 
sustainment mission.  It was assumed that corps, armies, and theater commands knew how to organize and run 
logistics, and nothing from the experience in North Africa suggested the Allies had anything other than a 
prioritization dilemma.    
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 Office of the Chief of Transportation, ETOUSA 
 SOS, COMZ, and ETOUSA were well served by the theater office of the chief of 
transportation (OCOT) led by MG Frank S. Ross.  Lee and Devers not only had the foresight to 
build their own transportation section modeled on the new Transportation Service; they went one 
step further.  In the summer of 1943 authority over motor transport was shifted from Littlejohn to 
Ross, who immediately established a motor transport service and later formed additional units 
designed to synchronize truck support for COMZ and field armies.  Ross created a professional 
team that contributed significantly to the planning effort for Overlord and integrated air, truck, 
rail, sea, and inland waterway transportation on the continent.  Maximizing the lessons learned 
during his two-month experience as the AFHQ chief of transportation, Ross created a capable 
organization that anticipated the skill sets, subordinate organizations, and resources needed to 
sustain a drive to the Rhine.  The U.S. Army’s failure to follow up on Ross’ recommendations to 
reorganize COMZ and outfit it with an adequate force of heavy trucks to support the breakout 
from Normandy had far-reaching consequences.  One could argue that the Allies failed to reach 
the Rhine River in September 1944 largely because they lacked the heavy trucks that had been 
requested by the OCOT thirteen months earlier.        
The decision to organize a transportation service in the United Kingdom predated the 
intent to form ETOUSA and its SOS.  Responding to a British request for U.S. help, the War 
Department informed MG Chaney on 22 April that COL Frank Ross and four assistants would 
be dispatched to form the core of a transportation office.41  Ross had been working in the WD G-
4 transportation branch for the previous four years and had just received orders transferring him 
 
41 Bykofsky and Larson, 74 and note 13.  Chaney asked that the number be increased to Ross plus twelve assistants 
against an end strength of fifty to sixty officers necessary to manage movements related to Bolero. 
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to command of a medium-tank regiment in the 10th Armored Division.  He had never served 
outside  the Infantry Branch prior to his four-year assignment in the WD G-4, having joined the 
Texas National Guard in 1916, advancing from private to 1SG in less than a year, and then 
receiving a direct commission into the infantry in 1917.42  Ross reached France in October 1918 
but did not see combat.  Between the two wars Ross served in the Philippines, headed the ROTC 
detachment at North Dakota State, commanded a medium-tank company at Fort Benning, and 
attended both CGSC and the Army War College.   
Ross and his small team linked up with Lee and the rest of SOS staff during their 
orientation period in Washington, traveled together by plane, and reached London on 12 May 
1942.  Initially the transportation section was limited to overseeing rail and maritime movement; 
motor transport was largely a quartermaster function with vehicle maintenance handled by the 
ordnance corps.  When SOS moved out to Cheltenham in July 1942, Ross split his office in half, 
leaving a team in London to work with the British on Bolero and to support early Torch 
planning.  In mid-August he decided his entire section was more useful in the city and he 
consolidated his people at the Selfridges’ Annex, less than a mile northwest of AFHQ 
headquarters at Norfolk House and two blocks from ETOUSA.43  Ross frequently attended 
Gale’s daily CAO coordination meeting from August to late October, and he served in Algiers 
from 11 November 1942 to 26 January 1943 when he was replaced by his deputy from 
ETOUSA, COL George Stewart.  Upon his return to London, Ross expanded the ETOUSA 
transportation service staff from three to seven divisions by breaking the motor, rail, and 
 
42 Irwin Ross, “Ross of ETO,” Army Transportation Journal 1, no. 3 (April 1945): 35. 
43 Bykofsky and Larson, 79.   
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maritime components of operations into their own divisions and adding movement coordination 
and supply divisions.44 
   
Figure 4.3: Organization of the Chief of Transportation, ETOUSA, Oct 43 
 
Ross felt plagued by a lack of qualified personnel during the first half of 1943 and 
decided he would have to do something internally to address technical shortcomings among 
transportation organizations.45  Ross decided to open his own technical school modeled on the 
Joint Q Planning Course to retrain officers and enlisted men.  Located at Avonmouth near 
Bristol, the first five-and-a-half-day course was launched on 1 August.  Ross’s commitment to 
the program was clear; he devoted three hours of his own time during each course to give two 
presentations, and he ensured that each of his division leaders explained his role in person to the 
class.46  This training was aimed at company grade officers and young NCOs within the U.S. 
transportation network working in the U.K.  It was designed to explain in detail how the U.S. 
 
44 Bykofsky and Larson, 79-80.  Administration and planning were the last two divisions.  This was the structure 
Ross maintained for the rest of the war. 
45 Bykofsky and Larson, 84.   
46 Course Outline, TC Training School, Movement, 24 Oct 43.  RG 498, UD 578, Box 3854, ADM 348. 
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structure was organized from the OCOT down to base, region, district, and Railway Traffic 
Offices (RTOs) and then how that American structure meshed with its British counterparts.  The 
course was designed to make transportation personnel comfortable with rail, port, and motor 
operations and movement control under administrative and combat conditions.  Teaching 
material provided a set of common references, terms, and the appropriate points of contact within 
each branch and division in the transportation section on the theater staff.  Graduates would not 
have expert command of the process, but they would understand how the system worked and 
where to turn for help.  Although almost all the material was taught in the context of how to 
operate in the U.K., most of the concepts and procedures were just as valid in a combat zone.  
Questioned about the training after the war, Ross claimed it produced excellent results.47  
One of Ross’ first initiatives upon reaching the U.K. was the activation of a motor 
transport service within his office under LTC Gustave A. Vogel.  During the first year of its 
existence Vogel’s division had no authority and very little to do, acting as a liaison between the 
ordnance and quartermaster sections to improve training, procurement of repair parts, and assess 
the quality of equipment in truck units.48  But the importance of this division grew rapidly when 
SOS transferred responsibility for all motor transportation from the Quartermaster Service to the 
Transportation Service in July 1943.  LTC Loren A. Ayers acted as the first MT division chief 
under this new arrangement.  Ross tasked Ayers to produce two papers for the War Department 
that same month: an estimate of the trucks needed for operations in France, and a justification to 
form an element of motor transport that would be the equivalent of Railway Grand Divisions, 
which, when eventually established, was called Highway Transportation Divisions.49  It was 
 
47 Bykofsky and Larson, 84.    
48 “Motor Transport Service”, History of Transportation Service, ETOUSA, 1942-1945.  RG 498, UD 1210, Box 
5981, 1. 
49 Ibid, 3, 5. 
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obvious from these moves that Ross understood the major shortfall within the U.S. Army to be 
that insufficient resources were dedicated to maximizing the effectiveness of wheeled 
transportation.      
Ayers completed both projects in the first half of August.   His proposal for a provisional 
MTS headquarters was approved by Ross and passed along to the War Department on 8 August, 
followed five days later by a detailed estimate of truck assets needed to support the first ninety 
days of operations in France.50  Ross and Ayers envisioned inserting a coordination agency 
between QM truck battalions assigned to COMZ and the base or theater transportation sections.  
The purpose of the organization was to coordinate closely with the combat echelon, be it an army 
or army group, to identify the most critical supplies of the moment.  Once these priorities were 
confirmed, the HTD would figure out where those supplies were by working with COMZ staff, 
technical service sections, and base section leaders.  Finally, the HTD would direct task-
organized teams of service units to deliver those supplies to dumps located in the combat zone.  
This organization did not serve the same purpose as a truck regiment or the provisional brigade 
formed within SOS in May 1944, because the traffic division combined command with staff 
coordination and because it was designed to synchronize service troops from four to six services.  
Personnel would come from existing quartermaster group headquarters, augmented with 
functional experts from other units to form these 60-man elements.51  The War Department 
authorized ETOUSA to form one experimental headquarters with existing personnel, which they 
did in November 1943.  The War Department did not acknowledge an Army-wide requirement 
for this organization, nor did it approve the recommended table of organization during the course 
 
50 Ibid, 3, 25. 
51 “Recommended Organization and Function of a HQ, Motor Transport Service Division” 26 Jul 45.  RG 498, UD 
1210, Box 5981.  This document was copy of the original T/O recommendation submitted in August 1943, prepared 
for inclusion in USFET General Board reports.     
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of the war in Europe.52  But because of the drive demonstrated by Ross, ETOUSA had an 
experienced motor transport section under COL Ayers and one motor transport brigade that was 
activated in early May available for Overlord.  Highway transportation divisions would follow in 
the fall and winter of 1944 – 1945.  
The provisional motor transport brigade (MTB) was established in early May under the 
command of COL Richmond and MSG Robert J. Logan and equipped with a small staff of 
ordnance personnel.  Richmond would command all truck companies in Normandy working for 
the ADSEC and not directly assigned to 1st Army, but he had no formal authority over those 
units until everyone reached France.53  As a result, Richmond could do nothing in May to better 
prepare his command for combat beyond train his small brigade staff.  The official history of the 
ETOUSA motor transportation service noted that the MTB lacked the range of expertise required 
to perform its mission, and most truck companies still had received no formal training on how to 
maintain their heavy equipment as late as December 1944.54  Coincidently, the various full-force 
rehearsals conducted in the spring and the invasion mounting operation that consumed much of 
May proved to be excellent training for the truck companies, MTB, and OCOT.  At one point in 
April and May a peak of 105 2.5-ton truck companies were shuttling men and equipment to their 
final marshalling areas, often forcing the MTS to conduct twenty-four-hour operations in foul 
weather.  They did not realize it at the time, but it was excellent exposure to the challenges they 
would face in August. 
 
52 ETOUSA eventually activated four closely associated provisional units: 6955th HHC, MTS and the 6956, 6977, 
and 6958 HHC, HTD.  The Highway Transportation Divisions directly supported the three field armies of 12th AG 
while the MTS worked with 12th AG, the ADSEC, and COMZ headquarters.    
53 History of Transportation Service, 7.   
54 Ibid, 8. 
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General Ross and his subordinates in the Transportation Service tended to be a few steps ahead 
of SOS and better attuned to emerging priorities in ETOUSA and COSSAC.  The transportation 
section anticipated requirements in a timely manner and then maintained pressure on the ASF to 
deliver them.  Ross also recognized the need for teams to plan and control transportation that 
could be split off to support the ADSEC and FECZ.  During the fall of 1943 Ross directed his 
deputy, COL Traub, to pull members from each division and organize an advanced section from 
the transportation office that would finalize planning for Overlord and would accompany the 
combat elements to Normandy.55  The other divisions remained heavily involved in operational 
planning, but Traub understood that his team would be responsible for executing the plan and 
making changes on the fly.  After the FECZ was formed in February 1944, Traub’s staff was 
assigned to that headquarters and, working in tandem with the transportation section at the 
ADSEC, developed the transportation annex for Overlord.  That same month Traub began 
coordinating his efforts with the 1st Army and with the ADSEC transportation office, which was 
eventually headed by COL George W. Beeler.56  The ADSEC team shifted from Cheltenham and 
London to Bristol in March to join the 1st Army staff.  Traub, Ayers, and Richmond represented 
Ross’s interests on the continent until he reunited his service in mid-August.  They would prove 
to be a capable team that overcame a host of obstacles, playing a large role in enabling the 
pursuit across France to almost pierce the Westwall. 
 
 
55 Bykofsky and Larson, 83, 234. 
56 Ibid, 235.  This staff was composed of personnel transferred from the OCOT, 4th Port, and 3rd Group Regulating 
Station and placed under COL Sibley, the Mersey port commander.  This transportation organization cycled through 
three officers-in-charge in less than a month.  Beeler would be replaced by Traub in mid-July; the ADSEC 
transportation section was absorbed by Ross upon his arrival with the rest of the COMZ staff in mid-August.   
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 Preparing for Overlord: The Troop Basis and Stockpiling of Material  
 In many ways, the first fundamental task for ETOUSA was to represent the United States 
in deliberations with the United Kingdom on the size and composition of Army forces that 
should be positioned in Great Britain for use in the war against Germany.  Because the answer to 
that question depended on how exactly the combined bomber offensive and the amphibious 
invasion of France would be conducted, the process for reaching it was long, complicated, and 
frustrating.  In a perfect world the Allies would have developed detailed operational plans for 
landing, securing a lodgment, and breaking out somewhere in France and then would have 
worked backwards from there.  But this was an impossibility in the early spring of 1942.  In a 
process we will examine in detail below, Allied planners agreed on very general goals centered 
on getting a million American soldiers to Great Britain in a twelve-month deployment window 
and working out the details later.   
The entire process was riddled with variables beyond the planners’ control.  Without 
knowing exactly what equipment or specialized troops would be needed for success in the first 
stage of the invasion, ETOUSA started the planning process already on shaky ground.  To reach 
the final goals of the deployment, the War Department needed to fill ships with men and cargo 
every month for nine to twelve months to deliver between 750,000 and a million men to the U.K.  
No one could wait for the publication of the final operational plan and still move the invasion 
force to the U.K.  Training and production were just ramping up in the U.S., and no one could 
guarantee that a balanced force equipped with modern weapons would be ready for movement on 
a reliable schedule.  Forecasting lift over twelve months’ time was a crapshoot; losses to 
submarine attack, new construction, and competing priorities were impossible to predict in early 
1942.  The War Department would rely on USAFBI/ETOUSA, working with their British 
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counterparts, to determine if this flood of American equipment and men could be received and 
disbursed to bases and depots and to see what U.S. assistance would be required if the British 
could not disperse it by themselves. 
Regardless of how well the Allies produced a flow of generic forces, the final scheme of 
maneuver, approved by the actual commanders of the operation, would eventually result in major 
changes to the troop basis.  But this could not happen until the CCS agreed upon a concrete date, 
location, and scheme of maneuver for Roundup, a tortured process that featured prominently in 
the major Allied conferences and leader visits from June 1942 to August 1943.  The first 
breakthrough was at Trident in May 1943, but a sense that planning for Roundup would take on a 
new intensity first emerged from Quadrant in August 1943.  Although a positive development 
from the planning perspective, a fixed suspense for the landing hardly eliminated further major 
changes in the fundamental variables ETOUSA was trying to address.  In January 1944 
Montgomery and Eisenhower agreed to a major expansion of the scope of the initial amphibious 
and airborne assault and, as a result, a one-month delay to the invasion date.  Anvil, the operation 
designed to liberate southern France and support Overlord, remained in flux until virtually the 
week of its execution.57  Doubtlessly frustrated, ETOUSA had no choice but to work around 
these shifts in aspects of the plan and to do the best they could, fully realizing that any changes 
they might eventually make to production or deployment schedules would have no reliable 
concrete impact on operations unless they were made more than twelve to fifteen months prior to 
their desired effect. 
 
57 There were doubts if Anvil would occur at all.  Once the Allies agreed to conduct the operation, the target date 
and exact landing locations changed as well. 
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It was easy to talk about 1.1 million men, or even to debate what percentage of that force 
should go to air, ground, and support forces.  The tricky part was translating very large raw 
numbers into specific formations.  How many infantry divisions, fighter wings, tank destroyer 
battalions, quartermaster truck companies, engineer special brigades, and transportation port 
operating battalions did ETOUSA need?  The simple answer was that it depended on the 
campaign concept, but this was a delaying tactic the Allies could not afford to accept.  ETOUSA 
had to be thinking nine to twelve months into the future; the longer they waited to get started, the 
longer it would be before they could stage Roundup.  The Allies had to make their best guess as 
to what a balanced invasion force should look like and refine it as they went along. 
Early benchmarks on the proper mix of the three major types of forces came from two 
very different but related procedures: a top-down and bottom-up approach.  The top-down 
approach looked to historical precedent and the current composition of the U.S. Army to impose 
fixed percentages among the three types of forces.58  The War Department drew up raw planning 
numbers in June 1942 to guide detailed planning by ETOUSA, basing the rough numbers  on the 
composition of the AEF in 1918; the allocation of American manpower among  the AGF, AAF, 
and ASF; and feedback from operations between 1939 and mid-1942. 
Type Strength  Percentage % Cbt/Serv 
AAF 206,400 19.3  
SOS 279,145 26 32% 
HQ 4,000 .4  
20 x Divisions 278,473 26  
 
58 Hypothetically, recent combat experience might have led to the conclusion that a theater needed more of one 
specific portion of the force than the Army could afford to provide based on competing global commitments.  The 
desire for more truck companies to support Overlord was at least partially supported by recent operational 
experience, but this had to be balanced against similar requests from other theaters.  The U.S. Army was large and 
well-equipped, but never large enough to make everyone happy.   This realization hit the War Department hard in 
the fall of 1943.  
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Ground Combat Spt Troops 303,110 28.3  
Divs + Gnd Spt 581,583 54.3 68% 
Total 1,071,060 100% 100% 
Table 4.1: WD strength projections for Bolero / Roundup, Jun 4259   
 Someone at the War Department had decided that twenty U.S. divisions was an adequate 
number with which to launch Roundup in April 1943.  Twenty divisions required a similar 
number of men in non-divisional combat and combat-related units to support them.60  The AEF 
consisted of about 32% service troops in 1918; this was as good a number as any with which to 
start estimates of support needed for Roundup.61  The War Department judged this planning 
guidance sufficient for ETOUSA to turn around and complete a bottom-up assessment to 
validate or refine these numbers, and flesh them out into specific branches, services, and unit 
types.  Eventually COSSAC and ETOUSA would understand the detailed tasks required to make 
Roundup a success, and the number of formations required to accomplish all those tasks.  
Working together, the War Department and ETOUSA would agree on a total number of men, 
divided into rough percentages by type, which would then be translated into divisions, 
supporting battalions and groups, wings, and service units deemed sufficient to execute the 
mission.    
 The process might sound simple, but reaching agreement on all of the variables involved 
proved to be practically impossible.  COL Barker, the ETOUSA chief of plans, was quick to 
point out that the War Department was promising to deliver 35,000 more men by 1 April 1943 
 
59 Memo, Barker to AGWAR, “Troop Basis” 15 Jun 42.  RG 498, UD 578, Box 3854, ADM 346.  COL Barker was 
the USAFBI / ETOUSA chief of plans when he responded to this WD guidance. 
60 Such as independent tank and tank destroyer battalions, reconnaissance groups, artillery battalions, combat 
engineers, and AAA units.  The U.S. Army divided these forces into combat and combat support clusters.  Figuring 
out exact numbers is difficult because some branches or services had force structure that fit into two or even all three 
categories.  The Corps of Engineers provides a good example. 
61 Excluding the AAF, which contained organic support capacity and would operate at least partially from the U.K. 
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than the planners in London believed possible.  He also pointed out that the plan did not account 
for a pool of combat-arms replacements; even as small a percentage as 5% of ground combat 
forces amounted to another 30,000 men.  Barker acknowledged that he could not speculate about 
how more shipping might become available.  Without more ships, however, the plan would have 
to eliminate 65,000 men from the projected invasion force.  It was the opening salvo in a two-
year process to try to reach consensus.     
 
 Torch and The Expansion Plan for the U.S. Army 
One of the vital drivers of the deployment process was the availability of U.S. 
formations, and in early 1942 this consisted primarily of infantry divisions.  As part of a 
deliberate plan of phased expansion, the War Department had only allocated 11.8% of its 
projected end strength for 1942 to the service forces, reserving the rest for ground and air units.62  
Marshall prioritized combat units because they needed longer training cycles that included 
extensive collective exercises after basic and individual training.  Furthermore, it was assumed 
within the War Plans Division that the U.S. Army would conduct few if any major offensive 
campaigns using anything beyond a half-dozen divisions before mid-1943.  But the second 
assumption underlying this decision proved faulty and directly contributed to the distribution 
problem experienced in North Africa during the winter of 1942-1943.  Allocation of manpower 
among the AGF, AAF, and ASF balanced out during the second half of 1942 and 1943, but there 
were never enough soldiers to meet all of the requirements.63  As the Army came to grips with its 
 
62 Ruppenthal, Vol I, 117. 
63 Kent R. Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley, The Organization of Ground Combat Troops 
(Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, U.S. Army, 1947), unnumbered table between 160 and 161.  By mid-1943 
the ratio among combat, service, and air units was about 2:1:2, adjusting for service units organic to the AGF and 
deducting non-deployable strength in the U.S.  Between the approved troop basis in November 1942 and that in July 
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manpower limitations by the fall of 1943, a ferocious internal battle began among the AAF, 
AGF, and ASF for prioritization.  This in turn produced overwhelming pressure from the War 
Department on the ASF to figure out how to be more efficient and get by with fewer soldiers.  
The fundamental variables were almost impossible to change; all the ASF could do was prioritize 
some services or units over others or else make better use of Negro troops or the Women’s Army 
Corps (WACs).64 
Type Goal by End Sep 
42 
% 
HQ, SOS 3,730 5 
Misc Admin 3,547 5 
Eng 29,479 40.3 
Med 2530 3.4 
Motor Trans Sec 13,210 18 
Ord 1,692 2.3 
QM 7,544 10.3 
Sig 1,777 2.4 
Transportation 8,854 12.1 
Chem Warfare 681 1 
Total 73,199  
Table 4.2: SOS personnel requests by service (submitted in early June)65  
 
Service Strength (Assign + atch) Percentage 
(Asgn 
only) 
Jun 42 
Projection 
HQ 2,765 6.7 5 
 
1944, service troops as a percentage of AGF formations rose from 11 to 17%.  Total Army strength peaked at seven 
million men.     
64 “Negro” was the orthodox term in the U.S. Army for African-American troops during the war.  In the minutes of 
SOS command and staff meetings, African-Americans were referred to as “colored” troops by the participants.       
65 RG 498, UD 578, Box 3854, ADM 345, Troop Basis.   
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QM 5,798 + 54 14* 10.3 
Med 3,581 + 515 8.7 3.4 
Eng 12,755 + 9,014 31.6+ 40.3 
Ord 4,739  11.6* 2.3 
Sig 1,353 3.3 2.4 
CWS 335 .1 1 
Transpo 4,555 11.1 30.1* 
Misc 5,093 + 1,742 12.4 5 
Sub-Total (assigned) 40,974 (vs 73,199 requested)   
Total (assigned + attached) 52,299   
Table 4.3: SOS strength 31 Oct 4266 
* The original troop request included a large motor transport service; the units that were 
deployed to meet those requirements consisted of QM truck companies and Ordnance repair 
units.   
+ SOS request for engineers would have been met and possibly exceeded without the diversion 
of engineers to Torch 
 
The first command that experienced the implication of these high-level decisions in the 
War Department about allocating manpower was ETOUSA, specifically, Lee’s SOS.  Lee 
emptied out Great Britain to provide as many service troops as possible to support the Central 
and Eastern Task Forces. Even so, these transfers were far from adequate to meet the 
requirements of the full U.S. force.  As soon as the AFHQ and two task forces had deployed to 
North Africa, Lee began trying to build up a solid foundation of service troops in Great Britain to 
execute Bolero.  SOS estimates called for a ground-to-air-to-support force ratio of 2:1:1, or 49%, 
24%, and 27% respectively of the million men the United States anticipated sending to England 
to stage Roundup.67  SOS estimated that it needed eight port battalions and three general service 
 
66 Progress Division, HQ SOS, 9 Nov 42.   RG 498, UD 578, Box 3854, ADM 345, Troop Basis.  The report was 
vague on what exactly “attached” meant, but one assumed that attached units were aligned against Torch and 
awaiting transportation.   
67 Ruppenthal, 117. 
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battalions by the end of September 1942 to keep pace with projected shipments during the rest of 
the year.  They also needed 400 rail engines to help the British to move material from the ports to 
operating bases and depots in the interior of the country.68  The strength of U.S. service troops in 
Great Britain was woefully inadequate to handle the first shipping surge during the summer of 
1942.  Only 2,000 men were on hand in June, rising to 21,000 in July, and topping out at 40,000 
men before dropping off slightly at the beginning of October.69  In light of these limited numbers 
of U.S. service personnel, it was unfair to blame SOS for the supply crisis triggered by the 
emergency cable sent in September 1942 from Everett Hughes calling for supplies.  At the 
beginning of August Lee had about 21,000 men available for duty, and priority number one was 
to get the other 19,000 men who were arriving that month settled in, oriented on the mission in 
Great Britain, and ready to deploy to North Africa as appropriate.  By the time Lee and SOS 
realized that thousands of tons of supplies needed for Torch had disappeared into British 
warehouses it was too late to go back and fix procedural problems that had caused the mess.  It 
was the first of many undeserved blows to the reputation of SOS.           
Either because he had been scarred by the experience in the fall or was frustrated with the 
lack of reinforcements that winter, Lee decided to be more proactive in securing personnel in 
1943.  He flew down for the Casablanca conference, judging it a good opportunity to see both 
Somervell and Eisenhower for the first time in months.  Lee came away from Casablanca with a 
new conviction to secure service troops for ETOUSA, but also with an appreciation that the 
timeline for Roundup had probably shifted into 1944.  He realized that in order to deploy a 
million men from the United States to Great Britain on a compressed timeline, U.S. forces would 
 
68 Ruppenthal, Vol I, 67. 
69 Ruppenthal, Vol I, 99. 
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have to help improve and then operate the British transportation network.  That implied the 
construction of new bases, expansion of British infrastructure, and an injection of skilled and 
unskilled labor to help build and run this system.  It would require men to unload ships, clear 
supplies from the docks, run depots, operate and maintain rail lines, and build and run airfields.  
Lee’s first post-Casablanca troop estimate called for 358,000 men to support a total of 1.1 
million U.S. personnel in the U.K., not including support units embedded at the army level and 
below.70  This was the first ETOUSA estimate that cited numbers from the U.S. experience from 
World War One to justify a leap from 25 to 33% of the total available manpower.  Lee’s request 
was largely ignored because of what others considered more pressing needs in North Africa and 
a lack of serious commitment to Roundup during the first half of 1943.  
 
The Impact of Trident and Quadrant on Roundup Planning, May to November 1943 
Force Strength % Strength % 
Ground 391,660 44% 391,660 61.5% 
Air 250,691 28%   
SOS 245,584 28% 245,584 38.5% 
Total 887,935 100% 637,244 100% 
Table 4.4: Revised Roundup projections, May 4371 
 
Ground, by Branch/Service  %  SOS, by Branch/Service  % 
Anti-Aircraft Arty (AAA) 59,000 14.7  Eng 51.7k 22.3 
 
70 Ruppenthal, Vol I, 117.  Lee and the ASF could argue that 33% of the total force was reasonable based upon the 
AEF experience.  The problem was this dismissed the portion of service troops at the army level and below.  
Assuming support units made up 10 to 15% of the air and ground combat strength, the total strength of service 
troops started to edge towards 40 to 48% of ETOUSA manpower. 
71 Letter, ETO to AGWAR, 1 May 43.  RG 498, UD 587, Box 3857, ADM 369: SOS ETO Tentative Overall Plan – 
Book I, Manpower, Supplement 1.  The total number and percentage by type was based on a projection on what 
could be moved to the UK by 1 April 1944 and would be required to conduct and support Roundup, excluding other 
forces already in the UK or moved there for other purposes.     
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Ord 14,751 3.7  QM 41.3k 17.8 
Sig 12,300 3.1  Med 43.2k 18.7 
Eng 36,100 9  Sig 7.7k 3.3 
QM 20,300 5.1  Chem 5.2k 2.2 
Med  22,200 5.5  Ord 36.8k 15.9 
Chem War Service (CWS) 6,700 1.7  Trans 23.0k 10 
Total (Service) 112,351 28  Provost Marshal 8.0k 3.5 
Total (Cbt Spt - AAA) 59,000 14.7  HQ, SOS 14.0k 6 
Inf, Arm, TD, FA 287,649 57.3  Total 231k  
Total 400,000      
Table 4.5: May 43 Roundup troop basis by branch and service; rounded to nearest hundred72 
 
Type Strength % 
Combat 100,000 40 
Service and HQ 150,000 60 
Total 250,000  
Table 4.6: 1 May 43 Roundup troop basis for the AAF by type 
 
Allied thoughts of invading France revived after the Trident Conference in May 1943; 
progress against the U-boat threat and success in North Africa permitted a more optimistic 
outlook.  Under these more favorable conditions, U.S. planners hoped to transport 1.4 million 
U.S. service members to Great Britain by 1 May 1944, to accelerate the combined bomber 
offensive, and stage Roundup.  This moderate increase in the number of men the U.S. hoped to 
deploy to Britain, combined with the renewed commitment to launching Roundup in 1944, drove 
ETOUSA to update their troop basis estimates in the summer of 1943.  SOS held its first follow-
 
72 Ibid.  Categorizing combat forces is problematic.  Some percentage of the AAA, Engineer, and CWS troops listed 
here as service or combat support forces often engaged in direct combat with enemy ground formations, while some 
FA and AAA units were used as service troops for short periods of time.  The percentages are helpful for general 
comparisons, but they were likely to fluctuate over time under combat conditions. 
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up meeting after Trident on 28 May at Cheltenham.  The group could not agree upon a complete 
forecast for service forces, but it did draft a new product – the long-term forecast – to supplement 
the short-term forecast. 73  This document extended the planning horizon from 30 to 90 days, 
prioritizing units crucial to keep Bolero on track and seeking War Department confirmation that 
the forces would be shipped within the next three months.   
Work on a comprehensive new troop basis continued under Lee throughout June and 
July, but the July figures were shot down by the War Department.  This estimate, prepared by 
Lee in his new role as the theater G-4, reserved 51% of the force for air and support units, 
leaving only 49% for the Army Ground Forces.  The War Department balked, pointing out that 
ground forces comprised 59% of NATOUSA at that time and seemed a more reasonable figure.74   
A significant issue was that ETOUSA and the War Department did not have a common 
language with which to discuss the subject.  Furthermore, there was no concrete scheme of 
maneuver for Roundup in July and August, nor was there much data from active theaters on what 
the right mixture of service forces was to support deep mobile operations.  Precedent existed to 
support both sides of the argument, but, without an approved, detailed scheme of maneuver 
associated with the Roundup concept, SOS struggled to justify their demands for service units.  
The War Department responded to the July estimate with a series of fundamental questions that 
lay at the heart of any attempt to match manpower requirements to resources.  Could service 
troops work outside of their area of expertise as general labor, or learn a secondary specialization 
for those times when a higher priority arose or when the unit was not consumed by its primary 
mission?  What was a realistic limit to the number of hours per day and the number of days per 
 
73 Memo, SOS, 25 May.  Minutes from Meeting on 28 May.  RG 498, UD 578, Box 3854, ADM 345 Troop Basis.   
74 Ruppenthal, Vol I, 121, 125. 
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week that a soldier could work?  Would civilian, prisoner of war, or unemployed labor be 
available to supplement SOS efforts in France?   
The War Department failed to recognize the hypocrisy of demanding justification of the 
service troop estimates based upon some linkage to the operational plan while insisting that SOS 
prioritize efficiency over effectiveness in its work in Great Britain.  Visitors from the ASF asked 
Lee why he could not consolidate some of the approximately 100 small depots sprinkled around 
the countryside into fewer super-facilities to economize on staff and reduce the amount of traffic 
among them. This suggestion ignored the fact that operations in France would demand a widely 
distributed network of depots the closer one got to the front lines.  Rather than trying to practice 
the critical combat tasks of managing inventory and loading supplies across dozens of scattered 
locations, the War Department seemed to prioritize cutting a few thousand service troops in the 
U.K.  The message coming from Washington about the manpower crunch was reinforced when 
the Army G-1 was the guest of honor at the 16 August 1943 SOS command and staff meeting.75  
His message was clear: no longer could you ask for everything you needed to accomplish the 
mission.  Now was the time to figure out how to get by with less – efficiency would be the name 
of the game.  Lee acknowledged the issue and the War Department perspective, but he would not 
budge on the principle.  France was not the United Kingdom; the country was likely to be a mess 
due to friendly and enemy action, and effective support demanded a certain amount of 
redundancy.  Lee closed by reminding his guests that Torch should have taught everyone the 
risks associated with under-resourcing the service of supply in a theater.     
The War Department was forced to do some soul searching as Quadrant transformed 
Roundup from a distant concept into a looming reality.  COL P. W. Edwards, ETOUSA’s 
 
75 SOS C&S Notes, 16 Aug 43.  RG 498, UD 578, Box 3882, ADM 455, NARA II.   
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principal interface at OPD, wrote the chief of staff on 15 August warning him that the Army G-4 
was pushing back against the latest draft troop basis because there was no associated 
administrative plan to justify the requests.76  Suddenly the need for a draft sustainment concept 
for Roundup became a hot issue, and ETOUSA realized they had nothing on hand that might 
serve as a starting point, and no organization equipped to begin the process.  As a result, Devers 
sped up the process of establishing an operational logistics planning capability in London.  This 
requirement contributed to the decision to place Crawford in London, to Devers’ letter to 
Marshall raising the issue of an Army Group headquarters, and to the assignment of Moses as the 
FUSAG G-4.  Before this Devers had relied on MG Barker as his most experienced and 
knowledgeable expert on Roundup and had dispatched him to cover Quadrant and follow up with 
the War Department on its implications.  In the interim, ETO chiefs of service tried to justify 
their recommended troop lists as best they could.  COL Rowan, head of the Chemical Warfare 
Service, shared with his peers at the end of August that he was struggling mightily.  Many CWS 
units were so new that they had never been committed in combat; there was no point of reference 
to estimate what would be required to support the initial invasion in France.77        
More bad news followed in a pair of letters from COL Edwards on 5 and 7 September.78  
He reported that the War Department, at last, had openly acknowledged that it had 
overcommitted in 1943, promising far more resources than were available.  The immediate 
reaction was a comprehensive review of the troop basis for every theater, a process headed by a 
COL Hodes that had just started that week.  Luckily for ETOUSA, MG Barker was still in town 
and had convinced Hodes of the validity of most of ETOUSA’s requests, but some units were 
 
76 Letter Edwards to Edwards, 15 Aug 43.  RG 498, UD 578, Box 3854, ADM 345 – Troop Basis.   
77 SOS C&S Notes, 30 Aug 43.  RG 498, UD 578, Box 3882, ADM 455, NARA II.  Rowan used smoke generator 
units as a concrete example.   
78 Letters, Edwards to Edwards, 5 and 7 September 1943.  RG 498, UD 458, Box 3854, ADM 345.   
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already on the chopping block, either because the Army had no more of that type and was not 
going to activate more, or because it was generally believed within the War Department that 
other troops could perform those functions as a secondary mission.79  Edwards confirmed that 
this initiative was aimed chiefly at the ASF, the result of General McNarney’s initiative to reduce 
the percentage of service troops in the Army.          
Based on the news coming from Washington, Devers asked for a comprehensive 
reassessment of ETOUSA’s troop basis, telling SOS to submit a new list capped at 375,000 men, 
or 25% of the 1.4 million total, down from the 490,000 on the August list. 80  Devers’ guidance 
was not as unrealistic as it seemed; about 15% of the AGF was comprised of service troops, and 
the AAF comprised a preponderance of service and command personnel and was likely to 
operate a large portion of their force from the U.K anyway.81  The 9th Air Force was equipped to 
be self-sufficient from the army group depot forward, with 65,000 of its 200,000 personnel 
consisting of service troops, plus twenty organic engineer battalions.  When one looked 
exclusively at the number of combat forces requiring support in France against the number of 
service troops assigned to any component of the Army, the ratio was almost exactly 1:1.82  Once 
in France, ETOUSA generally consisted of 50% support units and 50% combat and combat 
support elements.    
 
79 Edwards provided the following examples: fire-fighters, utility [as in building maintenance] detachments, special 
service companies [morale and recreation], photo signal companies, and bomb disposal squads.   
80 Ruppenthal, Vol I., 128.  AGF were allocated 626,000, AAF 417,000, and SOS 375,000 men in the final 
November 1943 estimate approved by the War Department, which had revised the total upward to 1.4 million men.  
Ruppenthal is guilty of presenting the numbers in the worst possible light from SOS perspective.  When one 
considers service troops assigned to in three components of ETOUSA, the support to combat ratio is closer to 1:1. 
81 Moses, Ford, and O’Hara, General Board 30, 3, 15-17.  8th Air Force remained in the U.K.   
82 Obviously, the ratio fluctuated over time, with combat troops frontloaded for Overlord and Anvil and various 
elements of the Allied Airborne Army bouncing back and forth between the U.K. and the continent as needed.   
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To some extent top-down percentages and force caps were immaterial to the discussion 
taking place.  The number 490,000 was the result of a bottom-up process conducted by each 
chief of service, based on the assumptions outlined by PROCO and expanded upon by the 
Americans working at COSSAC.  To reverse-engineer a bottom-up solution that arrived at the 
magical number of 37,500 required overly creative and even dishonest modifications to 
fundamental assumptions.  Each service office had to go back and change the planning estimates 
used to define the scope of the mission and thus the type and number of units needed accomplish 
those tasks within the desired time window.  The only way to do this was to convince oneself 
that the problem was easier.  To accomplish this, they assumed that more French labor would be 
available or that Frenchmen would come looking for work sooner.   They reduced the levels of 
damage anticipated for French infrastructure, and they accelerated their projected rates of repair 
to roads, rail lines, and bridges.  Planners cut how much support they assumed the civilian 
population would require from military sources, and they increased the anticipated windfall of 
supplies to be had from French or German sources.  ETOUSA also maximized the size and rate 
of the Allied force buildup in Normandy and accelerated the projected breakout from the 
lodgment.  SOS acknowledged that its estimates for French and POW labor were based 
completely upon guesswork and that they ignored the need for units to secure the rear area from 
enemy forces and civilian poachers.83  The entire process was about justifying an arbitrary 
number, not arriving at a common set of planning assumptions and then recommending an 
adequate support force.  It is illuminating that the AGF and AAF were not subjected to these 
same external audits of their planning assumptions and percentage of the manpower budget; only 
the ASF had to justify their requests to such a degree. 
 
83 General Board 128, 29. 
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 A Preliminary Assessment of the U.S. Troop Basis 
SOS was always honest about the lack of science behind the process used to generate 
their troop estimates.  Lord and the team that produced GB Report 128 pointed out: “No 
recognized War Department publications offered even a theoretical solution to the problem; they 
merely stated that such requirements would vary under different circumstances.”84  No higher-
level U.S. doctrine addressed this dilemma conceptually, much less with any detailed ratios 
between divisions and corps to their supporting quartermaster, ordnance, and transportation 
units.  By July, operations in the Mediterranean (and the Pacific) provided some rules of thumb, 
but the ASF faced an uphill climb trying to extract detailed information from NATOUSA on the 
distribution of service troops by type.  And each theater was different; the service troops needed 
to support 15th Air Force in North Africa were very different from SOS and base section 
structure used to support fighting in Italy and maintain garrisons in the Mediterranean.  
Operations in Tunisia in the spring of 1943 offered useful rules of thumb, but it was difficult to 
separate British and U.S. contributions within the communications zone and to agree upon a list 
of support units required to back up various types of combat formations.  Somervell finally gave 
up trying to use numbers from World War One to justify a larger ASF in February 1944, after 
Styer and Lutes convinced him that the number of service units in COMZ and combat zone were 
so mixed together as to be worthless.85  The truth was that no one really knew what the proper 
ratios, much less the exact distribution of services, should be.   
 
84 General Board 128, 28. 
85 Memo, Lutes to Somervell, 14 Feb 44, RG 160, Dir P&O, File 73, Box 6.  Somervell initialed his agreement with 
the recommendation. 
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The AGF had an easier task; they spoke of infantry and armored divisions with an 
agreed-upon ratio of supporting combat battalions.  The AAF talked about fighter, bomber, and 
transport wings.  Both air and ground estimates could be justified by the enemy’s strength and by 
established rules of thumb about how much ground a division or corps could hold.  In contrast, 
the War Department demanded that SOS reduce a host of independent variables into simplified 
planning assumptions.  Hitting the nail on the head was impossible, and the only safe bet was to 
err on the side of caution, something that most combat commanders and the War Department did 
not want to hear. 
Command 21 Jun 44 % 21 Jun 44 % 
COMZ 486,015 31% 486,015 42.3% 
Field Forces 661,836 42% 661,836 57.7% 
Other 429,271 27%   
Total 1,577,122  1,147,851  
Table 4.7: ETOUSA Strength, 21 Jun 44, by major command86   
  
Having said all of that, by mid-June 1944 SOS had won the battle to secure a significant 
percentage of the numbers committed to France for service troops.  Service troops comprised at 
least 42% of the force allocated for operations in France, and 15% of the field forces were 
support units as well.  ETOUSA’s percentage of service troops earmarked against operations in 
France was almost identical to the composition of the British 21st AG and 2nd Army in June and 
August.  If matching British percentages and securing an almost 1-to-1 ratio of service to combat 
 
86 The “other” category was not defined; I assume it consists of AAF and U.K. garrison forces not intended for 
immediate deployment to France.  Field forces included about 16% supporting branch and service personnel (signal, 
chemical warfare, TC, QM, AG, ordnance, and medical) organic to divisions, corps, armies, army groups and 
separate formations below division size. 
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forces are reasonable measures of effectiveness, ETOUSA had ensured that logisticians had 
enough troops to support Overlord.  
Branch or Service Percentage of Total 
Strength 
Infantry 16% 
Armor 7% 
Artillery 17% 
Engineer 13% 
Signals 5% 
Service 42% 
Table 4.8: Composition of 2nd British Army by type, Jun 4487 
 
Troop Type (combat or 
service) 
Percentage 
Combat (incl Signal and Eng) 56% (of 660,000) 
Service 44% 
    RASC (QM+TC)     15% (of 660,000) 
    Pioneer (Construct. Eng)     10% 
    REME (Repair)     5% 
    Medical     4% 
    MP, Ordnance, Intel, etc     10% 
Table 4.9: Composition of 21st AG with service breakdown, Aug 4488   
 
 Moses thought that the ratio at the army group level was about right in the aggregate, but 
new combat units tended to arrive well in advance of corresponding service units, creating minor 
 
87 John Buckley, British Armour in Normandy, Citing CAB 106/112, 30 Jun 44.  Signal and some portion of 
engineers would count as service troops in the U.S. Army, so the proper percentage for comparison would be around 
47% or just a bit higher.     
88 Ellis, Vol 1, 536.  21st Army Group numbers included the LoC and base command personnel.  Service troops 
represented around 47% of the total ground force committed to France, adjusting for signal and a portion of 
engineers included in the combat portion of the AG.    
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crises from time to time. 89  If resources were available, the authors of General Board Report 30 
suggested, the percentage of service troops in the field forces should be increased from 14.8 to 
16.8% with the additions captured in the table below.   
Service Number % Desired   Service Number % Desired 
Eng 9,000 .72 +1700  Trans 664 - - 
Chem 2,200 .176 +1500  Med 42,000 3.3 +3900 
QM 75,000 6 +9300  Signal 1,500 .12 +1000 
ORD 54,500 4.4 +12100      
Table 4.10: Service troops in 12th AG by May 45 and desired expansion90 
 
The Allies anticipated almost every logistical challenge they face from June to 
September, and set aside enough resources to overcome them, doing particularly well when it 
came to fixing ports, bridges, rail lines, and building a POL pipeline to support the forward 
armies.  There were artillery ammunition shortages at various stages in the campaign, but this 
had more to do with U.S. production decisions than COMZ’s ability to deliver the supplies.  The 
U.S. would have benefitted from having more cargo aircraft or from committing the aircraft they 
owned to aerial resupply.  But with perfect hindsight, ETOUSA was only confronted by one 
glaring shortage in capability in August and September, and that was in motorized transportation.  
The shortfall could have been mitigated by having more truck companies, switching over to 
heavier trucks, securing at least two drivers for each truck, or using and prioritizing the resources 
that were available. 
It is helpful to remember that ETOUSA accepted 160 truck companies as the bare 
minimum needed to support two armies to at least the Seine and, if properly equipped, to the 
 
89 Moses, Ford, O’Hara, General Board 30, 2-3. 
90 BG Raymond Moses, COL R.O. Ford, and COL J.J. O’Hara, “Service Troop Basis” USFET General Board 
Report 30, 3. 
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Westwall.  Despite an initial slow-down of the original deployment schedule, all these truck 
companies were operating on the continent by mid-August.91  By the end of the war ETOUSA 
had 464 truck companies assigned. One third were allocated to 12th AG, another third probably 
distributed among 6th AG and the two tactical air forces, and between 150 and 200 were 
centralized under COMZ control. 92  ETOUSA’s original estimate of either 160 heavy or 240 
standard 2.5-ton truck companies had not been far from the mark.93           
 
 Dropping the Ball on Heavy Trucks for ETOUSA  
The story of the whittling away of the initial truck company requirements submitted by 
the OCOT, ETOUSA was covered in depth in the official histories of ETOUSA and the 
Transportation Corps.94  However, neither volumes completely untangled a very complex debate 
that lasted almost a full year.  What is well known is that Ross wanted 240 truck companies on 
the continent by D+90, but the ETOUSA G-3 and G-4 authorized only 160.  Ross then asked that 
135 of these be upgraded from standard 2.5-ton trucks to special models including 72 companies 
equipped with various types of heavy tractor-trailer combinations, totaling 3,364 tractors.95  
OCOT also asked that two drivers be provided for each truck, increasing company strength from 
 
91 Ruppenthal and Bykofsky and Larson make much about the slow deployment of truck companies to Normandy, 
but the Red Ball express employed 132 companies during the first days of operation and by mid-September the 
COMZ had 181 companies assigned.  12th AG had another 104 companies under its control.  See page 568 and note 
77 on that page of Ruppenthal, Vol 1 and General Board 30, appendix 1, page 4.   
92 GB 30 Appendix 1, 4.   
93 The COMZ had to support a much larger force in spring 1945, but it could count on trains to handle much of the 
distance.  But when the Allies sustained a thrust across the Rhine deep into Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia, 
it was not because they had many more truck companies compared to the fall of 1944.  Instead, there was superior 
coordination by newly established motor transport organizations and heavy equipment had been fielded to the 
COMZ truck companies.    
94 Ruppenthal, Vol I, 315, 553.  Bykofsky and Larson, 239-242. 
95 These were submitted as PROCO GS 20 and 21 on 31 July 1943.  See Bykofsky and Larson, 240, note 17.  
Ruppenthal, Vol I, 554.   This represented PROCO and CLS IV requirements only.  Six months later the total 
ETOUSA requirement for 4- to 5-ton tractors had increased to 4,167. 
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about 105 to 145 men.  All these requests used as justification the first-hand experience gained in 
North Africa and Italy showing the importance of heavy equipment while keeping enough 
personnel to run trucks between sixteen and twenty-two hours a day.96   
The traditional story of why the ASF failed to provide heavy trucks to ETOUSA before 
Overlord posits that the ASF fought replacing 2.5-tons with heavy trucks, and, when they finally 
agreed to double heavy production in 1944, it was too late and the auto industry could not 
expand quickly enough.97  By April the ASF realized that they had an unsolvable problem; the 
only possible solution at this point was to offer a hodge-podge of substitute vehicles.  In 
hindsight these replacements were no better than the standard 2.5-tons they replaced.98  By the 
time heavy truck production was hitting its stride around October, port congestion in France 
prevented their delivery.99   
The true story of why the ASF failed to fill ETOUSA’s heavy truck request is a bit more 
complex.  The ASF directed the chief of ordnance to double production of heavy trucks in 1944 
from 35,000 units to 67,000 units on 26 July 1943.100  The U.S. Army accepted 38,314 heavy-
heavy trucks and trailers in 1943 and an additional 20,008 from January to June 1944.101  There 
were major problems with the expansion plan that the ordnance department tried to execute in 
1944, but there were plenty of trucks to meet ETOUSA’s requirement.  By the end of July 
ETOUSA had received 350 4- and 5-ton trailers with another 200 on the way; by the end of July 
 
96 SOS C&S Notes, 1 Feb 44.  RG 498, UD 578, Box 3883, ADM 456, NARA 2.  Lee was surprised to hear that the 
WD was pushing back on the request for two drivers per truck and asked Ross if he had cited Lee’s observations 
from a recent trip to Italy and more generalized reports coming out of North Africa.  Ross assured Lee that he had. 
97 Harry C. Thompson and Lida Mayo, The Ordnance Department: Procurement and Supply (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1960), 286-287.  Ruppenthal, Vol I, 554.   
98 Ruppenthal, Vol I, 555. 
99 Ruppenthal, Vol II, 243. 
100 Thompson and Mayo, 286, note 91. 
101 Ibid, 290.  The Army referred to heavy trucks pulling heavy trailers as “heavy-heavy” units.  This applied to 
anything with more carrying capacity that the standard 2.5-ton and 1-ton trailer. 
395 
 
the number would jump to 2,080, or about half of the theater requirements that had been 
established back in August 1943.102  At the end of October the number was 3,100, but another 
2,600 were in the pipeline.   
In early 1944 the ASF agreed to fill at least half of the ETOUSA request.  Somervell 
directed that the first two months’ production of a new 5-ton 4x2 tractor be diverted from the 
China-Burma-India theater to ETOUSA before 4 January 1944, equating to about 2,000 
trucks.103  Although they arrived a month later than the ASF had promised, 2,080 trucks of a 
similar capability had been shipped to France and put into use by the end of August.104  Other 
offices within the ASF clearly realized that ETOUSA needed more than 2,000 heavy tractors, but 
no sourcing plan for additional trucks can be found in the records.105  One is left with the 
impression that Somervell believed he had solved the problem by diverting early production of 
the 5-ton 4x2 and no one below him caught or tried to correct the mistake until late March or 
early April.  SHAEF was dragged into the issue in late April, and in mid-May SHAEF officially 
let the ASF off the hook.  Rather than demand that the ASF provide more standard truck 
companies or that it find and deliver additional heavy trucks beyond those offered by MG Handy 
in his letter on 29 April, SHAEF dropped the issue.   Even if all the trucks promised by Handy 
had arrived on time, they would have filled only 60% of Ross’ initial requirements.106  Despite 
 
102 Monthly status reports for June and July 1944, OCOT, ETOUSA.  RG 498, UD 578, Box 3883, ADM 451, 
NARA 2.  
103 BG W.A. Wood to Somervell, 5 Jan 44.  RG 160, Dir of P&O, File 33, Box 4, NARA 2.  This note assured 
Somervell that the first two months of production would be diverted to ETOUSA.   
104 OCOT Reports for August.  RG 498, UD 578, Box 3883, ADM 451, NARA 2. 
105 Magruder, “Analysis of Army 1944 Heavy Truck Required Production for Special Projects and CLS IV 
Reserves,” undated.  There is a cover note, dated 7 Dec 43 directing the retention of the document as the file copy.  
Earlier drafts with identical numbers go back to at least 23 Oct 44.  RG 160, Box 52.  COL Magruder was the chief 
of the plans division within the office of the director of plans and operations, MG Lutes.  In the document filed in 
December, Magruder reserved 1030 4-5 Ton 4x4 and 7264 5-Ton 4x2 tractors for ETOUSA in 1944.     
106 Letter, Handy to Crawford, 29 Apr 44.  Response, Crawford to Handy, 17 May 44.  RG 331, Box 249 (SHAEF 
Log Plans Branch Staff Studies), Staff Study 8, NARA 2.  Handy, the chief of OPD within the War Department, 
promised to collect 770 prime movers and 2,100 large trailers that had already been issued, and he confirmed the 
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over a year’s warning, the ASF failed to meet a straightforward request for equipment, ignoring 
shortages that would have massive repercussions in France.  It is no great leap in logic to suggest 
that had the ASF found and delivered 4,000 heavy tractors and their associated trailers to 
ETOUSA before July 1944 the Allies would have reached and perhaps penetrated the Rhine and 
Westwall in early fall 1944. 
How all of this happened is a rather long and convoluted story.  There are documents 
demonstrating that the demand signal for heavy trucks to support the CBI and ETO came from 
within the ASF, or at least pre-dated Ross’ 31 July request.107  The officer charged with long-
range planning, COL Carter Magruder, coordinated with SOS to help write the justification for 
PROCO projects GS 20 and 21 and for subsequent documents produced by Ross’ OCOT.108  
There is also documentation to prove that the ASF took this recommendation seriously, and it 
worked carefully over the next three months to produce a reliable estimate of global 
requirements and a plan to restructure heavy truck production.109 At the end of September BG 
Wylie reinforced the message that 15,000 2.5-ton trucks earmarked for line-of-communications 
duty in 1944 should be replaced by 12,500 long-body trucks or tractor-trailer combinations.110   
 
first 1,750 new 5-Ton tractors coming off the assembly lines would be sent to ETOUSA.  OPD/ASF finally 
delivered the last of this promised equipment between the end of September and the end of October 
107 COL Carter Magruder, truck file (400 series), RG 160, Director of Plans and Operations, Planning Division, 
Theater Branch, Central Decimal File, Box 52, NARA II.  The earliest document in this file includes a memo from 
Magruder to the Director Requirements Division, dated 12 July 1943, outlining the need for heavy trucks, 
particularly tankers, to support CBI.  In that same note Magruder suggests that the ETOUSA probably has the same 
requirements and just has not realized it.   
108 GS 20 and 21 established SOS requirement for trucks of all types.  Copies of correspondence between Magruder 
and various agencies are included in the file referenced in footnote 182 above.  A final version of the ETO request 
for 2139 4-5-ton 4x4 tractors, dated 4 Dec 43, is on file as the master copy.   
109 The chief of ordnance was notified by the director of the requirements division within the ASF that heavy truck 
production in 1944 needed to double on 26 July 1943.  Thompson and Mayo, 286, note 91. 
110 Wylie, “Motor Vehicle Production Schedule,” 30 Sep 43, memo from OCT, ASF, to Director, Requirements 
Division.  RG 160, Dir P&O, Planning Div, Theater Branch, Box 52, NARA 2.  Wylie acknowledged that the Army 
had accepted large numbers of heavy trucks between 1940 and 1943, but they were not easy to break down and load 
on ships.  New models needed to have this capability. 
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By supporting the call for heavy trucks, BG Wylie gave a boost to ETOUSA’s request 
and the eventual fielding of heavy trucks by the U.S. Army.  But he also slowed the delivery 
time of the first large batch of equipment when he introduced the idea that these requirements 
would be best met by new production.  The trucks were to be redesigned to ensure that they were 
semi-collapsible and therefore more efficient to ship overseas.  This memo might have played a 
major role in introducing the idea that ETO requirements should only be met with new 
production tractors and trailers rather than rounding up old equipment or the new production of 
the current models (4/5-Ton Autocar, White, and Federal 4x4s).111  The overall Army demand 
for heavy trucks in 1944 was massive, demanding a doubling of production from 35,000 to 
67,000 units in that year.112  The total U.S. requirement for 1944 was 69,575 heavy trucks, but 
only 37,900 of these were for the Army. Another 18,000 went to the U.K., Canada, and the 
USSR. 113  Magruder also pointed out that the Army already had 20,000 heavy trucks in its 
inventory.  From the beginning of 1941 until the end of 1943 the United States had produced 
almost 70,000 heavy-heavy trucks, to include 20,000 heavy tractors, and 19,000 heavy trailers, 
some of which had been given to allies under Lend-Lease.114  Surely it would be easier to use 
older models to meet ETOUSA’s time-sensitive requirements rather than wait on a new model 
due to enter production in May 1944. 
Regardless, by the end of December and early January it seems that ASF had decided that 
they had solved the issue with heavy trucks, even if the math never quite added up.  Magruder’s 
 
111 Wylie specifically referred to 5-ton 4x2 trucks and their associated trailers, with the same specifications as the 
CBI equipment.  This might have led staff officers to assume that older equipment, which could be delivered on 
time, would not work. 
112 Thompson and Mayo, 286. 
113 Table attached to numerous versions of Magruder’s projection for heavy trucks dated from 23 October to 
probably 7 December 1943.  If one included allocated support to Allies, the number increased to over 69,000. 
114 Aubin, 153, citing Office of the Chief of Ordnance figures. 
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final numbers for the ETO’s special projects (PROCO) and CLS IV reserves required 1030 of 
the 4/5-ton 4x4 truck tractors, 744 10-ton trailers, and 7,264 of the new 5-ton 4x2 tractors due to 
enter production in May 1944.115  The formal request form ETOUSA was for around 4,100 
heavy tractors for operational units.  Someone mounted a last-ditch effort to stick with 2.5-ton 
trucks, prompting Magruder to develop a rather clever chart to justify a preference for heavy 
equipment rather than standard trucks.  Magruder realized that the pressing concern within the 
ASF in the fall of 1943 was manpower; switching to heavy trucks in COMZ units would save the 
Army tens of thousands of drivers and mechanics.  The chart included in his analysis made that 
crystal clear, and it also touched on a second hot topic, tires:   
Type of Vehicle Ton/miles per gallon # drivers per 100 tons # tires per 100 tons 
2.5 Ton 6x6 (x4) 26.25 30 360 
5 Ton 4x2 40 10 100 
10 Ton GSLC 6x4 25 10 100 
Table 4.11: ASF comparative analysis of truck solutions 
 
This staff work dovetailed nicely with a recent approval of the ETO troop basis, which 
called for 312 truck companies with 35,880 men and 46 dump truck companies calling for 
another 5,244 men.116 About half of these companies had to be equipped with 2.5-ton trucks in 
order to operate on poor roads in the combat zone, but the rest were easily replaceable with road-
bound trucks.  Any solution that might cut manpower or tire requirements by a third or a quarter 
was welcome news.  Around the end of December, Somervell directed the ASF to send the first 
 
115 Magruder, “Analysis of Army 1944 Heavy Truck Required Production for Special Projects and CLS IV 
Reserves,” 7 Dec 43.  RG 160, Dir of P&O, Planning Division, Theater Branch, Box 52, NARA 2.  The tractor 
requirement seems to be about 1,500 too high based on Ross’ status report for 31 December, which called for 5,667 
heavy trailers in the theater.   
116 Cable W7203, Devers to War Department, 15 Nov 43.  RG 160, File 32, Box 3 (Dir of P&O Subject Files), 
NARA 2. 
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2,000 of the new 5-ton 4x2 tractors, due to begin production in June, directly to ETOUSA and 
considered the case closed. 117  No explanation for the discrepancy between the number of heavy 
trucks requested, a number between 4,180 and 8,500, and the number promised, 2,000 under 
optimal conditions, can be found in the records of either Director P&O or SHAEF G-4. 
Ross and Lee continued to monitor the delivery of trucks closely.  On 30 November, 10 
January, and 6 March Lee was quick to point out emerging problems with the delivery of new 
trucks and problems with older models.  In November SOS embarrassingly claimed that they 
were 15,000 trucks under strength, only to have the ASF point out they were using old tables of 
equipment.118  This was a mistake that rested squarely on the shoulders of SOS; only they could 
roll up the authorizations and equipment on hand submitted by every service, branch, and base 
command that possessed standard 2.5-ton trucks and dump trucks.  But it also illustrated how 
difficult it was for a senior headquarters to stay abreast of changing instructions from the War 
Department, even without the added chaos of combat.  In January ETOUSA shared the bad news 
that the latest tank recovery vehicle was considered too cumbersome for use in Normandy and 
1,420 smaller ones would be required before June.119  Lutes pointed out that U.S. production 
through May would provide only 350 trucks but that the U.K. had accepted 2,100 of the lighter 
M19s to date; perhaps ETOUSA could ask the British to reallocate some of these carriers.120  
Finally, on 4 March Lee reported that deliveries had fallen 8,000 trucks behind schedule to meet 
 
117 BG W.A. Wood to Somervell, 5 Jan 44.  Wood assured Somervell that ETO would receive all production from 
May and June 1944, which would meet 90% of their requirements if production started on time and reached the 
1,000 units-a-month goal.   
118 Cable from Sextant (ASF HQ) to Devers and the War Department, 30 Nov 43.  Cable from Somervell to ETO 
and WD, 1 Dec 43.  RG 160, File 32, Box 3.   
119 Cable from USSOS through USFOR [ETO] to WD, 10 Jan 44.  Cable from USFOR to WD, 25 Jan 44.  On 10 
January Lee reported that the M25 would have to be replaced with M19s.  On 25 January the ASF pointed out that 
production of the M19 for U.S. forces had ended and that only 350 would be built by May to close out Lend-Lease 
obligations.  ETO wrote back that same day confirming the need for 1,420 tractors and 111 trailers to meet British 
and U.S. requirements. 
120 Cable, Lutes to ETOUSA, 26 Jan 44. 
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the Overlord troop basis requirements, and this time it could not be chalked up to accounting 
error.  Lutes confirmed the shortfall, in the process uncovering a few other critical shortages such 
as signal equipment and 750 2,000-gallon tankers and 2,000 2.5-ton trucks converted to carry 
750 gallons of fuel each.  Writing on 1 April, Lutes admitted that the ASF could do little to fix 
the 2,000-gallon tanker issue.   
A rising sense of concern over the truck situation began to emerge at SHAEF and 
ETOUSA around mid-March.  The G-4 staff at SHAEF had settled into a rhythm by early 
March, and one of the first projects handed to the planning division was an assessment of the 
logistical situation after the conclusion of Overlord, which was defined as the period from D+60 
to D+240.  This work exposed problems with the documents SHAEF had inherited from other 
sources and led some officers to suspect they were not adequately resourced for the upcoming 
mission.121  At the same time, General Lord, who was accompanied by the ETO chief of service 
for engineers, quartermaster, ordnance, signal, and transportation, arrived in Washington, D.C. to 
try to accelerate the arrival of essential equipment.  Their primary concern was with PROCO 
items; “normal” items listed on unit tables of equipment were not the issue.  It was a fruitful trip 
that helped energize the ASF and focus everyone on critical shortages, but it also exposed a 
handful of unsolvable problems.  A formal out brief was held on 30 March, and there the ETO 
team reiterated their concerns over a few key projects.  General Moore, the theater engineer, still 
desperately needed material and tools to build 800 miles of 6-inch POL pipeline, and Ross was 
adamant that he needed the heavy trucks he had asked for back in July and August.122  There 
 
121 SHAEF G-4 Weekly Reports, 2, 17, 25, and 27 Mar 44.  RG 331, SGS Decimal File, Box 30, NARA 2.   
122 Memo from Magruder to Lutes, 30 Mar 44.  RG 160, File 33, Box 4, NARA 2.   
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were pages of other shortages attached to the report, but Lutes insisted on switching to a new 
standard: items whose absence jeopardized the accomplishment of Overlord.123 
This new standard helped to resolve most of the outstanding issues.  The chiefs of signal 
and medical service reported they could live with what was on hand and projected to arrive in the 
coming months.  The quartermaster broke his list into two priorities; priority one was needed 
before 6 June, but priority two items could arrive as late as 31 July.  Lutes promised to ship 
everything listed at priority one on the April and May convoys.  The chief of ordnance presented 
a problem that was much harder to fix.  If one included ammo received, on the way, or promised, 
the ETO was still short the following items: 
 
Table 4.12: ETOUSA ammunition shortages 3 Apr 44 
These shortages translated to insufficient obscuration fires, increased the danger of large-
scale tank attacks to infantry formations, and rendered the U.S. heavy artillery virtually 
worthless.  Medium 105 mm howitzers were the backbone of division artillery regiments and 
high-explosive shells were essential in both attack and defense.   
Lutes admitted that there was little they could do to fix many of these shortages, but over 
the following three weeks the ASF did everything within its power to work on the prioritized list 
provided by ETOUSA.  MG Styer, the ASF chief of staff, summarized progress to date in a letter 
 
123 Memo from Lutes to Chiefs of Services, ETO, 3 April 44.   
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to General Hull at the War Department on 29 April.  The team had started with 120 critical 
shortages, but through hard work they had reduced the original list down to 39.  At the same 
time, they also discovered 40 new ones.124  The ASF would review progress on all 81 items 
twice a month, and it anticipated providing but three items before they were needed in France. 
Styer knew that they could not meet the requirement for the M29 cargo carrier (which was 
basically a tracked jeep), the 4/5-ton tractors with trailers, and the Buda engines for the tankers 
(diesel replacement engines for heavy machinery).  Three weeks prior to Overlord the list was 
expanded to include amphibious trucks, LVTs, mine-exploding devices, and the already 
mentioned tank transporters, heavy trucks, and artillery ammunition.125  
While the ETOUSA and ASF staff labored to identify and fill critical shortages during 
the last week of March and the first two weeks of April, SHAEF was independently validating 
concerns with the troop basis and certain equipment shortages on their own.  In order to produce 
a concept of the support needed after Overlord, the SHAEF team had to understand where 1st 
Army and FUSAG believed the command would be on D+60.  COL Whipple, chief of log plans 
at SHAEF, led his team through a reexamination of all the logistical planning and underlying 
assumptions used by Moses and the various technical services at ETOUSA.   The result was a 
mounting sense of anxiety.  The divergence of opinion about the feasibility of the draft estimates 
was compounded by a lack of ETOUSA presence at the SHAEF G-4 planning sessions.  SHAEF 
G-4 and 21st Army group administrative staff had a close relationship, but SOS and technical 
services seemed to be boxed out of these meetings, either because they were not readily available 
or because SHAEF forgot to invite them.126  At the end of March serious questions about POL 
 
124 Letter, Styer to Hull, 29 Apr 44.  “Supply Situation for the ETO” RG 160, File 33, Box 4, NARA 2. 
125 Ruppenthal, Vol I, 259, note 67 on 260. 
126 SHAEF Log Plans Update Four, 17 Mar 44.  RG 331, SGS Decimal File, G-4 Weekly Reports, NARA 2. The 
report lists the attendees for the second post-Overlord meeting, and no one from the ETO general or special staff 
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pipeline material, rail repair, port capacity, and truck requirements had emerged from these 
planning sessions. 
By 7 April SHAEF G-4 believed they understood the key limiting factors that would 
impede expanding the lodgment in Normandy.  It had come as a surprise to the group that 
distribution over an already modest road and rail network even before it was damaged by 
friendly and enemy action would be the greatest challenge – not port capacity.127  The 
recommended solution was plenty of engineers, landed early, to fix the roads and rail lines.  But 
a week later a more sophisticated appreciation of the problem had emerged.  At the top of the list 
was a shortage of truck companies, followed by insufficient road networks, the time it would 
take to repair rail lines, and port capacity if the Allies faced unanticipated delays in securing a 
second major port.128  SHAEF also rediscovered the shortage of tank transporters that ETOUSA 
had raised on 10 January, reporting a critical shortage of 1,740 M19s and 496 M25s by 15 July 
1944.129  The staff wanted these trucks to move tanks over long distances, but their initial 
contribution in France was their ability to carry a mass of supplies. 
  SHAEF’s growing concerns were echoed at the AEAF, especially within 9th Air Force.  
Motor transportation had been a point of emphasis since the command had been established. The 
author of General Board 30 explained the concerns at 9th Air Force before the campaign in 
France, pointing out that “reports from Africa, Sicily and Italy indicated that truck transportation 
was always in short supply during operations.”130   When told they could not have any more 
 
were present.  The report also notes that SHAEF sent representatives to all 21st AG admin meetings.  Whipple saw 
the chiefs of the ADSEC and FECZ at the weekly SOS command and staff starting in March, but planning and 
preparation for Overlord were barely mentioned in most meetings.   
127 Log Plans Update 6, 1 Apr 44.    
128 Log Plans Update 7, 7 Apr 44. 
129 SHAEF G-4 Admin Weekly Report, 8 Apr 44. 
130 GB 30, 21. 
404 
 
companies beyond their current troop basis, the service command centralized half of the 
companies under their direct control, internally resourced two drivers per truck, and converted 
four companies to carry bulk fuel.  These four companies were high on the 9th Air Force priority 
list and landed in France on D+21, and they were reinforced with two additional companies soon 
after.  Everyone who had studied the problem was worried about distribution until the rail lines 
could be restored. 
By the middle of April, SHAEF G-4 resembled a bloodhound on a fresh trail.  Whipple 
and Vissering, the latter a British colonel in charge of the movement subsections 3 and 4 within 
the G-4, met with Ross and FUSAG staff on 12 April to reconcile the various estimates of the 
transportation required for Overlord.  On 14 April SHAEF G-4 convened the first meeting of a 
recurring workgroup to produce Planning Forecast No. 1 in concert with G3 and ANFX 
planners.131  For the first time the G-4 realized that they could not adequately do their job 
without the most up-to-date information from the G-3.  Only by working together could they 
agree upon the projected front-line, inter-allied boundaries, the army rear boundary line, the 
location of major groupings of divisions, and a common appreciation of the location and status of 
ports, railroads, depots, and airfields at various stages of the campaign.   
It had taken a few months, but the G-4 realized that logistics planning could not occur in 
a vacuum divorced from maneuver planning, a handicap ETOUSA or SOS could never have 
overcome.132  One result of these efforts was the conclusion that the Allies would have a serious 
 
131 Log Plans Update 8, 15 Apr 44. 
132 The first order of business at the 30 March post-Overlord meeting was collecting updated estimates from the 
engineers, transportation service, civil affairs, and air planners.  G-4 plans also visited 21st AG and SHAEF G-3 
plans that week.  SHAEF had the authority and organic staff to coordinate this joint and combined effort while 
ETOUSA would have been hard pressed to do the same.  All these estimates changed very rapidly; staying on top of 
the latest numbers was a full-time job eased by periodic face-to-face engagement.  Pulling this off before January 
1944 would have been impossible.  To do so after the final scheme of maneuver was approved and COSSAC began 
405 
 
truck deficit at D+40.  Various worries over trucks would dominate SHAEF G-4 periodic 
updates for the next month.  On 22 April Whipple reported that after three weeks of study 
“requirements for truck companies indicated [a] much greater [need] than current availability.”  
These conclusions were shared with and validated by the ETO G-4, FUSAG G-3, and G-4 and 
chief of staff at the FECZ.133  ETOUSA had indicated that it was taking action to meet the 
requirements, hinting that an internal change to the planning assumptions might close the gap.  
All the questions about trucks raised by the OPD and the ASF had reached Lee and ETOUSA 
was reconsidering their stand on the issue of shortages.   
The ASF reacted to the bad news from Ross in April by questioning the validity of his 
planning estimates.  On 29 March the Operations Division at the War Department and the Stock 
Control Division of the ASF requested copies of the validation data underlying his original 
requests; these were received by the acting chief of transportation by 11 April.134  In addition to 
suggesting that it was too late to replace standard cargo trucks with heavy tractor-trailers, Wylie 
acknowledged that Ross’ planning figures might not be perfect, especially the assumptions about 
the total tonnage and distances to be overcome.  It was not a criticism, just a recognition of how 
hard it was to predict with any accuracy when so many independent variables were in play.   
Unfortunately for ETOUSA, this information provided a crack to either shift blame for the 
problem back to Ross and Lee or perhaps make the crisis go away if they could convince theater 
logisticians to agree to more forgiving planning assumptions.  
Three days later Magruder passed along a message to theater branch, a sub-section within 
P&O, repeating Wylie’s point about tonnage and distance and then adding his concern that 
 
its transformation into SHAEF, a large portion of the ETOUSA staff would have needed to collocate with SHAEF to 
take this planning burden off their shoulders.       
133 Log Plans Update 9, 22 Apr 44.   
134 Wylie to Magruder, “Motor Vehicle Requirements for ETOUSA,” 11 Apr 44.   
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perhaps rail capacity was being ignored.  He directed theater branch to reengage ETOUSA to 
answer the following questions: 
Determine if the tonnage to be moved is reasonable; determine if the 
distances over which the tonnage is to be moved [are] reasonable; determine if the 
road net will permit any such tremendous truck movement; determine if the 
locomotives and rolling stock that we will furnish for use in the continental 
operation will be used to capacity and their capabilities included in reducing the 
overall requirement for tonnage to be moved by truck.135 
 
It is almost impossible to believe that Magruder took this action on his own, or even 
considered it a good idea.  Just three days earlier, Magruder had received a letter from BG Wylie 
confirming that the ETO validation figures made sense.  Magruder had helped ETOUSA write 
their first validation statements back in July.  He had recognized the need for heavy trucks in the 
U.S. Army and had reached out to ETOUSA to submit their requirements.  The list of questions 
passed back to the ETO on 14 April cast doubt on the most basic professionalism and planning 
abilities of the command.  Yet, at the same time the ASF was asking for a comprehensive review 
of the entire distribution plan from ETOUSA, SHAEF had just arrived at the same set of 
conclusions that Ross had foreseen back in August 1943.     
 It cannot be proven, but Magruder’s action was consistent with guidance from Lutes, 
Styer, or perhaps Somervell himself to stretch out the process of validating a critical equipment 
shortfall that numerous officers within the ASF had acknowledged repeatedly between October 
and January.  It suggests a deliberate delaying campaign designed, first, to introduce doubt about 
the requirement with the hope that someone in ETOUSA would fold their cards and, second, to 
obscure the fact that the ASF had dropped the ball on a major issue about which they had been 
 
135 Magruder, “Motor Vehicle Requirements for the ETO,” Plans Division to Theater Branch, 14 Apr 44.  RG 160, 
File 33, Box 4.    
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reminded repeatedly.  Unfortunately for SHAEF and those hoping for an early end to the war in 
Europe, it worked. 
It seems that the first person willing to reconsider the criticality of heavy trucks or more 
companies was LTG Lee.  Whipple had noted in his 22 April weekly update that “it appears that 
tactical assumptions reducing the requirement [for truck companies] may be permissible, 
dependent upon a decision now being taken at SHAEF.”  Bykofsky and Larson state that 
Eisenhower’s staff briefed him on the truck problem and that he passed the issue to Lee for 
reexamination.  They do not provide exact dates when this happened, and their source was a 
letter written by Vissering in August 1952.136  Whipple reported in his 29 April update that all 
studies related to truck requirements “have been concluded” and left it at that.  Bykofsky and 
Larson stated that Stratton provided a new estimate that downplayed the issue.  They add that he 
had developed a plan to use trucks from 3rd and 9th Army to support COMZ until they were 
needed.  Stratton thought that the transportation system would be adequate “if the heavy vehicles 
on order materialized in time and rail operations were begun by D plus 60.”137  This highly 
qualified answer must have been delivered around 29 April and was enough to kill the truck 
issue for about five days. 
It is easy to imagine Lee directing his staff to find answers rather than presenting 
unsolvable problems.  Lee was comfortable assuring Eisenhower that COMZ could accomplish 
its mission with the existing 2.5-tons, heavy vehicles already promised, and second drivers for 
the truck fleet.  This was Lee’s prerogative, but it was hard to believe that everyone was 
connecting all the dots.  At the same time when ETOUSA and SHAEF were worrying about the 
 
136 Bykofsky and Larson, 242, 240 note 15. 
137 The quotation is from Bykofsky and Larson, 242, who cite the History of G-4 COMZONE ETO, Sec. VII, Pt. I, 
Tab 2b, pp. 7-8. 
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adequacy of their motorized transport, the Allied air forces were pounding French rail centers, 
bridges, and rolling stock.  Despite emerging doubts about transportation and the realization that 
early refurbishment of the rail network would be essential to mitigate the truck shortage, no one 
seemed to reassess the ongoing bombardment campaign.  ETOUSA waited until the last minute 
to find second drivers for the trucks they did have, and no one put any serious effort into finding 
manpower to stand up and train provisional truck companies ready to operate trucks once they 
became available.   
 Almost to the day that Lee decided ETOUSA did not have a truck problem, the issue was 
resurrected by the War Department staff.  On 29 April MG Handy, the director of the operations 
division, wrote MG Crawford informing him that the War Department had validated the 
requirements submitted by Ross and the office of the chief of transportation at the ASF.  The 
War Department would release all the vehicles that were at hand that might help, and they 
reaffirmed their commitment to providing 1,750 trucks with trailers originally promised to the 
Ledo Road Project.138  Handy acknowledged that the equipment that he was releasing for 
transfer to ETOUSA would address only about 35% of the shortfall, but it was all he could do at 
this late hour.  Luckily for ETOUSA, the War Department had sided with Ross and the 
Transportation Corps and was forcing the ASF to find heavy trucks to meet ETO requirements.  
By way of mitigation, Handy suggested that SHAEF could reduce its goal of amassing twenty-
one days of reserves on the continent.  Handy also pointed out that the ETO would have about 
2,000 extra 2.5-tons once the promised heavy vehicles were delivered, provided the command 
could find drivers to move them.  Perhaps SOS could maintain better than the 66% operational 
 
138 Handy, “Motor Vehicle Requirements for ETOUSA,” Memo for General Crawford, 29 Apr 44.  RG 331, SHAEF 
G4, Log Plans Branch, Staff Study 8, Box 249, NARA 2.   
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readiness rate used in the ASF study?  He finished the letter by asking for an assessment of the 
truck shortage’s impact on and implications for operations.  SHAEF had been given a second 
chance to press home the importance of this issue or else to admit that they disagreed with Ross’ 
initial staff work.   
 The final result was two weeks of hard work, a softball answer that let the War 
Department off the hook, and a new low point in the relationship between SHAEF G-4 and 
ETOUSA.  After reading Handy’s letter from 29 April, Crawford wanted a thorough reappraisal 
of the entire truck and transportation question; Whipple launched a new staff study on 4 May.  
The workgroup, composed of logistics plans, G-4 administration, and G-4 movement and 
transportation, had two key tasks: review the original truck estimate submitted by ETOUSA, and 
confirm that drivers were available to man the extra trucks provided by the War Department and 
to double the driver pool within authorized companies.139  Whipple also noted that a preliminary 
study of the attached justification indicated that the “basic logistical computations attached are 
completely unrealizable,” but it is hard to tell if that opinion came from Crawford himself or 
from a third party.  The good news was that General Crawford had coordinated with Moses and 
Ross for their full cooperation on the project; noticeably missing was any mention of Stratton or 
Lord.   
 It did not take long for a confirmation bias to kick in.  Vissering wrote a less than 
flattering preliminary assessment of the ETOUSA study, finding it “considerably out of line” 
with the products developed with the SHAEF G-4.140  The study had evidently ignored port 
clearance, inner-depot (static), and troop transport requirements, but it also greatly inflated the 
 
139 Whipple, “Motor Vehicle Requirements for ETOUSA,” 4 May 44.  Memo from log plans to Chief Q ‘A’ British 
G-4 Division and Chief Mov and Tn G-4 Division.  RG 331, G-4, Log Plans Division, Box 250, NARA 2. 
140 Vissering, Staff Minute Sheet, Mov and Tn Branch to Log Plans, 5 May 44, 1. 
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tonnage that would be moved daily.  Vissering agreed with their planning factors on the capacity 
and ORR of truck units, but SHAEF had used greater turn-around times in their products.  The 
net result was a wash; 160 companies in COMZ was just about the right number.  He did note 
that he thought that having 122 companies dedicated to supporting the Army Air Force on the 
continent was excessive and that ETOUSA might redistribute some of these assets to address 
shortages in COMZ. 
 After the first workgroup meeting on 6 May SHAEF agreed that 160 companies was the 
right number for COMZ, with 43 working port clearance, 29 dedicated to static missions and a 
reserve, and the balance used for long-distance LoC support.141  Whipple also asked his superiors 
to step in and reduce the tonnage FUSAG wanted to land between D+40 and D+60 to reduce the 
strain on motor transport during that critical window.142  After six more days of coordination and 
follow-up, Whipple felt confident to make a final recommendation to the boss, which basically 
validated ETOUSA’s concerns, if not the method used to produce them. 
Having studied the entire issue in great detail, Whipple now had an appreciation of the 
nuances behind any concrete answer, and he probably had a deeper understanding of the issue 
and its implications than just about anyone at SHAEF or ETOUSA.  He started off his answer by 
hedging – truck requirements were directly linked to port capacities, the POL plan, and the 
availability of semi-trailers.143  The obvious implication was that a moderate change to any of 
these would directly impact motor transport needs.  He told Crawford that 141 truck companies 
in COMZ at D+40 “will probably be adequate” but that the situation at D+60 to D+90 remained 
indeterminate, “but no great increase in the number of truck companies will be required.”144  
 
141 Vissering, Staff Minute Sheet, Movement Sub-Section 3 and 4 to Log Plans, 6 May 44, 1-2. 
142 Whipple, “US Tonnage at D plus 60,” memo from Log Plans to MG Napier, Chief of Mov and Tns Branch, 1. 
143 Whipple, “Truck Companies,” Log Plans to G-4 and Chief Mov and Tn Branch, 17 May 44. 
144 Ibid. 
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Whipple wrapped up his introductory material by stating: “The logistical computations upon 
which Gen. HANDY’s memorandum was based are so wide of the mark as to be completely 
worthless.  The greatest shortage is not in truck companies, but in trucks.”145  This comment 
indicated a growing sense of frustration within the SHAEF G-4 with quality of work they had 
inherited from SOS, ETOUSA, and COSSAC.  The work done between 11 April and 17 May 
seemed to spend as much energy questioning ETOUSA’s competence as it did on fixing the 
truck problem. 
It is also likely that SHAEF had confused themselves about what was really important 
here; they desperately needed the War Department to ship them 4,000 heavy tractors or provide 
an equivalent number of alternative vehicles between D+60 and D+90 to support operations 
beyond Normandy.  COL Elliot, the deputy G-4 for Movement and Transportation tried to 
emphasize this point in the branch endorsement of Whipple’s work published on 18 May, but it 
is easy to see how the message might have been garbled.   Elliot confirmed that 160 companies 
was the minimum number necessary by D+60 and that this would be sufficient through D+90 as 
long as “semi-trailers and other heavy equipment requested by OCOT, ETOUSA is (sic) not 
delayed.”146  It was too late, because the heavy equipment requested by the OCOT was already 
delayed and there was no way the Army could deliver it in the next three months.  Just moving 
the modest shipments promised by Handy on 29 April took until the end of August.  Those who 
really understood the issue were very concerned, but they could not say so without equivocation.  
No logistician wanted to go on record predicting failure based on a shortage, and that was 
 
145 Ibid. 
146 Elliot, “Requirement - Truck Companies,” Movement and Transportation Branch to G-4, 18 May. 
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basically what Handy and Lutes were demanding before they would move heaven and earth to 
find heavy trucks and drivers. 
Crawford closed out this last chapter of the pre-Overlord truck debate with a formal 
response to Handy written on 17 May.  Crawford reported that if all the trucks promised were 
delivered, SHAEF would have just enough motor transport to see them through D+50.147  The 
situation after D+50 was much harder to predict, but what might happen then could no longer 
jeopardize Overlord, since the lodgment area would be secure.  Presumably rail would have 
picked up some of the load by then, and the lodgment would be too large for the Germans to 
eliminate.  It is obvious that Crawford’s team was not forecasting requirements needed to reach 
the Seine, much less eastern France.  Planning forecasts developed since 14 April showed the 
Allies on the Seine by D+90 and not across it in any strength until D+150.  Based upon his 
comments while attending his first SOS command and staff meeting where he outlined 
Montgomery’s preferred way of operating, Crawford probably believed that the ground forces 
really would halt on the Seine until COMZ was sorted out, reducing a sense of urgency over the 
shortage of heavy trucks at SHAEF.  Crawford thought SHAEF would have time to recover from 
any transportation problems during the pause along the Seine, and he did not consider what 
might happen if someone convinced (or forced) Montgomery to quickly surge into eastern 
France.   
 
147 Crawford to Handy, 17 May 44.   
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Figure 4.4: Allied planning forecast, D+150, as of 24 May 44148   
 
In contrast, there are a few indicators that Ross had initially planned to operate under 
much more challenging conditions.  The first drafts of Ross’ documents submitted to justify the 
transportation troop basis asked for forces necessary to reach and penetrate the Westwall before 
the rail network was repaired.  These documents also projected truck companies operating 150 
miles forward of the closest port or railhead, almost triple the doctrinal norm and double the 
SHAEF planning figures.149  Only heavy trucks would be able to support combat divisions so far 
away from the closest ports and railheads.  Eventually Ross convinced some officers at SHAEF 
 
148RG 489, UD 346, Box 1489, G-4 ETOUSA, Planning Directive Series H-2, 24 May 1944. 
149 COL Loren A. Ayers and LTC William F. Schultz, Jr, General Board Report 122, “Operation, Organization, 
Supply, and Services of the Transportation Corps in the European Theater of Operations” (USFET, 1945), 42.  Draft 
justification documents received from ETOUSA, RG 160, Dir of P&O, Planning Division, Central Decimal File, 
Box 52, NARA 2.  See the 400 group, “Truck” folder.  The first justification in the file has “to the Westwall” in 
typed text, which is lined out in ink.  It is impossible to determine how that objective got into the document and who 
decided to line it out.     
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that he was correct, but they could not convince Lee and Eisenhower to demand a solution from 
the ASF in time to support the breakout in August.  Ross anticipated the correct conditions 
SHAEF would face at the end of August and early September and developed a solution that 
would have sustained the Allies through a penetration of the Westwall in early fall.  But he could 
not overcome bureaucratic inertia and turn this vision into a field capability.   
Ironically, as the window closed to reequip COMZ with heavy equipment, the British 
Army was completing a transition to 6- and 10-ton trucks in some of their general transport (GT) 
companies.  By 22 April 21st AG had almost reached its goal of fielding 3,197 6-ton lorries and 
1,778 10-ton trucks, even anticipating a surplus of 200 of the largest vehicles.150  Reserve stocks 
for both trucks would be in place by Y plus 21.  Thirteen truck companies supporting 21st AG 
were equipped with 10-tons, twelve companies had 6-tons, and 6-ton platoons were mixed in 
with the Army and Armored Division direct support companies.151  The superior British supply 
situation in August and September is often attributed to the shorter line of communications 
behind the lead divisions, but more efficient heavy equipment contributed as well.  
All the studies bouncing around SHAEF looking at the adequacy of U.S. motor transport 
triggered a similar examination of 21st Army Group.  The conclusion reached was that after 
D+90 Montgomery could no longer rely solely on motor transport.152  The command would need 
a major port closer than Cherbourg or rail support that could conquer some of the distance.  The 
British converted all of their motorized assets into 3-ton platoon equivalents, allocating 80 
directly to armoured divisions or using the truck crews to operate DUKWs, with 346 remaining 
 
150 “Progress Report for Q Branch, G-4 Division for week ending 22 April 1944,” RG 331, SGS Decimal File, Box 
30, NARA 2.    
151 COL W.J.J Allen, “Annexe A, “Post-NEPTUNE Operations D plus 90,” 5 Jun 44.  RG 331, G-4, Log Plans 
Division, Box 249, NARA 2.  
152 Allen, 3. 
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for army, army group, and RAF support.153  Port clearance was the most intensive mission, 
consuming 42 mixed companies, followed by direct support to formations with 38.5.  Static, line 
of communications, and RAF support consumed eight, five, and eight companies respectively.  
Bulk petrol would be moved by 7.5 specially outfitted companies.  The distances anticipated by 
D+90 are surprisingly short, less than 30 miles from port to rear maintenance area depots and 
then between 22 and 87 miles to the further airfields and corps field or forward maintenance 
areas (FMAs).154  Despite superior resources and shorter operating distances, the British worried 
as much as their American partners about crossing the Seine without restoring rail lines. Like the 
Americans according to the final U.S assessment, 21st Army Group had been provided adequate 
motor transport for Overlord, but the next step would require additional resources. 
 Obviously, the 17 May letter from Crawford to Handy did not stop SHAEF from 
worrying about trucks.  As the conversation shifted away from heavy equipment and the total 
number of truck companies on the troop basis, SHAEF discovered that they had a 2.5-ton truck 
shortage.  Problems with equipping 3rd Army had been anticipated, and ETOUSA knew they had 
another month or two before this became a crisis, but SHAEF discovered that units projected to 
land in France during the first days and weeks of the operation still had shortages, such as a 420-
truck deficit at 9th Air Force.155  SHAEF and ETOUSA worked together to develop a list of the 
units that should be filled up first; the document was approved by the SHAEF G-3 on 22 May.156  
Despite the fact that a shortage had developed in the first place, this determination of priorities 
showed how the relationship between the two organizations was supposed to work.  It was also 
 
153 Allen, Annexe A. 
154 Allen, Annexe B. 
155 SHAEF G-4 Dairy/Journal, Q Branch, entries for 17 and 22 May 44.  RG 331, SGS Decimal Files, Box 30, 
NARA 2.   
156 SHAEF G-4 War Diary/Journal, Q Branch, Requirements Section, week ending 27 May 44.  The signed letter 
was sent to ETOUSA on 22 May 44.  ETOUSA first raised the issue, in writing, on 8 May.    
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an example of good staff work completed in a reasonable amount of time, having taken fifteen 
days to go from identifying the problem to publishing a solution. 
One outcome of the two months of continuous engagement between ETOUSA and 
SHAEF about equipment shortages was a deteriorating relationship between logisticians in the 
two commands.  Moses and Ross seem to have come through with their reputations intact, but 
Crawford dismissed any attempt to coordinate with Stratton and Lord as a waste of his time.  In 
defense of SOS, their earliest estimates were grounded on PROCO and not on the operational 
plan for Overlord.  Revisions prepared by ETOUSA in March and April did not benefit from the 
advantages that SHAEF had, including the latest tactical information and a large pool of 
manpower.  The fact that there were still problems with ETOUSA’s estimates and the documents 
justifying them confirmed that no administrative staff could develop an operational concept of 
support if that group of officers was isolated from maneuver planners.  SOS, or ETOUSA, could 
develop a solid troop basis, PROCO catalogue, base section structure, and concept of support 
only after COSSAC or SHAEF had provided an overall concept of operation and outline of a 
campaign plan.  Because of their physical location and focus, SHAEF G-4 and the ETOUSA 
special staff collocated with them would always produce a better product than either the small 
team with Lord at the Selfridges Annex or the main staff back at Cheltenham.  The only way to 
implement Lee’s preferred theater organization was to collocate the portion of the ETOUSA staff 
dedicated to operational planning with SHAEF.  Despite the size of the staff located at 
Selfridges, and despite their proximity to SHAEF, General Crawford and his team did not seem 
to value their input.   
The War Department did not show the drive needed to follow through on the promises 
made by Somervell and Handy.  By the end of August ETOUSA had received half of the heavy 
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tractors needed in theater, about half of the cab over engine (COE) 2.5-ton trucks, and less than 
ten percent of the 10-ton trailers.157  The timely arrival of trucks designed to carry bulk fuel was 
a minor success story; by the end of July ETOUSA had close to 100 per cent of the requested 
750-gallon 2.5-tons and had received a third of the 2,000-gallon trailers.  By the end of August, 
the theater had 120 per cent of the smaller fuel trucks and 77 per cent of the 2,000-gallon 
version.  This success story in fielding the bulk POL fleet was not replicated on the cargo side of 
the equation.  As late as December 1944 ETOUSA was still missing half of the heavy trailers 
then believed essential, and a third of the tractors to move them, despite the production of 
another 27,000 heavy-heavies between August and December 1944.  If the War Department had 
made quicker progress delivering the heavy cargo and fuel trucks that Ross first requested in 
August 1943, the impact in August and September 1944 would have been immeasurable.   
The shortage of heavy trucks was compounded by a tardiness in deploying truck 
companies to Normandy, but the decision to prioritize combat formations over service units was 
made by Bradley and approved by Eisenhower.  The initial plan for the troop build-up had called 
for 130 companies ashore by the end of July, but in practice only 94 made it by then.158  The 1st 
Army frontloaded combat troops and displaced service units until later in the deployment flow 
when efforts to break out of the lodgment progressed slower than originally anticipated.  As a 
result, at the start of the breakout after Cobra, COMZ was missing a third of its truck companies.  
The remaining companies landed in August, but even this minor delay must have worried the 
logisticians at ETOUSA and SHAEF. 
 
157 OCOT Monthly Reports, Aug 44.  RG 498, UD 578, Box 3881, ADM 451, NARA 2. 
158 Ruppenthal, Vol I, 557-558. 
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Figure 4.5: Status of special vehicle requirements for ETO, report at end of May 44 
    
Figure 4.6: ETOUSA truck status, report at the end of Jul 44 
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Securing additional drivers for the trucks available proved to be another task at which the 
Army seemed incapable of getting out of its own way.  In his original motorized transport 
proposals made in 1943, Ross had asked to increase the size of each QM truck company by 40 
men.  During a command and staff meeting in February 1944 Lee discovered that the 
recommendation had still not been addressed by the Army G-1 or ASF and got personally 
involved.159  Back in the fall the War Department had refused to authorize the 6,400 men needed 
to provide two drivers per truck for the initial troop basis and made the reasonable suggestion 
that SOS find these personnel internally.  SOS issued an order at the end of April directing each 
base section to provide a portion of the requirement; the majority of these men did not report to 
their respective QM companies until the second half of May.160  Although adequate to meet 
immediate needs, this precluded a formal training program to teach these new men about 
preventive maintenance, safe driving, and improvised repair.  
 This examination of how the U.S. Army failed provide ETOUSA with a moderate 
amount of heavy truck companies by July 1944 leaves one with three residual inexplicable 
questions.  It seems odd that the ASF held out for new production of the 5-ton 4x2 tractor to 
meet ETOUSA’s requirements.  Trucks built in May and June, if the program had remained on 
its original timeline, would still have addressed only about half of Ross’ requirements.  Why 
didn’t the ASF reallocate some of the 20,000 heavy trucks already in the inventory, or send older 
models coming off the assembly lines during the first half of 1944 to the U.K.?  Why were senior 
 
159 SOS C&S, 1 Feb 44.  RG 498, UD 578, Box 3883, ADM 456, NARA II.  Lee was upset that Ross had asked for 
only 40 drivers per company rather than 48, or one per truck assigned to a company.  Ross pointed out that all his 
planning figures for Overlord assumed that only 40 of the 48 trucks would be operational at any one time.  During 
this conversation Lee asked Ross if his request had cited the results of Lee’s reconnaissance to Italy, where trucks 
were on the road sixteen to twenty hours a day.  Ross explained that he had made it clear, citing historical data from 
both North Africa and Italy. 
160 “History of the MTS”, 5-6.   
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leaders at ETOUSA and SHAEF so quick to dismiss the urgency of the issue and to accept the 
partial solution offered by General Handy on 29 April?  Finally, why did it take so long for the 
portion of equipment promised by OPD to reach France, and why so long for the ASF to fill all 
of Ross’s theater requirements?  There are partial answers to all three questions in the historical 
record, but none of them are satisfying.161         
  One outcome of the battle not in dispute was the damage done to the relationship 
between the logisticians at SHAEF and at ETOUSA.  By mid-May hints of open hostility if not 
contempt had emerged, a shift recorded by Stratton in his response to the reorganization 
initiative sent to Lord on 3 June.  Lutes had noticed the same friction during his theater visit at 
the end of April and in the first week of May.  SHAEF seemed to be growing increasingly 
frustrated with the poor quality of the work they had inherited from the organizations that had 
preceded them and with the incomplete answers they received from ETOUSA headquarters.  
Perhaps Crawford had decided that if he had to rework everything built by ETOUSA or if he was 
constantly referred to the special staff sections for technical data, it was time to cut out the 
middleman.  To be fair to ETOUSA, they did not have access to the operational information 
necessary to develop the theater concept of sustainment, only minor supporting plans based upon 
the overarching structure developed by SHAEF and FUSAG.  Inadvertently, the battle over 
trucks, the troop basis, and logistical support after D+90 had exposed the logical flaw among 
U.S. doctrine, Somervell and Lee’s vision of the role of SOS or COMZ, and the primacy of the 
joint combined headquarters when it came time to synchronize maneuver and sustainment.  
 
161 The hold-up in delivery of heavy trucks between August and November was largely based on insufficient 
discharge capacity at Cherbourg.  The equipment was eventually shipped to Marseilles in November and December.  
There was a bit of finger pointing between Lutes and Lord/Stratton after the fact.  ETOUSA claimed they could 
have unloaded the trucks sooner; Lutes stated that no one told that to the ASF.  See Bykofsky and Larsen, 328, and 
Ruppenthal, 243.  The other two decisions are more puzzling.    
421 
 
Blending logistics and maneuver could not be accomplished as a part-time job physically 
removed from the operational headquarters.         
 
 Problems with SOS on the Eve of Overlord 
 ETOUSA’s reputation was under duress by late May 1944.  SHAEF and FUSAG seemed 
to have lost a great deal of confidence in Lee, SOS staff and to a lesser extent in the various 
technical services.  In early June Stratton noted a drastic increase in “hostility and interference in 
recent months” coming from the SHAEF and FUSAG G-4 sections.162  Stratton did not address 
the source of this hostility, but obviously there were problems.  Did SOS know at the time which 
critical skills they lacked?  Did the organization have significant flaws, or was it just unable to 
explain the difficult conditions it had operated under over the last year?  Lee and SOS knew 
about some weaknesses because of a comprehensive inspection tour and resulting assessment 
provided by MG Leroy Lutes.  What was more problematic was a cultural aversion to critical 
self-assessment that started with Lee and trickled down through his command.  This flaw may 
have prevented SOS from accurately seeing itself and taking action to fix issues before they 
resulted in a crisis in August and September.     
LTG John C.H. Lee seemed to be a man of great outward optimism.  If asked in late June 
1944 if COMZ was ready to perform its mission in France or had any fatal flaws, he would have 
doubtlessly answered “yes” to the first question and “no” to the second.  What he actually 
believed would have been an entirely different question.  In documents written during the war 
and interviews and reports compiled after the war, Lee seemed almost incapable of critical self-
 
162 Stratton to Lord, draft response to SHAEF reorganization proposal, 4 Jun 44.  RG 498, UD 578, ADM 238, 
NARA 2. 
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assessment, either of himself or of his organization.163  In contrast, the various General Board 
reports prepared by Ross and Moses were very honest and pointed out a number of areas where 
those leaders and their organizations could have done better while handling significant 
challenges.  Lee’s reticence in explaining himself or admitting when the command might have 
made a mistake surrendered the field to his critics.  There are plenty of implicit and explicit 
charges against Lee and COMZ originating from SHAEF or 12th AG in the historical record and 
in General Board reports, but Lee refused to provide a convincing defense or counterargument of 
his own.   
 The reasons for Lee’s approach are unknowable, but a few clues stand out.  Lee was 
deeply religious, and he also did not believe in publicly criticizing individuals or 
organizations.164  At a command and staff meeting on 2 August 1943, Lee vaguely addressed 
criticism of his chief of staff that had come to his attention, stating:   
I love him like a brother, and because I love him like a brother, I resent anything 
that is ever said against him…. We are partners in a business.  It is the greatest 
enterprise that you and I will ever engage in…. Anybody that says anything 
slightingly about our partners or our brothers in this enterprise will find his 
remarks are resented…. Now the little stings and the little digs and the criticisms, 
the idle gossip that hurts tends to disintegrate the bond between us.165   
 
This negative view of criticism may have prevented productive self-reflection and may 
have interfered with Lee’s ability to contribute much to lessons learned and to the historical 
 
163 He also preferred to avoid directly answering questions, at least in any depth.  Forrest Pogue found him to be his 
most difficult charge while writing The Supreme Command, complaining in a private note that he could not get Lee 
to dedicate quality time, focus, stay on topic, or provide anything but the most superficial answers to questions.  See 
copies of his original interview notes in The Supreme Command file at AHEC.   
164 Lee was Episcopalian, but demonstrated traits more common in fundamentalist sects.  He did not drink, gamble, 
or play cards during the war.  He went to services daily, and sometimes more than once a day, forcing his staff to 
join him.  He refers to himself as “we” in his unpublished memoirs, not as a sign of arrogance as some historians 
claim, but as an outward sign that he had surrendered his life to God and Jesus and followed their lead in every 
action and decision made.  Lee spent the last eleven years of his life serving in the Brotherhood of Saint Andrew, to 
include executive vice president and president.   
165 SOS C&S Notes, 2 Aug 43.  RG 498, UD 458.   
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record at the end of the war.  Another motive behind Lee’s reticence to embrace critical self-
evaluation was that any meaningful critique of COMZ would inevitability cast some blame back 
on Somervell or Eisenhower, two men for whom Lee had boundless respect and loyalty.  It is 
hard to believe that every logistical shortfall of any significance could be exclusively blamed on 
COMZ.  SHAEF or the ASF would have contributed in some measure to any major 
shortcomings, and Lee was not interested in volunteering that information to outsiders.  Finally, 
Lee’s stoicism, and ultimately optimism, at least when it came to issues beyond his control, were 
perhaps linked to his faith.  Events would take their natural course, and, because Lee believed he 
was fighting on the morally superior side, matters of chance were likely to work out in favor of 
the Allies.  Lee worked relentlessly to strengthen and prepare his command, but he refused to 
worry about what he could not control, leaving those concerns to a higher power. 
Perhaps as a result of Lee’s personality and his attitude about public criticism, COMZ’s 
contributions to the General Board tended to be a bit shallow.  One is forced to read between the 
lines and sort through poorly supported conclusions to move beyond the trivial.  Often, when 
they took note of a problem, the authors offered no assessment of why the issue had arisen, what 
might have been done differently, or what were potential solutions.  General Board Report 128, 
which covered the history of SOS in the U.K. and its efforts to execute Bolero, acknowledged 
only two major problems that the command experienced in France that it said should have been 
identified and fixed before leaving the U.K.  These were universally followed depot 
accountability procedures and, also, a well-understood system to distribute POL.  
Lord admitted in General Board Report 128: “Control of Depot Operations was a 
controversial matter never quite crystallized to the satisfaction of either the Base Section 
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Commanders, SOS Chiefs of Services, or the Depot Commanders.”166  Figuring out exactly who 
could and could not issue instructions to each depot was probably the most significant problem.  
Lord pointed out that depots endured too many inspections – by general and service staff of SOS, 
by the local base and district staff, and by ETOUSA personnel on occasional visits.  The 
reporting demands placed upon each depot followed the same three lines of authority, and each 
organization had its own ideas on the best way to run things in its chain of depots. 
This theme was addressed by MG Lutes at the end of a ten-day visit to ETOUSA in late 
April 1944.  He had noted that in general each service knew what it had on hand, but inventory 
methods varied from location to location and from service to service, and both the Signal and 
Engineer procedures were spotty at best.167  As a result it took too long for SOS to figure out if it 
had a particular item on hand when asked by a base section or combat unit or if the item needed 
to be placed on order through the Port of New York.  Littlejohn’s office had published numerous 
SOPs on stock control and depot management that were accepted as the standard for the theater, 
but obviously some services preferred to use their own tried and trusted methods.  In theory this 
was fine – inventory experts at each depot and for each service generally knew what they had at 
each location and in the theater.  But problems would arise if they had to turn that depot over to 
different personnel who were not familiar with their methodology, which was exactly what 
would happen during the consolidation of facilities in the U.K. after Overlord and on the 
continent as the ADSEC moved east to keep up with the combat units.   
Stock control was further complicated by the existence of kits with imprecise inventory 
lists and also by problematic relationships between general and technical staff officers at various 
 
166 General Board 128, 35-36. 
167 MG Leroy Lutes, “Supply Organization and Procedures,” 27 Apr 44.  RG 498, UD 578, ADM 238, NARA II.  
This was a five-page summary of his observations from a ten-day inspection tour of ETOUSA.   
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levels in the chain of command.  Lutes noted that ETOUSA had found that a “considerable 
number” of maintenance items incorrectly believed to be in short supply were available as 
components within an amphibious pack.168  Those items had not been recorded on stock records 
because no one knew they were in the pack, the inventory was imprecise or had gone missing, 
and no one had opened it until April.  Of greater concern was the lack of trust and confidence 
among the deputy G-4 at Cheltenham, the base section G-4s, and the combat units they were 
supposed to support.  No one trusted anyone -- the G-4 would bypass the base section staff and 
work directly with technical sections or combat units.  Combat units would bypass the base 
section and work directly with SOS staff.169  Base section G-4s did not have timely or accurate 
information on what was available in the depots within their footprint and could not extract that 
information from the technical services at any level.  Despite Lee’s attempts to empower his base 
section commanders, Lutes noticed that everyone seemed to treat them as unnecessary obstacles 
among consumers, the technical services who knew exactly what they had in theater, and SOS 
general staff that matched prioritized requirements to material on hand or authority to order it 
from the U.S.  Base section commanders who actually tried to synchronize service troops and the 
technical staff at their level to support their associated combat units were failing miserably as 
they were bypassed by SOS and combat formations.  This did not bode well for the conditions 
expected in France, where decentralization and cooperation between base sections would be 
indispensable during offensive operations.        
 A byproduct of these problems with depot and stock control procedures was a recurrent 
need for sorting sheds in the U.K. and then on the continent.  Sorting sheds were nothing more 
 
168 Ibid, 2.  Like the British, the U.S. Army developed resupply bundles of mixed parts to support all the vehicles 
and equipment in a regiment or division.  These were packaged for easy delivery to Normandy.  There were parts 
within these packages that SOS was incorrectly reporting as critical shortages in the theater. 
169 Ibid, 2, 3. 
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than weather-proofed locations where improperly marked containers could be opened, 
inventoried, and repacked for onward movement.  Obviously, this double-handling was 
inefficient and something SOS hoped to get away from eventually.  However, operations in 
North Africa, in Normandy, and along the French-German border from 1942 to 1945 
demonstrated that sorting sheds were a necessary evil, and the ability to set them up and operate 
them was a critical capability for COMZ.  Sorting sheds would have been unnecessary if every 
unit handling supplies had been trained, was following the same detailed procedures, could keep 
inventories reconciled with the constant stream of new deliveries and issues, and was handling 
properly marked containers.  In practice the system tended to fail under the friction of field 
operations.  In France the doctrinal solution seemed to collapse when an organization worked 
with new partners and a superior headquarters for the first time or when they inherited 
disorganized facilities with inaccurate, or completely non-existent, inventories from service 
troops who were heading east to keep up with the advancing combat divisions. 
A second process that SOS failed to master in Britain, and one that would hinder the 
Allied attempt to penetrate the Westwall in the fall of 1944, was control over the transportation 
and distribution of fuel and lubricants.  The U.S. “…experiences in the BI did not…furnish a 
basis for evaluating the proper division of responsibility and control of POL supply and flow 
between SOS G-4, the QM service, and the Engineer and Transportation Services.  Later, on the 
continent, this division of responsibility came to be a major problem and one that was to be 
changed several times before an efficient procedure was devised.”170  It was surprising that such 
a critical process, and one that was practiced for over eighteen months in Great Britain prior to 
the invasion of France, could not be finalized before it was used in combat.  It suggests that 
 
170 General Board 128, 24-25. 
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ETOUSA did not have a thorough understanding of the challenges faced by the 1st British Army 
over the winter of 1942/1943 or of the steps taken by AFHQ and NATOUSA to meet them.   
Both problems -- standardization in accountability procedures at depots and figuring out 
the nuts and bolts of fuel distribution -- showed a failure to anticipate requirements and impose 
operational discipline.  Fuel distribution was more problematic because it was the type of work 
that only COMZ or a base section staff could accomplish.  The task was difficult because it 
demanded the synchronization of four branches or services in order to work, and this integration 
could only be performed either by a specially appointed lead service or else by the chief of 
operations in a half-dozen base sections or at COMZ.  It was exactly why Lee had created base 
section commanders -- to integrate the activities of various support troops in order to accomplish 
combined-service tasks.  Because SOS did not develop, validate, disseminate, and practice a 
common procedure in the United Kingdom, they were forced to improvise under much more 
difficult conditions in France.  Linked to the fact that the Allied advance stalled in September 
because too little fuel was reaching front-line divisions, it was a deficiency with massive 
implications.   
Other sources might have helped SOS to identify important gaps in capability before their 
deployment to France.  MG Leroy Lutes shared with ETOUSA two reports that he had written in 
April and May to capture his impressions after an extensive tour throughout the U.K.171  These 
observations along with some recommendations are more interesting than the items pointed out 
in GB Report 128 because we know Lutes’ comments reached Lee and his staff in time for the 
command to take corrective action.  Lutes and a small team of supporting staff officers visited 
 
171 The timing of this trip, following immediately after the ETOUSA visit to the United States, suggested that the 
ASF might have been losing confidence in Lee and SOS around the same time that SHAEF and FUSAG were 
growing increasingly hostile.   
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SOS, FUSAG, Air Service Command, 1st Army, V Corps, ADSEC, and FECZ trying to gauge 
the health of sustainment preparation in ETOUSA.  The result was a six-page open report as well 
as the “secret memo” shared only with Somervell and, one assumes, orally with Lee.172  The 
overall impression from both documents is that FUSAG was logistically ready for Overlord, that 
COMZ had a number of important procedures they needed to improve, and that their staff was 
saddled with two officers who could not measure up to their responsibilities and who needed to 
go.   
Lutes had commented on stock control and interaction at SOS and base-section level.  
Now he addressed three other areas of concern including the relationship among COMZ, 
subordinate logistics organizations, and major combat units; problems with operational logistical 
planning; and weaknesses among key members of the ETOUSA staff.  Lutes detected the same 
friction between ETOUSA and FUSAG noted by Stratton and Lord in early June; Lutes also 
mentioned Moses’ frustration over shortages and a lack of transparency within SOS procedures 
that were used to determine the allocation of controlled or critical items between the Air Force, 
Ground Force, and SOS.173   Lee was surely satisfied with his procedures, especially in the light 
of the decision to pool and issue PROCO material based on who needed the equipment first.  But 
without a window into how those priorities were decided, FUSAG felt slighted.  It was not a 
question of decision-making, but one of process and transparency.  In France Lee continued to 
resist external pressure to hold periodic prioritization boards where 12AG and USSTAF were 
welcome; he seemed to loathe the inefficiency, and perhaps the voluntary reduction of authority, 
 
172 In the note to Somervell Lutes confirmed that he had not shared his negative opinion of some of the leaders 
within ETOUSA with Eisenhower, but he mentioned discussing the issue with Lee. 
173 Lutes, “Supply Organization and Procedures,” 2.   
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that this might present.174  But boards were common tools within the Allied military in 1944, and 
they had proven very effective in prioritizing scarce assets in North Africa without generating 
bad feelings.   
Some of the breakdowns in communication mentioned by FUSAG were echoed by 1st 
Army, where staff officers noted that they always had to pull information from Cheltenham and 
base sections rather than automatically receiving periodic updates.  Lutes pointed out that he had 
heard the same complaint leveled against district transportation offices as well.  He found local 
transportation sections to be competent, but they did not embrace the need to proactively engage 
the combat formations they were supporting.175  In the private memo Lutes wrote exclusively for 
Somervell, Lutes added a few other problems.  SOS lacked procedures for expediting critical 
items from dockside to depots and the troops. 176   There were fundamental problems with the 
centralized stock control systems at SOS.  Lee’s team seemed to do fine with routine procedures, 
but, when it came time to step outside established norms to handle an emerging crisis, it became 
clear that they had not anticipated the problem and had not organized teams ready to solve them. 
 Lutes’ rebuke of operational planning conducted to date was even sharper, and he blamed 
both SOS and FUSAG.  He thought that Plank and Moses had been too passive by waiting for 
someone in authority to provide definite tonnage allocations rather than developing estimates of 
their own.  They also had made insufficient progress in determining how requisitions would flow 
from 1st Army up to COMZ through the ADSEC.  He was worried that he had seen no detailed 
assessment of how the ADSEC intended to jump from handling 15,000 tons of supplies daily in 
 
174 Eisenhower asked Lee to run a periodic ETOUSA manpower utilization board, an idea Lee resisted until directly 
ordered to do so.  Eisenhower eventually put Crawford in charge of establishing a system to determine which units 
could or could not billet in Paris after he lost confidence in Lee’s objectivity.     
175 Ibid, 4.   
176 Memo, Lutes to Somervell, 8 May 44.  MG Leroy Lutes Papers, DDEPL. 
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the U.K. in March to dispersing 24,000 tons daily by D+40 in France.  He also found nothing to 
indicate that COMZ understood just how difficult managing spare parts was going to be, and he 
offered three concrete solutions to how to reorganize the staff to better handle the surge of 
detailed work it would require.177  Privately Lutes encouraged Lee to get more involved in future 
planning and to supervise the computation of requirements that formed the basis of all theater 
sustainment projections.  
Echoing concerns about favoritism among the SOS staff and their inability to remain 
neutral when establishing priorities, Lutes noted frustration within the ETOUSA Office of 
Transportation.  Officers there complained of constant pressure by SOS and other services for 
preferential treatment and accelerated delivery of their cargo, resulting in friction with agencies 
that thought they were constantly being bumped to the bottom of the list.  The recommended 
solution was simple: tighter supervision at headquarters ETOUSA to enforce theater priorities 
held by the theater and add transparency to the process.  Mentioned in the private memo but not 
in the public report, Lutes also advised Lee to establish a larger and more competent LNO 
section at SHAEF.  Lutes did not state the underlying purpose of the team nor suggest the 
problems such a step might help solve.178   
Lutes saved his most explosive comments for the end of his private letter to Somervell.  
In early May he recommended that Lee relieve the chief of staff and G-4 at ADSEC and that 
Lord and Stratton be removed from the same positions at ETOUSA.  He urged that Lee replace 
 
177 Lutes, “Supply…,” 5.  These concerns took up almost all of the fifth page of the report and reflected his 
appreciation of the importance of the issue after two and a half years of experience in the job.  Lutes suggested the 
solution was to create a special portion of the staff among SOS, base sections, and technical services staffs dedicated 
to the problem.  He also recommended increasing the reserves from 75 to 90 days and refining theater planning 
figures as operational experience provided greater clarity on consumption rates. 
178 One can only speculate that Lutes detected a gap between the two organizations, a possibility supported by the 
lack of ETOUSA input to SHAEF sustainment planning between March and May.  Regardless the reasons behind 
the recommendation, Lee implemented it. 
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Lord with BG Littlejohn, the chief Quartermaster.  Lutes explained that he had spent much of the 
last week teaching Lord and Stratton how to do their jobs and concluded that Lord did not know 
how to harness and drive a large staff.  Lutes had obviously discussed the issue with Lee, 
because the SOS commander had defended Lord on the grounds of his positive relationship with 
Eisenhower, Smith, and the rest of the SHAEF administrative staff.  In the end, Lutes’ 
recommended personnel changes at ETOUSA and ADSEC were not carried out, and this was 
most likely the correct call.  Changing what were in essence the two most important staff 
positions in the two essential logistics nodes a month before Overlord would have been a drastic 
measure that could have been justified only by gross incompetence. 
It is worthwhile to add a word of caution about Lutes’ observations.  His experience with 
logistics and managing large organizations was recent.  His most significant duties prior to 
joining the ASF in early 1942 was a short period in command of a coastal artillery brigade, a 
long assignment with the National Guard bureau, and about two years as first the G-4 and then 
the chief of staff for 3rd Army in Atlanta.  Lutes managed a massive and diverse workload in the 
ASF and was in constant contact with SOS and theater leaders, but he had no practical 
experience with logistics in combat.  Lutes had an excellent reputation as a smart, honest, 
hardworking, and effective officer and manager, and he was considered as a replacement for Lee 
on two or three occasions.  But Lutes’ comments were likely to be dismissed or modified by 
someone like Larkin, Crawford, or Hughes as those of someone who did not understand the 
friction and competing priorities that came from working with the British and maneuver 
commanders.  We can see that Lutes had identified a few key issues that would have a drastic 
impact in France, while missing a few others.  Given the limits of the technology of the time, 
having perfectly accurate and up-to-date inventories at the theater and base-section levels was a 
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fantasy.  Lutes accurately noted the friction that traditionally develops between any sustainment 
organization and the combatants it is supposed to support, and he offered methods that SOS 
might use to restore a measure of faith and confidence among the fighters.  His insightful 
concern centered on the way in which ETOUSA had rendered themselves largely irrelevant to 
operational planning at SHAEF and FUSAG and the steps that might contribute to reversing that 
trend. 
Public criticism of SOS/COMZ on two major occasions in 1944 was balanced by votes of 
confidence from Somervell and Eisenhower.  There were rumors throughout the war that Lee 
was close to being fired, but both of his bosses continued to support him until the end of the war.   
In an end-of-year summary to Marshall on 13 December 1944, LTG Devers wrote about Lee and 
his command: “The S.O.S. has accomplished much.  It has been able to keep ahead of the peak 
loads, has worked well with the British, has a fine organization and is well-disciplined….  Lee 
has been particularly aggressive and efficient and is responsible for the fine condition of his 
organization.”179  Devers was never one to criticize a subordinate in writing, but he was also not 
the type of person to keep weak officers in key positions.  Doubtlessly SOS had its share of 
mediocre officers, broken systems, and some aversion to deep introspection at the senior level.  
But it also had it strengths, and it enjoyed the professional confidence of Eisenhower and 
Somervell.  
 
 Conclusion 
 The ETOUSA SOS was a remarkably successful organization during its two years in the 
U.K., at least in the execution of the core tasks associated with Bolero.  Starting literally from 
 
179  Devers to Marshall, 13 Dec 43, box 11, DP, in Wheeler, 236. 
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scratch, Lee built up an effective organization while trying to turn concepts into reality in a 
complex environment.  There was no doctrinal script, nor were there standing operating 
procedures or established tables of organization to govern what Lee was trying to accomplish in 
the ETO.  In many ways, the methods directed by Marshall and Somervell went against doctrine 
and professional officer education and experience by trying to assign the theater special staff to 
Lee.  Tighter integration between the SOS and theater special staff was needed in order to break 
up the stove-piped technical services and to reform them into combined-service commands at 
every echelon.  This approach offered the opportunity to decentralize logistical support and to 
create a more flexible and responsive sustainment structure.  But because it was new, not 
addressed by doctrine, and not taught in military schools, it was a very difficult task that was 
resisted by traditionalists and others with a vested interest in older or alternative systems. 
Despite these difficulties, Lee forged an integrated command capable of issuing 
instructions and monitoring compliance from Cheltenham to five base commands and then down 
to regional and district offices.  SOS helped identify and fix the numerous logistical mistakes 
identified during Torch, many of which originated with the Port of New York and the ASF.  SOS 
trained and retrained its people, demonstrating tremendous flexibility in order to accomplish its 
most important mission during each phase of its existence in the U.K.  Lee demanded discipline, 
honest feedback, and a commitment to learning and to getting better.  The command sought out 
information from active theaters, and it sent numerous orientation missions to North Africa and 
the Mediterranean.  Lee led the U.S. Army by creating a powerful office of transportation, 
transferring control over motor services to Ross’ team, and approving the creation of provisional 
units to coordinate and lead truck companies in France.  Lee embraced the opportunity to learn 
from the British, constantly inviting them to inspect and address his units, and endorsing their 
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idea of creating the Joint Q Planning Course.  After a rough start, SOS pulled off Bolero, packing 
1.5 million Americans into Great Britain before June 1944 and building the barracks, depots, 
training sites, airfields, and headquarters to support their work.  It was an impressive list of 
accomplishments. 
When it came time to expand beyond the functions associated with reception and garrison 
duties, SOS stumbled.  For whatever reasons, Lee could not replicate his success with Bolero in 
the planning and preparation for Roundup.  The core team from within SOS remained aloof from 
the dirty details being hammered out at COSSAC, and the quality of their requests back to the 
War Department suffered as a result.  It was as if Lee and SOS could not envision how the 
mission would change once they were in France, and therefore how the procedures that worked 
well in the U.K. would have to be replaced.  SOS was consumed with the present rather than 
passionately preparing for the future.  This made sense because so little of the staff had 
participated in an active campaign, and a two- to three-week observation tour is not the same 
thing as living in actual combat conditions with its associated pressures and responsibilities.  The 
result was a command that was poorly informed about the sustainment plan for Overlord and had 
no plan for how to reconfigure in France.  There were no approved SOPs explaining how 
procedures would change once in combat, or much drive to train for those tasks prior to heading 
across the Channel.  SOS was a garrison command in what amounted to a safe rear area, and this 
produced a culture clash when they were forced to work together with combat veterans returning 
from the MTO. 
 This was exactly what happened throughout the summer and fall of 1943.  The result was 
a slow erosion of SOS’s authority, reputation, and trust.  This development was not completely 
fair, but neither Lee nor Devers did anything to send their people (other than Ross) to the MTO 
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for extended duty or to rotate experienced logisticians into SOS.  For SOS’s sake it was a shame 
that Lee did not establish a closer relationship with Crawford and learn from him.  Despite these 
limitations, ETOUSA and SOS did a remarkable job in securing an effective troop basis for 
Overlord, with all the equipment and material necessary to launch and sustain the invasion, with 
only a few problem areas.  Shortages of artillery ammunition could not be exclusively solved by 
ETOUSA, but the failure to deploy more heavy trucks and pre-position the material necessary to 
build the POL pipelines would prove to a major mistake.  It was not exclusively the fault of SOS, 
but it could be argued that Lee should have done more within command channels in the winter 
and spring to generate options.  Lee did so with other issues, so it is possible that he did not 
understand how important both projects were until it was too late to address the material 
shortcomings that would hobble their effectiveness.    
As it got to work in February and March 1944, SHAEF brought fresh eyes and a more 
comprehensive understanding of what the campaign in France was likely to look like.  As the 
SHAEF G-4 worked to extend the logistical support plan beyond D+90, his organization was 
forced to go back and critically examine the estimates and supporting plans developed by 
COSSAC, FUSAG, and SOS.  In general, ETOUSA/SOS had secured a healthy balance of 
combat, air, and service forces and the equipment necessary to succeed in France.  A few critical 
shortages caused quite a bit of last-minute activity, none more so than the storage of truck 
companies or heavy equipment for the units that were available.  As a result of reviewing the 
work completed by ETOUSA, some leaders at SHAEF emerged with a growing sense of 
exasperation with the perceived failures of the SOS staff.  A shortage of artillery ammunition and 
heavy trucks would have a significant impact on Overlord, but perhaps the most important result 
of the reassessment of the support plan conducted that spring was a widening gulf between the 
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SHAEF and ETOUSA logisticians.  By late May the common perception at SHAEF and FUSAG 
seemed to be that one was better off bypassing Lord and the ETOUSA staff and going directly to 
the special staff sections.  This might have been driven by personality clashes, but more likely it 
was really about finding the officers who had the operational details at their fingertips.  
Moreover, because the technical services were more deeply engaged with planning, they tended 
to be of more value than the general staff at SOS to their SHAEF and FUSAG counterparts.  
The return of Eisenhower accelerated a few trends that had emerged during the three 
months of Devers’ command.  Maintaining both ETOUSA and SOS was counterproductive; both 
organizations had very similar missions and there not enough experienced staff officers to 
probably man both commands.  There was no question that Eisenhower and the team from the 
Mediterranean would use SHAEF as the sole integrator of theater and joint maneuver and 
logistics and that they would look to FUSAG (with ADSEC and FECZ) to do the same on the 
continent, at least until the end of the initial phases of Overlord.  Eisenhower looked to Lee and 
the newly consolidated ETOUSA staff to replicate the function of NATOUSA: routine 
coordination with the War Department and efficient management of the rear areas.  He did not 
need or want another American headquarters standing between him and the field forces or trying 
to replicate the planning functions mastered by Gale and Crawford.  Eisenhower did expect Lee 
to run COMZ in France, but the formal division of sustainment responsibilities and anticipated 
transition dates among 12th Army Group, ETOUSA and SHAEF remained vague throughout July 
and August 1944.   
But on the eve of Overlord, there were already indicators that COMZ might struggle in a 
few key areas.  By May 1944 if was already obvious that Lee and his staff had problematic 
relationships with their counterparts at SHAEF and FUSAG; Lutes worried they would carry 
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over, might get worse, and had the potential to interfere with effective cooperation on the 
continent.  More importantly, Lee and Crawford either did not have much influence on decision-
making in SHAEF or chose not to exert it very often.  COMZ had no experience as a field 
coordinating agency, and the base sections and special staff could not fill this vital role for them.  
Lee would confront time-sensitive operations in the chaos of combat conditions for the first time 
ever in France, and the command was utterly unprepared for the adaptation needed to thrive 
under these circumstances.  Finally, Lee and Ross had taken steps to centralize, organize, and 
equip their motor transport forces, but that area remained one of grave concern for all experts 
who had studied the issue carefully.  Until the railroads and POL pipelines could be pushed up to 
and over the Seine, there would be a menacing gap between requirements and lift capacity that 
might bring eastern movement to a halt.  Everyone expected the Germans to fight a series of 
staged withdrawals to successive river lines that should allow the Allies to restore the lines of 
communication right behind the armies.  But if a rapid advance proved possible, then distribution 
of fuel, food, and ammunition might become a major problem.  It would be terribly important to 
repair and extend rail and POL pipelines as quickly as possible and to manage truck companies 
centrally to get the most out of what resources COMZ had available under these circumstances. 
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Chapter 5 - Gale’s Struggle to Match Ends to Means 
 By late May 1944 it was obvious to a number of senior leaders in Great Britain that the 
lack of combat experience in ETOUSA/COMZ, among other concerns, would require other 
organizations to carry more of the burden than might technically be their responsibility.  Bradley, 
Moses, and other officers at FUSA/FUSAG would take up the slack during the early weeks of 
the campaign, while SHAEF focused on integrating the joint team and fusing operational 
maneuver with large-scale logistics.  General Humfrey Gale needed to scale up the systems he 
had put in place in North Africa and the Mediterranean to an entirely new level, all while trying 
to gently guide the two national requisition and distribution systems with much less formal 
authority than he had enjoyed in 1943.  This chapter outlines the systems Gale put in place at 
SHAEF, how those processes fared during the early weeks of the campaign, and how they 
changed in response to the rapid increase in the tempo of operations after the breakout at St. Lô.      
At the heart of the chapter is an examination of the critical breakdown of the system LTG 
Gale put in place as the Chief Admin Officer at SHAEF, a staff process that was designed to link 
potential operational objectives to logistical limitations and requirements.  But between 25 
August and 12 September 1944 the conduct of the Allied campaign was largely divorced from 
any deeper concerns about its long-term logistical viability, and this conflict was not truly 
resolved until Eisenhower forced Montgomery to accept the clearing of the Scheldt as the top 
Allied priority around the middle of October.  During the pursuit Eisenhower largely ignored the 
logisticians at SHAEF and the advice of Montgomery, preferring to authorize the simultaneous 
advance on half-a-dozen corps level objectives.  With this decision, Eisenhower almost 
guaranteed he would accomplish none of them before the recovery of the German Army just 
short of the Westwall.  Partially acknowledging his mistake, after 10 September Eisenhower 
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generally prioritized Montgomery’s thrusts to cross the Rhine in the Netherlands while hoping 
2nd Canadian Army could simultaneously clear the approaches to Antwerp.  But Eisenhower, 
abetting by well-intentioned advice from Bradley and Lee, could not curb his enthusiasm for 
keeping the enemy off balance by attacking multiple objectives simultaneously, inadvertently 
ensuring that no attack launched in September had the weight and logistical legs required to 
achieve a decisive success.  Gale belatedly realized he could not provide his commander with 
better logistical advice because of the disfunction occurring in COMZ, a problem that could only 
be resolved by SHAEF taking over the last important functions that had been retained by Lee.  
 This period of time and sequence of events may well be one of the most thoroughly 
examined subjects in the history of World War Two.  What is different here is that we will 
examine the causally-linked decisions of 25 August, 10 September, and the backsliding of 12 
September within a context framed by similar decision-making that occurred in the months prior 
to Market Garden, and during the six weeks after the British escape from Arnhem.  What has 
been missing in the past is an understanding of exactly how SHAEF made decisions that required 
a blending of the selection and timing of maneuver objectives while acknowledging and 
addressing the requirements imposed by logistics, and context of how the three sub-phases of 
Overlord influenced each other.1  Since we will see that Eisenhower largely listened to his 
logisticians up to the 25 August crossing of the Seine, what changed between then and the 
decision to force Montgomery to put his main effort into clearing Antwerp?  What role did the 
promises of COMZ (and the Allied Expeditionary Air Force and specifically CATOR) play in 
unleashing Eisenhower’s optimism, and why did Gale not anticipate the gap between what Lee 
promised versus what could be delivered?  Examined across a wider timeframe, one realizes that 
 
1 D-Day to Cobra, Cobra to Market Garden, Post-Market Garden to the opening of Antwerp. 
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SHAEF had a healthy process to funnel integrated logistics and maneuver concepts to senior 
leaders to aid their decision-making, and that Eisenhower generally followed their advice, 
perhaps too much so, until the Allied crossing of the Seine, when things changed fundamentally 
for about two months.  Determining exactly why this happened is worthy of our attention.   
In the period between the seizure of Paris and Montgomery’s confrontation with him on 
10 September, Eisenhower indulged his preference to attack on a wide front, a method designed 
to keep the enemy on the run everywhere, thus preventing the formation of any pockets of 
resistance that might threaten the Allied flanks or rear area.  If logistically sustainable, it was an 
approach with significant advantages over deep and narrow thrusts by smaller elements.  But on 
10 September Eisenhower was forced to acknowledge that he no longer had the logistical 
capacity to attack everywhere at once, and agreed to prioritize Montgomery’s northern thrust.  
Two factors soon caused Eisenhower to reconsider this decision – Gale and Lee demonstrated 
that not all of the transportation capacity of the theater could be funneled to support Montgomery 
exclusively, and Bradley convinced Eisenhower that Patton should continue to advance with 
whatever portion of the supplies the theater distribution system could provide.  Regardless the 
merits of, and the recriminations that eventually followed, the decision to keep 12th Army Group 
on the attack in September, Eisenhower accomplished only one of his five operational objectives 
before the pursuit came to a permanent halt in the face of winter weather – the seizure of Brest.2   
After Market Garden had shot its bolt, staff officers at SHAEF waged a minor guerrilla 
war with 21st Army Group to regain control over the direction of the ground campaign.  These 
efforts culminated around mid-October when Eisenhower acknowledged that theater logistical 
 
2 The others were opening Antwerp, getting a bridgehead over the Rhine, threating the Ruhr to the west of Köln, 
threating the Saar between the Moselle and the Rhine. 
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requirements had to trump operational maneuver objectives designed to reach and cross the 
Rhine, triggering a decisive showdown between Eisenhower and Montgomery (and his 
supporters at the War Office).  The Allied campaign in France over the summer and fall hinged 
as much on getting integrated maneuver and logistics appraisals in front of commanders to guide 
good decision-making as it did on the battle of egos between Eisenhower and Montgomery or in 
the clash of national approaches to the best way to conduct operational campaigns.  SHAEF had 
a decent system to keep Eisenhower informed of the logistical implications of his choices, a 
system he heeded through mid-August.  But starting on 25 August Eisenhower was much more 
comfortable facing the risk that the sustainment system might collapse than Montgomery or the 
administrative staff at SHAEF were willing to face.  Some of this risk Eisenhower accepted from 
a position of ignorance, the result of deliberate misinformation, made up numbers, or admissions 
of cluelessness passed on to SHAEF from COMZ and 12th AG.  Gale was surprised during this 
crucial period because he had trusted Lee and believed the information fed to him by ETOUSA.  
In the course of September Gale recognized how lost COMZ was, and took steps to shift key 
functions up to SHAEF, to include direct supervision over specific special staff sections at 
ETOUSA, to prevent these breakdowns in the future.  After the disappointment of Market 
Garden and lingering disagreement over the relative priority of clearing the Scheldt, Gale set out 
to regain his dominant position, both in the accuracy of SHAEF’s understanding of the logistics 
situation, and in his ability to guide Eisenhower by presenting operational advice that tempered 
theater goals with the limitations imposed by supplies and transportation.    
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 Building a New Team 
It is easy to forget just how little experience the SHAEF staff and command group had 
working together as a collective body by the summer of 1944.  The headquarters had been 
created through a hasty marriage of COSSAC, those portions of ETOUSA focused on Roundup, 
and the circle of trusted subordinates Eisenhower brought with him from AFHQ.   SHAEF’s 
subordinate service commands were created using components from various British Home 
Forces, whose leaders had been selected by the British chiefs of staff with no input from 
Eisenhower.  Everyone had about two months to get to know one another and try to mesh the 
two systems of procedure inherited from COSSAC and AFHQ before the headquarters was 
overwhelmed by detailed planning and preliminary operations designed to make D-Day a 
success.  Eisenhower knew and had worked with all his service chiefs for Overlord while serving 
in the Mediterranean, other than Leigh-Mallory.  Eisenhower’s unfamiliarity with Leigh-Mallory 
was mitigated by the transfer of Tedder and Spaatz from North Africa to the U.K., where Tedder 
was assigned as the deputy command of SHAEF and Spaatz assumed command of a new 
organization charged with synchronizing the activities of 8th and 15th Air Forces.  Working with 
Churchill, Eisenhower managed to marginalize Leigh-Mallory when he transferred effective 
control of the air campaign to Tedder in February, and he looked to Spaatz to synchronize U.S. 
strategic and tactical airpower in support of the Overlord campaign.  A less pressing, but 
eventually critical, concern was Eisenhower’s professional relationship with Montgomery.  
Eisenhower had always benefited from the presence of a British middleman between him and 
Montgomery in North Africa and Italy, but in France Montgomery would answer directly to 
SHAEF.  At some point during the campaign Eisenhower would assume control over ground 
operations from 21st AG, a delicate endeavor under the best of conditions.  Like Leigh-Mallory, 
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Montgomery was not his first choice as a subordinate commander, but Eisenhower believed in 
his own ability  to manage the strong-willed and popular British general and secure his 
cooperation with Bradley and with leaders of the other services, just as he had managed to do 
with the command team he had inherited in the Mediterranean. 
 In addition to coordinating the joint campaign and eventually taking over control of 
ground operations, Eisenhower had to reconcile the conflicting priorities of the combat 
commanders with those of his communications zone, specifically LTG Lee and the staff at 
ETOUSA/COMZ.  By mid-May 1944 there were already clear indicators that friction existed 
between Lee and the logistical teams at FUSAG and SHAEF, and there were hints that COMZ 
might not be up to the task of controlling supply operations in France.  A more astute observer 
might have concluded that each of these three agencies believed it had primacy over the 
coordination of logistical support to the armies once on the continent, but none of them had the 
experience to do an effective job right away.  Exactly how COMZ, FUSAG, and SHAEF would 
coordinate with one another and the specific sub-set of the theater logistic mission each 
organization would control remained vague.  Work conducted by SHAEF in April and May led 
them to think that the joint-combined staff would have to play a prominent role in operational 
planning and managing coordination between the COMZ and the army groups.  But this was a 
task SHAEF was not organized or trained to accomplish and one that Lee might refuse to cede to 
their level. 
 What were the mechanisms for distilling logistical problems effecting SHAEF and 
funneling them up to the command group prior to and during the first five months of the 
campaign in France, and were they effective?  It is difficult to determine exactly for two reasons. 
First, Eisenhower acted decisively to ensure that his version of reality became the official 
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narrative of the fall campaign.  In January 1945 Eisenhower provided an extensive interim report 
to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that set the tone for subsequent reports and official histories 
published over the next three or four decades.  Eisenhower advanced his agenda with this 
document, which included omissions, partially accurate excuses, and a few out-and-out lies 
designed to protect his own reputation and preserve his freedom of action in the spring 
campaign.  Second, any criticism of Eisenhower’s performance as the commander of ETOUSA 
must acknowledge that he was also the ground campaign coordinator after mid-August 1944 and 
the director of the theater joint campaign, and he was constantly reminded of the political 
implications of military operations by Marshall and Churchill.  It eventually dawned on some 
observers, both during and after the war, that Eisenhower and Bedell Smith both tried to do too 
much themselves.  The fact that Eisenhower was personally supervising too many tasks was a 
major contributing factor in some of the problems dogging SHAEF during the fall campaign.  
But the same critics who realized that Eisenhower was trying to do too much himself were short 
on realistic solutions of how to delegate any of these responsibilities to someone who was 
capable and acceptable to both the British and U.S. senior leaders.   
 Despite organizational overlap and Eisenhower’s tendency to saddle himself with too 
large a span of control, SHAEF was exceptionally well positioned to manage the integration of 
theater logistics and operational objectives.  Smith and Gale were efficient and effective officers 
who had already worked together for almost eighteen months by the time SHAEF was officially 
established in early February 1944.  One of Gale’s first steps once he was settled in London was 
to create a logistical planning section and an independent joint plans section.  Gale had learned 
the hard way during the preparation for and early months of executing Torch that both 
capabilities were essential at the joint-combined level.  Crawford was a new addition to the 
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logistics team, but he had combat experience from North Africa, six months of familiarity with 
how ETOUSA and COSSAC operated, and a reputation among his peers as a strong officer.  
Harold Bull, the SHAEF G-3, understood the importance of both the G-1 and G-4 functions and 
sought out and listened to their advice.  Finally, Eisenhower, Bradley, and the U.S. army 
commanders respected a number of their key logisticians, including Gale, Crawford, Larkin, 
Moses, and Plank.  It is also obvious, by reviewing various messages sent throughout the 
campaign, that these officers had frequent and easy access to their commanders, who tended to 
absorb, agree, and act on the recommendations of their logisticians.   
 The other side of the coin was that there were officers who were not trusted at SHAEF or 
among the army groups.  Among them were Lee, Lord, and Stratton, some of the base section 
commanders, and the heads of special staff sections in ETOUSA/COMZ.  SHAEF had figured 
out how to package information to meet Eisenhower’s needs by early June, but they still had a 
long way to go to figure out how to effectively coordinate with the armies and COMZ.  Hindered 
by the limitations of communications technology of that era, logisticians struggled to stay abreast 
of current developments and coordinate with their peers.  The challenges of maintaining currency 
and keeping open effective dialogue were made that much harder because maneuver and 
sustainment staff officers tended to occupy different and widely dispersed headquarters.  If that 
was not enough, advanced command posts manned primarily by the combat-oriented staff 
sections moved frequently to remain fairly close to Eisenhower, Montgomery, and Bradley.  As 
the fall campaign began to slow down in September and October as a result of logistical 
challenges, SHAEF realized that they did not have procedures in place to drive well-informed 
decision-making.  Faced by the failure of COMZ to recover its balance and start doing its job 
effectively, SHAEF embarked on a crash program of extracting periodic reports, hosting 
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coordination meetings, and dispatching liaison and inspection teams to subordinate 
organizations.  SHAEF discovered that in order to solve the logistics problems they faced in 
October the command needed to exert tight control over the requisition and distribution chain.  It 
also dawned on SHAEF that they had not established the administrative procedures and did not 
have the communications gear needed to extract the detailed information that was a prerequisite 
for effective management of theater logistics.  Because COMZ had failed to develop this system, 
and because the effects of its absence were immediately felt at their level, SHAEF stepped into 
the gap, but not before the opportunity to break though the defenses of western Germany had 
already passed. 
 What were the concrete results of SHAEF’s attempts to integrate maneuver and logistics 
during the fall campaign?  The various opinions about the merits and weaknesses of the 
conceptual framework of Montgomery’s narrow thrust versus that of Eisenhower’s broad front 
are well documented by historians.  Most historians ignore the failure of the SHAEF and 21st 
Army Group staffs to seriously consider what would happen if the operational pause along the 
Seine did not occur.  Everyone at SHAEF had convinced themselves that the command would 
pause on the west bank of the Seine for a couple of weeks while the ports in Brittany were 
opened and rail service restored.  Plans were developed for Allied operations beyond the Seine, 
namely Lucky Strike, but they did not have continencies to deal with an early collapse of the 
German Army west of Paris or to sustain forces with only trucks and cargo aircraft.  When these 
conditions emerged, Montgomery and the staff at SHAEF recovered quickly and presented 
realistic recommendations to Eisenhower, but they could not penetrate the bubble of optimism 
that had overtaken the U.S. commanders.  The voices urging caution and demanding ruthless 
prioritization that emerged in late August through mid-September were almost unanimous at 
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SHAEF and 21st AG, but they were undone by overly optimistic estimates and recommendations 
delivered by Bradley and Lee on 12 September.  At the same time Montgomery and the SHAEF 
logisticians were urging him to focus on one or two key objectives, Eisenhower tried to capture 
Brest, penetrate the Westwall and Rhine with three separate armies, and clear the approaches to 
Antwerp.  Around 23 August Eisenhower believed that he could accomplish all these objectives 
at the same time, mainly because any sort of effective resistance by the Germans had evaporated.    
By 9 September Eisenhower realized that he needed to focus on opening two or three major 
ports, but he allowed Montgomery to talk him into prioritizing Arnhem over Antwerp, and 
Bradley was left continuing to try to reach Aachen, Metz, and Nancy before moving on to the 
Rhine.  The results gained by these five simultaneous operations were disappointing everywhere 
other than Brest, and SHAEF was forced to settle in for another long, slow campaign of attrition 
to break the Germans along their western ramparts.  He had received good if somewhat 
pessimistic advice from his logisticians since the landings in Normandy, but in the last week of 
August Eisenhower chose boldness over caution and reached for ultimate victory in one decisive 
stroke.  Around 10 September, he admitted that this approach would not work and that that he 
needed to mass his resources to achieve one or two operational objectives.  By this time, it was 
perhaps already too late to restore mobility and inflict a crippling blow to German morale and the 
weapons factories in the Ruhr.  It was a very close-run affair, but SHAEF failed their first critical 
test between 23 August and 5 September. Then they failed their second critical test when they 
poured resources into the siege of Brest and diversionary attacks by 3rd and perhaps 1st Army at 
precisely the time they should have been straining every nerve to open Antwerp and perhaps 
penetrate the Westwall in one critical location.     
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 Controlling Logistics at SHAEF 
The administrative staff at SHAEF developed a few highly competent planning agencies 
between February and June 1944 that helped senior logisticians deliver compelling arguments to 
the command group.  Gale attempted to transplant the procedures, relationships, and effective 
collaboration among scores of officers from Algiers to London in order to replicate the 
successful results he had eventually achieved in North Africa and Italy while minimizing the 
growing pains he experienced during Torch.  Gale was only partially successful in achieving 
these goals for many reasons, but, in general, his efforts usually ensured that logistical planning 
and integrated joint coordination were strengths of the staff at SHAEF.  The planners at SHAEF 
helped Eisenhower make well-informed decisions based on the thorough and realistic 
assessments developed within their sections.  Gale was less successful in establishing a 
capability to supervise current operations among the administrative staff at SHAEF, largely 
because he thought this function would be performed by COMZ and the two army groups.  
When he discovered in September and October that COMZ was incapable of filling the gap 
between 12th AG/ADSEC and SHAEF, Gale launched a crash program to develop those 
capabilities within the G-3 and G-4 sections.  Ultimately achieved thanks to the expanded role of 
SHAEF and the seasoning of COMZ, these improved capabilities to manage and forecast 
logistical operations came too late to support the simultaneous pursuit of five major objectives or 
to convince Eisenhower to focus on only one or two key tasks in the month of September.    
 
 Eisenhower’s Narrative For the Fall Campaign 
Determining exactly what happened at SHAEF during the summer and fall campaign and 
what mistakes might have been committed was complicated by Eisenhower’s preemptive 
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publication of his version of events and underlying causes.  Under fire from the British chiefs of 
staff during the week of 12 to 18 December over his conduct of the ground campaign since 
August, and having learned from his early experiences in North Africa, Eisenhower was 
determined to seize the initiative.3  In January 1945 Eisenhower prepared a top-secret summary 
of the recent campaign for his military and civilian superiors designed to make sure his version 
of events was the first committed to the official record.  It was a document designed to convince 
its readers that Eisenhower had made the correct call on Anvil and the transportation plan, two 
controversial subjects that had dominated debate over strategy during the spring and summer.  
The report also included a chapter designed to explain how and why the Allied armies outran 
their logistical support that fall and to explain that, despite the result, Eisenhower had chosen the 
proper course for the ground campaign.  These themes were subsequently picked up and repeated 
by the General Board, ETO official histories, and finally the comprehensive history of the U.S. 
Army in World War Two.  It provided the script for Lee’s defense of COMZ and conditioned the 
first wave of postwar professional historians to accept SHAEF’s version of events and causes.  
Eisenhower’s report was written to preserve his job and his freedom of action in the spring 
campaign, not to give an honest and nuanced assessment of SHAEF’s failures and missed 
opportunities.  In the long term, the document showed those who had shaped the campaign how 
to cover their tracks and dodge tough questions about what exactly went wrong.  
Eisenhower’s version of what happened in the fall of 1944 and the role of logistics in 
stopping the advance established the precedent that Lee and the General Board would follow 
over the next year.  Constrained by an official narrative that refuted the possibility that SHAEF 
 
3 Edward E. Gordon and David Ramsay, Divided on D-Day: How Conflicts and Rivalries Jeopardized the Allied 
Victory at Normandy (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2017), 317.  Niall Barr, Eisenhower’s Armies: The 
American-British Alliance During World War II (New York: Pegasus Books, 2015), 419-422.   
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might have made major mistakes in controlling the ground campaign, all that remained for the 
logisticians was to emphasize the scope of the problem and the effort expended trying to 
overcome it.  Eisenhower’s report was short on details of what exactly broke down and why 
between August and October, but it emphasized the unexpected demands of crossing the Seine 
without a secure base area in Brittany while relying on a transportation network that both the 
retreating Germans and the French Resistance had wrecked by bombing and sabotage.   SHAEF 
and COMZ had not failed, the report claimed.  They had covered themselves in glory by devising 
innovative solutions to these unanticipated and uncontrollable conditions, and their efforts had 
kept the armies supplied.  Eisenhower explicitly acknowledged the relationship between the 
supply difficulties experienced in the fall and the extensive destruction inflicted on the French 
transportation infrastructure, much of it caused by Allied bombers.4  Eisenhower pointed to the 
massive volume of fuel delivered to the advancing armies and the rapid construction of a POL 
pipeline system that had almost reached Paris by mid-September as examples of the foresight 
and hard work at ETOUSA.  The report claimed that SHAEF had exploited air transport to 
deliver 2,000 tons of supplies a day during the height of the pursuit and that at no time did 
ongoing or potential airborne operations divert this effort -- two statements that a large pool of 
officers at SHAEF and 12th AG knew to be lies.5  Eisenhower and Montgomery tried to use 
massed airborne forces throughout the campaign; these forces were considered a key asset to 
dislodge any new German defenses anchored on a major river or to close the route of escape for 
 
4 “Supreme Commander’s Dispatch for Operations in N.W. Europe,” Jan 45, 176.  RG 498, UD 386 (AG Admin 
Branch Misc. Classified Records), Box 2526.   
5 Ibid, 178.  It is inconceivable that these two statements were honest mistakes based upon intensity of the debate 
about the issue in August and September, and the multiplicity of records maintained on the subject throughout 
SHAEF.  Some senior officer at SHAEF was more interested in protecting their reputation than presenting facts.  
Aerial resupply will be examined in detail in the next chapters.   
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retreating forces.6  It is surprising that the report listed all of the places where airborne forces 
were almost used while denying that these preparations had any negative effect on aerial 
resupply.  
Eisenhower did not outwardly criticize Montgomery for failing to clear the approaches to 
Antwerp fast enough, but he did state that he had emphasized Antwerp as a decisive objective 
early in the pursuit and had repeatedly called for its capture between late August and early 
October.  Eisenhower glossed over the instances were SHAEF had permitted 21st AG to 
simultaneously pursue three or four major objectives in August and September and shown 
latitude toward Montgomery in accepting his internal priorities.  SHAEF was well informed 
about 21st AG’s plan and timeline for clearing Antwerp and about the inadequacy of those 
measures, and yet it did nothing to force the issue until early October, which was ignored in the 
document.  The chapter dedicated to logistical challenges wrapped up by noting the recovery of 
the German defense almost simultaneously with the breakdown of the line of communications in 
the first two weeks of September.7  Eisenhower did not blame only the logisticians for the halt 
short of the Westwall.  New German formations behind prepared defensive lines and major 
rivers were just good enough to stop the Allies, who arrived in front of these new positions in a 
trickle of units and with insufficient artillery ammunition to blast through them.  Eisenhower 
strongly implied that, if fuel and ammunition had been more readily available, SHAEF probably 
would have broken through the German defenses established in early September.  Anyone who 
read Eisenhower’s report would have concluded that SHAEF and ETOUSA/COMZ had done 
 
6 Ibid, 178-182.  The report lists the places where the command considering using 1st Allied Airborne Army: the 
Paris-Orleans gap after Falaise, to help cross the Seine or Somme, to seize a port and cut the escape route of 15th 
Army in the Pas De Calais area, and finally in central Belgium and then in Market Garden to cut escape routes and 
cross the Rhine.  Senior leaders at SHAEF and in its ground component clearly understood how the training and 
rehearsals necessary to prepare for these operations impacted the ability to airlift supplies.       
7 Ibid, 192.   
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everything within their means to reach western Germany in the fall of 1944, only to be defeated 
by the scope and scale of the physical distances involved.  The clear implication was that 
SHAEF had done nothing wrong and that no better options had existed that might have produced 
more favorable results.  Obviously, there was no suggestion that COMZ had failed to fully 
exploit the capacity of their service units and to coordinate their employment.  Eisenhower also 
avoided dwelling on opportunities that SHAEF had had to simplify or reduce what was asked of 
the COMZ.  For example, they could have scaled back bombing associated with the 
transportation plan sooner in the campaign, postponed operations against Brest, used every C47 
available to deliver supplies, or put everything behind one or two operational objectives rather 
than try to simultaneously accomplish four.  No leader from SHAEF ever remotely addressed 
why they did not demand a contingency plan for operations beyond the Seine if conditions did 
not allow a pause to sort out the lines of communication.  Eisenhower was trying to win an 
argument and preserve his job with his January dispatch; combined with the results of the Battle 
of the Bulge, it did so.  The unintended consequence was the creation of a blueprint for how to 
avoid critical self-reflection at SHAEF, ETOUSA, and COMZ and, in addition, the prioritization 
of avoiding blame over recognizing and correcting mistakes.   
   
 Eisenhower’s Many Hats 
There is no doubt that Eisenhower and the staff at SHAEF had tough jobs.  SHAEF was 
responsible for the joint-combined theater campaign plan, direction of the ground war beginning 
in the last week of August, and, increasingly, the integration of U.S. forces in the absence of a 
strong ETOUSA staff.  Once heavily engaged in combat operations, it was discovered, COMZ 
could barely manage the lines of communication, forcing SHAEF to shoulder the burden of 
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theater logistical planning and of integrating combat operations and sustainment.  To say that 
under these conditions Eisenhower, his many deputies, and his primary staff officers did not have 
enough time and mental energy to devote to each major issue is an understatement.  This is 
illustrated by the inclusion of two issues in Eisenhower’s January dispatch.  The report 
mentioned the debate over Operation Anvil and pointed out that Eisenhower had insisted upon it 
because of the numerous advantages a force in southern France offered SHAEF.8  Eisenhower 
also brought up the battle to gain approval for the transportation plan and the commitment of the 
heavy bomber fleet to help pull the interdiction of western France off.9  The report admitted that 
the aerial support plan led to a moderate number of French civilian casualties, but it implied that 
these were justified by the contribution that heavy bombers made to the success of Neptune.10  
Eisenhower pointed out the linkage between the effectiveness of the air campaign between April 
and August and the sustainment difficulties encountered in August and September in the chapter 
dedicated to logistical difficulties. 
Getting both Anvil and the transportation plan approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff 
consumed a massive amount of senior leaders’ time at SHAEF.  LTG Smith collected all of his 
cables, memos, and meeting notes associated with the discussion over Anvil conducted in 
February and March; they filled a two-volume book.11  Between 23 January and 31 March there 
 
8 Ibid, 32-33. 
9 Ibid, 45-46.   
10 Ibid, 50.  The debate over the transportation plan, SHAEF control of heavy bombers, and French civilian 
casualties is covered in detail in Pogue The Supreme Command, 123-137; Craven and Cate The Army Air Forces in 
World War II Volume Three, Europe: Argument to V-E Day, 67-83 and 138-181; and Bourque’s Beyond the Beach: 
The Allied War Against France.  The real point is that Eisenhower had to expend a massive amount of time and 
effort to get control over his own air component, dictate how Spaatz and Harris would assist Overlord, and convince 
Churchill that the political and civilian cost were justified by military results.  It took Eisenhower, the joint-
combined theater commander, a long time to convince his superiors that he should have the final say in how SHAEF 
set up the air component and what airpower would contribute to getting and staying ashore in Normandy.           
11 SHAEF CoS collected cables and meeting notes on Bigot “Overlord-Anvil” discussions.  RG 331, UD 386 (AG 
Admin Branch Misc. Classified Records, 1942-1945), Box 2526.  The notes fill two legal-sized volumes and are 
about two inches thick.   
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was at least one entry in the log daily, and on some days  there were as many as half a dozen 
cables, staff memos, and meeting transcripts on the topic.  Not only was the volume of traffic 
massive, but most meetings demanded the attendance of Eisenhower, Smith, Tedder, and 
Morgan.  It is fair to say that the effort applied to convincing the CCS to authorize Anvil and the 
transportation plan consumed much of Eisenhower’s attention from early February to mid-April 
1944.12  Anvil did not end there.   It would continue to demand Eisenhower’s attention right up 
to 15 August.  
The real point of mentioning Anvil and the transportation plan here is to illustrate how 
the exact role and function of a combined-joint headquarters was still in flux as late as the spring 
of 1944, and trying to integrate joint operations and the interaction of one theater upon another 
drained the commander and his immediate circle of advisors.  Eisenhower had his hands full 
trying to establish SHAEF, merge ETOUSA and SOS, and plan the integration of three services 
in Operation Overlord.  By retaining his role as the ETOUSA commander and insisting that 
SHAEF take over the direction of ground operations after the activation of a second army group, 
Eisenhower put too much on his plate to do everything well.  This might have been reasonable if 
SHAEF had been a mature and experienced organization, or if the U.S. Army in Europe had 
reached some consensus on the relationship between the various headquarters involved in 
running a theater, but this was not the case.   
 
12 The debate about air power at SHAEF consisted of a half-dozen or more sub-components that included the 
procedural relationship between Tedder and Leigh-Mallory, the approval of the Transportation Plan, and the role of 
the heavy bombers in supporting all aspects of the ground campaign in France.  The most intensive period of 
conflict over these issues ran from 15 February to 17 April, running from the first public pushback by Spaatz and 
Harris against the Transportation Plan, and Tedder’s publication of an order to begin execution of the plan despite 
continued resistance by Churchill.  Churchill continued to fight the decision through mid-May, but he could not win 
the support of Roosevelt or the commander of the Free French forces in the U.K., MG Pierre Koenig.  See Craven 
and Cate Volume 3 and Webster and Frankland, Volume III, Part 5.    
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Saddled with an air component commander whom he did not know and whom others 
mistrusted, Eisenhower had to spend capital to rearrange the command structure to shift power to 
his deputy Tedder.  Linked to finding an air leader to whom everyone would listen, SHAEF 
needed an aerial campaign that would harness all the resources at their disposal to improving the 
chances of establishing a successful lodgment in Normandy.  It was a surprisingly difficult 
proposition that met resistance from Churchill, Harris, and Spaatz, each motivated to resist the 
transportation plan for their own reasons.  Eisenhower’s detractors were overcome by deft 
bureaucratic maneuvering and timely assistance from Tedder, Portal, and Roosevelt.   
Eisenhower had to go through this process again between August and December to 
establish control over ground operations.  The overall guidance Eisenhower gave for how he 
wanted to run the campaign after breaking out of the lodgment remained generally consistent 
from the SHAEF concept he approved in late May to how he conducted the spring offensive in 
1945.  By conducting a two-pronged penetration of the western German border both north and 
south of the Ardennes, Eisenhower would not present an open flank and prevent the Germans 
from massing reserves to stop any narrow thrusts.  He thought this campaign would progress at a 
slower pace, much as it had in the last few months on the Western Front in World War One 
rather than in 1940.  Under these circumstances it was hard to imagine the Allies outrunning 
their transportation network.  At precisely the moment when this original vision for how the 
campaign would unfold was becoming irrelevant, the pre-appointed conditions for transfer of 
control from 21st Army Group to SHAEF also occurred.  Montgomery and Brooke thought he 
adjusted poorly to the new circumstances, and repeatedly they tried to convince Eisenhower and 
his superiors to surrender control to a subordinate ground commander.  
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Before the irreparable break, Montgomery tried to convince Eisenhower to see the 
campaign his way, most notably on 23 August and again on 4, 7, and 10 September.  In both 
cases Montgomery convinced Eisenhower to come around to his view at least in part, but his 
influence lasted for only a few days before the Americans would drift back to trying to advance 
on three separate objectives simultaneously.  Effective communication between the two men 
were not made any easier by the physical distance between Granville and 21st AG’s forward 
command post and the limitations of the signal equipment at SHAEF in early September.   It also 
did not help that SHAEF moved from London to Granville during this critical phase of the 
campaign, motivated to some extent by a barb from Montgomery delivered back in early July.  
After Eisenhower had visited his headquarters in Normandy and asked about the transition 
timeline, Montgomery told Brooke that his answer had included the statement that “he…must 
come over here and devote his whole and undivided attention to the battle.  Any idea that he 
could run the land battle from England, or could do it in his spare time, would be playing with 
fire.”13  Since Eisenhower had subsequently decided on 1 September as the transition date, he 
needed a command post in France before then.  The choice of Granville and the timing were 
unfortunate, but when those decisions were first made in early August, they made sense.  
Evidently it was too late to hold off, or too difficult to pick a different location, when the 
movement began during the last week of August.  
 As the debate over priorities and the proper way to conduct the fall campaign dragged on 
into mid-September, it became harder and harder to separate egos and the need to “win” from the 
merits of the various arguments.  Montgomery made two impassioned pleas for his “full-blooded 
thrust” on 4 and 7 September, and he won approval for Market Garden as the Allied main effort 
 
13 Montgomery to Brooke, 7 Jul 44, Alanbrooke MSS 6/2/26, LHCMA, in Barr, 397. 
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on 10 September.  But Eisenhower was never going to give back control over ground operations 
to Montgomery.  Eisenhower was under intense pressure from Marshall and Bradley to exert 
U.S. authority over what was becoming an overwhelmingly American enterprise.  On numerous 
occasions Montgomery had talked Eisenhower into placing U.S. forces under British command 
and stop the advance of 3rd or 1st Army, only to see Eisenhower backtrack under pressure from 
Bradley and Patton.14  Without a doubt,  Montgomery sincerely believed that Eisenhower’s 
refusal to prioritize one major thrust during the pursuit directly contributed to the failure to 
capture the Ruhr and establish a bridgehead across the Rhine in the fall of 1944, but his ego and 
personality made it hard for him to maintain a constructive dialogue with SHAEF and Bradley.  
Montgomery was still fighting the command arrangements, the concept of the broad front, and 
the overwhelming importance of Antwerp as late as 9 October.  When they saw a 21st AG order 
published that day, Smith and Morgan discovered that clearing the approaches to the port was 
listed as the third priority for 21st Army Group.15  In a tense series of meetings, in phone calls, 
and in an exchange of formal letters conducted between 5 and 13 October, Montgomery finally 
gave in to pressure from Marshall, Brooke, Eisenhower, Ramsay, Morgan, and Smith to stop 
trying to win the war his way and to give his undivided attention to Antwerp.  Up until 13 
October Montgomery continued to insist that the Ruhr was the more critical objective and point 
out that the Americans, not the British, needed Antwerp.  Confronted by proof that he was alone 
in his stand against Antwerp, Montgomery conceded on 16 October, moving it up to the top 
priority for the army group.   
 
14 Gordon and Ramsay, 290-291, 293.  This occurred twice at the height of the pursuit.  The first incident between 
23 and 28 August, and the second around 10 to 14 September. 
15 Gordon and Ramsay, 315-316.   
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Montgomery almost guaranteed that he would lose his argument on the direction of the 
campaign by continuing to insist that Eisenhower was unqualified to run the ground campaign.  
In a memo from Montgomery to Smith delivered on 10 October, he correctly pointed out that 
“Eisenhower’s idea had always been for the whole line to go forward, to capture the Ruhr, and 
the Saar, and the Frankfurt area….[but] the Americans have outstripped their maintenance and as 
a result we have lost flexibility on the front as a whole….[thus] we are now unlikely to get the 
Ruhr or the Saar or Frankfurt.”16  There were operational advantages to the broad front concept if 
it could be supported logistically, but Montgomery had realized since 23 August that it was 
highly unlikely that SHAEF could fully sustain two or three major thrusts, and he had tried to 
convince Eisenhower on numerous occasions that this was the case.  In moments of clarity 
Eisenhower tended to agree with Montgomery, but each time Lee delivered an optimistic report 
about how the line of communications was shaping up, or Bradley insisted he could make a real 
difference with his residual allotment of supplies, Eisenhower lost his resolve.  Both men could 
have “won” if Montgomery had just followed orders and applied massive force against the 
Germans defending Beveland and Walcheren Island starting in mid-September, perhaps at the 
expense of Market Garden.  This was not a concession about the importance of getting a 
bridgehead across the Rhine, only a temporary pause.  A mid- to late-October Market Garden, 
supported by strong pushes by 1st and 3rd Army into the Ruhr and Saar, might have been more 
successful than the September version.  Even more promising would have been the 
recommendation to shift the main effort to 1st Army around 10 September while 21st AG focused 
on clearing Antwerp.   
 
16 Montgomery to Smith, 10 Oct 44, Eyes Only, WBS Papers, DDE PL, in Crosswell, 732. 
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Rather than trying to work with Eisenhower and integrate an understanding of the 
external factors restricting his freedom of action, Montgomery insisted on keeping the focus on 
him and his army group.  Montgomery ended his 10 October appeal to Smith for a return to the 
old command arrangements by concluding that the root of “all our troubles can the traced to the 
fact that there is no one commander in charge of the land battle….SHAEF is not an operational 
headquarters and never can be.”17  To make matters worse, Montgomery had shared a similar 
comment with General Marshall on 8 October.  These personal attacks against Eisenhower’s 
abilities were virtually guaranteed to ensure that Montgomery lost his ability to influence the 
overall design of the campaign in the late fall, which was unfortunate, because he was the most 
experienced ground commander within the Allied camp.  His insistence upon revisiting the issue 
of command arrangements triggered frustration, confusion, and vacillation in the Allied high 
command repeatedly between 23 August and 16 October, directly contributing to the failure to 
pick a solution and stick with it.  It was true that “no one commander [was] in charge of the land 
battle” only because Montgomery refused to follow orders and prioritize the clearance of the 
approaches to Antwerp.  His continued attempts to change Eisenhower’s mind or ignore orders 
with which he disagreed  undermined his ability to influence the conduct of the campaign after 
early October.18  Montgomery had a more realistic view of what the pursuit could and could not 
accomplish, but he failed to convince Bradley and Eisenhower to see the solution his way, and 
then he failed to be a loyal subordinate.  His stubbornness delayed the opening of Antwerp and 
repeatedly distracted Eisenhower and SHAEF at crucial stages of the campaign. 
 
 
17 Ibid, in Crosswell, 732.   
18 There was a postscript to the debate over control of ground forces in November and December when Brooke took 
up the issue with Churchill and the British combined chiefs.  On 18 December the British agreed to raise the issue at 
the next CCS meeting, a decision overwhelmed by the Battle of the Bulge.  See Barr, 421-422. 
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 Running Logistics at SHAEF 
Because Eisenhower was involved in various battles with his subordinates and superiors, 
the logisticians at SHAEF had to be both independent operators and effective communicators on 
those rare occasions when they needed the boss’s attention.  Luckily SHAEF had practiced 
people running the staff, men familiar with the planning and preparation that had gone into 
Roundup, and first-hand experience with how Eisenhower had run AFHQ.  Smith and Gale 
accompanied Eisenhower from the Mediterranean, joining Morgan, Crawford, and Lee, and they 
all set about to merge the procedures and personalities of the three organizations that had come 
together to form SHAEF/ETOUSA.  The strongest personality among the administrative staff at 
SHAEF was LTG Humfrey Gale, who had worked with Eisenhower and Smith since August 
1942.  Gale had a sterling reputation and had been a non-negotiable transfer from AFHQ to 
London.  Interviewed soon after the war, Tedder had described Gale as a splendid supply man 
while in North Africa, adding  that his greatest strength had been  setting up and running a series 
of meetings designed to synchronize the logistics community.19  Gale had also quickly 
established capable logistics and joint planning teams at SHAEF designed to avoid the early 
mistakes encountered during the campaign in North Africa.  SHAEF had a strong G-4 section, an 
operations officer who paid attention to administrative issues, and logisticians located throughout 
the chain of command who were trusted and respected by the maneuver commanders.  These 
strengths were necessary in order to overcome the challenges presented by the tendency to group 
the administrative staff at a rear headquarters while the maneuver staff clustered closer to the 
front lines, and Gale’s discovery that COMZ did not precisely know how to run the rear area and 
that SHAEF would have to bridge the gap. 
 
19 Tedder, interviewed by Pogue, 13 Feb 47.  Background material for The Supreme Command, AHEC. 
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 Once he had settled in at SHAEF, Gale recreated the weekly administrative coordination 
meetings he had held since becoming the AFHQ chief administrative officer (CAO) back in 
August 1942.  The scope of these meetings had grown in tandem with the authority wielded by 
SHAEF and with the complexity of the activities associated with Overlord.  Gale held his first 
meeting at SHAEF on 18 March 1944; Lee represented ETOUSA and there were senior 
representatives from the various air commands, the navy component, 21st Army Group, and the 
British War Office.  Before the invasion the group had often struggled to justify the time spent at 
the meeting, but occasionally a significant issue came up.  At the first meeting on 18 March MG 
Napier, the SHAEF G-4 transportation officer, noted that he did not have a U.S. counterpart.  As 
a result, he was forced to coordinate with three separate U.S. organizations, FUSAG, COMZ, 
and First U.S. Army (FUSA), in order to synchronize with the Americans.  Napier asked if 
ETOUSA could appoint a deputy chief of transportation for the theater and assign him to the 21st 
AG staff to handle some of this workload.20  Evidently General Ross was frequently unavailable, 
and when he was present, he could not speak authoritatively about the overall U.S. position.  At 
the meeting the following week, MG Brownjohn, Crawford’s British deputy in the G-4, pointed 
out that the delivery of POL pipeline construction material had fallen significantly behind 
schedule, and this report came as a surprise to Lee.  Once he had time to follow up on the issue, 
Lee told the group on 1 April that the problem would be solved before the landings; 1,000 miles’ 
worth of material for both 4- and 6-inch pipeline would arrive before June.21 
 Frequently key leaders were pulled away from the weekly coordination meeting for major 
rehearsals and briefings.  When Lee was not available, ETOUSA was represented by MG Lord.  
 
20 SHAEF CAO Coordination Meeting Notes, 18 Mar 44.  RG 331, Entry 34, Box 24.  The minutes do not record 
Lee’s response to the complaint and recommendation.   
21 Ibid, 1 Apr 44.   
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The tone of Gale’s weekly meeting, at least before August, was very different from the meetings 
held at AFHQ between August 1942 and February 1943.  It was more reminiscent of the 
meetings conducted after 18th Army Group took over ground operations in Tunisia.  SHAEF’s 
control of logistics was much more indirect and remote; details associated with supplying 
material and integrating the various service troops were being handled by the service commands, 
the War Office, and ETOUSA.  This left SHAEF with reduced scope of responsibility: Gale 
approved combined theater SOPs and adjudicated those cases where two or more subordinate 
units disagreed with a policy or wanted more of something that was in short supply in the theater.  
As a result, no contentious issues were recorded in the meeting notes from March to August, and 
the first operationally significant concerns did not enter the record until early July.  Interviewed 
after the war, Gale explained the difference: “In North Africa we actually achieved integration; 
SHAEF was a bigger affair; the organization was more loosely knit.”22  He had a good feel for 
what he could handle on this own, and for those issues that  he needed to take to Smith. Gale got 
along well with Lee, but he admitted that he found Crawford a bit prickly.  COSSAC and 
ETOUSA had allowed the routine U.S. – U.K. coordination meetings to lapse, but Gale 
reestablished weekly meetings to discuss shipping, transportation to the continent and then 
ashore, and to confirm that ETOUSA and the War Office were aware of SHAEF’s needs and 
meeting them.    Gale added that he felt as if he had spent 60% of his time at SHAEF working on 
transportation crises, 20% on the oil requirements of the theater, and 20% on everything else.23  
 After almost four months discussing relatively minor administrative issues, Gale brought 
up the topic of Operation Chastity, the project to turn Quiberon Bay into a major port, at the 1 
 
22 Gale, interview by Pogue, 27 Jan 47, transcript, 2.  Pogue notes for The Supreme Command, AHEC, Carlisle, PN. 
23 Ibid, 3.   
463 
 
July meeting.  The ability to discuss major logistical challenges, the implications associated with 
changes or delays in the campaign, and how to mitigate bad news was exactly why Gale had 
established such a high-powered meeting in the first place.  Chastity came up on 1 July because 
of 21st Army Group’s slow progress through the bocage, which threatened to put Chastity 
hopelessly behind schedule.  The Allies needed a second major port in operation by early 
October, and Quiberon Bay would require significant work before it was ready to efficiently 
process cargo ships.  There were also early rumbles from the Navy that Brest needed to be 
secured before work could start on Chastity.  On 1 July Gale asked the representative from 21st 
AG for a revised projection of when they would break out of the Cotentin and move into 
Brittany.  The 21st AG promised to examine the issue and come back with an answer in two days.  
The resulting discussion at SHAEF on 3 July was inconclusive; the Brittany ports were still 
important to the overall scheme of support, Channel ports would not be able soon enough and 
would never be able to handle enough tonnage, but SHAEF was running out of time to reach and 
develop Quiberon Bay based on the original timeline.  The group agreed they had until mid-July 
before the problem became a crisis.   Meanwhile, SHAEF would look for alternatives to the 
discharge problem while pushing 21st AG to develop options to accelerate the capture of a port in 
Brittany.   One positive outcome from these conversations was the increased dialogue it triggered 
between the maneuver and logistics planners at SHAEF and its subordinate commands.   It 
forced senior officers to acknowledge the interdependence between objectives linked to logistical 
capabilities and the maneuver options that these objectives made possible.  If SHAEF wanted the 
campaign to remain on track, 21st AG would have to come up with new ideas to get Chastity 
back on track or find a replacement.  
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 What is really important is that the conversations on 1 and 3 July demonstrated that 
SHAEF had a system for identifying major logistical problems and bringing together the entire 
team to develop solutions.  Gale’s meeting gave administrative staff officers from three layers of 
the chain of command a forum in which to share their insights on potential problems and 
possible solutions.  It ensured that Crawford and Gale were aware of these issues, enabling them 
to force the G-3 and service commanders to integrate them into their plans.  Because Gale had 
ready access to Smith, Morgan, Tedder, and Eisenhower, he could ensure that any significant 
administrative concerns emerging from this process were injected into command channels if 
needed.  It did not mean that he could win every argument or that the logistical tail wagged the 
dog, but it did mean that Gale was likely to know about major problems in time to explain them 
to his superiors and develop solutions to overcome them.  This process was to assume an 
increased importance in August and September.    
 MG Harold Bull, the SHAEF G-3, appreciated the importance of personnel and 
sustainment systems and how they impacted his role at SHAEF.  Soon after arriving in London 
he took steps to insure he remained well informed about administrative developments and any 
restraints they would impose on the campaign in France.24  He received a daily strength report 
from the U.S. G-1 from January to May 1944 that outlined what troops would be available for 
Overlord, broken down by those already in the U.K., those arriving in the next 30 days, and 
monthly projections after the landing in France, broken down by major commands.25  Bull’s 
personal papers also included two draft copies of the FECZ COMZ plan, dated 25 April and 3 
 
24 Bull was the War Department G-3 for two months in 1942, an observed in the Middle East and North Africa from 
April to June 1943, and he commanded III Corps in the U.S. for five months.  In October 1943 he was assigned to 
the operations branch at COSSAC and took over as the SHAEF G-3 on 14 February 1944.  Bull remained in that 
position until V-E Day, other than a nine-day stint as the commander of 4th Infantry Division in November 1944.   
25 SHAEF G-1 Daily Strength Reports, RG 331, Entry 23, Box 14.   
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May.26  It is impossible to tell if Bull read them, but he did keep them on hand for reference and 
had been given the chance to provide input before publication of the final version on 14 May.  
He was obviously aware of the projected phase lines out to D+360 and the widely held 
assumption that SHAEF would halt along the Seine long enough to fix the rail lines and establish 
forward depots around Rennes before trying to cross the river.  Bull remained well-informed and 
intensely curious about personnel developments throughout the war in Europe.  Starting in 
September 1944 Bull demanded refinements to an ETOUSA G-3 periodic report they had 
initiated in August.  Bull wanted the initial arrival date, location (Normandy, Marseilles, UK, or 
released from detached duty with the COMZ), and projected availability date of new combat and 
combat support formations assigned to the theater.27  The G-3 understood the process and 
general timeline required to integrate new units but wanted a twice-monthly progress report from 
ETOUSA to ensure things were on track.  The report also forced SHAEF and ETOUSA to 
maintain a running dialogue about which combat units were most important at that stage in the 
campaign and about the relative importance of supplying units already in the fight or using that 
transportation to move up new formations.   
 It was not all about personnel; Bull understood the importance of supplies and worried 
about getting detailed information from the G-4 community as well.  In April 1944, Bull 
complained to Brigadier McLean, the chief of his planning section, that their work failed to 
adequately address logistics.28  That spring Bull also felt that the logisticians were not looking 
far enough into the future, having failed to project the need for massive quantities of bridging 
 
26 RG 331, Entry 23, Box 48.   
27 Memo for ETOUSA G-3 from SHAEF G-3.  RG 331, Entry 23, Box 50.  The memo explained the format and 
frequency of this new report, and it forced ETOUSA to project how long it would take to get new units equipped 
and then transported to the front line.   
28 Note, Bull to chief of plans section, SHAEF/21522/Ops, 10 Apr 44.  MG Harold Bull papers, Box 1, DDE PL.   
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equipment needed to move through the Low Countries and heavy artillery with plenty of 
ammunition needed to crack through the Westwall.  The G-3 knew sustainment was critical and 
valued the input of the G-4, but there were limits to the independence he would concede to the 
logisticians.  On 17 May Bull responded to a recent request from Crawford that the G-4 be added 
as a full voting member to the reviewing chain for draft documents produced by the joint plans 
section.29  Bull refused; his argument was that Gale held that power for the administrative staff, 
representing the interests of both the G-1 and G-4.  Bull suggested that, if Crawford had a 
problem with a decision coming from the G-3 or JPS, he should bring it up in person with Bull 
on a case-by-case basis.  Obviously, something had convinced Crawford that the G-4 had been 
undercut by the current planning process, or that it was just seeking more autonomy from Gale, 
but Bull disagreed with making any fundamental changes to the staffing process.   
 One of the most important and difficult tasks at SHAEF was trying to ensure that 
everyone within the extended command had the information needed to make informed decisions.  
SHAEF G-3 was responsible for publishing a daily two-page sitrep designed to keep all elements 
of the command informed of the developments going on around them.  It was a consolidated, 
joint and combined document; each staff section and service component contributed to the final 
summary.  The report included a weather forecast, the general front-line location of enemy and 
friendly troop concentrations,  a summary of significant activities conducted by each corps  (and 
divisions when considered relevant) from the last day or so, and an overview of upcoming major 
operations. 30  The summary included not only traditional ground operations but also activities of 
 
29 Note from Bull to Crawford, 17 May 44.  Response to SHAEF/1001/9/GDP from Crawford to Bull, 10 May 44.  
Bull Papers, DDE PL.  The G-4 received copies of draft documents and was encouraged to provide input but did not 
have the bureaucratically important power of a “concur/non-concur” vote.  The ability to “non-concur” was 
equivalent to a veto.  When confronted by a non-concur, the creator of the draft document either had to work out a 
compromise acceptable to the office voting no, or the issue had to be elevated to a higher authority for adjudication.   
30 SHAEF Daily Situation Report.  RG 498, UD 342 (ETOUSA G-3), Box 1485. 
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the French resistance, the British SAS working behind enemy lines, and Allied air and navy 
forces.  The administrative portion of the report provided Allied casualty figures for the last 24 
hours and the discharge figures for the ports and beaches of Normandy.  This included the 
number of men and vehicles, tons of equipment unloaded over the last 24 hours, plus a 
cumulative roll-up of the figures to date.  The format of the administrative section did not change 
from June to September.  No mention was made of the location of major COMZ units or 
headquarters, COMZ’s current focus and priorities, the progress of critical projects, or the most 
significant logistical challenges facing SHAEF.  The purpose of the daily SHAEF sitrep was to 
increase situational awareness, help all units maintain an up-to-date war map, and see the 
unfolding campaign in the same light.  The fact that Gale, Lee, and Crawford never changed the 
format and content of information they chose to emphasize across every element within SHAEF 
speaks to a lack of imagination and appreciation for how the report could have helped them 
convey their message.  By keeping the format of their portion of the sitrep static for four months, 
SHAEF and ETOUSA logisticians ensured that their portion of the report was irrelevant to the 
corps and army commanders and staff, missing out on an opportunity to help combat leaders 
anticipate looming logistical challenges and shortfalls.31 
 Another step designed to ensure that SHAEF had accurate, up-to-date information with 
which to make decisions was to establish liaison sections within various subordinate commands.  
Bull ran a war room at SHAEF that received information on the ground situation directly from 
liaison officers he stationed with 21st and 12th Army Group, 1st Allied Airborne Army, AEAF, 
USSTAF, and the Allied Naval Command.  The chief for this subsection within the G-3 was 
 
31 In their defense, it is probably one of the most difficult mental transitions possible to turn a requirement to provide 
routine information to another staff section or the commander into a tool designed to make your function more 
effective.  Gale and his team, confronted with so many other important tasks, did not see how they could use the 
daily sitrep to better communicate with their critical partners.  
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COL Negrotto, who reported directly to Bull and his British deputy MG Whitely while providing 
a courtesy copy of all reports to the ETOUSA/COMZ G-3.  Each of SHAEF’s subordinate 
commands likewise provided its own liaison sections to various staff sections SHAEF, and the 
process was replicated at the army group and COMZ level.  The purpose of all these officers was 
to ensure a timely flow of accurate information and to hunt down the answer to specific 
questions when other methods failed.  The usefulness of the SHAEF liaison cell was 
demonstrated by a report submitted from the 21st AG team on 14 September.  The document 
confirmed that Montgomery’s staff was consumed getting ready for Market Garden, due to begin 
on 17 September, preventing any work on operations designed to clear the approaches to 
Antwerp or open up alternative ports.32  The report went on to confirm that the attack on 
Boulogne was scheduled to begin on 15 September, and the author knew that a SHAEF G-4 rep 
had been to Le Havre to conduct an assessment of the discharge capacity of the port.  From this 
report it was obvious that SHAEF had been asking specific questions about 21st Army Group’s 
efforts to open new ports and that Montgomery was ignoring Antwerp in order to focus on 
Market Garden and Boulogne.  Despite Eisenhower’s talk of the importance of Antwerp, Bull 
could confirm that 21st AG was largely ignoring the objective in mid-September.  SHAEF was 
getting accurate information about the priorities and activities of its subordinate organizations.  
Whether that information reached senior officers or impacted decision-making at the highest 
levels is harder to determine. 
  
 
32 Negrotto for SHAEF G-3, 14 Sep 44.  RG 498, UD 340 (ETOUSA G-3 War Room and Liaison Section), Box 
1483.  Although created by SHAEF for its own leaders, this copy of the report was found in the ETOUSA records, 
confirming that the command was well informed about problems with getting the port of Antwerp opened for Allied 
traffic. 
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 Poor Communication Between the Two Halves of the Staff 
 Significant changes to the Allied ground campaign unfolded quickly from early August to 
mid-September.  It was critically important to maintain good communication, not only up and 
down the chain of command, but also horizontally between maneuver and administrative staff 
sections.  This was more difficult than might first be imagined by both the mental and physical 
distance between the two groups at most headquarters.  It is important to remember that the two 
groups of staff officers often occupied different physical locations, sometimes separated by 
hundreds of miles and connected by less than adequate communication links.  Most major 
commands maintained a main and a rear command post, and often established a third, forward, 
node closer to the front lines.  To provide one example, on 9 October SHAEF rear was still at 
Bushey Park near London, the main headquarters was at Versailles, and the advanced command 
post was near Reims to make it easier to talk with the central and northern army groups.33  In 
early November 1944, the G-4s at 12th AG and 1st Army were not collocated with their G-3s; 
conversely, 3rd and 9th armies decided to run one consolidated command post.34  Each command 
had slightly different arrangements; 21st AG kept the medical, ordnance (REME), provost 
marshal, and quartermaster (RAOC and RASC) sections at the rear command post, with the chief 
admin officer (G-4), chemical warfare, engineer, signal, and transportation (Q movements) 
sections at the main.  SHAEF had its own adjutant general, air defense, engineer, signal, medical, 
public relations, psychological warfare special staff sections at the main headquarters, but the 
ETOUSA/COMZ element located with them were not listed in the phone book.35  Another very 
similar set of special staff sections was located with COMZ in Paris, but that headquarters also 
 
33 SHAEF Daily Sitrep, 9 Oct 44.  RG 498, UD 342, Box 1483. 
34 ETO Continental Telephone Directory, 2 Nov 44, 15.  RG 407, Entry 427, Box 190.   
35 Ibid, 5. 
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included a number of unique technical services charged with executing logistical support.  Just 
figuring out where everyone was located and how to reach them by telephone presented a major 
challenge for an officer trying to coordinate with new partners.  Everyone exchanged liaison 
teams, but maintaining effective communication was complicated by the separation of functions 
across two or three headquarters, often precluding face-to-face communications that involved a 
wide range of staff sections.  Signal officers did the best they could, but there was only so much 
that radio, telephone, and telex could do to replicate the richness of inclusive and interactive 
dialogue. 
 The size of the staff in these organizations contributed to the need to split them up into 
three or four subgroups to spread the burden associated with sustaining them.  It was also 
important to have at least two fully functional command posts in order to leapfrog command and 
control behind the advancing divisions.  But these dispersed operations also helped create 
barriers to effective communication across staff boundaries.  SHAEF was a massive 
headquarters, with some 1,200 officers and almost 5,000 men were assigned to the command in 
July 1944; by February 1945 the number had jumped to 16,312.36  During Overlord, the SHAEF 
staff occupied three large and widely separated footprints, not to mention the various liaison 
groups scattered throughout subordinate organizations.  The G-4 section alone contained 439 
soldiers at the height of Overlord.   
It is hardly surprising that not everyone knew each other on the SHAEF staff or that 
officers from different functional areas found it difficult to communicate with one another, which 
quickly led to distrust in their professional capabilities.  BG Thomas J. Betts was the U.S. deputy 
in the SHAEF G-2, having transferred from AFHQ in the spring of 1944.  In an interview 
 
36 Pogue, 533, 534.   
471 
 
conducted in 1975, Betts was asked how the SHAEF staff functioned and what the relationships 
were among various sections.  When questioned specifically about the G-4, Betts admitted he 
could not remember the director’s name.  But he did remember that he had not been impressed 
with the officer, who seemed to be overshadowed by LTG Humfrey Gale and his British 
deputies, a “Blackbill or something” (Ravenhill) and MG Charles Napier. 37  Admittedly, 
Crawford and Betts came from different communities within the U.S. Army, and Betts was being 
asked very specific questions about events from thirty years in the past, but it does seem odd that 
the deputy G-2 could not remember the name of the G-4, a man with whom he served in  combat 
for over a year.  Napier had made a favorable impression on him with his work on the French rail 
service in the fall of 1944.  Betts suggested that Lowell W. Rooks would have been a better 
choice as the SHAEF G-4 but  was not available because he had been  reassigned as the G-3 for 
the Mediterranean theater (NATOUSA).38  Betts’s answers hinted at just how hard it was to keep 
up with everything going on around you in an organization as large and complex as SHAEF.       
 If BG Betts did not think much of the senior officers at SHAEF G-4, Eisenhower had a 
more nuanced appreciation of the talent working logistics for him.  From his official 
correspondence and various recommendations for promotion, it is clear that Eisenhower 
understood that his logisticians had a wide range of competence.  Directed in February 1945 to 
provide a rank-ordered list of his senior subordinates from 1 to 38, Eisenhower listed Lee at 19 
 
37 MG Thomas J. Betts, interviewed by Dr. Maclyn P. Burg, June 25, 1975, interview 2, transcript, OH-397, DDE 
PL, Abilene, KS, 128.  It seems that perhaps SHAEF had too many people working logistics to keep them all 
straight.  In addition to LTG Morgan, LTG Gale, MG Crawford, and the various British and American senior 
officers within SHAEF G-4 and the senior officers at COMZ; Eisenhower appointed MG Everett Hughes his 
personal logistical troubleshooter. Furthermore, MGs Clay, Aurand, and Lutes would show up in Britain and France 
from time to time to conduct inspections on behalf of General Somervell.  There were many general officers to try to 
keep up with.     
38November 20, 1974 (this is a mistake, the interview occurred in 1975 and the transcript is mislabeled), interview 3, 
133.  Betts interview 3, 133.   
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(the only lieutenant general not in the top five), Crawford at 27, and Larkin at 28. 39  Bull and 
Rooks were a few positions higher than Crawford and Larkin on the list, which tended to weigh 
army and corps commanders over staff officers anyway.  Despite Crawford’s being listed at 27 
on this list, Eisenhower described his performance of his duties as “exceptional.”  The supreme 
commander also thought highly of BG Plank and BG Moses and continued to push for their 
promotion to major general throughout 1944 and 1945.40  Plank, Moses, and Larkin all had 
excellent reputations among their peers from both the sustainment and combat arms communities 
during and after the war, which was not the case with Lee, Lord, and Stratton.  Crawford seemed 
to occupy a mid-tier position.  As in any other large professional organization, the quality and 
interpersonal skills of logisticians in SHAEF covered a wide spectrum, but generally there were 
enough officers with a solid reputation among the fighting generals to get a fair day in court 
when they brought up concerns or made recommendations.      
 
 Rebuilding a Joint and Logistics Planning Capability at SHAEF 
 In order to generate integrated staff products, SHAEF needed organizations and 
procedures that forced all the various communities within the staff to interact in an effective way.  
Maintaining organizations or committees that met frequently and subsequently produced high-
quality work was the best way to ensure that leaders got a well-rounded appreciation of 
challenges and opportunities.  Upon his return to London, Gale discovered not only that 
SHAEF’s precursor did not have a joint or logistics plans section but also that the various 
 
39 Chandler, message 2271, 1 Feb 45, Eisenhower to Marshall.     
40 Chandler, message 2247, 26 Apr 1945, Eisenhower to Marshall.  Eisenhower ranked Plank second and Moses 
third on this list of five BGs deserving promotion.  Eisenhower had mentioned Plank as his number two candidate 
the month prior as well (see message 2349).  Eisenhower had pushed for Plank’s promotion from COL to BG in 
January 1944; this recommendation was approved, and Plank was promoted on 24 February (see 1512).   
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headquarters in London had stopped holding the coordination meetings he had put in place prior 
to deploying to North Africa with AFHQ.  Two of Gale’s first initiatives in early February were 
to reconstitute the logistics plans section he had added to the AFHQ staff in February 1943 and 
to expand G-3 plans into a full joint plans section.  Smith reluctantly approved the creation of a 
joint plans section on 4 March after about three weeks of deliberation over the composition and 
control of the group.41   
Gale had initially asked to create a group focused on long-term logistics planning, but the 
conversation that emerged as a result of his initial request eventually produced an expanded 
capability that included permanent and associated representatives from the general and special 
staff and key subordinate headquarters.  This new joint planning office, at first called the 
Combined Planning Section, was formed around a core consisting of the G-3 planners and the G-
4 logistics plans section.  Although the G-3 and G-4 plans sections were technically separate 
entities, their products were often lumped together and attributed to the Joint Plans Section (JPS) 
or G-3 plans section.  Until May 1944 BG Arthur Nevins was in charge of the G-3 plans and 
operations section, but in May the two functions were divided and Brigadier Kenneth G. McLean 
took over as head of plans.42  Both men were very capable and had the background needed to 
establish an effective theater planning cell; Nevins had helped plan Torch while serving on the 
AFHQ staff and McLean had been the chief Army planner at COSSAC since spring 1943.  COL 
Whipple, the chief of the SHAEF logistics plans section, moved over from ETOUSA G-4 in late 
February.   
 
41 SHAEF staff memos, 12, 21, 28 Feb 44.  RG 331, Entry 26 (SHAEF G-3 Future Plans and Joint Planning 
Section), Box 80. 
42 Pogue, 68. 
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The JPS demonstrated the power of its inclusive structure when it published the first 
coordinating draft  “Post-Neptune Planning Forecast No. 1” on 19 April 1944.43  The document 
was essential because it validated a standard set of planning assumptions about Allied strength 
and location on the continent from D to D+360 in 30-day increments, allowing COMZ and the 
services to link their logistics planning to the common framework established by this outline of 
the campaign.  The final version of the forecast indicated that the Allied armies would reach a 
line running through Verdun, the western Ardennes, Liège, and Antwerp by D+270.  After a 
short pause, the Allies would launch thrusts north and south of the Ardennes to seize the Ruhr, 
cripple German industrial production, and trigger political collapse.  These benchmarks were 
significant because they corresponded to where the Allied pursuit crested in early- to mid-
September 1944, almost six months sooner than SHAEF predicted, but also because they 
outlined Eisenhower’s concept for penetrating the German western border.  It took so long to 
turn the first draft into the approved forecast because of all the factors accounted for in the 
document and because the feedback provided from across the Allied chain of command was so 
extensive.  No one could claim to be surprised by the projected operational pauses along the 
Seine and the Westwall or by Eisenhower’s preference for two simultaneous thrusts to reach the 
Rhine. 
 Planning Forecast No. 1 filled a useful purpose before D-Day, but between late May and 
mid-October SHAEF did not update the document.  Components of the original forecast were 
revised and published, but not the consolidated, integrated appraisal of the overall campaign.  
About two dozen special studies were published by the joint plans section and the logistics plans 
section during the summer, but these failed to reconcile the progress of the maneuver and 
 
43 The final, approved planning forecast was published on 27 May after a month of refinement. 
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logistics battles, matched with revised projections, to create a common vision of how the 
campaign would progress over the coming months.  Looking back in mid-October, Whipple 
realized that this was a mistake and that he had contributed to the failure to anticipate and 
mitigate the logistical problems that stopped SHAEF short of its operational objectives that fall.  
To fill that gap, SHAEF G-4 decided to publish a comprehensive logistics forecast twice a month 
beginning in October, based upon operational projections provided by the G-3.  Starting in 
October, Whipple asked the SHAEF G-3 operations division for a rough estimate of unit 
strengths, front-line location, and general type of activity (the choices included: advance, heavy 
fighting, moving through rough terrain to include water obstacles, defense) by the 5th and 20th of 
each month.44   
Armed with what types of operations corps and armies planned to do and a forecast of 
what the transportation network could move over the coming two weeks, Whipple tried to paint a 
picture of what the command could and could not sustain or what would cause logistical 
headaches and where they would develop.  The resulting product consisted primarily of a 
simplified depiction of transportation networks with tonnage capabilities of each linked to the 
number of divisions this distribution system could support at the front line.  It seems as if 
SHAEF found this process useful for about six weeks, until the new bureaucratic routine was 
interrupted by the German counteroffensive in the Ardennes.  Whipple’s initiative was useful at 
a critical time during the campaign because it combined three separate projections into one 
overall forecast that depicted where the Allies could accomplish their goals and where 
breakdowns were likely to occur.  It integrated Ross’s transportation projection, ETOUSA’s 
 
44 There is a series of memos and cables between SHAEF G-4, SHAEF G-3, and the liaison section throughout late 
September and October that established this system.  See RG 331, Entry 26, Box 75.  Whipple put LTC Osmanski in 
charge of the process necessary to gather information and the creation of the twice monthly logistics estimate. 
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timeline for the arrival and availability of major new combat units, and anticipated operations 
from division to army level (and therefore the consumption rate of supplies by type) for the next 
two to three weeks.  Based upon these critical inputs, SHAEF G-4 could predict the total tonnage 
requirements by class of supply and then determine if the theater inventory and distribution 
capacity could provide enough material to maintain desired consumption rates.  If yes, then 
SHAEF could work with COMZ to decide how to use the excess transportation capacity.  If there 
was a shortfall, SHAEF would be forewarned and could try to work out a solution.   It was a 
powerful document provided by SHAEF G-4 at a time when 12th Army had lost all faith in 
COMZ’s ability to manage theater logistics.  Whipple’s forecast did nothing to change exactly 
how ETOUSA was managing the theater logistical system, but it did reassure SHAEF and the 
army groups that the logisticians had a grip on the problem and a methodology to help leaders 
make tough decisions.  
 
 Reports and Meetings 
 In addition to a network of liaison officers and permanent organizations made up of all 
the disparate experts on the SHAEF staff, the command could use recurring reports and meetings 
to try to extract a wide range of information and then fuse it into a comprehensive whole.  A bit 
surprisingly, by the start of the campaign in Normandy, SHAEF still had not figured out how 
they wanted to collect and process reports on logistics.  Before October 1944 the SHAEF files 
contained no comprehensive reports that outlined the overall logistical situation - because the 
command had not established any requirements for their submission.  Prior to early October, 
SHAEF accepted the frequency and content of the reports voluntarily submitted by COMZ, the 
air and navy components, and the army groups.  The crisis in logistics in September and October 
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occurred during a period of frequent relocation of the key headquarters, delaying the emergence 
of an effective reporting system at SHAEF and ETOUSA.  As with so many other challenges 
faced by SHAEF and ETOUSA, there was no doctrinal template or body of historical experience 
to guide and accelerate the emergence of useful reporting formats.  Officers with practical 
experience from AFHQ had an advantage in describing the right level of detail they wanted to 
see, but in general almost no one knew how to strike a balance between gathering minutiae and 
exercising benevolent neglect.   
 What was the right level of detail to gather from the armies and army groups, and how 
often should this information be collected?  No one knew; ETOUSA had no experience 
supporting combat units in the field, and AFHQ had worked through air, land, and sea 
intermediary commands.  What had worked in the Mediterranean would need to be modified for 
the new conditions in France.  For the duration of the campaign in Europe SHAEF allowed the 
army groups to work out their own systems and formats for submitting periodic logistical 
reports.  This resulted in very different information being provided by 21st, 12th, and eventually 
6th Army Group, with each organization taking a slightly different approach in the effort to turn 
raw data into meaningful statistics.  The first routine report to reach SHAEF G-4 had been the 
buildup report provided by FECZ, which was passed along with no refinement or additions, for 
inclusion in the SHAEF daily sitrep.  FECZ had done the same, consolidating six individual 
reports from the beach and port commands before passing them along to ETOUSA and 
SHAEF.45  Pressure on the SHAEF G-4 to do better than this intensified when LTG Morgan 
asked at the 31 July chief of staff meeting for an assessment of the logistical situation on the 
 
45 RG 331, Entry 34 (SHAEF G-4 Executive Section Decimal File), Box 10.   
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continent.46  Up until this point Crawford had received nothing but a daily list of the discharge 
figures from FECZ and notification of occasional emergency supply requests from Bradley and 
the team at FUSAG.  Another tool that might have helped Crawford figure out how things were 
going on the continent, his weekly G-4 coordination meeting, had been cancelled at the end of 
May when half of the attendees displaced to forward headquarters.  Despite the request from 
Morgan and an internal understanding that SHAEF G-4 needed to be tracking logistics and 
transportation information from the units in France, Gale and Crawford never got around to 
setting up a system for collecting reports and conducting periodic meetings with the army groups 
beyond the CAO weekly huddle. 
 The absence of such a system was a minor irritant until mid-September when it became 
apparent that insufficient transportation had slowed if not stopped the pursuit.  This (hopefully) 
temporary pause convinced ETOUSA and SHAEF they needed to become ruthlessly efficient in 
matching fundamental logistical requirements against the limited transportation that was 
available, and in order to do this they needed accurate information.  The meant SHAEF had to 
find out what was really going on beyond the confines of the various command posts – to see the 
problems being masked by the current reporting procedures.  These problems were not unique to 
the logistics community.  They existed across all the general and special staff sections at 
SHAEF.  SHAEF G-4 published its first weekly “Basic Statistic Report” on 7 October, and on 8 
October the G-3 began holding a daily operations conference; COL Whipple was the G-4 
representative at the meeting.47  Bull had zeroed in on logistics as the critical issue preventing a 
return to mobile operations, and he pinned his hopes on clearing the approaches to Antwerp as 
 
46 Minutes, 31 Jul 44 SHAEF CoS Meeting.  RG 331, Entry 34, Box 25.   
47 RG 331, Entry 34, Box 12 and 26. 
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quickly as possible.  But the maneuver work group chaired by the G-3 was under no illusions; 
they realized that as late as 9 October Montgomery was not putting his full effort into opening 
Antwerp; and even after the Germans were gone, the Navy  would need  another month  to 
sweep the channel.48  At the 20 October G-3 meeting 21st AG and COMZ briefed that Antwerp 
would be able to receive ships by 15 November; Whipple pointed out that late November was 
more realistic.  Since Whipple’s estimate proved to be correct, Bull was forced to admit that 
there was no operational solution to the Allied logistics problem and that the hope of restoring 
mobility along the front anytime soon was unrealistic.  On 3 December Bull decided that his 
daily coordination meeting had accomplished its purpose and would be discontinued 
immediately.  By then SHAEF had largely fixed its sustainment problem, but it was too late to 
accomplish any of the objectives left over from the fall campaign. 
 When the logistics crisis hit in mid-September, Crawford thought that, if SHAEF was 
going to contribute to solving the problem, it needed to gather and share a lot more raw data 
across the command.  If COMZ was not managing theater logistics at the level of detail required, 
Crawford would do it for them.  The result was the weekly “Basic Statistical Report.”  By mid-
November this report consisted of 30 pages of inventories by class and service of supply, 
consumption rates for the last available period, the current status of the transportation network, 
and the strength and disposition of service units assigned to the command.  To help collect all 
this data, Crawford sent a liaison section to 12th AG in mid-October tasked to provide updates 
whenever they came across something useful.  Crawford was especially interested in getting 
confirmation of how far along the line rail service had been restored, the volume of material 
delivered by train and plane, and the results of personal inspections of large service unit 
 
48 Whipple’s notes for the meetings on 9 and 20 October.  RG 331, Entry 34, Box 26. 
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headquarters, regulating stations, and depots.49  This work was designed to flesh out and provide 
context for the two-page weekly logistics report provided by 12th AG G-4.  Moses’ short report 
summarized the overall sustainment situation at each of three armies, broken down by classes of 
supply, and then provided a detailed inventory of ammunition on hand within each command.50  
Devers’ 6th Army Group went in an entirely different direction, providing a lengthy weekly 
report running to dozens of pages and providing the sort of detail included in the “Basic Statistic 
Report” published by SHAEF.  Crawford and Lee did not insist upon a standard format, relying 
on liaison teams and COMZ tracking systems to fill in the required details starting in October. 
 The logistics report submitted by 21st AG offered a third approach that occupied a middle 
ground between 12th and 6th Army Group.  Reports were provided every three to four days and 
included two sets of information.  The first cluster was always the same; the subject of the 
second cluster rotated every four to five cycles so that a complete new set of data was provided 
every two weeks.  Army group feeding strength, broken down by nationality and unit type 
(division, corps overhead, line of communication, POWs, and civilian labor) was included with 
every report.51  Rotating data included the number of tanks in each brigade and division, the days 
of supplies on hand by each major type, detailed fuel and ammunition inventories, and an update 
on the status of new French units receiving British equipment and training.  In general, 21st AG 
had fully recovered from its supply difficulties by late October.  The only shortage considered 
 
49 RG 331, Entry 34, Box 10.  It was obvious that Crawford was seeking a trusted and independent source of 
information beyond 12th AG and COMZ.  COMZ already had an LNO with 12th AG, COL Bendetsen.  Crawford 
wanted his officers to get out and see these activities themselves, to uncover problems that were not reaching his 
level, and to expose success stories if found. 
50 RG 331, Entry 34, Box 12.  The report was broken down into an overall status report by the three armies (days of 
supply by class) and any shortages of operational importance.  The second page listed ammunition on hand in each 
of the three armies by type and by units of fire, and it provided the number of rounds authorized to be fired by gun 
by type daily.   
51 21st AG Log Report 31 Oct 44.  RG 331, Entry 34, Box 10.  The three categories were almost exactly equal: 
221,921, 220, 024, and 228,296.     
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worth mentioning was gasoline (MT 80) in Canadian 1st Army, which had ten days of supply 
distributed between division, corps, and army depots.52  The report submitted on 30 October also 
identified new planning estimates of  the daily maintenance tonnage requirements for the troops 
in support of each division; there is no indication if this was in response to a query by SHAEF or 
provided as part of a British initiative to revise consumption factors.53  It was obvious that the 
British Army had a well-developed administrative reporting system already in place independent 
of the need to provide one to SHAEF.  For whatever reason, the last report from 21st AG on file 
at SHAEF was from 15 December 1944.   
It seems that the combination of the end of the Allied logistical crisis and the start of the 
Battle of the Bulge eliminated the requirement for most of the meetings and reports initiated by 
SHAEF in October.  In February 1945 COMZ picked up the burden of collecting and publishing 
theater sustainment reports, but it was obviously a product designed to serve the COMZ and not 
the armies or operational planners at SHAEF.  This final version of the theater logistical report 
was submitted by subordinates daily and rolled up for distribution across the command weekly.  
The document attempted to track deliveries to each army by class and service of supply, the 
means of transportation (air, rail, truck, ship), and the status of the various dumps in the combat 
zone (tonnage on hand in each by class for each service of supply, and the quantity issued, 
received, and ordered in the last reporting period).  It must have been a very painful report to 
produce and keep accurate while providing very little payoff beyond COMZ/ETOUSA; it 
seemed to be designed to address the deficiencies noted by Lutes and Somervell during their 
winter inspection tour.   
 
52 21st AG Log Report 3, 30 Oct.  RG 331, Entry 34, 10.   
53 210 tons for full scale offensive operations, 70 in the pursuit, and 120 for defense/holding operations.  The report 
does not mention what the division baseline tonnage was.   
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By the time the Overlord campaign began, SHAEF had a few well-developed systems in 
place to identify and tackle problems originating from below or generated by other sections of 
the general staff.  Gale, Crawford, and Bull built a system with various methods of forcing 
crosstalk among the logisticians and among the maneuver and sustainment communities.  Gale 
reintroduced a weekly CAO meeting in March 1944 and used it to synchronize logistical support 
for SHAEF. Attendees from the War Office and ETOUSA provided him a direct link back to the 
industrial bases for both countries, and senior representatives from the three services were 
present to bring up any emerging concerns or requests.  Senior leaders at SHAEF received well-
integrated, comprehensive assessments of anticipated challenges from the logistics plans section 
and the joint plans section.  These documents and briefings helped the administrative staff at 
SHAEF understand all aspects of difficult logistical problems and the interplay between the 
maneuver and sustainment viewpoints.  A strength of the SHAEF system by May was its ability 
to anticipate challenges well in advance, providing time to study them in detail in cooperation 
with a wide range of partners and then take action to ensure they did not derail the overall 
campaign plan. 
If integrated planning was a strength of the headquarters, supervising execution of 
logistical tasks and monitoring the current situation was initially a weakness at SHAEF, most 
likely because leaders trusted COMZ to perform this role.  When the logistics crisis emerged in 
early September, SHAEF realized that they were getting two very different stories as to what was 
happening from COMZ and the two army groups.  With no independent information system of 
their own, SHAEF did not know which reports to believe and could not decide exactly what was 
broken and therefore what must be fixed.  SHAEF decided to create its own sources of reliable 
data, including robust liaison teams, more frequent coordination meetings, and reoccurring 
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reports from subordinate organizations.  By pulling confirmed data from several sources, SHAEF 
was able to recreate the integrated maneuver and logistics forecasts that had proven to be so 
helpful in North Africa and during the final preparation for Overlord.  How this work informed 
operational decision-making at SHAEF throughout the summer and fall will be examined in the 
in the next section.  
  
 Planning and Controlling Operations on the Continent 
 An examination of SHAEF’s records reveals a pattern of effective coordination between 
the G-3 and G-4 portions of the staff, and among SHAEF, 21st Army Group, and eventually 12th 
Army Group.  As might be expected, the slow pace of the Allied advance during the first six 
weeks of Overlord made this initial collaboration much easier.  Operating from long-occupied 
and robustly resourced facilities, agencies had time to study relatively static problems, discuss 
and evaluate solutions, and select a method of overcoming them.  The logistics plans section and 
JPS drove these processes within SHAEF and had access to brief their results to senior leaders 
through the CAO weekly meeting and chief of staff daily meeting.  In turn, Smith and Gale had 
time to confer with Eisenhower and his subordinate commanders and recommend changes to the 
campaign plan if appropriate.  ETOUSA/COMZ did not seem to participate in the early stages of 
this cycle, but Lee was brought into the process as a regular attendee at the CAO weekly 
coordination meeting and commander huddles with Eisenhower.  Before the breakout achieved 
by Cobra, logisticians at SHAEF managed to convince Eisenhower and Montgomery to avoid 
any risky operations and to stick to the original outline for the ground campaign.  SHAEF 
managed to stay in step with, if not in front of, new maneuver concepts published by the 21st 
Army Group staff and to insist that new proposals be vetted by the entire joint community and be 
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judged logistically possible before taking them to Eisenhower for final decision.  Even when 
Eisenhower chose to disregard the advice on supply and maneuver offered by Montgomery or 
the planners at SHAEF, he did so fully informed about the current logistical situation and the 
potential implications of his choices.  Through mid-September Eisenhower demanded that some 
objectives be captured based solely on their value to the theater sustainment infrastructure, and 
generally he acknowledged that other objectives were beyond the Allies’ reach until certain 
logistical preconditions had been met.    
 But this prudent and sequential approach was disregarded twice, once during the last 
week of August, and a second time between 10 and 15 September.  In the first instance 
Eisenhower was willing to gamble that the logisticians could keep six pursuing corps moving to 
the eastern border of France (and perhaps beyond) and that the German Army in the West was 
too shattered to cause any major problems.  In the second case, his two army group commanders 
convinced him to make three simultaneous pushes they hoped would approach and perhaps cross 
the Rhine while postponing an all-out effort to open Antwerp.  Eisenhower found this risk easier 
to stomach because Bradley and Lee convinced him on 12 September that supplies were 
sufficient to pull it off and that the overall logistical situation was steadily improving.  Rather 
than sticking to his decision to prioritize Montgomery’s thrust at Arnhem with a U.S. supporting 
attack by 1st Army against Aachen, Eisenhower allowed his subordinates to conduct piece-meal 
attacks all along the front throughout September and October.  At one point in mid-September 
SHAEF was conducting three separate ground attacks near the Westwall, had committed all their 
air transport to Market Garden, and were continuing to pour resources into supporting VIII 
Corps’ attack against Brest.  None of these operations addressed the Allied transportation crisis 
that was bringing the pursuit to a halt.  After doing so well during the first ten weeks of the 
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campaign, disciplined decision-making at SHAEF seemed to collapse.  Ironically, SHAEF 
continued to pursue the capture of Brest, an objective motivated largely by logistical concerns, 
long after doing so made any sense in the big picture.   
Eisenhower never wavered in his demand that Montgomery treat Antwerp and the 
Scheldt as his most important objective, but he looked the other way when Montgomery 
postponed putting his full energy into this task for over a month.  Bull knew that 21st Army 
Group was not dedicating the forces and attention to this objective that were justified by 
Eisenhower’s priorities, but the G-3 and other senior officers at SHAEF could not force a 
confrontation and resolution until 16 October.  By then it was far too late -- the port would not 
begin handling ocean-going ships until late November.  Without a major port located 
significantly closer to the front, COMZ could not solve the supply and transportation problem 
preventing a new large-scale attack aimed at reaching and crossing the Rhine.  By early October 
Eisenhower realized that he could not land a decisive blow against the German Army and resume 
mobile operations before winter weather changed the nature of the campaign.  In hindsight, 
SHAEF might have been better served by pursuing a series of phased, sequential operations 
designed first and foremost to open Antwerp before moving on to alternatives.  Montgomery was 
right when he advised Eisenhower to mass all his transportation behind one army group in order 
to sustain a deep thrust that could obtain decisive operational objectives, but he did the supreme 
command no favors when he virtually ignored Antwerp until 16 October.  The Allied advance 
that fall was stopped by logistical difficulties that several agencies had seen coming and that 
could have been overcome with a different approach to the ground campaign.    
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 Second Thoughts about the Transportation Plan? 
 Once safely ashore in Normandy, one of the first decisions that faced senior leaders at 
SHAEF was to decide whether or not to continue to execute the transportation plan into July and 
August.  The transportation plan was the aerial support campaign conducted by AEAF, assisted 
by 8th Air Force and the British Bomber Command, designed to prevent rail support to German 
operations in Normandy both before and after D-Day.  Sometimes called the attrition or 
communications campaign, it was developed by Professor Solly Zuckerman and E.D. Brant 
based upon their observations and study of air operations in support of the landings on Sicily and 
southern Italy.54  Supported by Leigh-Mallory and Tedder, the plan called for a 90-day campaign 
targeting what would eventually be 101 railway maintenance and support centers in France, the 
Low Countries, and western Germany.  The objective was to prevent the flow of German 
supplies and reinforcements to Normandy both before and after the landings, but without tipping 
off exactly where the Allies intended to land.  Although Churchill, Harris, Doolittle, and Spaatz 
resisted the plan strongly for several reasons, Eisenhower won military support for it on 25 
March and lukewarm political support from Churchill in mid-April.  In May the campaign grew 
in intensity when interdiction targets were added to the list.  Fighters, fighter-bombers, and the 
heavies went after bridges and supply depots in northwestern France.  In the last two weeks prior 
to D-Day, Operation Chattanooga Choo-Choo specifically targeted rolling stock, destroying 475 
locomotives and cutting the rail line at 150 locations.55  Air attacks associated with the 
 
54 Pogue, 127.  Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II.  Volume Three: 
Europe: Argument to V-E Day (Chicago, The University Press, 1951), 73-74.  Webster and Frankland, 245.  The 
transportation plan could not be described as a traditional aerial interdiction operation because of the anticipated 
duration and scope of the targeting plan.  As originally designed, the campaign would last 90 days before D-Day, 
and at least another month after the landings.  Targets were located in France, Belgium, and Germany, and therefore 
required heavy (four-engine) bomber support.   
55 Craven and Cate, 156.   
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transportation plan and efforts to cut the German supply lines continued after 6 June, focused on 
all three target sets: rail maintenance and marshalling facilities, bridges over the Seine and Loire, 
and rolling stock.  The results were not perfect but they badly disrupted resupply and the delivery 
of heavy equipment by rail into the Normandy area.  Forced to detrain and road march to 
Normandy, German reinforcements coming from all over France and even from the eastern front 
were slowed down, shot up, and separated from their tanks and artillery.   
But unfortunately for the Allies, destroying French rail infrastructure cut both ways.  As 
the battle in Normandy dragged on, leaders at SHAEF realized that they were doing more and 
more damage to the rail system that would be vital in sustaining Allied forces east of the Seine.  
SHAEF had hoped to harness trains to provide a major portion of Allied transportation capacity 
between D+60 and D+90, but by D+50 they were still attacking the French rail system as hard as 
they could.  The irrationality triggered some leaders at SHAEF to ask if there were targets that 
might be removed from the list.  Were some targets immaterial to the defense, or the ability of 
the German army to retreat if defeated?  In support of the transportation plan experts had argued 
that the Germans would destroy these assets during their retreat anyway.   But if their defensive 
line collapsed quickly, would they really have the time to rip up everything currently on the 
target list?   
At the SHAEF chief of staff meeting held on 16 June, LTG Morgan asked MG Bull to 
reconsider some of the targets associated with the transportation plan.  If the Germans did not 
have access to the facilities or the time to destroy them, perhaps the bombers could be 
redirected.56  As the senior leader within the command group with the deepest understanding of 
the intricate linkage between all the moving parts associated with Roundup/Overlord, Morgan 
 
56 Minutes from daily CoS meeting, 16 Jun 44.  RG 331, Entry 1, Box 7. 
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realized that each bridge and train servicing area that could be preserved would make  future 
logistical support that much easier.  In addition, any French civilian casualties that could be 
avoided would calm the Prime Minister and make the recruitment of labor on the continent a bit 
easier.  Unsuccessful in his bid to curb the ferocity of the transportation plan in mid-June, 
Morgan’s insights were validated when Crawford pointed out on 22 July that, based on the rate 
of destruction from bombing attacks, the Allies had not requested enough railway bridge repair 
material and were likely to run out by September.57  This observation did not save any bridges 
for the next three weeks, but it showed that  the logisticians were keenly aware of the problem 
and were committed to stopping the bombers as soon as they could convince the commander to 
do so.  The idea that the transportation and interdiction plans had outlived their usefulness was 
reinforced when on 28 July Bradley sent a note to Eisenhower explaining that his units were 
struggling to make progress south of Saint-Lô  because of all the destroyed bridges.58  On 2 
August SHAEF placed the bridges in Brittany off limits to aircraft and added the bridges across 
the Seine and Loire to the restricted target list on 17 August.59  In the meantime, Allied airpower 
continued to attack relentlessly not only German formations but also road and rail network 
targets west of Paris until the operation around Falaise was nearing its conclusion. 
 There are hints that senior leaders had voiced concerns over the impact of the 
transportation plan on friendly logistics back in the spring, but there is little in the historical 
record to support the claim that these comments were made before the damage was already done.  
In the official history of the U.S. Army Air Force in World War Two, Craven and Cate claimed  
 
57 Minutes from weekly CAO meeting, 22 Jul 44.  RG 331, Entry 34, Box 24.   
58 Note from Bradley to Eisenhower, 28 Jul 44.  Pre-Presidential Papers, Box 13, DDE Presidential Library.  
Destroyed by Allied bombing, not German demolition.   
59 Craven and Cate, Vol. III, 260.  12th AG asked for the Seine and Loire bridges to be added to the restricted target 
list on 2 August, and again on 8 August.   
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that “British generals from SHAEF” objected to the plan advanced by Leigh-Mallory and 
Zuckerman, pointing out that destruction of French transportation networks would cut both 
ways.60  BG Plank, the ADSEC commander, backed up these assertions in a letter he sent to 
Ruppenthal in 1951 during the preparation of The Logistical Support of the Armies.  Plank 
claimed: “Beginning late in June supply and transportation officials repeatedly asked that railway 
bridges, tunnel, and viaducts, whose repair entailed large expenditures of effort, be spared in the 
hope that the enemy would not destroy them in retreat.”61  Plank’s observations were not unique 
to the U.S. Army.  COL Poole, the logistics planner at 21st Army Group, wrote to MG Graham 
on 21 August “The AF are still shooting up locos, and the Maquis destroying tracks.  Has not the 
time come when this is more of a hindrance to us than to an enemy who has no reinforcements to 
send up, and only defeated armies to supply?  We shall want all the rolling stock that we can 
find.”62  Poole was correct, but he was also entirely too late to do much good for the Allied cause 
when it came to preserving French rail infrastructure.   
Even though they evidently failed to stop the transportation plan as soon as they would 
have liked in July and August, SHAEF learned from the experience and took a different 
approach in during the final offensive across the Rhine.  On 4 April 1945 the SHAEF G-3 
published the  memorandum “Air Attack on Transportation Targets in Germany,” designed to 
provide proactive measures to show how to restrict and then stop aerial bombardment of crucial 
 
60 Craven and Cate, 73, 75-76.  The authors did not specify which British generals, or provide any citations backing 
up the claim, but suggested that the first rumblings of dissension arose in late January at AEAF bombing committee 
meetings.  The authors implied that Brooke was against the transportation plan at least in part because of the impact 
on Allied logistics, and we know Morgan was one of the first leaders to suggest a curtailment of bombing to 
preserve transportation infrastructure.    
61 Ruppenthal, Vol. I, 500, note 11.  Ruppenthal cites a CAO meeting on 26 August and note from Plank dated 10 
July 1951.  It seems likely that there were rumblings in late June and July, but the issue did not reach command 
channels until mid-August when Bradley asked SHAEF to stop attacking some targets associated with the 
transportation plan.   
62 Poole to Graham “Admin Appreciation” 21 Aug 44, WO 205/671 Overlord Maintenance Appreciation, G (Plans) 
21 AG, National Archives, Kew.    
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infrastructure in western Germany.63  The document directed the G-4 to form a working group 
along with the engineers and air staff to develop a restricted target list.  If the restricted target list 
was put into effect, “[t]hese targets [are] not to be destroyed without agreement from this 
headquarters except in case of urgent operational necessity.”  In the official history of the U.S. 
Army, the difficulties caused by unrelenting air attacks on French transportation infrastructure 
were accepted as a necessary evil.  But it is obvious that officers at SHAEF and 12th AG had 
second thoughts during the fall campaign and took measures to ensure tighter control during the 
last offensive.    
 It is easy, with the benefit of hindsight, to conclude that the Allies continued to attack 
bridges, rolling stock, and rail repair facilities for far too long after the success of Cobra.  The 
problem with this line of reasoning is that it demands entirely too much of Allied intelligence 
capabilities to have pinpointed the precise moment when a certain effect had been achieved 
against the enemy.  Russell Hart demonstrated that Allied aerial interdiction of the German 7th 
Army’s main supply line running back to Le Mans and then over the Loire played a major role in 
the success of Operation Cobra.64  Allied aircraft knocked out the most important bridge over the 
Loire at St. Cyr on 15 July, and the Germans could not restore rail service to Le Mans until 25 
July.  On that day, 7th Army received its first large shipment of fuel and ammunition in ten days.  
At the start of Cobra, the defending German divisions had 30% of their authorized ammunition 
reserves; as resistance cracked on 26 and 27 July, 7th Army reported that they  were completely 
out of 88mm anti-tank ammunition and that they had been forced to abandon two companies of 
Panther tanks when they ran out of fuel.65  Hart argues that the Germans broke at Saint-Lô but 
 
63 RG 331, Entry 23, Box 48.  
64 Russell A. Hart, “Feeding Mars: The Role of Logistics in the German Defeat in Normandy, 1944” War in History 
3, no. 4 (1996): 418-435.   
65 Ibid, 432-433, note 26 and 28.   
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held on around Caen because the Allies successfully interdicted 7th Army but could not do the 
same to 5th Panzer Army.  The line of communications running east across the Seine proved to 
be more robust than the one running south across the Loire.  Hart did not address German 
logistics during the attempted counterattack around Mortain, but it is easy to conclude that Allied 
interdiction caused the same problems as the Germans tried to mass troops and supplies during 
that operation.   
Interdiction played a key role in the success of Cobra and in the U.S. ability to hold on at 
Mortain, and bridges across the Seine and the Loire were the easiest and most logical targets to 
help accomplish that effect.  From 21st Army Group’s and SHAEF’s perspectives, it was difficult 
to determine when the disadvantages of such an aerial campaign began to outweigh the 
advantages.  If destroying the bridge at St. Cyr on 15 July was a good thing, then perhaps the 
Allies should have continued to interdict the bridges and ferries over the Seine beyond 17 
August.  There are valid arguments that the Allies could have done more to disrupt the Germans 
escaping over the Seine by ferry after the Battle of Falaise and that the failure to do so 
contributed directly to the recovery of the Germans’  defensive line along the Westwall a few 
weeks later.66  But based on how the U.S. Army preferred to fight, it  should come as no surprise 
that SHAEF prioritized interdicting German lines of communication rather than preserving them 
for Allied use.  The U.S. Army in Europe tended to be most comfortable with direct, attritional 
warfare waged across broad, continuous fronts, operations designed to grind down enemy 
formations.  Examples of penetrations, mobile operations, and deep encirclements designed to 
break cohesion and the will to resist existed, but they tended to be the exception and not the 
 
66 Ellis, Victory in the West, Vol. 1, 455.  Most of the men and equipment that got out were ferried across the river 
between 25 and 27 August. 
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norm.  Most U.S. generals in Europe tended to think about a pace of operations similar to that of 
World War One, and so they were not overly concerned about preserving or quickly repairing 
hundreds of miles of rail line to sustain deep operations.      
 
 Neptune and the Lodgment 
 From the earliest days of the campaign in France, what really happened diverged from 
what had been planned by 21st AG and SHAEF, forcing the command to adjust the scheme of 
maneuver and logistics support plan almost immediately.  What quickly emerges from a study of 
how this staff interaction occurred is an appreciation of the interconnected nature of air, navy, 
and army operations in France that summer.  Because SHAEF was the only headquarters 
formally authorized to coordinate the joint campaign and capable of doing so, they had to play a 
central role in driving changes to the original ground and theater campaign plan.  It was one 
thing to say that SHAEF had delegated control over ground operations to Montgomery, but the 
reality was that only SHAEF had the knowledge, relationships, and authority to pull together an 
integrated understanding of the situation and underwrite risks for the other two services and 
COMZ.67  An examination of the daily back-and-forth between SHAEF and 21st AG planners 
also shows how seriously logistical constraints were accounted for during the first two months of 
Overlord, but how this influence faded over time.       
 Even before the Allied lodgment in Normandy was secure, SHAEF and 21st Army Group 
started refining the concept for the next stages of the campaign.  This group of plans were 
generally referred to as “Post-Neptune” or “Post-Overlord” operations, but the specific set of 
 
67 Conceptually it is possible for a lead service to synchronize a joint concept before seeking final approval from the 
theater commander, but Montgomery did not have the personality or reputation to do so by June 1944.  Additionally, 
his staff did not have the time, subject matter experts, or information at their fingertips to do the work.    
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actions designed to reach the Seine and liberate Paris was code named “Lucky Strike.”  The first 
concept for the operation was developed by 21st Army Group; initially it was designed to break 
and then trap German forces in a pocket contained by the Atlantic Ocean, the Seine River, and a 
combined U.S. – U.K. right hook consisting of half-a-dozen armored divisions.68  The Germans 
would be prevented from escaping across the Seine by a combination of air attacks against 
bridges and ferry sites and possibly by  airborne forces landed along the river.  But 21st AG 
realized that, in accordance with the initial campaign plan, the U.S. Army would not be available 
until they had cleared the Brittany Peninsula and established depots around Rennes.  This was 
problematic, because Montgomery realized he could not execute Lucky Strike without some U.S. 
assistance.  
What would help would be some way to shorten the amount of time needed to make a 
few U.S. divisions available for Lucky Strike, and this largely centered on securing a major port 
in Brittany as quickly as possible.  The 21st AG’s first proposal was an air, land, and sea advance 
called “Hands Up” that aimed to seize and hold on to the area around Quiberon Bay until a 
ground force advancing from around Avranches could join them.  Quiberon Bay was important 
because it was linked to Operation Chastity, COMZ’s project to convert the large natural harbor 
into a first-class port that was tied into the French rail network.  At this stage, the planners at 
SHAEF and 21st AG did not realize that the Navy was unwilling to conduct operations or start 
work at Quiberon Bay until the submarines at Brest were bottled up and the Allies had access to 
intermediate shelter somewhere nearby.69  These reservations would emerge over the coming 
two weeks. 
 
68 “Appreciation of Possible Development of Operation Lucky Strike” 21st AG, 18 Jun 44.  RG 331, Entry 26, Box 
74.  Delivery of this document triggered SHAEF to issue a planning directive to the JPS two days later.   
69 21st AG provided SHAEF a general outline of Hands Up on 17 June as an isolated operation designed to use a 
small airborne force to open approaches for a seaborne assault.  This force would then hold on, reinforced and 
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The outline for Lucky Strike that was passed from 21st AG to SHAEF on 18 June 
concluded by asking for U.S. feedback on the operation: “Any time after D+60 a general pursuit 
may develop which will increase the L of C across the Seine and subsequently west, northeast, 
southeast or a combination of all three…a proportion of the Allied forces will be striking 
southeast on the south bank of the Seine towards Paris.  Is this feasible and if not when must 
Chastity be secured?  How many US divisions can be maintained between D+30 and D+70 with 
and without Chastity?”  A few days later SHAEF began to examine what was logistically 
feasible should the Allies strike out towards Paris without first securing any ports in Brittany.   
 The first reaction from logisticians and the Joint Planning Section at SHAEF was outright 
dismissal of the idea that the U.S. Army could strike toward Paris before opening a few ports in 
either Brittany or perhaps along the coast of Bordeaux.  Acknowledging U.S. resistance to even 
considering an advance on Paris until a major port was available in Brittany, 21st AG created 
“Beneficiary” to provide a second option for an air-land-sea coup de gr𝑎𝑎�ce, this one targeted at 
Saint-Malo.  The 21st AG issued a planning directive to FUSAG for Hands Up and Beneficiary 
on 24 June; the British wanted to know if the Americans thought either option feasible, within 
the overall context of Lucky Strike.  The staff at 21st AG asked the question of FUSAG, but 
realistically only SHAEF was positioned to provide an accurate answer.  
 The initial response from the working-group level at SHAEF was critical of both 
operations.  The joint plans assessment made it clear that, in accordance with the original 
concept for the campaign, the first objective after breaking out was to secure the ports of 
 
supported by air and sea until a breakout force could link up from the Cotentin.  Over the next two weeks the navy 
planners at SHAEF pointed out that Ramsey was uncomfortable conducting an amphibious operation at Quiberon 
before some portion of Brest was available to Allied ships and the German submarines there destroyed or at least 
pinned up.     
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Brittany; Lucky Strike must not interfere with accomplishing that goal.70  The JPS at SHAEF did 
not favor either Hands Up or Beneficiary – it would be easier and less risky to take Saint-Malo or 
Quiberon Bay advancing from Normandy after a breakout from the lodgment.  Airborne forces 
would probably be easier to integrate into Lucky Strike and should be husbanded to do so.  
However, SHAEF believed that the U.S. Army could pursue two objectives simultaneously, six 
divisions advancing into Brittany and six detached to support Montgomery’s southern flank.  
Although this support was conceivable, McLean’s team recommended that 21st AG should try to 
accomplish the goals of Lucky Strike on their own if at all possible.  If six U.S. divisions were 
committed to Lucky Strike, air transport would have to supplement truck transport in order to 
keep the Americans supplied all the way to the Seine.  It was obvious from the first assessments 
of Lucky Strike prepared by SHAEF planners that they were extremely concerned about the 
inadequacy of U.S. motorized transport and about the need to supplement its capacity with 
numerous aircraft.  Anticipating that his section would be directed to figure out how to supply 
six U.S. divisions all the way to the Seine, Whipple asked the chief of the G-4 Movement and 
Transport planning section to study how long it would take to establish depots around Alençon 
for that purpose.71 
 The same day that the SHAEF JPS recommended abandonment of Beneficiary and Hands 
Up and hedged U.S. support to Lucky Strike, 21st AG published a major revision of the plan to 
reach the Seine.  The document is useful because it provides a perfect example of the difference 
between how leaders at SHAEF thought about large ground operations in comparison to the 
methods used by Montgomery.  Plans created by U.S. officers during this period did not use the 
 
70 Preliminary assessment of proposed operations by 21st AG, SHAEF JPS, 27 Jun 44.  This was a draft document 
created by O6s for further consideration by their superiors, not a final decision by SHAEF. 
71 BG Moses, the D/MGA at 21st AG and the future G-4 for 12th AG, was included in all internal traffic among 
SHAEF G-4 log planners and the correspondence between SHAEF and 21st AG maneuver planners. 
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concept of phases, beyond the very generic phase lines used to depict Allied progress across 
France in 30-day increments contained in Overlord planning documents.  The original phase 
lines used to frame the Overlord campaign, developed largely by 21st AG, implied a certain 
sequence of events that would progress from securing the lodgment, conducting the initial 
breakout, clearing Brittany, advancing to Paris, and eventually to the penetration of the Westwall 
by early summer 1945.72  The idea of linking together a series of objectives with a corresponding 
timeline and outlay of air and ground forces allocated to each objective was very much a British 
technique at this stage in the war.   
The concept for Lucky Strike, published by 21st AG on 27 June, broke the overall 
operation into four phases with two major options for a knockout punch to be delivered during 
the second phase.  It anchored each phase to a rough schedule, basing the timeline on how long it 
would take to reach each intermediate objective and then amass the forces and supplies necessary 
to accomplish the next portion of the plan.  Each of these intermediate objectives fed on one 
another, eventually enabling the completion of the overall campaign objective.  This might seem 
like a minor issue, but the entire structure of the operation depended on acknowledging the 
requirements of mechanized warfare.  Also, it reflected the approach Montgomery had used in 
North Africa to advance from Egypt to the Libyan-Tunisian border.  Typically, a large force of 
twenty motorized divisions could not attack in three or four directions simultaneously because of 
logistical constraints.  It was therefore necessary to divide any major operation into pulses, where 
a portion of the force would accomplish a preliminary objective, pause to reorient and shift 
supplies, and then move on to the next phase.  
 
72 Even the concept of developing these phase lines from D+30 to D+360 was a British initiative worked out been 
COSSAC and 21st AG.  
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This is the idea that lies at the heart of the operational art of war.  The purpose of an 
operation or campaign is to string together a series of intermediate objectives to achieve a greater 
whole.  Sequencing is necessary because, in general, one never has the combat strength and 
logistical means to do everything simultaneously.  Deciding what to do simultaneously and how 
to sequence each of these operations, and the resources to allocate to each, is operational art.  
Despite strong arguments that the Allies did not understand the operational level of war during 
World War Two, the 21st AG concept for Lucky Strike clearly demonstrates Montgomery did.  
Montgomery and the veterans of the desert war had internalized this thinking by the summer of 
1944, while the Americans had not developed such a framework. 
 
Figure 5.1: SHAEF's concept for a two-phase Lucky Strike with simultaneous drives on 
Paris and Quiberon Bay, 28 Jun 44 
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 Montgomery had his staff develop two options for the critical phase of Lucky Strike – 
one in which U.S. support was available, and a second plan should the British be forced to go it 
alone.  The preferred solution was option one, which would use about six U.S. armored and 
motorized divisions to hit the Germans with a right hook while the Commonwealth forces 
pushed them back on the Seine.  Without U.S. assistance, the best Montgomery could hope for 
was a broad frontal advance on Paris designed to seize ground, but that would see most of the 
enemy escape to fight another day.  SHAEF eventually incorporated 21st AG’s phases into their 
own version of Lucky Strike, and Whipple and Vissering got to work figuring out how long 
COMZ and 12th AG needed between phases one and two in order to build up the supplies needed 
to reach the Seine.  On 28 June the JPS recommended the addition of the phase line labelled 
X+15 in figure 5.1 to the SHAEF concept for Lucky Strike.  The idea was that a five- or six-day 
pause along that line would give COMZ enough time to shift fuel and ammunition dumps 
forward and to prepare a few tactical airfields to guarantee fighter support for the advancing 
divisions during phase two.  This latest appreciation of Lucky Strike published by SHAEF also 
conceded that the Allies did not need to clear all of Brittany – only enough to gain access to 
Saint-Malo and Quiberon Bay. 
 The slow advance out of Normandy had impacts on the Allied campaign plan beyond a 
search for ways to use U.S. divisions to conduct two simultaneous operations.   In a short memo 
on 29 June, Bull informed Eisenhower that Bradley had decided to switch to an alternate troop 
landing schedule for Operation Neptune.  Bradley wanted to prioritize infantry replacements and 
new combat formations at the expense of service troops until German resistance in the 
hedgerows had been broken.  The issue had been raised two days earlier by Churchill, who 
agreed with Bradley.  Bull was against the idea of changing the carefully orchestrated 
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deployment plan to prioritize short-term needs over long-term requirements, but he was 
overridden by Bradley and Eisenhower.73  Around the same date, Whipple noted that the idea 
was gaining traction at 21st AG and SHAEF that Lucky Strike might eliminate the need to clear 
Brittany and develop Quiberon Bay, a notion he strongly disagreed with.74  Whipple’s position 
was somewhat weakened when BG Moses presented the FUSAG appreciation of Lucky Strike 
on 3 July, concluding that the U.S. could provide six U.S. divisions for the operation with the 
logistical assets currently on hand.  Trucks and planes would have to be massed to resupply the 
advancing divisions while everyone else stood down, but it could be done.75  The next day the 
SHAEF JPS published another refinement of their own appreciation of Lucky Strike that called 
strongly for  simultaneous drives into Brittany and Paris and for a pause along the X+15 phase 
line sufficient to build up supplies before moving on towards Paris.  Under fire from several 
directions, SHAEF resisted pressure to drop carefully developed plans and look for shortcuts, 
instead sticking to their recommended sequence of actions needed to establish a firm base of 
supply on the continent.  It was also obvious that none of the senior leaders briefed on Lucky 
Strike between 28 June and 4 July considered it unrealistic to expect a voluntary pause that 
allowed defeated German forces to break contact and withdraw unmolested.  It seems that the 
maneuver and logistics planners believed it was necessary and realistic to accept a halt for up to 
 
73 Note from Bull to G-3 Ops, 27 Jun 44.  Bull Papers, DDE PL.  Bull directed BG Nevins to draft a response from 
Eisenhower to the Prime Minister to address the recommendation that SHAEF prioritize landing combat over 
service troops in Normandy over the coming weeks.  Bull was against the idea; after the breakout the U.S. logistics 
challenge would be greater because they were on the open or moving flank and would have to cover more ground.  
Once changed, it would take weeks to restore the proper balance between combat and service forces.  Two days later 
Bradley made the discussion a moot point, and it is highly unlikely Bradley would have made this call without 
consulting Eisenhower first.     
74 Lucky Strike planning file, memo by COL Whipple, 1 Jul 44.  RG 331, Entry 34, Box 34.   
75 FUSAG Admin Appreciation for Lucky Strike, 3 Jul 44.  This eight-page document was produced by the U.S. 
team imbedded with 21st AG and endorsed by BG Moses.  It was a repetitive, meandering document that 
demonstrated how inexperienced U.S. logisticians were in trying to match maneuver objectives to logistical 
constraints and provide a recommendation to commanders.     
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a week in order to drag supplies forward before continuing to exploit the breakout from the 
lodgment.  Apparently, the G-3, G-4, CAO, and planners from 21st AG did not challenge this 
assumption. 
 SHAEF was never finished with a staff study or appreciation of a proposed operation 
until that event happened or the possibility of it happening no longer existed.  Attached to the 
updated document published by SHAEF on 4 July was a table that broke Lucky Strike into six 
critical tasks and then assigned representatives from SHAEF and subordinate headquarters to a 
working group charged with further study of the problem.  BG Moses was directed to supervise a 
team that included COL Albrecht from COMZ (really the Forward Echelon of COMZ or FECZ 
at this stage), COL Whipple from SHAEF, and COL Poole from Q plans at 21st AG in order to 
develop the U.S. administrative appreciation of the new proposal.76  This work table 
demonstrated exactly how joint and combined planning at the theater level really worked by the 
summer of 1944.  Headquarters tried not to develop products in isolation and then ship them 
around to one another, meeting instead face to face across three layers of the chain of command 
with experts from every relevant community to build a realistic plan as quickly as possible.  The 
Allies realized that when time, proximity, and technology permitted, collaboration across the 
organization was the best way to work out solutions to tough problems and that a rigid division 
of labor was often unrealistic. 
 General Eisenhower weighed in on this ongoing process on 6 July when he sent a note to 
General Smith that revealed a good deal about how decision-making at SHAEF really worked.  
The SAC asked Smith re-examine the possibility of using the British 1st Airborne Division and 
Polish Airborne Brigade to seize Saint-Malo around the first week of August.  Eisenhower 
 
76 SHAEF working appreciation of Lucky Strike, 4 Jul 44.  RG 331, Entry 26, Box 74.   
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explained that his air leaders had already indicated their support for the idea, adding that an 
amphibious force could possibly link up with the airborne troops as soon as beaches or the port 
itself had been cleared.  Initial resupply would come by air until beaches or ports could handle 
administrative traffic.  Smith was directed to get input from the Navy and 21st Army Group, but 
Eisenhower wanted a fresh appraisal of the feasibility of the operation.77  This note made it clear 
that Eisenhower was aware that the JPS had shot down 21st AG’s concept for Beneficiary back in 
June, but he thought that changing conditions in Normandy (or perhaps a push from Tedder or 
Montgomery) justified a reappraisal.  With the commander now heavily involved in the process, 
senior leaders at SHAEF scheduled a conference for 11 July at the headquarters of 21st Army 
Group to reexamine all three possible operations.  Gale and Bull were dispatched to represent 
SHAEF. 
 The results of this meeting were not surprising, but it was a productive event because 
senior leaders gained a deeper understanding of why the logistics community was resisting some 
of the proposals.  The group reached a consensus that Brittany was initially more important than 
an advance to the Seine, that Beneficiary (Saint-Malo) was not worth the effort and risk, but that 
Hands Up (Quiberon Bay) warranted further study.78  The Navy finally convinced the group that 
securing Brest was essential before trying to develop Quiberon Bay.  Because of possible enemy 
naval activity as well as concerns with the weather and tides, Chastity was too risky without 
capturing Brest first.  Montgomery and Bradley left the meeting having agreed that 3rd Army 
would be able to handle Brest and Quiberon Bay while 1st Army supported the British during 
 
77 Letter, Eisenhower to Smith, 6 Jul 44.  RG 331, Entry 26, Box 74.  There is also a note from a group captain from 
the AEAF plans section to his counterpart at CATOR dated 7 July explaining that all the pushback against 
Beneficiary had come from the G-4 and Q staff planners, who thought that the effort required to capture Saint-Malo 
would be completely unjustified based on the tiny capacity of the port.  This note reinforces Eisenhower’s statement 
that a reconsideration of Beneficiary come from within the air force community at SHAEF.   
78 Meeting notes, 11 Jul 44.  RG 331, RG 26, Box 74. 
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Lucky Strike.  The JPS at SHAEF endorsed the decision to abandon Beneficiary the next day and 
provided a revised assessment of Hands Up.  An airborne operation was possible, but 
amphibious landings were too risky.  The airborne forces could hold their objectives for three to 
five days, but then would have to be rescued by ground forces.  The JPS stuck to their original 
conclusions and recommended Smith tell Eisenhower that both Beneficiary and Hands Up did 
not offer sufficient advantages to offset the significant risk involved.79  
 By this point the Allies were running out of time to get Chastity back on its projected 
schedule.  In the original concept approved by Smith on 23 April, construction was slated to 
begin on 16 July.80  The British continued to plan and prepare for Beneficiary and Hands Up, but 
in mid-July 21st AG was forced to inform Combined Operations Command and Headquarters, 
Airborne Troops that the Navy had cancelled a planned reconnaissance of the beach areas around 
Saint-Malo, citing the danger of mines and small attack boats.81  Crawford engaged Smith on 19 
July in an attempt to convince him to cancel Chastity and focus on Brest as a better, and quicker, 
alternative.82  McLean’s joint planning section examined the recommendation on 21 July and the 
recommendation was quickly endorsed by General Napier, the chief of the movement and 
transportation section within the G-4.  On 21 July the JPS informed Smith they were still 
awaiting an official response to the suggestion from ETOUSA, but that they had heard that Lee 
had given up on Chastity and agreed with Crawford that Brest was an adequate substitute.83  By 
 
79 Letter, JPS to Smith, 12 Jul 44.  Both Saint-Malo and Quiberon Bay (QB) were tough nuts to crack from the air.  
The number and dispersion of heavy artillery and anti-aircraft guns required a large number of airborne troops to 
land too far away from their final objectives.  Until all the heavy guns were knocked out, it was too dangerous for 
amphibious reinforcements to arrive.  Successful airstrikes might change the math, or the Navy could underwrite the 
risk of landing under this fire, but the planners could not make these decisions.  Discharge tonnage at Saint-Malo 
would be tiny, and QB was worthless without Brest.  Therefore, both operations were just not worth it.  
80 Record of SHAEF decisions made at the CoS meeting, 16 Jul 44.  RG 331, Entry 1, Box 7.   
81 Cable, 21st AG to COHQ and HQ, Airborne Troops, undated.  RG 331, Entry 26, Box 74.   
82 Office memo, Crawford to Smith, 19 Jul 44.  RG 331, Entry 26, Box 74.  Smith agreed to examine the issue and 
passed the directive to do so to the JPS. 
83 Memo, JPS to Smith, 21 Jul 44.  RG 331, Entry 26, Box 74.    
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late July the consensus among the SHAEF and ETOUSA logisticians was that the best 
compromise available was to restore Brest as quickly as possible once it was captured.  
 
 Breakout to Breakdown, 29 July to 4 September 
After six weeks of worrying about the glacial pace of the Allied advance and its impact 
on the long-range logistical situation, things changed drastically when Operation Cobra managed 
to punch through the German defense between 27 and 29 July.  But as a result of the deep 
penetration by 3rd Army and the total collapse of the German left flank, SHAEF almost 
immediately began to reconsider the commitment to tackle Brittany first, or at least concurrently 
with Lucky Strike.  By 3 August Eisenhower, Montgomery, and Bradley had decided that 
unhinging the German defense in western France was more important than rushing into Brittany; 
21st AG directed three armies to envelop the Germans west of the Seine while one corps from 3rd 
Army cleared Brittany.84  At this point in the campaign the only short-term logistical concerns 
bothering senior leaders at SHAEF were  the backlog of unloaded cargo ships, the rate at which 
LSTs were being damaged while serving as impromptu supply vessels, and a shortage of artillery 
ammunition among U.S. forces.85  Securing a deep-water port somewhere in Brittany would help 
with some of these problems, but SHAEF’s immediate priority was to exploit the gap around 
Avranches to turn the German western flank and bag the two armies trying to hold the base of 
the Cotentin Peninsula.86  Patton’s 3rd Army encircled Rennes by 4 August, reached Mayenne 
and Laval a day later, and by the evening of 8 August had captured Le Mans, deep behind 7th and 
 
84 Weigley, 175.  21st AG message to subordinate commands, 29 Jul and 4 August.  At first 21st AG planned to halt 
the U.S. Army at the base of the Cotentin and advance with only 1st Canadian and 2nd British armies.  Four U.S. 
divisions would clear Brittany during the month of August. 
85 CAO meeting notes, 29 Jul 44.  RG 331, Entry 34, Box 24. 
86 The debate behind that decision, and the impact on the campaign, will be examined in detail in the following 
section.    
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5th Panzer armies.   As early as 5 August SHAEF began to worry that Patton was outrunning his 
supply lines, but Lee dismissed their concerns, promising that trucks were already delivering 
huge quantities of fuel and ammunition and that aerial resupply was adding 1,000 tons a day to 
sustain the advance (which was not even close to accurate).87  But Lee was correct when he said 
that COMZ could keep Patton resupplied, and over the next three weeks they managed to keep 
3rd Army moving and fighting all the way to the Seine. 
 The breakout and rapid progress towards the Seine in the first week of August triggered a 
reappraisal of what might be accomplished over the coming weeks.  On 12 August Whipple 
provided the audience at the CAO weekly meeting a briefing on how the Allies could sustain a 
drive to the Seine, and Napier shared a progress report on efforts to restore rail service beyond 
Saint-Lô  and Caen.88  In Napier’s opinion, by the time the Allies reached the Seine in late 
August, Allied rail service would terminate at Rennes and Le Mans.  Based upon these 
limitations, maneuver planners recommended that, after a short pause to build up local depots, 
the British cross the Seine north of Paris in order to open Le Havre and Rouen, assisted by two 
U.S. corps north of Paris.  These objectives along the English Channel provided the added 
benefit of eliminating most of the German V1 launch sites.  Sustaining any drive east of the 
Seine would require massed air transport, and the planners recommended that these operations 
not begin until early September when rail repair and the POL pipeline reached Le Mans.89  Even 
under these optimal conditions, SHAEF would not be able to support more than two U.S. corps 
on the east side of Paris.90  By the time Gale chaired his weekly meeting on 19 August, it was 
 
87 Ibid, 5 Aug 44.   
88 Ibid, 12 Aug 44. 
89 SHAEF JPS Lucky Strike assessment, 12 and 17 Aug 44.  RG 331, Entry 26, Box 74.   
90 “Post-Neptune Ops Section III Crossing the Seine and Capture of Paris”, 17 Aug 44.  RG 331, Entry 23, Box 52.  
Rail service from Cherbourg to Paris was the prerequisite for sustaining more than six U.S. divisions east of Seine in 
the minds of the SHAEF log planners.  This was obviously too conservative an approach.   
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becoming more and more apparent that the ports in Brittany were going to be captured too late to 
be of any assistance in supplying the drive to the Seine.91  A note of panic began to creep into 
SHAEF discussions about the need to secure additional ports before the weather began to 
deteriorate but also about the futility of wasting resources in Brittany.  In a remarkably short 
time, the logical sequencing of the Allied ground campaign in France seemed to be falling apart, 
overcome by the desire to capture or destroy as much of the retreating German formations as 
possible.   
One solution to the Allied logistical strain was to shift priorities from capturing a port in 
Brittany to opening up channel ports between the mouth of the Seine and the Somme.  On 22 
August Whipple published a new logistics assessment of the plan to drive on beyond the Seine, 
three days before the attack was due to begin.92  Whipple believed it would take the British a 
week to reach Abbeville and the Somme using 26 divisions in the main attack (13 U.S and 13 
Commonwealth).  Eight divisions would be stranded in Brittany and Normandy, and four U.S. 
divisions would be supplied at a reduced rate and arrayed to protect the Allies’ southern flank.  
All the heavy artillery and much of the anti-aircraft artillery would be left behind in order to 
reduce supply requirements and provide additional truck companies.  The eight immobilized 
divisions and artillery battalions would provide trucks and manpower for 49 new truck 
companies.  Attacking divisions, and their associated attachments, needed 535 tons of supplies a 
day, and the U.S. line of communications would be significantly longer than that of the British 
during this phase of the operation.  All rail capacity would be dedicated to 12th AG, and the 
British would transfer four truck companies to COMZ.  A total of 338 truck companies would be 
 
91 CAO meeting notes, 19 Aug 44.   
92 First draft of SHAEF logistics assessment for operations east of the Seine, 22 August 1944.  Portions of this 
version were handwritten by Whipple, who shared his work with G-3 plans the next day. 
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massed under COMZ control to sustain the advance.  But Whipple estimated that SHAEF needed 
423 companies to meet all its requirements, broken down to provide the following support: 
 Air Forces     45 companies 
 Main Effort (13 U.S. divisions)  155 companies   
 Four U.S. divisions on flank security  61 companies  
 Move reserves to the front   23 companies 
 Port clearance     70 companies 
 Motorize one U.S. infantry division  6 companies 
 Bulk POL and static ops   63 companies 
 Total theater requirements   423 companies 
 
 The shortfall of 85 truck companies would have to be made up by rail and air 
transportation.  SHAEF planners assumed that air transport could provide 1,000 tons of lift a day 
(equivalent to ten truck companies); the balance of the requirement would have to be covered by 
trains, which Whipple knew was impossible until mid-September at the soonest.93  The logistics 
plans section did not come out and say it, but their work demonstrated that the upcoming 
offensive could not be supported for more than a few days before major problems began to 
develop.  Whipple’s team was right, but they were also ignored.   
Just before the Allies crossed the Seine, leaders at SHAEF were still generally tempering 
maneuver objectives based upon logistical requirements and limitations, but this would gradually 
change over the coming days.94  SHAEF and the two army groups had been examining ways to 
sustain a major force east of the river for weeks and were confident that they could keep a dozen 
divisions supplied on the far side with some creative approaches to logistics.  In some respects 
 
93 The rail line from Cherbourg to Le Mans was opened on 17 August.  Progress with repair east of Argentan and Le 
Mans had to await the outcome of the battle around Falaise and the German retreat out of the pocket between 16 and 
21 August.  As Whipple wrote his new assessment on 22 August, he had to know that the Allies were short about 75 
truck company equivalents.  By the end of August, the Allies could move 3,000 tons daily from Cherbourg to the 
west side of Paris, equating to 30 truck companies.  Whipple knew that once the Allies crossed the Seine with 26 
divisions they were living on borrowed time before major supply difficulties would begin to appear.  
94 In theory Eisenhower had agreed on 24 August to prioritize logistical support to Montgomery and 1st Army, but 
Bradley continued to commit resources off and on to Patton for the next three weeks.  
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the decision to advance beyond the Seine was taken out of the hands of senior leaders when 
tactical formations, in the course of maintaining pressure on the Germans retreating from Falaise, 
discovered intact bridges over the river and quickly pushed security forces to reach the far bank 
and prevent German demolition of the spans.  Despite Montgomery’s last-minute plea to 
prioritize and resource one main thrust, Eisenhower made it clear on 24 August that he wanted to 
continue to advance with both army groups.  The northern forces, supported by the Airborne 
Army, would orient on Antwerp and the Ruhr; the southern group of armies would protect the 
British southern flank and advance on Metz and then the Rhine.   
By late August both Eisenhower and Montgomery were under intense pressure from the 
British War Cabinet to eliminate V-1 launch sites along the Channel as quickly as possible, 
complicating SHAEF’s freedom of action.  The SHAEF JPS published a detailed examination of 
the V-1 and V-2 problem on 24 August; the paper recommended that the most efficient solution 
was to isolate or eliminate these facilities with a ground advance by 21st AG rather than trying to 
use airborne or amphibious landings.95  That same day Gale attended a meeting hosted by MG 
Miles Graham, the MG (A) for 21st AG, that sought to outline the concept of the ground 
campaign over the coming two months and to ensure that it was logistically sustainable.  The 
army group thought it would have bridgeheads over the Seine by 1 September, would reach the 
Somme two weeks later, and might seize Rotterdam and Antwerp around 15 October.96  
Planning was also underway at 21st AG for a large airborne operation to occur within the next 
seven days designed to help the British cross the Somme.  At this point 21st AG was still 
 
95 JPS study on V1 and V2 threat, 24 Aug 44.  RG 331, Entry 26, Box 74. 
96 Notes from meeting held by MGA, 21st AG, 24 Aug 44.  RG 331, Entry 34, Box 23. 
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relatively conservative when it came to projecting their rate of advance, not realizing how 
decisively the German Army had been defeated in Normandy. 
 When the Allied vanguard crossed the Seine it triggered Gale to take a recommendation 
to Smith and Eisenhower on 26 August to stop attacking rolling stock and rail maintenance 
facilities across France.97  Only a few days into the operation on the east side the river, the 
Americans were already struggling to keep their lead divisions moving, and Whipple had made it 
abundantly clear that things would only get worse until trains could pick up some of the slack.  
Both 1st and 3rd Army were forced to advance in spurts corresponding to the arrival of fuel 
convoys, which tended to come in every two to three days.  These stocks were supplemented by 
aerial deliveries and the capture of German depots, but Bradley was also forced to pare down the 
size of his spearheads.  Even then, the lead U.S. divisions were immobilized about every fourth 
day between 26 August and 8 September, providing the Germans a few days to man new 
defensive lines based on the Albert Canal, Westwall, and Moselle River.   
The Allies did not realize it at the time, but their pursuit culminated in each army sector 
successively, progressing from south to north, throughout September.  On 5 September Patton 
discovered that operating beyond the Moselle would require a deliberate attack to unhinge the 
defenses at Nancy and Metz.  On 11 September Hodges paused along the Westwall near Aachen 
to restore his supply situation, and by 24 September it was obvious that the British 2nd Army 
would fall short of its Market Garden objectives.  In each case Allied commanders believed they 
could restore mobility after a short pause to bring up left-behind troops, artillery, and 
ammunition, but they misjudged the severity of challenges faced by their logisticians, and the 
recuperative powers of the Germans.  Throughout the month Eisenhower, Bradley, Lee, and their 
 
97 CAO meeting notes, 21 Aug 44.   
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subordinates were slightly out of touch with the new reality at the front, preserving a bit too 
much optimism that they could get the Germans on the run again before winter weather set in.  
By early September the British faced the same logistical challenges as their U.S. partners 
but took more effective measures to manage the crisis until they could shorten the line of 
communications, bring in more transportation assets, or a combination of the two.  On 2 
September the CAO meeting included a discussion on how the extended line of communications 
was affecting 21st AG.  At the end of August, the British had decided to cut the daily discharge 
rates in Normandy by half, going down to 6,500 tons a day so they could redirect trucks from 
port clearance to long-haul support for the advance.  Because this reduced tonnage could not 
cover daily requirements, 21st AG was eating into their reserves, and these measures could only 
be sustained for about two weeks.  Air transport could not pick up any significant portion of the 
load being carried by motor transport because the C47s were tied down preparing for Operation 
Linnet (a drop around Tournai scheduled for 2/3 September that was cancelled later that day).  
SHAEF decided the best short-term solution was to transfer rolling stock from U.S. to British 
control to supplement the work being done by the British GT companies, which would 
eventually allow the British to restore their daily discharge rate back up to about 14,000 tons.  
By this point the Allies were largely flying by the seat of their pants when it came to 
finding ways to sustain the eastward advance.  The day after Gale had met with MG Graham at 
21st AG, Whipple wrote a note to Crawford and Gale admitting that all of the administrative 
plans the Allies had developed to date were largely obsolete.98  Whipple noted that the armies 
were executing operations that logistics planners had believed were impossible and that the only 
functional ports were in Normandy, although Marseille and a Channel port or two would 
 
98 Memo, Whipple to Crawford and Gale, 3 Sep 44.  RG 331, Entry 26, Box 75.   
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probably be available in the next few weeks.  In order to keep 12th AG rolling, Whipple 
recommended transferring control over one of the Seine ports to COMZ and arranging a massive 
air lift to support to Patton.  “With 2,000 tons of air lift,” he said, “General Patton may be across 
the Rhine in a week.  Without it he must sit still while German troops organize the Rhine for 
defense.”99  Acknowledging the interest at SHAEF to use the 1st Airborne Army in a major 
operation rather than dedicating the C47s to supporting the advance, Whipple recommended 
Rotterdam as the best objective from a logistical perspective.100  
 At this stage there was still a fundamental disagreement between two groups within the 
Allied camp about what could realistically be accomplished on the ground.  Montgomery 
continued to insist that the advance could only achieve operational-level objectives if 
Eisenhower prioritized one of his two army groups.  On 4 September SHAEF sent a telegram to 
all subordinate commands that illustrated the fundamental difference in the approach favored by 
Montgomery and the logisticians in contrast to the approach favored by Eisenhower and his U.S. 
commanders.  The message directed a simultaneous advance by both army groups in order to 
destroy as many retreating German formations as they could catch.101  Eisenhower’s directive of 
4 September directed his two subordinates to orient on Antwerp, the Ruhr, and Frankfurt, but 
these geographical objectives were incidental to the destruction of German forces.  Surprised by 
the ease with which the Allies’ divisions had moved from Normandy to the western frontier of 
Germany, Eisenhower refused to listen to warnings from his logisticians and Montgomery that 
SHAEF had to focus its efforts or risk culminating short of the Westwall, much less the Rhine.  
 
99 Ibid. 
100 Montgomery would overrun Antwerp the day after Whipple wrote this note. 
101 Cable, SHAEF to subordinate commands, 4 Sep 44.  RG 331, Entry 23, Box 52. 
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In the middle of an intensive dialogue among Eisenhower, Bradley, and Montgomery 
during the first week of September about the best way to accomplish their immediate goals, the 
staff at SHAEF continued to warn their superiors that the only hope of sustaining the offensive 
was to mass efforts in one zone.  In the short assessment “Crossing the Siegfried Line and the 
Rhine” published by the SHAEF logistics plans section on 6 September, Whipple suggested that 
the best line of advance was to strike north of the Ardennes with two armies supported by 500 
C47s.  Another 300 British planes would drop one airborne brigade to support the operation.  
The best target for this strike was the approaches to Antwerp or Rotterdam, which had to be 
opened soon to ease the supply crisis developing in 12th AG.  It might be possible to reach the 
Rhine with a focused thrust, but maintaining that force would be extremely risky.  It seems likely 
that Crawford, Bull, and Gale read the assessment, or at least received a briefing on its high 
points, but Eisenhower, Bradley, Hodges, and Patton had too many issues competing for their 
attention to really consider the implications of the recommendations coming from their staffs.  
These men also had received mixed messages from Lee about the implications of significant fuel 
and ammunition shortages and how they might or might not slow the advance of 1st and 3rd Army 
in the coming weeks.  The delay required for more accurate and balanced information to reach 
and influence U.S. leaders at the highest levels resulted in a situation in which Montgomery was 
trying to force Eisenhower to make tough decisions with no support from the logisticians at 
SHAEF and COMZ.   
 
 Brest and the Brittany Peninsula 
 It is helpful to go back and examine Allied decisions about the best way to tackle Brittany 
in one continuous sweep.  Examining the issue in detail is useful for two reasons.  First, the 
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historical verdict on the campaign remains in dispute 70 years later, suggesting there is room for 
further debate.  Second, the decisions made by the Allies during the campaign offer a perfect 
study of how the priorities of combat commanders frequently come into conflict with those of 
logisticians.  Third, it allows us to examine how SHAEF and its subordinates communicated with 
one another and attempted to resolve disagreement, as well as why it was so difficult to make 
fully-informed decisions during an ongoing operation.   
 At the end of July, SHAEF and COMZ still thought there were about half a dozen 
important military objectives that justified the commitment of troops to clearing Brittany.  
Around mid-July logisticians had given up on Chastity, the project to build a massive port in 
Quiberon Bay, and were discussing the merit of various alternatives.  By the end of the month a 
consensus had begun to emerge that either Cancale or Brest justified the effort it would take to 
develop either location into a first-rate port.102  Cancale was an undeveloped bay that shared the 
advantages of Quiberon, while having  the added advantage that the capture of Brest was not a 
precondition of starting Cancale’s  development.  Brest had the most potential, but was 
guaranteed to have a large German garrison that would probably wreck most of the facilities 
before they surrendered the city.   A few minor ports might be pressed into action sooner, but 
their small discharge capacity made it counterproductive to invest the resources necessary to 
restore and run the facilities.  Still, if Granville, Saint-Malo, or Lorient fell into Allied hands 
quickly and in relatively good shape, they might be able to handle a few thousand tons a day 
until better ports were available.  In early August these seemed to be the only realistic options the 
Allies had for getting a few more ports opened within the next four to six weeks. 
 
102 Ruppenthal, Vol. I, 471-474. 
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 The value of any port in Brittany was directly linked to two factors: the Allied concept of 
how to expand the lodgment in Normandy, and the long-term plan to move men and supplies 
from the United States to the continent.  It is fair to say that the slow progression out of the 
bocage followed by the rapid advance to Dreux and Chartres and then on to the Seine completely 
invalidated the methodical plan to clear the Brittany Peninsula, build up depots at its base, and 
then advance on Paris.103  After these developments, the value of a major Breton port was its 
proximity to the United States.  The U.S. Army hoped it might begin unloading men and material 
directly in France starting in October, thus eliminating the need to first route everything through 
the U.K.  This meant that SHAEF needed well-developed ports that could process tens of 
thousands of tons of heavy crated material on a daily basis at about the same time that bad 
weather and the withdrawal of coastal and assault shipping reduced the effectiveness of over-the-
beach discharge in Normandy.  Furthermore, these supplies would be next to useless without rail 
lines and rolling stock to transfer the material eastward.  Whipple reexamined the entire problem 
at the end of July and validated his prior conclusions that SHAEF could not afford to wait on 
replacement ports along the English Channel. 104  The anticipated gap in time between securing 
an appropriate site in Brittany and capturing adequate ports between the mouth of the Seine and 
the Netherlands made the Allies look for something to carry them through the period when 
discharging over the beaches would no longer be viable.  If this was not accomplished, the Allies 
 
103 The developments emerged gradually.  It was not until mid-August that the Allies realized they had already 
inadvertently covered half the distance to Paris and about a week later destroyed all the German formations capable 
of offering any serious resistance during the second leg of the journey.  Because the short-term value of Brittany 
evaporated precisely while the campaign to clear the peninsula was occurring, it was difficult to maintain an 
objective view of relative value of those objectives, and the timeline of when they were important.  
104 Staff Study 12, Part II, Delay in Capture of Brittany and Seine Ports, 24 Jul 44, SHAEF G-4, in Ruppenthal, 472.  
Whipple’s study contained a lot of independent variables that might result in a more optimistic outcome if SHAEF 
and COMZ focused on improving them, but the bottom line was that the best estimates from SHAEF plans indicated 
that the Allies desperately needed another working port by October and that Brittany offered the best choices. 
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would begin to suffer a significant aggregate reduction in discharge capacity starting in October.  
The operational impact of this reduction in discharge rates would be the need to delay the arrival 
of six U.S. divisions on the continent between October and December.  SHAEF desperately 
needed to expand their port discharge capability by early October, driven by the need to reduce 
the amount of transit time for U.S. cargo ships and transfer port operations to all-weather 
locations.  It was an important requirement, yet not an immediately pressing one.105 
 This provides the relevant background for any examination of Allied decision-making 
associated with Brittany during the first week of August.  In keeping with the plans developed 
before the breakout after Cobra, Bradley planned to push two and then three corps of Patton’s 3rd 
Army into Brittany between 1 and 3 August.  Patton’s mission was to destroy the four German 
divisions on the peninsula and capture two minor ports, two bays that might be turned into major 
ports, and Brest.  But on 2 August Bradley came under intense pressure from Eisenhower and 
Montgomery to either abandon Brittany altogether or else to use only one corps to clear the 
peninsula while the bulk of 3rd Army was used to reach Le Mans and cut off the two German 
armies arrayed along the base of the Cotentin.106  Bradley did not realize it at the time, but 
similar pressure was bubbling up out of VIII Corps and the two armored divisions that formed its 
vanguard, consisting of 4th AD commanded by MG Wood, and 6th AD commanded by MG 
Grow.  After working through a bit of confusion that emerged between 2 and 4 August, Patton 
and Bradley managed to simultaneously accomplish their objectives in Brittany and at Le Mans.  
XV Corps captured Le Mans on 8 August, Saint-Malo and Lorient were both isolated by 5 
 
105 In hindsight, the Allies discovered they could keep beach landings going longer than first anticipated and that 
they could increase the capacity at several minor ports.  More ships were diverted to Marseilles, and medium sized 
ports along the English Channel proved to be useful until Antwerp was opened at the end of November.  Prudence 
demanded a major port in Brittany; experience eventually demonstrated this was not necessary. 
106 Weigley, 175.   
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August, and Brest was partially blockaded by late on the 6th; Brest was completely invested by 
mid-day on 9 August.107  The commander of the first U.S. division to reach Brest, MG Grow, 
decided on 8 August that German defenses were too strong for an armored division to overrun 
and decided to await the arrival of reinforcements.  Early on 9 August the German 2nd Parachute 
Division managed to slip past his cordon, increasing the size of the garrison to 38,000 men 
formed around a core of two understrength infantry divisions.  Probably half of these men were 
not ground combat troops but service personnel from the German Air Force, Navy, and Army.   
There is merit to the claim that 12th AG was hampered by delay and confusion between 2 
and 6 August, with Bradley and Patton issuing conflicting orders and division commanders 
exhibiting a bit too much initiative.  If Wood, Grow, and Middleton had followed (some) orders, 
ignored others, and driven relentlessly to isolate their many objectives on the peninsula, VIII 
Corps might have isolated Brest a few days sooner than 9 August and thus prevented 2nd 
Parachute Division’s retreat into the city.108  This probably would have accelerated Middleton’s 
first major assault against the city by a couple of weeks, although it is hard to speculate if he 
would have received the air support, transportation resources, and artillery ammunition he 
wanted at the height of the battle around Falaise and its immediate aftermath.  The commitment 
of one or two additional mobile divisions in Brittany in early August would also have helped 
speed up Middleton’s arrival outside Brest.  Patton could have invested Rennes, Nantes, and the 
four minor ports and bays along the north and south coast while simultaneously pushing two or 
 
107 Weigley, 185.  Grow’s 6th Armor Division destroyed the German 266th Division on 8 and 9 August as it 
attempted to retreat into the defenses around Brest.  The 2nd Parachute Division managed to avoid the Americans 
and join the garrison on 9 August.   
108 Of course, it was not so simple.  VIII demonstrated initiative during the first days of the campaign that slowed the 
advance on Brest, but it followed instructions from Bradley on 3 August that delayed the advance for 24 hours.  
Middleton was put in the impossible position of needing to guess which orders to ignore and which orders to follow 
in order to win the race to Brest in front of the retreating Germans. 
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three divisions to isolate and then storm Brest.  But in order to achieve this concentration of 
forces in Brittany, XV corps would have been diverted from Le Mans, delaying the encirclement 
of the German 7th Army and Panzer Group West.  Committing more of 3rd Army to Brittany also 
would have forced Bradley to make some hard choices about how to hold the Avranches-Mortain 
corridor.  On 2 August the Allies had intercepted a message from Hitler directing OB West to 
use four or five panzer divisions to retake Avranches and cut 3rd Army off from its supplies.109   
In hindsight, SHAEF had been presented with three simultaneous opportunities, and 
Bradley and Patton managed to accomplish all three.  The Avranches-Mortain gap was held 
continuously for the first week of August by two to three divisions, providing just enough 
strength to stop a large German counterattack in the region that started on 7 August.  XV Corps 
reached Mayenne and Le Mans with three divisions by 8 August, cutting the supply lines and 
southern line of retreat of the German 7th Army and Panzer Group West, opening up the 
possibility of a major encirclement around Argentan.  Finally, VIII Corps had isolated or 
captured every port, bay, and major city in Brittany by 12 August, preventing German escape 
and setting conditions for the Allies to seize any objective they considered critical.  Bradley 
could have isolated Brest a few days sooner and perhaps even captured the city up to month 
before its final capitulation on 19 September, but at what cost to the overall ground campaign?  
And would it have been worth it?  Weigley thinks Patton and Bradley should have weighted their 
priority in the opposite direction, swinging 4th and 6th Armored Divisions east after reaching 
Rennes, not west, allowing those two divisions to participate in and quicken the encirclement of 
 
109 Weigley, 183.  Bennett, ULTRA in the West: The Normandy Campaign 1944-45 (London: Hutchinson and  
Co., 1979), 109-116.  Bradley knew of Hitler’s orders to prepare a counterattack against Avranches on 2 August; he 
knew it would take a few days to assembler the force needed for this attack.  
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the two German armies defending Normandy.110  In reality, Bradley provided a perfect example 
of how to match resources to objectives while balancing risk, securing two key objectives while 
ensuring he did not get a nasty surprise from the Germans at Avranches in the process.  The 
irony here is that Bradley was rewarded for simultaneously pursuing three goals in early August 
while Eisenhower would eventually be criticized for trying to do exactly the same thing a month 
later.  The difference was that Bradley scaled his goals to match his and the enemy’s forces, 
keeping within the realities presented by the supply situation.  Most importantly, he was lucky, 
and he was lucky because he did not bet too much against the odds. 
Ruppenthal and Crosswell disagreed with Bradley’s balanced approach and with 
Weigley’s preference to prioritize the thrust towards Le Mans and Chartres.  They argued that 
the Allies should have stuck to the original plan and committed two full corps into Brittany, 
linking the survival of the Brest garrison until 19 September to a shortage of U.S. troops during 
the early stages of the campaign.111  The full-blooded commitment of VIII Corps to Brittany on 2 
August, reinforced by one or two mobile divisions from another corps, may very well have 
resulted in the capitulation of Brest coming early, thus with less damage to the port facilities.  
But even if the city had fallen in mid-August and started receiving ships in mid-September, the 
distribution problem that dominated Allied logistical difficulties into mid-October would have 
still remained.  Once the Allies gave up on the idea of a pause along the Seine, any port in 
Brittany was only important as a replacement in moving the tonnage landed over beaches in 
Normandy and for its proximity to the United States.  According to the original plans, as long as 
 
110 Weigley, 186.  Weigley is dismissive of the port capacity eventually developed in Brittany, and he completely 
ignores the logistical side of the debate that was occurring while Bradley was waging this campaign.  With the 
benefit of perfect hindsight, he ignores the logic of why a set of intermediate ports were important to SHAEF in 
early August.    
111 Crosswell, 708.  Ruppenthal, Vol. II, 7.   
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those additional 20,000-25,000 tons were available in the month of October, the Allies would be 
fine.  Even then, the value of such a port was also linked to the rail capacity to send on the 
material landed there off to the east.  Until sufficient rolling stock, engines, and coal were there 
to move the combined capacity of Cherbourg and Brest (something in the neighborhood of 
50,000 tons) at the same time, the only advantage of the Breton port was to unload ships onto the 
continent faster.  In the second half of October, the total Allied rail capacity equaled about 
55,000 tons; under half of this capacity was committed to moving supplies from the ports to 
Paris, with the other half dedicated to deliveries to army dumps. 
 
Figure 5.2: ETOUSA rail forecast, second half of October 1944 
 
Both authors forget or ignore that during the time they claim Brest would have made a 
major difference in the Allied supply situation, Cherbourg could not forward its daily discharge 
519 
 
tonnage, much less begin to clear out the depots that had been abandoned in Normandy.112  
Throughout September and October, ETOUSA expended considerable energy trying to increase 
daily download figures from 10,000 tons in September to 15,600 tons near the end of 
November.113  Another port, further from the front line and in direct competition with Cherbourg 
over dock labor, trucks, engineers, the expansion of rail lines, and rolling stock would have 
slowed the development of the best port the Allies had available.  It is hard to imagine how Brest 
would have helped the Allies after 25 August but not impossible to see how it might have made 
things initially worse.   
SHAEF began to appreciate this logic on their own beginning in the second half of 
August.  COMZ would have welcomed the addition of Brest in the first half of the month, when 
the idea of a short pause along the Seine was considered realistic.  But between 16 and 25 
August it became clear that the pursuit would continue across that river, and logisticians came 
around to  just waiting for some of the Seine ports to open up.114  To bridge the gap, the Allies 
would expand the minor ports already under their control, to include Saint-Malo, Granville, and 
Cancale in Brittany.  Unfortunately for the health of the partnership between the logisticians and 
maneuver staff officers at SHAEF, COMZ, and 12th AG, these decisions emerged at precisely the 
same time when VIII Corps was demanding significant logistical support in order to begin the 
reduction of Brest.  The first loud demands for large quantities of artillery ammunition emerged 
 
112 Ruppenthal, Vol. II, 83-88.  In August trains cleared 38% of the cargo at Cherbourg, with trucks handling the 
other 62%.  COL Sibley, the port commander, was relieved on 29 September for failing to improve the situation.  
Cherbourg needed more men, trucks, rail lines, and rolling stock in September and October in order to reach a peak 
efficiency of 14,600 tons a day in early November, of which about 90% was then forwarded out of Normandy.  
Another large port west of the Seine would have only competed for the resources needed to improve the efficiency 
of Cherbourg and then move the downloaded cargo off to the east.  Running Cherbourg more efficiently proved to 
be much more important to the Allied supply situation than if Brest had come on line a month or two sooner.         
113 Ruppenthal, Vol. II, 87, 88, 85.  The COMZ goal for the port by the end of October, published on 3 October, was 
24,000 tons. 
114 Ruppenthal, Vol. II, 47. 
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from VIII Corps on 23 August, requests that Stratton promised to deliver.  But over the next 
week, COMZ failed to deliver what Stratton had so quickly promised to provide.  Ruppenthal 
speculates that the lackluster support provided VIII Corps in the last week of August was a result 
of the internal debate within the logistics community about the relative value of Brest.115  Less 
nefarious explanations were just as easy to find; COMZ and the Brittany Base Section were 
inexperienced and there were a number of vitally important issues in play simultaneously in late 
August and early September, such as moving the SHAEF and COMZ command posts.   
In early September doubt was beginning to emerge about the need for Brest, but there 
was no consensus among the logisticians, and they did not formally share their emerging 
concerns with their maneuver counterparts until mid-September.  Between 3 and 7 September 
Whipple recommended that the ports in south Brittany  be abandoned, and SHAEF decided to 
not use Nantes, St. Nazaire, Lorient, and Quiberon Bay.116  As late as 4 September the JPS still 
considered Brest essential, although it was willing to concede that the other Breton ports were 
unimportant as long as Le Havre was allocated to the U.S. Army.117  Lee finally offered a 
compressive reassessment of the entire port situation on 14 September, advising Eisenhower to 
give up on Brest, to use Le Havre as a stop-gap, and to rely on Antwerp, Rotterdam, and 
Amsterdam as the best long-term solution.118  A few days later SHAEF concurred on all points 
other than Brest, which had been captured in the meantime and would be rehabilitated to receive 
troops – and only troops – in  the future.119  The logisticians had come around to what in 
 
115 Ruppenthal, Vol. I, 535 and note 179. 
116 Ruppenthal, Vol. II, 50. 
117 JPS appreciation of Brittany ports, 4 Sep 44.  RG 331, Entry 26, Box 74.   
118 Ruppenthal, Vol. II, 50-51.   
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hindsight made the best sense, but it came too slowly to help SHAEF conserve the resources they 
poured into VIII Corps during the second week of September. 
Between 23 August and 6 September COMZ struggled mightily to provide the support 
directed by SHAEF and promised by Lee and Stratton, especially the delivery of large quantities 
of artillery ammunition. 120  Because of this friction, Bull dispatched three officers from SHAEF 
and 12th Army Group to Brest between 3 and 6 September to help clear up the issue.  SHAEF 
had gotten deeply involved in fixing the supply problems of VIII Corps at least in part because of 
the convoluted chain of command in Brittany.121  For about two weeks VIII was authorized to 
work directly with COMZ to coordinate their supplies, bypassing 3rd Army and 12th Army 
Group.  When ETOUSA/COMZ dropped the ball in August, SHAEF felt compelled to get 
involved.  LTC Ballentine, a staff officer at SHAEF G-3, had visited COMZ headquarters on 3 
September and discovered that Stratton had issued orders for release of ammunition and 
commitment of transportation that were never executed by Ross’ OCOT, Cherbourg Base, or 
Brittany Base Section.122  After arriving at VIII Corps headquarters, it became apparent to LTCs 
Clark and Ballentine that the orders issued by Stratton back in Paris were not producing results at 
Brest.  COMZ orders to move ammunition by truck had been countermanded by the ADSEC and 
Motor Transport Brigade, LSTs were off their designated schedules and arriving underloaded, 
and Stratton had issued dispatch orders for ammunition that was not available in France.123  
Clark and Ballentine’s persistence eventually paid off; they got accurate information about the 
 
120 See chapter six for the problems with COMZ communication with and support to VIII Corps at the end of August 
and first week of September 1944.   
121 VIII answered to 3rd Army, but on 23 August Bradley authorized Middleton to work directly with COMZ and the 
Brittany Base Section, relieving 3rd Army of any supply responsibilities in Brittany.  Despite these arrangements, 
12th AG continued to play a direct role in coordinating support through COMZ.  SHAEF was drawn into the 
situation as the superior headquarters for ETOUSA/COMZ.  On 5 September VIII Corps was assigned to 9th Army. 
122 Ruppenthal, Vol. I, 534 and note 169.   
123 Ruppenthal, Vol. I, 532-534. 
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problems they had discovered back to Lord and Stratton (and their superiors at SHAEF) on 6 
September, and finally the logistics machine began to deliver the ammunition it had been 
promising since 25 August.  Between 7 and 12 September ammunition poured into the VIII 
Corps Ammunition Storage Point (ASP), reaching 13,000 tons and three units of fire by mid-
month compared to Middleton’s initial request for 8,000 tons.  When Brest surrendered on 19 
September, the corps had 25,000 tons of ammunition in reserve.  But it took a lot of ships, trains, 
and trucks between 6 and 18 September to move these supplies, resources not available to 
support Patton, Hodges, and Montgomery’s buildup for Market Garden.  
 SHAEF had demonstrated that it could motivate COMZ and solve logistics problems 
better than Lord and Stratton, but at what cost and for what reward?  Regardless how quickly 
COMZ filled up the VIII Corps ASP, it was obvious by early September that Brest could not be 
restored as a functional port anytime soon.  Based on the damage discovered at Cherbourg, it was 
reasonable to assume that it would take four to six weeks to repair the port at Brest.  SHAEF had 
continued to press for the capture of Brest as late as 4 September, but with a reduced sense of 
urgency.  What was not discussed in any staff paper or recorded from any senior-level meeting 
was any discussion about the relative merit of Brest in comparison to Metz-Nancy, Aachen, or 
Market-Garden.  Eisenhower continued to emphasize Brest and Antwerp as his top two 
objectives in the first half of September, even if his actions did not always correspond to those 
priorities.  Looking back at the cost in casualties, scarce artillery ammunition, transportation 
assets, and airpower used to capture Brest, one wonders if Gale and Lee might have done more 
to convince Eisenhower and Bradley to hold off on capturing the port.124  Asked about Bradley’s 
 
124 Russell F. Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants: The Campaigns of France and Germany, 1944-1945 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), 285.  
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decision to storm Brest, Patton said that Bradley had admitted to being motivated by pure 
stubbornness.  When Blumenson followed up on this issue in a later interview, Bradley agreed, 
adding: “Anytime we put our hand to do a job we must finish it.”125  Bradley, after the war, tried 
to justify the operation by claiming he did not think the German commander in Brest would take 
being bottled up without causing trouble.126  General Hermann-Bernhard Ramcke was not going 
anywhere in mid-September with what amounted to one limited-mobility infantry division -- 
Bradley and Patton could have waited a few weeks to demonstrate the resolve of the U.S. Army 
when SHAEF was a little less preoccupied with sustaining the pursuit.   
The entire episode illustrated how hard it was to let go of an idea once it had taken root, 
the single-minded determination of maneuver commanders to accomplish an assigned mission, 
and the distorting effect on higher priorities this fixation might create.  Rather than stepping 
back, taking a deep breath, and seeing the bigger picture, Crawford, Bull, and Gale allowed 
SHAEF to get sucked into a costly distraction at exactly the time where every plane, train, and 
truck mattered.  In their defense, these senior officers at SHAEF were encouraged at least in part 
by the joint planners who continued to emphasize the importance of Brest as late as 4 September 
and by the lack of a timely and compelling argument from Lee and COMZ.   So much was going 
on simultaneously in these three critical weeks that it was unrealistic to expect surgically precise 
decision-making.  SHAEF was in the process of moving from London into what amounted to a 
communications black hole at Granville.  COMZ spent the first two weeks of September closing 
up three headquarters and reassembling in Paris.  Perfectly good reasons to quickly overrun a 
port or three in Brittany in early August had lost their luster twenty days later and then pointed to 
 
125 Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers (2 vols, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972-1974), II, 532 in Weigley, 285.   
126 Bradley’s post-war excuse is from A Soldier’ Story (New York: Holt, 1951), 367, in Weigley, 285. 
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outright stubbornness twenty days after that.  It is easy to see this in hindsight, but it was 
virtually impossible for the Allies to detect, much less build consensus on, while living through 
the experience in real time.  Things might have turned out otherwise if ETOUSA had been 
organized differently, if Eisenhower had not been not distracted by his arguments with 
Montgomery, or if logistical support to the pursuit had gone a bit more smoothly, but each of 
these factors got in the way of clear thinking about Brest.  
 
 Hitting the Westwall 
By the end of the first week of September Montgomery realized that he was running out 
of time to match logistical support and adequate strength at the front to accomplish meaningful 
objectives before the Germans recovered their balance.  On 7 September Montgomery made a 
second attempt to get Eisenhower to support one strong thrust designed to pierce the Rhine. His 
message on 4 September had missed the mark, forcing Montgomery to take a new approach in 
trying to convince Eisenhower and his senior advisors at SHAEF that he was right.  The British 
Field Marshal explained:  
My maintenance is stretched to the limit.  First instalment of 18 locomotives only 
just released to me and the balance still seems uncertain.  I require an air lift of 
1,000 tons a day at Douai or Brussels and in last two days have had only 750 tons 
total.  My transport is based on operation 150 miles from my ports and at present I 
am over 300 miles from Bayeux.  In order to save transport I have cut down my 
intake into France to 6000 tons a day which is half what I consume and I cannot 
go on for long like this….  As soon as I have a Pas de Calais port working I would 
then require about 2500 additional 3-ton lorries plus an assured air lift averaging 
minimum 1000 tons a day to enable me to get to the Ruhr and finally Berlin…a 
reallocation of our present resources of every description [that is of both fighting 
strength and supplies] would be adequate to get one thrust to Berlin.127   
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Perhaps the realities of logistics had started to sink in a bit with Eisenhower after the 
latest round of discussions with Montgomery and Bradley, because in a new directive on 9 
September SHAEF attempted to outline the relative priority and sequencing of the various Allied 
objectives.  Eisenhower made it crystal clear that his two immediate priorities were Antwerp and 
Brest; obviously the concerns held by logisticians about keeping the armies supplied at the end 
of a 400-mile line of communications had registered at the highest levels.128  Eisenhower went  
on to say that, once the operations designed to capture Antwerp and Brest were properly 
resourced, then SHAEF could consider the best way of cutting off the Ruhr and Saar. This might 
occur while the Allies were capturing the two large ports, or after they were secure.  Eisenhower 
also confirmed that he intended to commit the airborne army in the Arnhem area to help 21st AG 
get across the Rhine before the end of the month.  The directive published on 9 September 
acknowledged that Allied logistical challenges were mounting, but it implied that increased rail 
capacity and the opening of ports at the mouth of the Seine and along the Pas de Calais would 
soon clear up these problems.  Although Eisenhower seemed to be coming around to the idea 
that SHAEF could not afford to pursue all its objectives simultaneously, the commander seemed 
comfortable pursuing three major objectives simultaneously by mid-September.129   
Eisenhower’s clarity of thought was not aided by the steady stream of overoptimistic 
information fed to him and his subordinates by Lee.  At the 9 September CAO meeting Lee 
reported that the overall motor transport situation was improving and that he had recently 
decided to authorize trucks to run with white lights at night on the Red Ball Express.130  
 
128 Cable, SHAEF to subordinate commands, 9 Sep 44.  RG 331, Entry 23, Box 52.   
129 Eisenhower approved Market Garden on 10 September.  Montgomery convinced Eisenhower that 1st Canadian 
Army would continue to clear ports, to include Antwerp, along the Channel while 2nd Army got a bridgehead over 
the Rhine. 
130 CAO meeting notes, 9 Sep 44.  RG 331, Entry 34, Box 24.   
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Whatever advantages this might provide, there was no way COMZ was going to dig itself out of 
its transportation deficit solely by driving a little faster at night.  Every time Lee told the leaders 
at SHAEF that the supply situation was close to working itself out while not demanding that they 
make hard choices and ruthlessly enforce priorities, he made it that much more likely that the 
pursuit was going to stall out short of its operationally significant objectives.   
By this stage the logisticians at SHAEF had a better grasp on reality than Lee.  On 10 
September BG Napier sent an update to his boss, MG Crawford, outlining the current situation 
with ports.  Getting Rotterdam or Antwerp running had become absolutely critical for the Allied 
logistics picture, the most important objectives possible based on the requirements for 
transportation in the theater.131  Napier was comfortable that Le Havre could be used by the 
Americans without creating a traffic control nightmare in the rear areas of 21st AG, but the 
eventual capture of Brest was not going to provide any immediate relief to COMZ or help with 
the supply situation at the front.  The primary advantage that control of the port would provide 
was the possibility of reducing the backlog of ships waiting to be unloaded and of providing a 
more direct destination for the troop convoys projected to arrive from the United States 
beginning in October.  In both cases, transportation shortages on the continent would prevent the 
movement of men or material to the front until major improvements were made to the French rail 
service.  Napier had discussed all these issues with Gale and Admiral Ramsay before writing this 
summary, and both men had agreed with his assessment of the overall situation with 
transportation.   
As a result of his appreciation of the problems plaguing the theater distribution system, 
Gale came to the conclusion between 4 and 12 September that Montgomery’s plan for the next 
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stage of the campaign was irresponsible from a logistical perspective.132  On 8 September Gale 
recorded in his diary his reaction to the telegram sent by Montgomery on 7 September, 
“demanding all sorts of resources and providing a very ill thought out answer to a telegram the 
SAC had sent to him on the subject of a purely Montgomery advance straight to Berlin.”133  On 
10 September Gale described Montgomery’s “proposal to rush to Berlin at the expense of the 
immobilization of the rest of the Allied Armies…a fantastic proposal viewed from any angle and 
was highly unsound logistically.”134  At the conference held that day, all of the senior leaders 
involved agreed that they needed to provide a better logistical support to Hodge’s 1st Army so 
that it could protect Montgomery’s right flank and draw off German forces.  Some historians 
miss the point that Montgomery was fighting for greater resources for the northern thrust, which 
included 1st Army, and not just 21st Army Group.  In order to encircle the Ruhr from both the 
north and south, Montgomery knew he needed U.S. help.  The second major topic of discussion 
at the 10 September meeting was trying to figure how mcuh further 21st Army Group could 
advance with their current logistical situation; Montgomery felt he had already culminated while 
Graham believed they could reach the Rhine.  At some point during the meeting Gale tried to 
convince Montgomery to pay more attention to opening up Antwerp, but the British commander 
insisted the port could wait a few weeks and that reaching the Rhine was more important in the 
short term.  On the flight back to Granville Gale used the opportunity to share with Eisenhower 
“what I thought about the Communications Zone and the precarious logistical situation in which 
we found ourselves.”135  By now Gale knew that COMZ was struggling mightily, and 
 
132 There are strong indicators that Ramsay had convinced Gale to resist Montgomery’s scheme to reach the Rhine at 
the expense of clearing the approaches to Antwerp.  The two men met on 9 September for several hours, but Gale 
committed no notes to paper about what was discussed.   
133 Gale’s War Diary, 8 Sep 44.   
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Montgomery seemed determined to avoid going all out for the one objective that might save the 
day.  Gale summed up his thoughts about the current direction of the campaign in his last diary 
entry for 10 September: “His [Eisenhower’s] strategy is sound, his plans are well laid, but now 
that Montgomery is no longer the Ground Force Commander it is perfectly clear to me that he is 
going to play for his own hand regardless of the wider issues involved.  Bedell Smith is very 
worried about it all.” 
SHAEF continued to receive signs that it was emphasizing the correct objectives and had 
accurately appraised the logistics picture through mid-month.  On 12 September SHAEF got 
confirmation that the British chiefs agreed with Eisenhower’s directive of 9 September directing 
the main effort to run north of the Ardennes and reiterating the importance of taking Antwerp or 
Rotterdam before bad weather shut down discharge over the beaches in Normandy.  On 14 
September the chief of the plans section, BG K.G. McLean, passed along an update on the rail 
situation in France.  Working closely with BG Ravenhill from G-4, McLean pointed out that rail 
transportation was being held back by a shortage of coal and rolling stock by this point rather 
than by problems with bridge or line repair.  In the short term, shortages meant that SHAEF 
could only use trains to fix the logistical problems of one army group, not both.  Based on all 
these messages flowing around SHAEF between 10 and 14 September, the command was well 
informed as to the reality of the logistics situation and as to what was required to make any 
drastic improvements.  But these limitations, and the concerns they produced among the 
logisticians, did not seem to penetrate to the level of the U.S. senior commanders, at least to an 
extent sufficient to force Eisenhower to significantly reduce the number of simultaneous 
objectives he was trying to accomplish.  
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This was odd, because Eisenhower had first mentioned his logistical headaches to 
Marshall in an update provided on 4 September, noting that his two major concerns at the time 
centered on the resistance offered by the German garrison at Brest and fuel shortages that were 
slowing the Allied pursuit.136  Five days later he passed a similar message to the Combined 
Chiefs of Staff, emphasizing his efforts to restore rail service between Cherbourg and Paris and 
to secure a port east of the Seine as the steps required to ease the strain.137  But on 12 September, 
Bradley and Lee managed to convince Eisenhower that the supply situation was not as dire as 
they had first believed and as Montgomery continued to insist was the case.  Facing the 
possibility of becoming a sideshow after Eisenhower gave precedence to Montgomery on 10 
September, Bradley painted a new, rosier assessment of his logistical situation on 12 September.  
Lee said that he could deliver everything SHAEF had promised for Montgomery with enough 
tonnage left over to sustain drives by 1st and 3rd Armies.138  Excited by this good news from his 
two subordinates, Eisenhower authorized Bradley to continue his twin offensives.   
Eisenhower was further encouraged to make this decision based on a second independent 
point being made by Gale around the same time.  During a meeting on 12 September at Amiens, 
Smith, Gale, and Lord continued to discuss with Montgomery and Graham ways to better 
support 21st Army Group.  By this stage Montgomery was asking that every ounce of logistical 
support go to the northern thrust – that Patton be all but immobilized.  Gale believed it was 
impossible to do so, and tried to convince Montgomery and Graham why this was the case.139  
Gale recorded in his diary that is was a matter of technical detail and the physical limitations of 
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the distribution network.  One assumes Gale was referring to the inability of northern roads and 
rail lines to handle the entire theater’s worth of traffic, and the time it would have taken to 
relocate regulating stations and support facilities from behind 3rd U.S. Army up to 1st U.S. and 
2nd British armies.  Perhaps Gale was wrong; he was operating off of bad and incomplete 
information furnished by COMZ and ETOUSA with no reliable way to check their figures.  But 
one suspects Gale had an accurate feel for how long it would take to shift a large portion of the 
supplies off of the southern lines of communication and deliver them behind 21st Army Group, 
and that as a general rule, the road and rail network could not presently handle that volume of 
traffic.  It was another strong argument in favor of delivering some quantity of supplies for 
Patton, and letting the American general try to accomplish as much as he could with whatever 
made it through.  
Between 13 and 15 September Eisenhower seemed to swing back and forth between new 
hope for his original concept, a reluctant admission that logistics would limit his options in the 
near future, and, finally, back to optimism that he might deal the Germans a death blow before 
the Allied advance ran out of steam.  On 13 September Eisenhower told his subordinates that the 
overall logistical situation was improving rapidly; on 14 September he reversed course and 
admitted to Marshall that the distribution challenge remained “critical” with no drastic 
improvement on the near horizon.  Eisenhower realized that his logistics problems were catching 
up with him, but that did not stop him from making one more push along the entire front, 
authorizing Bradley to push on to the Rhine on 15 September.140  This decision was probably 
justified in Eisenhower’s mind by Lee’s promise to increase deliveries to Bradley by an 
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additional 2,000 tons a day while still meeting the increased targets established for 21st Army 
Group.  By mid-month Eisenhower was convinced that the Allies could still support three major 
simultaneous attacks, and that getting a bridgehead over the Rhine at Arnhem was more 
important that clearing the approaches to Antwerp, at least in the short run.  Eisenhower boldly 
decided to make one final attempt to win through his preferred methods, but this gamble did not 
pay off.   
While wrestling with the decision whether to hold up Bradley, Eisenhower also published 
a document designed to provide a longer-term view of the fall campaign, which was published 
on 16 September.  Eisenhower strongly believed that the Allies still had the initiative and that the 
logistics problems facing the command would soon be overcome.  Based upon the assumption 
that Market Garden would establish a bridgehead over the Rhine and help open up Rotterdam 
and Antwerp, Eisenhower assumed that the Ruhr and Saar would fall soon after.141  The real 
purpose of the document published on 16 September was to talk about what would happen after 
the Allies had secured bridgeheads across the Rhine.  The scheme of maneuver outlined in this 
paper seems completely divorced from logistical realities.  Once over the Rhine, SHAEF would 
dedicate one army group each to take Hamburg, Berlin by way of Leipzig, and Munich.  By 
advancing on all three objectives, Eisenhower hoped to cut off reinforcements from other 
theaters and prevent the creation of any centers of resistance beyond Berlin.  Montgomery’s 
advance on Hamburg would seal off the possibility of German counterattacks from Norway or 
Denmark.  Devers would block any forces that tried to come up from Italy and the Balkans and 
thus prevent a German retreat into the old Nazi strongholds in Bavaria.  Bradley, with both of his 
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flanks protected by Montgomery and Devers, would head straight to Berlin through Leipzig.  
Eisenhower’s 16 September guidance was a bit strange in its timing, disregard of the current 
logistical situation, and apparent repudiation of everything Montgomery had tried to impress 
upon Eisenhower over the last three weeks.  Eisenhower projected how SHAEF would conduct 
the campaign in the spring of 1945, but in September 1944 it read more like fantasy than useful 
guidance for the staff and subordinate commanders. 
One of the most frustrating aspects of the Allied campaign in September and October 
from SHAEF’s point of view was the dissonance between what Eisenhower stated was his most 
critical preliminary objective and the resources Montgomery applied to accomplishing it.  The 
fact that Montgomery was in no hurry to clear the approaches to Antwerp was common 
knowledge across SHAEF.  A lack of planning or preparation for the operation was repeatedly 
reported by liaison officers attached to 21st Army Group, mentioned during meetings hosted by 
21st AG with SHAEF staff members in attendance, and discussed in assessments and estimates 
shared between both the maneuver and sustainment communities.  On 14 September 
Montgomery sent a cable to SHAEF outlining his actions in response to Eisenhower’s directive 
of 9 September.142  Le Havre had recently been cleared of the enemy and would soon be 
available to receive U.S. ships.  Montgomery claimed that 1st Canadian army would soon begin 
to clear the approaches to Antwerp; this was not true, a fact confirmed by the LNO from SHAEF 
that was assigned to 21st AG.  Montgomery argued that the next logical major objective for 21st 
AG should be the Ruhr; his advance against this target would uncover Antwerp and Rotterdam, 
which would then be cleared by the Canadians.  Market Garden, due to start sometime in the 
second half of September, would establish a bridgehead over the Rhine and pull German reserves 
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to the north, making it easier for the 1st U.S. Army to penetrate the Westwall and encircle the 
Ruhr from the south.  Once the British and Americans had linked up on the west side of the 
Rhine near Köln, the next stage of the offensive could begin.  Montgomery promised to 
coordinate closely with Bradley during these operations, and on 10 September Eisenhower 
endorsed the ten-day delay Market Garden would impose on the advance on Antwerp and 
Aachen. 
Bull was aware of the contradiction between Eisenhower’s desire to clear Antwerp and 
the energy being expended by 21st AG to do so.  As a result, SHAEF began to develop a series of 
operations designed to solve the port problem on their own, pushing these concepts to 21st Army 
Group for their input.  The joint plans section developed an outline for a set of options designed 
to quickly secure Antwerp or Rotterdam and shared them with the Navy, AEAF, G-2, G-3, and 
G-4 for further study.143 Similar to the concepts embodied in Beneficiary and Hands Up, SHAEF 
developed outlines for various air, sea, and ground operations that might quickly solve their 
logistics problem.  But as had been the case at Saint-Malo and Quiberon Bay, Antwerp and 
Rotterdam were not vulnerable to small- to moderate-sized airborne and amphibious forces.  The 
ports would have to be opened by a large ground force.  On 22 September Bull dispatched an 
LNO, LTC W.W. Stromberg, to visit First Allied Airborne Army, 21st Army Group, and 1st 
Canadian Army to get a second opinion on the actions proposed by SHAEF planners, and to 
extract a status report on progress being made around Antwerp.  Stromberg reported that General 
Simonds, the commander of 1st Canadian Army, was not available for consultation because he 
was directing operations at Calais and Boulogne.  His staff thought that 27 September was the 
soonest that attacks against Sud Beveland and Walcheren might begin, but 1 October was more 
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realistic.144  Leaders at 21st AG were not comfortable beginning a major operation around 
Antwerp until they had shortened their own supply lines by opening Dieppe, Ostend, and 
Boulogne and had cleared out enemy forces that might cause problems along the line of 
communications.  This might have been frustrating for SHAEF, but it closely mirrored the U.S. 
logic for assaulting the garrison at Brest. 
By late September it looked as if Antwerp was not going to be opened up anytime soon, 
and supply shortages continued to hamper Allied operations.  At the CAO meeting on 22 and 
again on 29 September the assembled leaders were forced to acknowledge that shortages of both 
5-gallon jerry cans and 55-gallon oil barrels were hamstringing the effort to move bulk fuel 
forward to the divisions and fighter squadrons.  By 6 October fuel was still a major concern, but 
since the end of Market Garden aerial resupply had begun to make up some of the transportation 
shortfalls and new trains were being unloaded at Dieppe as well as at Cherbourg and Marseilles.  
It was hard to project the net balance between added capability (the opening of new ports and 
arrival of additional transportation assets), rising demands, the coming bad weather, and 
increased wear on the equipment that had been used relentlessly since late July.  Leaders wanted 
to remain optimistic and believe that they could fix their sustainment problems in time to resume 
the offensive before winter weather set in.      
By late September logistical shortfalls were having an increasing impact in limiting 
SHAEF’s options.  Eisenhower had asked his staff to look into what it would take to create a 
theater strategic reserve larger than just 1st Allied Airborne Army, and on 26 September McLean 
came back with the recommendation not to do so.145  Pulling units out of the line would consume 
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transportation resources that were already in short supply.  More importantly, committing that 
central reserve back into the line would put even more strain on the lines of communication.  The 
same day that SHAEF plans told Eisenhower they did not have the lift resources to employ a 
theater reserve, 21st Army Group reported that they could not open Antwerp.146  The hope of 
accomplishing any significant objectives anytime soon seemed more and more remote a 
possibility. 
The SHAEF joint plans section had not given up yet, but thought the Allies first needed a 
one month pause to finish clearing the approaches to Antwerp and to bring the Channel ports 
fully on line. 147  By late October the Allies might be able to support nine corps on the east bank 
of the Rhine and launch a three-pronged drive to capture Hamburg, Berlin, and Leipzig.  Once 
again, these projections were predicated upon delivering 2,000 tons of supplies by air daily 
(something the Allies had never accomplished in perfect weather and with a maximum effort), 
restoring rail service from the ports up to the west bank of the Rhine (supported by sufficient 
rolling stock and coal), and committing every truck in the theater to supporting the nine corps 
and their air support.  This estimate also assumed that Antwerp would be discharging 27,000 
tons of supplies a day by 15 November and that SHAEF could mass 125 truck companies to 
support 21st AG and 422 for 12th AG.  Based on the Allied situation on 26 September when the 
report was presented to Eisenhower, the plan seemed a bit far-fetched.  In their defense, the plans 
section had probably been working on this product for up to a week before its publication, and 
they had assumed that Market Garden would achieve its objectives.  Once SHAEF reconsidered 
the situation after the British withdrawal from Arnhem, the headquarters was forced to admit to 
 
146 SHAEF JPS “Advance of 21st AG on the Ruhr” 26 Sep 44.  RG 331, Entry 23, Box 52. 
147 SHAEF JPS “Advance into Germany after Occupation of the Ruhr” 26 Sep 44.  RG 331, Entry 23, Box 52.   
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themselves that the effort to retain the initiative and prevent a solid German line forming along 
the Westwall had failed.  Furthermore, it seemed likely that clearance of the approaches to 
Antwerp was going to be more difficult than originally assumed.  By attempting to do too much 
all at the same time in September SHAEF had failed to achieve any of its operational goals.  The 
sinking feeling that the war would drag on into 1945 could no longer be ignored.   
 
 The Allied Stalemate in the Fall 
 In a note written to a friend on 6 October, Eisenhower admitted that the Allied offensive 
had shot its bolt across the entire front, that he would have to fight another major battle to get 
across the Rhine, and that the war would last into 1945.148  Eisenhower had probably reached 
this conclusion as a result of a conference hosted by SHAEF the day before designed to derive a 
realistic timeline for the opening up of Antwerp.  Admiral Ramsay was present and refused to let 
Montgomery off the hook -- for failing to secure the approaches to the port back in early 
September, despite Navy warnings to do so, and for failing to put enough energy into the task in 
the following month.  Field Marshal Alan Brooke, the British chief of the imperial general staff, 
was present at this meeting and was forced to admit that Montgomery had dropped the ball.  
Brooke noted in his diary: “I feel that Monty’s strategy for once is at fault, instead of carrying 
out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place.”149   
With the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to see that 21st AG had missed their best chance to 
cut off the Beveland isthmus and prevent German reinforcement when Montgomery ordered 2nd 
Army to halt and regroup around Antwerp between 4 and 7 September.  On the afternoon of the 
 
148 Eisenhower to Surles, cable 2027, 6 Oct 44. 
149 Barr, 415 
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4th the British 11th Armoured Division was only fifteen miles away from the Albert Canal; when 
the advance resumed on the 8th the British ran into hastily deployed Germans occupying the 
excellent defensive position afforded by the water obstacle.150  Admiral Ramsay found this 
development all the more frustrating because he had emphasized the importance of securing the 
Scheldt estuary to SHAEF and 21st AG on 4 September.  Ramsay wanted to accompany 
Eisenhower and Tedder when they visited Montgomery at his headquarters on 10 September to 
ensure that Antwerp was given top billing in the near future, but something changed and Ramsay 
did not travel with the SHAEF delegation. 151  As we have seen, as a result of the meeting that 
day, Eisenhower authorized Montgomery to conduct Market Garden and tacitly approved a 
lessening of the effort to clear Antwerp.   
Once the Canadians captured Boulogne on 22 September and Calais on 1 October, 
clearing up most of Montgomery’s logistical concerns, the Field Marshal was in no hurry to shift 
his main effort to clearing the Scheldt.  When the SHAEF staff pushed Montgomery on the issue 
of clearing the approaches to Antwerp between 5 and 10 October, he threw the issue back into 
Smith’s and Morgan’s faces, explaining that the port was required to supply the Americans but 
not 21st Army Group.152  Montgomery had already decided to supply 100% of 2nd Army’s needs 
at the expense of 1st Canadian Army so the former could make one final try to reach Köln.153  It 
 
150 Barr, 414.  Gordon and Ramsay, 304. 
151 Gordon and Ramsay, 304.  These authors cite Ramsay’s diary, which is vague as to why the admiral was 
removed from the trip.  Gale noted in his war diary that he had a long meeting with Ramsay on 9 September, but 
doesn’t mention what they discussed.   
152 Gordon and Ramsay, 315-317. 
153 COL Poole, draft plan for BG Feilden (DQMG 21st AG) to forward to MG Graham (MGA), 30 Sep 44, WO 171/ 
146 Q Plans, National Archives, Kew.  At some date between 27 and 30 September COL Poole was directed to fully 
resource 2nd Army at the expense of 1st Canadian and to postpone any attempt to build up local reserves at the front.  
The memo produced on 30 September provided his proposed distribution of daily lift capacity based on this new 
guidance.  2nd Army would get 7,700 tons daily, or 100% of its requirements.  Between 24 and 27 September Poole 
had continued to point out that the army group could not sustain two simultaneous army-level attacks, and on the 
24th he had recommended Antwerp as the most important objective.  
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was not until 16 October that Montgomery finally gave in and made Antwerp his number one 
priority, only after Brooke, Marshall, Eisenhower, Tedder, Morgan, and Smith all made it clear 
that they disagreed with any other distractions.   
Walcheren and Beveland were cleared by 3 November, and the approaches to the port 
swept of mines by 26 November.  The first oceangoing vessels pulled in at the docks on 28 
November, and the port was discharging 23,000 tons a day by mid-December, three months later 
than what might have been accomplished had 21st AG advanced fifteen miles on 4/5 September.  
The Allied logisticians had basically been holding their breath and counting on this development 
to solve the theater transportation crisis since the beginning of September.  Antwerp was critical 
not only because of its proximity to the western border of Germany but also because its massive 
discharge capacity was needed to offset the loss of the beach unloading sites with the arrival of 
winter weather.  Montgomery had proven to be entirely too cavalier in risking the entire 
foundation of Allied theater logistics in order to make one more thrust designed to get a 
bridgehead over the Rhine, penetrate the Westwall, and place the Ruhr at risk from the north.   
In the end, all three Allied thrusts designed to restore mobility to the front before the end 
of the year failed.  Montgomery was forced to give up his goals of getting across the Rhine or 
encircling the Ruhr from the north when he shifted his main effort to 1st Canadian Army on 16 
October.  Patton spent from early-September to mid-December trying to break through the line 
of the Moselle and reach the Westwall near Saarbrücken, advancing only 46 miles in three 
months.  In September 3rd Army had been slowed by the combination of too few U.S. forces at 
the front and a strong local counterattack by Fifth Panzer Army.  This renewed aggressiveness 
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from the Germans convinced Patton he would have to proceed more carefully in the future.  A 
series of deliberate attacks designed to capture Metz used up October and most of November, 
hampered by shortages in artillery ammunition, bad weather, and tenacious German resistance.  
The situation was much the same with 1st Army fighting around Aachen and 7th Army in 
Lorraine.  Positional warfare at Aachen, in the Hűrtgen Forest, and at Schmidt tied down and 
bled out two U.S. corps. burning through artillery ammunition that was already in short supply.  
To Patton’s south, Devers found himself tied down in rugged terrain with his own supply 
challenges, too few U.S. divisions to maintain sustained pressure on the enemy, and a French 
army that was distracted integrating replacements and reinforcements pulled from volunteers 
from within the resistance.154   
Rather than bleeding out the German frontline defenders, wearing down their mobile 
reserves, and forcing them to consume fuel and ammunition faster than it could be replaced, 
Eisenhower recognized that he was losing the battle of attrition in October and November.155  
One bright spot, Devers’s advance up to the Rhine at the end of November, was not exploited.  
Eisenhower was uncomfortable with the risk of putting one army across the river while the rest 
of SHAEF could not support them, just to reach what amounted to an operational dead end. 156  
On 24 November, SHAEF ordered Devers to stop his preparations for an assault crossing of the 
Rhine.  The Allies never stopped their probing attacks between September and early December, 
but these were smaller, localized operations conducted by a few divisions at a time, meant to 
secure tactical objectives and wear out German formations until they broke.  Eisenhower could 
 
154 Pogue, 305.  1st French Army, already short the service troops needed to maintain the fighting divisions, was 
busy trying to integrate FFI recruits into regular formations and exchange metropolitan Frenchmen for the Arab 
soldiers that were veterans of combat in North Africa and Italy. 
155 Pogue, 306. 
156 Wheeler, 364-365.   
540 
 
not coordinate a multi-army sustained attack until Antwerp was open, thus clearing up his supply 
and transportation situation.   Since Antwerp was not opened until late November, SHAEF was 
forced to plan for a massive new attack in early 1945, an operation that might allow the Allies to 
cross the Rhine at a couple of points, shatter German cohesion in the West, and reinstate mobile 
warfare on an operational scale.  Although they failed to understand it at the time, SHAEF had 
lost its best opportunity to pierce the Westwall and get across the Rhine in the first half of 
September, and they did not have the strength to do so in October and November.  Because it 
took so long to open the port of Antwerp and because no other solution to the Allied 
transportation shortage existed, SHAEF could not properly resource more than two deliberate, 
army-level attacks at a time.  Because Eisenhower either could not or would not mass his 
resources for one powerful but isolated thrust, the Allies had to settle for static attritional warfare 
until the logistical situation improved.  A combination of logistical challenges and Eisenhower’s 
commitment to mutually supporting attacks conducted on a broad front prevented the Allies from 
trying to penetrate the German line and achieve an operational-level breakthrough in 1944.  As a 
result, SHAEF had to ride out the German counter-offensive in the Ardennes and then wait for 
the return of decent weather in the spring before trying once more to restore mobility to the front.        
 
 Conclusion 
 This chapter has demonstrated the strengths and weaknesses of the systems used by 
SHAEF to control sustainment operations at the theater level and to reconcile what the command 
hoped to accomplish with what the experts considered logistically possible.  We have seen that 
SHAEF logistics planners had a realistic understanding of the current supply and transportation 
situation, often having a more accurate view than Lee’s COMZ.  In his first few months as the 
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Chief Administrative Officer at SHAEF, Gale built the staff agencies and led effective meetings 
required to identify and then study complex issues, which could then lead to synchronized 
solutions and cohesive recommendations.  Smith, Gale, Crawford, and Bull collaborated well 
among themselves and with their peers in the various service commands.  The creation and 
empowerment of a strong Joint Plans Section under Brigadier McLean and the Logistics Plans 
Section under Colonel Whipple ensured that SHAEF often had a more holistic understanding of 
the interrelationship between sustainment and maneuver than any other Allied headquarters 
engaged in France.   
Despite the healthy organizations and procedures in place at SHAEF calculated to 
manage and integrate logistics into the theater campaign, Gale’s team suffered as a result of two 
relevant shortcomings.  Throughout August as SHAEF gradually transitioned into their role as 
the ground war coordinator, Gale and his subordinates realized that things were not running as 
smoothly within COMZ as they assumed would be the case.  For a few weeks Gale tried to get 
Lee to fix these problems before finally giving up in early October and taking over those tasks at 
his level.  Gale found it especially frustrating that COMZ did not have an accurate picture of 
ongoing logistical operations, that Lee never seemed to have the details at his fingertips, and that 
the team at ETOUSA could not be counted on to accomplish the many promises made by Lee 
and the chiefs of the technical service sections.157  Reflecting on a meeting conducted on 12 
September at 21st AG headquarters to work out the details of additional logistical support needed 
for Market Garden, Gale noted: “It is clear that the success of this visit was largely due to the 
fact that we had someone [Lord] with us who could speak authoritatively for what the Com Z 
 
157 War Diary, LTG Gale, CAO at SHAEF, entries for 5 August, 4, 6, 12, 16, 21, and 22 Sep 44.  Gale Papers, 
Section 2, Entries 14 to 25, Liddell Hart Center, King’s College, London.   
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could do.  The C.G. himself is never able to give you a decisive answer.”158  About a week later, 
in response to criticism from Montgomery about the theater supply and transportation situation, 
Gale defended SHAEF’s performance: “In actual fact we have no means of knowing the exact 
logistical situation of the American Armies as their system dictates that this information is in the 
hands of COMZ and even their Army Group do not know the details.”159  Gale had realized that 
it was impossible to manage theater logistics when over half of the variables remained a mystery 
and when the “facts” that were shared often proved to be wildly inaccurate.   
This public admission of incompetence by COMZ led to something of a breakthrough; on 
22 September Gale, with Eisenhower’s blessing, began to take a more direct role in managing 
COMZ and taking over the functions it was performing poorly or not at all.  This transition to a 
more hands-on approach corresponded to a period when the front lines had stabilized and 
SHAEF and COMZ were settling into well-resourced facilities that allowed them to consolidate 
half a dozen headquarters into two locations separated by about a dozen miles.  In early October 
SHAEF established overlapping procedures designed to extract more timely and accurate 
information from subordinates, information which then formed the basis of integrated 
assessments, future plans, and recommendations to the commander.  In early October, looking 
back on what had gone wrong with logistical support in the theater over the last few months, 
Gale and Hughes concluded that Lee and COMZ had struggled to remain relevant because they 
did nothing to stay up to date on the current operational situation and did not maintain regular 
contact with the army groups in order to identify their priorities and concerns.160  Since Lee 
 
158 Ibid, 12 Sep 44. 
159 Ibid, 21 Sep 44.  Eisenhower, Gale, and Napier had flow to Brussels to meet with Montgomery, who lashed into 
Gale over the logistical problems bedeviling not only 21st Army Group, but the entire Allied force.   
160 Gale’s War Diary, 5 Oct 44. 
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knew about this assessment and still had not done enough to fix the areas of concern, Gale and 
the SHAEF logistics staff decided to do the work themselves. 
The second challenge confronting the logisticians at SHAEF was getting Eisenhower to 
listen to and consistently agree with Gale’s team at SHAEF.  First, the logistics and joint plans 
sections at SHAEF found it extremely difficult to keep up with the pace of change after Cobra, 
often finding themselves presenting assessments or recommendations undermined by 
developments over the last 24 to 72 hours.  Second, Montgomery, Bradley, Lee, and, to a lesser 
extent, Hughes provided Eisenhower alternative and sometimes conflicting sources of 
information and recommendations about the logistical situation and its impact on projected 
operations.  SHAEF often had the best information and most realistic assessments, but even then 
they were far from perfect.  Every mistake and missed projection made it that much harder to 
compete with narratives reaching Eisenhower from other sources.  In the end, Eisenhower was, 
and probably needed to be, more comfortable taking risks that undermined his logistical 
foundation in order to punish the enemy and accomplish operational objectives.  The SHAEF 
staff had excellent access to Eisenhower, but they were not the lone authority on logistics, nor 
was their opinion the one the commander was predisposed to prioritize in every case.     
Up until the decision to launch a full-scale pursuit east of the Seine, Eisenhower and his 
subordinates generally listened to their logisticians and accepted the restrictions to maneuver that 
they recommended.  The campaign was going so well after 25 August that Eisenhower decided 
to ignore Montgomery’s plea to focus all transportation behind one army group, preferring to 
drive as fast and with as much combat power as was possible to ensure that the Germans could 
not catch their breath.  The risk associated with this decision was very low; it was obvious that 
every German formation in France was either bottled up manning a fortress or else was wrecked 
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and incapable of staging anything beyond very limited local counterattacks.  Ultra would alert 
the Allies of the arrival of large-scale reinforcements coming from another theater, which was 
highly unlikely anyway because of German transportation difficulties and the disaster unfolding 
on the Eastern Front between June and October.   
Perhaps the two great surprises that resulted from the Allied decision to push beyond the 
Seine with three armies (four if one included 7th Army in the south) were , first, the rapidity with 
which significant logistical problems emerged and, second, the speed with which the Germans 
recovered, who managed to man a defensive a line running from the Albert Canal, along the 
Westwall, and down the Moselle by early September.  Patton’s and Hodges’ lead formations 
were quickly strung out by recurring fuel shortages; as a result, when the Americans ran into 
knots of German defenders, they struggled to quickly mass enough combat power, backed up by 
adequately supplied field artillery, to bypass and overrun even minor pockets of resistance.  In 
addition to losing entire days sitting idle waiting on the delivery of fuel, U.S. vanguards, too 
small to blast around or through ad hoc positions manned by German battle groups had to wait 
on support coming up from the rear and arriving on the flanks of the enemy before they could 
start moving again.  Planners at SHAEF had warned that this would happen, but Eisenhower had 
decided to accept the risk.   
By the first week of September, Eisenhower was stymied by the very situation that 
Montgomery had warned would develop.  Brest, deemed essential by theater logisticians and 
Bradley alike, had tied down VIII Corps and was sucking in supplies, transportation assets, and 
airpower sorely needed elsewhere.  Patton found himself tangled up in the twin strongpoints of 
Metz and Nancy, while Hodges struggled to cross the Meuse and reach the Westwall to his north.  
Montgomery halted just short of the Albert Canal at what he considered the prudent limit of his 
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line of communication, awaiting the arrival of divisions left behind during the pursuit and giving 
his logisticians time to build up local supply dumps and perhaps open a minor port closer to the 
front lines.  By the time each army tried to resume offensive operations between 5 and 17 
September, they were met by German defenders that had recovered their equilibrium.  In 
attempting to accomplish five major objectives simultaneously, Eisenhower virtually guaranteed 
that he would accomplish none of his objectives quickly or cheaply, committing the Allies to a 
second round of attritional warfare in worsening weather and rough terrain.  Montgomery had 
warned Eisenhower repeatedly in August and during the first ten days of September that he had 
to pick and properly resource one major thrust.  After seemingly conceding that Montgomery 
was right on 10 September, Eisenhower changed his mind a few days later and authorized 
simultaneous attacks by 12th Army Group that seemed disjointed from the goal of establishing a 
bridgehead over the Rhine and clearing the approaches to Antwerp.  Regardless of the merit of 
this decision, Eisenhower made an obvious mistake when he allowed Montgomery to first talk 
him into postponing a major effort against the Scheldt until after Market Garden, and then to 
dither for almost a month before launching a properly resourced, all-out attack aimed to clear the 
approaches into Antwerp.  In both cases, Eisenhower’s logisticians had painted a clear and 
accurate picture of the implications of such decisions, warnings Eisenhower chose to ignore.    
 SHAEF could have overcome their logistical limitations and achieved additional 
operational advantages during the fall campaign by making different decisions on how to 
conduct the ground war.  But things might also have gone better if ETOUSA/COMZ had been 
more efficient when it came to using the resources they did possess.  The next chapter will 
examine how and why ETOUSA and COMZ struggled to fulfil their duties as the integrator of 
logistics for the theater.  Unlike SHAEF and 21st Army Group, COMZ lacked the practical 
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combat experience required to quickly identify problems and staff shortcomings and take 
decisive steps to solve them.  The U.S. 1st Army and 12th Army Group shared the challenges 
linked to inexperience, but they benefitted from the direct supervision and support afforded by 
21st Army Group from January to late July 1944.  Only Lee and ETOUSA/COMZ found 
themselves both unprepared and unsupervised during the critical months of the Allied breakout 
and pursuit.  By the time SHAEF realized that COMZ could not stand on their own, it was too 
late to repair the harm they had done to the chances of a strategic victory before the recovery of 
the German Army and the arrival of winter weather.  As we will see in the next two chapters, 
COMZ had the assets to better support 1st and 3rd Armies, but they lacked the competence and 
organizational procedures to do so.
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Chapter 6 - COMZ’s Struggle to Adapt in France 
 This chapter focuses on exactly how staff procedures worked in ETOUSA/COMZ and on 
what the commander personally prioritized and focused his organization on accomplishing.  The 
next chapter looks at how COMZ executed the sustainment mission, with a special emphasis on 
the performance of motor and aerial transport during the pursuit across France, and on the 
similarities and differences with logistical support in 21st Army Group.  It should come as no 
surprise that COMZ made rookie mistakes during the first three months when it was in charge of 
theater logistics, despite having already performed that mission for two years in the U.K.  Lee 
failed to anticipate adequately the challenges his outfit would face in France or to prepare 
sufficiently to conduct the tasks he did identify as critical to success.  COMZ recovered quickly; 
by late October the command had a good handle on the theater requisition and distribution 
system and could run the rear area.  But Lee’s command never mastered the art of operational 
planning and collaboration with the joint-combined headquarters and the various headquarters 
running combat operations, failing to live up to the role U.S. doctrine reserved for the 
COMZ/SOS.  There were institutional hurdles that made adequate preparation difficult, but in 
the end, Lee’s personality seemed to do the most damage.  Lee seemed unable to focus his 
attention on the impact combat conditions would have on the COMZ staff and to master the 
technical processes that were essential to managing a theater requisition and distribution 
network.  Lee remained at heart an engineer and a supervisor of complex construction projects, 
not an integrator of the quartermaster and transportation function. 
 As we saw in the previous chapter, SHAEF enacted some decisions that made COMZ’s 
job much harder than it needed to be.  Regardless, it seems that COMZ could have done more to 
support the continuation of the pursuit in August and September.  SHAEF and the two army 
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groups thought it reasonable that they might penetrate the Westwall and cross the Rhine in the 
fall of 1944.  This goal was considered logistically and tactically feasible as late as the end of 
September.1  There was also agreement, among officers at the time and among historians since 
then, that various logistical expedients would have made it possible to achieve some of these 
objectives.  This chapter will demonstrate why COMZ was incapable of synchronizing the level 
of support needed to accomplish those objectives -- namely, that each commander has an 
outsized impact on the performance and capabilities of his organization, that true learning 
emerges much more easily from doing rather than watching, and that it is almost impossible to 
accomplish one taxing mission and adequately plan and prepare for another. 
It is hard to pinpoint what tasks COMZ was and was not deeply involved in, and what 
Lee considered important and of secondary importance.  Record keeping at 
ETOUSA/COMZ/SOS was spotty, varying in quality over time and among the various 
components of the command.  One finds batches of meticulously kept and operationally focused 
records, but the quality and regularity of those documents dropped off from early August through 
late September when the command was consumed with relocating from the U.K. to Normandy 
and then on to Paris.  This uneven attention to recordkeeping was not unique to COMZ; SHAEF 
and 21st AG had a similar gap, and this lack of documentation during a critical period in the 
campaign makes it hard to unravel exactly what the logisticians were trying to accomplish.  It is 
easier to reconstruct what was going on at SHAEF and within the army groups in comparison 
with COMZ because those leaders maintained diaries, wrote operational summaries soon after 
the front stabilized to cover what had happened during the pursuit, produced honest and detailed 
 
1 Pogue, 251, 259, 295.  As late as 27 September Montgomery was pushing for a combined operation by 2nd and 1st 
Armies to capture the Ruhr and establish bridgeheads over the Rhine north and south of Köln.  This idea was finally 
killed by the strength of the German resistance northwest of Antwerp and before Aachen in early October.   
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official reports soon after the war, and agreed to be interviewed by and provide frank answers to 
U.S. historians over the next decade.  We have already seen that Lee and his command were 
different in this regard.  Lee avoided interviews or, when he did agree to them, gave superficial 
answers to most questions.  His command wrote few “after-action reports” or “lessons learned” 
summaries and did not maintain a war diary or a register of decisions made.  The General Board 
reports supervised by COMZ and ETOUSA were simplistic narratives that tended to avoid any 
causal linkage or deep self-assessment and had few concrete suggestions about how the 
command could have functioned more effectively.  The reports produced by the ETOUSA 
special staff sections were much more useful, but also more technical in nature.  ETOUSA and 
COMZ produced hundreds of boxes of historical documents during the campaign in Western 
Europe, but those records are poorly organized, resisting a search for insights into how the 
COMZ staff functioned and what role they had in the operational aspect of the campaign.2  As a 
result, it is extremely difficult to determine with any certainty what exactly Lee and COMZ did 
to solve the logistical problems plaguing SHAEF and the army groups. 
Lee had positioned a significant part of the ETOUSA staff in Normandy by 7 August, 
linking up with FECZ and assuming responsibility for the recently activated communications 
zone.  At this point COMZ tried to assume its doctrinally defined role as the lead agency for 
managing logistics and principal sustainment advisor to Eisenhower in his capacities as 
ETOUSA and SHAEF commander.  COMZ was immediately confronted by the need to modify 
the procedures they had perfected in the U.K. in order to make them applicable to the conditions 
the command faced in France.  COMZ spent the four weeks on the continent moving first to 
 
2 These records are not broken down into sub-categories, finding aids and categories are sometimes incorrect, and 
across the board the finding aids are much less helpful than those for the other significant U.S. organizations. 
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Normandy and then to Paris; taking over duties from the ADSEC, FECZ, and ETOUSA special 
staff; immersing themselves in the details of the logistics plan; and trying to synchronize theater-
level logistics under combat conditions for the first time in its two-year history.  In the process, 
COMZ discovered that they had major problems with their ability to command and control 
complex logistical operations and that the G-4 section could not effectively manage the 
requisition and distribution systems. The general staff at COMZ, especially the G-4 section, did 
not know how to identify and prioritize requirements coming in from the field, figure out what 
was immediately available for delivery in the theater, and match service troops with 
transportation assets to deliver the essentials to continue combat operations.  The original plan to 
divide the rear area into various base sections was still applicable, but at first the lodgment 
expanded much more slowly than anticipated, and then much quicker than forecasted, forcing 
Lee to abandon his original plan to match clusters of staff officers to a specific region in France.  
Surprised by a number of unanticipated developments, ETOUSA demonstrated that it was a 
flexible and adaptive organization, and by late October they were well on their way to 
implementing the changes required to fix problems identified earlier in the campaign.  But these 
changes came too late for SHAEF to sustain the operational momentum needed to pierce the 
Westwall before the end of September.  Furthermore, COMZ struggled to restore the theater 
sustainment systems throughout October and November. Failure to do so prevented a rapid 
resumption of offensive operations that might have restored mobility at the front.  Adequate 
supply and transportation resources were available on the continent to do so, but COMZ could 
not harness them before the Germans solidified a new defensive line.   
 Admittedly, the breakdown of the Allied transportation network confirmed everything the 
logisticians had warned might happen if they continued past the Seine without shortening or 
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restoring the lines of communication beforehand.  Despite what was, in retrospect, a thoroughly 
impressive performance in rehabilitating ports, bridges, roads, rail lines, and building hundreds 
of miles of POL pipelines, the Allies could not keep the lead elements of three armies on the 
move in September.  One by one, 3rd, 1st, and 2nd British Armies ran into supply difficulties and 
slowed down, allowing the Germans to recover and scrape together a defensive position 
anchored on obstacles along their western border.  Forced to rely almost exclusively upon motor 
transport, the Allies could not deliver enough fuel to keep the spearheads moving and to keep the 
Germans on the run or enough ammunition, combat troops, and replacement equipment to 
quickly blast them out of their hasty defensive positions when they stopped.   
COMZ’s performance during this period was impressive, but it also exposed their 
inability to ruthlessly prioritize what was shipped to the front, maximize the transportation assets 
that were available, and maintain a healthy dialogue with the staff officers within the two army 
groups.  COMZ struggled to figure out exactly what 12th Army needed, ship them only those 
items, and maximize the potential of the truck companies, air transport, and POL pipelines that 
were available.  There was also a similar breakdown in communication and coordination within 
COMZ itself.  A cursory examination of how requisition and distribution were managed within 
21st Army Group and its FUSAG staff liaison section suggests that the British had a more 
effective system that succeeded in avoiding the problems that emerged in the U.S. system.  It 
would have greatly benefitted the Allies if COMZ had successfully integrated some of these 
techniques prior to taking over the communication zone for the theater in early August.     
 In order to help accomplish SHAEF’s operational objectives for the fall of 1944, COMZ 
would have needed to behave differently.  First, it would have demanded of the organization a 
ruthless efficiency and ability to enforce priorities that could only be expected from an 
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experienced and well-oiled bureaucratic machine.  Second, it would have required a positive 
relationship with SHAEF and the two army groups that was based upon mutual respect and 
effective two-way communication.  Only then could Lee have helped Eisenhower and Bradley 
scope and sequence operational objectives to conform with the limitations imposed by 
ETOUSA’s distribution network.  It would have been helpful if some senior logistician had 
recognized the possibility that a long pause along the Seine would not be realistic and had 
directed a serious study of what could be accomplished using only motorized and aerial transport 
and the ports and beaches of Normandy.  Whipple, McLean, and the administrative staff at 21st 
Army Group had a good working knowledge of these parameters, but these concerns did not 
penetrate up to the level of Bradley and Eisenhower.  Not only did Lee fail to serve as the senior 
logistical advisor to the U.S. and Allied commands, but on two separate occasions he encouraged 
Eisenhower to try to do too much based upon an overly optimistic assessment of the logistical 
situation provided by COMZ.  Lee was also late coming to the table with a comprehensive 
reassessment of the Allied plan to open various ports, adding nothing of value in late August and 
the first half of September when SHAEF was trying to decide if clearing Brest was worth the 
effort, what should be done with the recently captured Channel ports, and if everyone could just 
hold on until Antwerp was opened up.  Luckily for the Allies, Eisenhower had other logisticians 
available to take on the role as the senior sustainment advisor and integrator while SHAEF made 
major changes to the original theater campaign plan for Overlord. 
 As we will see, Lee and COMZ struggled to fulfill their most fundamental role -- 
managing the service units assigned to the rear area -- much less take ownership of operational 
planning and the integration of sustainment into the scheme of maneuver, roles Lee had 
surrendered back in the fall of 1943.  Lee and his subordinates did not seem to realize it, but, 
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without immersing themselves in the operational aspects of the campaign, it was almost 
impossible to run the communications zone under the conditions experienced during the pursuit.  
By late September COMZ realized that it had surrendered too much authority to ADSEC, 
ignored the operational side of logistics for too long, and failed to build the internal structures 
and systems that were required to run sustainment at the theater level.  The most important staff 
section, the G-4, was poorly organized and did not understand its unique role, and no other staff 
sections had the time, manpower, or remit to help them.  All along Lee had hoped to empower 
his base section commanders and to delegate the forces and authority required to allow them to 
manage the details of synchronizing support to the armies, hoping decentralized execution by 
commanders could overcome any shortcoming in COMZ’s ability to control from the center.   
But COMZ discovered that the mission in France was very different from the role they 
had filled in the U.K.  In France, what everyone needed was a coordinator or conductor to 
manage the interaction between base sections, technical staff sections, the army groups, and 
SHAEF.  Someone had to bridge the gap between the nearly limitless demands of the combat 
units and the limitations imposed by the transportation network and array of service troops.  A 
functional COMZ could have explained this reality to SHAEF and the army groups and then 
could have collaborated with the operational commands to accomplish a set of sequenced 
objectives.  Once equipped with a realistic list of missions to accomplish, COMZ could have 
assigned roles and forces to base sections and units with a theater-wide span of authority, such as 
the Motor Transport Brigade or Military Pipeline Service, and it could have synchronized 
everyone’s interaction to achieve acceptable results on time.  But COMZ was not ready to 
perform these functions during their first three months on the continent, and, as a result, the 
Allied sustainment system collapsed in early September and did not fully recover until early 
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December.  Lee’s command learned quickly, but the gap between the required level of 
performance of an effective theater service command compared to the starting capabilities of 
ETOUSA/COMZ was too great to overcome quickly or easily.             
 
 COMZ C2: Synchronizing the Sustainment Mission 
Lee established the COMZ command post at Valognes on 7 August, assuming 
responsibility for the newly established communications zone and placing his staff in close 
proximity to the two army groups they were charged with supporting.  Large portions of the 
ETOUSA special staff had been attached to ADSEC and FECZ before the invasion started, and 
deployed to France between mid-June and mid-July.  From 7 August to the middle of September 
Lee’s headquarters operated from the camp at Valognes and attempted to fulfill its multi-
functional role as ETOUSA and COMZ.  For the first time in its history, ETOUSA/COMZ was 
solely responsible, at least in theory, for operational sustainment planning, theater-level logistics 
integration within the overall campaign plan, and management of the communications zone.  Its 
performance in the three different roles was mixed, but, as could be expected of any 
inexperienced organization forced to jump into the middle of an ongoing complex activity, 
COMZ struggled to make itself relevant during its first three months on the continent, and to 
anticipate and solve logistics problems bedeviling the two army groups, but especially 12th AG.  
Forming a dispassionate opinion about the performance of COMZ during this critical 
stage of the campaign is complicated by the lack of accessible records.  Lee, COMZ, and the 
ETOUSA special staff did not maintain war diaries or continue to produce periodic operational 
reports like those maintained by ADSEC, 1st Army, and 12th Army Group.  In general, COMZ or 
ETOUSA were only mentioned by these other commands to note disagreements or perceived 
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failures to adequately support the combat units.  Official histories and General Board reports 
completed after the war seem to gloss over either the events or the underlying causes of friction 
that plagued COMZ from August to October.  One is forced to rely on what few internal 
contemporary records survived from COMZ, logistical breakdowns captured in the historical 
record, and competing narratives about what went wrong generated after the war.   
What emerges is the picture of an inexperienced organization trying to make the 
uncomfortable transition from the physical comfort and relatively slow pace of operations in the 
U.K. to combat field conditions ten days after the breakout following Cobra.  Any traction the 
command had started to gain was disrupted by the phased move to Paris that occurred between 1 
and 14 September.  At two critical points during the Allied pursuit of the Germans, COMZ found 
themselves in the middle of its transition with ADSEC in Normandy in mid-August and in the 
middle of its move and consolidation in Paris during the first two weeks of September.  Even if 
the command had been combat-hardened, had had excellent contacts and a solid reputation at 
SHAEF and with the two army groups, and had been adequately equipped with communications 
networks to its critical partners, it still would have struggled to complete the two moves while 
keeping a tight grip on managing sustainment operations.  
Actually, the general staff at COMZ found themselves forced to really pay attention to 
the operational sustainment plan for the first time since its publication.  They also had to try to 
absorb and adapt various procedures that had been refined by ADSEC during its two months 
alone in France.  At the same time COMZ was trying to make sense of the widely scattered array 
of depots and an uncertain inventory of what was stored where on the continent and what was 
still afloat awaiting a berth to begin unloading the cargo.  The relationship among 
ETOUSA/COMZ, SHAEF, and what would become the 12th Army Group logistics staff had 
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been damaged by the frantic last-minute activity that precedes any large operation.  
Communications networks were good, but they were insufficient to run sustainment with the 
same procedures that had been used in the U.K.  COMZ did not seem to understand the critical 
role that only they could achieve or how they should organize and operate in order to do so.  
Confronted by their first logistics challenge, COMZ stumbled badly.  ADSEC had settled into a 
functioning rhythm, and many key leaders from the ETOUSA staff had been on the continent for 
weeks learning the ropes.  But for the COMZ general staff, especially the G-3 and G-4, it was the 
first time they were confronted by their combat mission.  Because they were an organization that 
emphasized the importance of constantly learning from its ongoing operations, COMZ figured 
out how to do their job sufficiently well to accomplish the mission by early November.  There 
was similar growth in understanding how to array base section boundaries and the role of the 
staff in each of these regional commands.  Because these lessons were learned largely by 
reacting to complaints and watching the armies run out of essential supplies at the front, COMZ 
was unable to harness the full potential of the command in order to extend the reach of the 
pursuit just a little farther in September or to help trigger a return to mobile operations in 
October.  COMZ was too busy learning how to do its job between August and October to 
overcome any logistical mistakes made by SHAEF and 12th AG.  
 
 ADSEC Fills the Void 
 The division of effort among the various headquarters that contributed to planning 
sustainment operations during Overlord has already been mentioned, but it is helpful to quickly 
review the way SHAEF outlined how command and control responsibilities would change over 
time during the campaign.  This was directly related to which headquarters published what 
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planning documents and when they did so.  It is worth nothing that SHAEF played no official 
role in developing the various plans designed to govern logistics up to D+90.  Until they took 
over control of ground operations from 21st AG somewhere between the activation of 12th AG 
and D+90, SHAEF had no direct role in controlling logistics and integrating that effort with 
maneuver.3  The family of orders, their publication date, and the windows of responsibility over 
time relating to logistical support in Overlord is depicted in the two tables below.  
Title of Document Publishing HQ Date 
Neptune Initial Joint Plan SHAEF (21 AG, AEAF, ANXC) 1 Feb 44 
U.S. Concept for Neptune FUSA 25 Feb 
Joint Outline Maintenance Project SHAEF 23 Mar 
Joint Administrative Plan FUSAG (at 21 AG) 19 Apr 
ADSEC Plan ADSEC 30 Apr 
COMZ Plan FECZ 14 May 
Table 6.1: Authority and publication date for components of the logistics plan4 
 
Dates Chief of Rear Supporting 
Ele 
Coord. 
Agent 
Trigger for Change 
D to D+20 1st Army ADSEC 21 AG Activation of a 1st Army Rear 
D+20 to 
+40  
ADSEC FECZ 21 AG, 12 
AG 
Arrival 3rd Army; Activation of 
12th AG 
D+41 FECZ ADSEC 12 AG, 21 
AG 
Brittany and Normandy Base 
Sections Established 
D+90 COMZ ADSEC SHAEF Closure of COMZ in France 
Table 6.2: Allied transition plan for the control of logistics5   
 
3 Of course, Eisenhower was the ETOUSA commander, and as such had administrative responsibility for all U.S. 
forces in theater.  In reality, he delegated all administrative duties to Lee, Spaatz, and Bradley.  
4 Ruppenthal, Vol. I, 269. 
5 Bykofsky and Larson, 234-245.  The authors explain the concepts used to divide up Overlord planning and the 
control over the rear area in France among the various commands, and then explain how those concepts changed up 
through early August. 
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 There are three obvious conclusions suggested by these two tables.  First, the division of 
labor among so many agencies directed to develop the sustainment plan for Overlord made it 
difficult to maintain one common vision among all them and among the officers who made up 
these organizations.  Second, the detailed plans published by ADSEC and COMZ were finished 
so late in the preparation phase that it was almost impossible to disseminate them, internalize 
their instructions, reconfigure organizations to execute the tasks directed, and gather more 
resources to make the directed tasks easier to achieve.  Third, the constant transfer of 
responsibility for coordinating logistics and maneuver combined with four planned transitions of 
which agency was charged with managing the communications zone ensured that procedural 
continuity was a fantasy.  Even if everyone had perfectly understood and agreed with the plan, it 
was almost guaranteed that four different commands could never execute them the same way.  
Both sets of command transitions, among the coordinating headquarters and among the executive 
headquarters, were likely to be difficult.  In the end, the first critical transition, and the more 
influential upon the fortunes of the Allied pursuit, was the three-way reconfiguration in early 
August.  At that time, 12th AG was activated and began to operate semi-autonomously from 21st 
AG, ETOUSA took over responsibility for the communications zone in France from ADSEC, 
and Eisenhower and SHAEF exerted a strong influence over the campaign while postponing 
their official assumption of ground coordination duties.  It was within this context that COMZ 
tried to perform its combat mission for the first time, only to discover that initially they could not 
effectively replace ADSEC and the logistics coordination element under FUSAG/12th AG at 21st 
AG headquarters. 
 COMZ’s inability to smoothly assume the role of FUSAG and ADSEC two months into 
the campaign might be surprising.  ETOUSA/COMZ was a much larger organization than 
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Plank’s ADSEC, one that enjoyed the benefit of a very senior and experienced team of technical 
service chiefs, continuity among the base section commanders and staff brought along to France, 
and almost two years of practical experience working together in the U.K.  But two problems 
confronted Lee at the beginning of August.  First, the sustainment mission became exceptionally 
more difficult after the breakout that followed Cobra.  Second, COMZ was the weak link in a 
chain of organizations that had spent months studying the logistical challenges associated with 
Overlord and had then accumulated two months of practical experience figuring out what 
actually worked on the continent before Lee and his team showed up.  The fact that COMZ 
trusted ADSEC and FECZ to the extent of being comfortable all but ignoring operational 
planning and early operations in France was all the more surprising because Lee disagreed with 
the standing up of those organizations in the first place.  SHAEF ordered the creation of ADSEC 
based upon recommendations inherited from COSSAC.  Lee’s reaction to the creation of an 
organization whose form contradicted doctrine and blended together the roles of a base section, 
ADSEC, and COMZ, was to create his own FECZ in a bid to retain control over operational 
planning.   
But the cumulative effect of employing strong personalities to lead logistics organizations 
focused on combat tasks was a migration of authority and expertise away from ETOUSA/SOS 
into FUSAG and ADSEC and, to a lesser extent, FECZ and SHAEF.  For various reasons, 
COMZ allowed ADSEC to become the operational logistics experts within ETOUSA.  Letting 
ADSEC do its job was not the problem; the problem was that once SOS delegated various 
responsibilities to ADSEC and FECZ, the command largely ignored the details associated with 
Overlord until early August.  Paired with FUSA and FUSAG, ADSEC became the dominant 
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U.S. logistics player in the months leading up to the invasion and during the first two months of 
its execution.6        
The creation of what would eventually become the advanced section of COMZ, 
commanded by BG Ewart Plank, grew from an initiative launched by COSSAC.  The operational 
history of ADSEC, written in August 1945, stated that the earliest drive to create a specialized 
organization to improve logistical support to the invasion force developed after COSSAC sent a 
team to Italy to study supply difficulties sometime in the fall of 1943.7  This team visited 
Hughes’ NATOUSA in Algiers, 5th Army headquarters, and the base section providing support 
for U.S. forces on the Italian peninsula.  After a rough start, NATOUSA agreed to create an 
advanced section collocated with 5th Army to coordinate logistical support with the base section, 
Larkin’s SOS, and NATOUSA.  In addition to the functions listed in FM 100-10, 5th Army’s 
ADSEC was heavily involved in maneuver planning, helping to relate projected operations to a 
concept for how to sustain those operations that blended service units, accumulate the specific 
material requirements, and establish the command and control structure necessary to synchronize 
these surge periods that could not be handled exclusively by routine procedures.  One of the most 
relevant observations for COSSAC was the conclusion in 5th Army and NATOUSA that “[a] 
further source of difficulty emanated from the fact that the agency responsible for supply 
operations was not the one which had done the logistical planning.”8  COSSAC’s solution was to 
 
6 Simple labels for the sustainment planning and management teams are misleading; ADSEC played a major role, 
but other organizations were essential to the process.  The operational logistics planning team evolved from a 
number of committees at COSSAC, and included small elements from the ETOUSA/SOS special staff, ADSEC, 
parts of FECZ, FUSAG, and 21st AG.  SHAEF played an increasingly important role beginning in April.  Control 
over support units in France, and their integrations into the ground scheme of maneuver, was also a group effort.  
ADSEC, slowly reinforced by officers from FECZ, worked closely with FUSA and the U.S. element at 21st AG to 
synchronize their activities.  The logistics staff at SHAEF had a major impact on the flow of the campaign in July 
and August, helping to set the tone of what was and was not demanded of the service troops.  
7 Operational History of ADSEC, ETOUSA, August 1945, 2.  RG 407, Entry 427, Box 190.   
8 Ibid, 2. 
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press for the early creation of an ADSEC to help plan logistical support for Overlord and then to 
coordinate logistics for U.S. forces in France prior to the arrival of FECZ or COMZ. 
One may be tempted to read too much into the sequence of events leading to the decision 
to activate ADSEC and into its timing.  The reality is that COSSAC, doubtless encouraged by 
Crawford and Moses, came to the conclusion that 1st Army and then FUSAG would benefit from 
an offshoot of SOS dedicated solely to operational planning.  Recent experience also pointed out 
the advantages associated with using the command that built the plan to execute it.  It also made 
sense to get elements of the first base section and staff officers of what would eventually be the 
COMZ ashore and working as soon as possible.  Morgan saw the value of the idea, but only 
Smith and Eisenhower could make it happen.  Because of all the turbulence among the 
headquarters and personalities involved, the order directing the creation of ADSEC was not 
issued until 7 February.  Plank had been warned of this possible development back at the end of 
December, and was shifted from command of the Eastern Base Section to chief of this new 
organization on 30 December.  With no formal duties and very few assigned personnel, Plank 
decided to take the core element of his new team on a reconnaissance mission to the 
Mediterranean during the second half of January. 
 Plank visited a group of organizations that had already been studied by the COSSAC 
team, accompanied by his chief of staff and the chiefs of his transportation, medical, ordnance, 
and engineer staff sections.  The group spent three days with AFHQ and NATOUSA; a week 
with the Peninsula Base Section (which had evolved from the ADSEC), 5th Army, and AFHQ 
forward; and three days with the SOS and Mediterranean Base Section.9  Plank was especially 
interested in anything he could pick up on repairing ports, building POL pipelines, and, in 
 
9 Ibid, 4. 
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general, repairing existing infrastructure rather than trying to use new construction.  At each stop 
the team asked what the command had learned to speed up requisition and distribution 
procedures, better organize the staff, and cut unnecessary overhead.  The observation group 
returned to the U.K. on 5 February, and ADSEC was formally activated on 7 February.   
 ADSEC played a decisive role in developing what would become the FECZ’s COMZ 
plan. The process that Plank used to create that plan is instructive, showing what was required to 
integrate a dozen individual plans proposed by various service units into a synchronized concept 
of support.  After studying everything they had inherited from COSSAC and ETOUSA and after 
validating their own planning assumptions with SHAEF and 21st AG, ADSEC spent about five 
weeks developing and refining the proposals from individual services.  Plank referred to these 
sessions as “wargames,” and each iteration consisted of an initial briefing by the special staff 
section in charge, followed by a question-and-answer period with the entire general and special 
staff of ADSEC.  The goal of each of these sessions was to develop plans within each technical 
service that meshed with the plans of their fellow specialists.  It was up to the ADSEC general 
staff to identify friction points, where the activities or resources required by one section might 
limit the capabilities of another, and to recommend a solution to allow both to succeed at the 
same time or else to prioritize one action over the others.  The general staff also identified and 
tried to resolve any cases of overlap or gaps in planning or supervisory responsibility.  It was a 
hard process because of the number of invested staff sections and the complexity of the plan they 
were trying to write.10  Wargames were conducted from 18 March to 26 April; annexes were 
 
10 The final version of the COMZ plan published by FECZ on 14 May contained seventeen sections, seventeen 
appendices, and fourteen annexes.  The official history of the ADSEC noted how a lack of in-house printing 
capability complicated their work.  The command did not have the resources to print copies of each service estimate 
through their various permutations, or create a master reference of assumptions and consumption rates. 
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completed and turned into FECZ for review by 5 May.  Nailing down the troop list and the POL 
annex proved to be the most difficult parts of the plan to complete.   
 After the sustainment plan was completed, the next priority was to prepare ADSEC for 
the different operating conditions they would face in France.  There they would be confronted by 
less well-equipped facilities and a more frantic pace than they had experienced in Bristol.  The 
staff spent a week living and working out of tents, and started figuring out the impact that 
twenty-four-hour-a-day operations would have on the staff.  Breaking the staff into two shifts 
was the answer, but this triggered a search for internal efficiencies and procedural short-cuts 
needed to accomplish twice as much work with the same number of people.11  Plank tried to 
replicate the tasks his command would face during the first week of Overlord, ensuring that staff 
sections understood and followed the plan and various ETOUSA and ADSEC SOPs.  Learning 
from four months of activity before the landing and from the hectic pace of work during the first 
month ashore, the most significant organizational and procedural changes that ADSEC made 
were in the G-4, transportation, and engineer sections.  The strength report for the ADSEC on 6 
May was 1,535 total personnel, with the special staff sections dominating the general staff in 
total numbers.12  Plank retained a prominent position for the special staff, leaving them in charge 
of planning and coordination and not trying to control or replicate their functions in the G-1 and 
G-4.  It was a different approach from the system Lee was trying to put into place at 
SOS/COMZ, but it seemed to work for Plank and 1st Army. 
 
11 Operational History of ADSEC, 25. 
12 The G-4 had 81 soldiers.  Engineer had 173, medical 98, signal 180, transportation 144, and quartermaster 92.   
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Figure 6.1: Headquarters, ADSEC, 1 May 4413 
 
 Looking back at the end of the campaign, the official history offered two major 
observations on what the ADSEC had learned from the process of preparing for and conducting 
Overlord.  First, there had been too many U.S. headquarters trying to plan logistical support to 
the ground forces.  Among ETOUSA/SOS (eventually COMZ), FECZ, ADSEC, and the G-4 
sections at SHAEF, 21st AG, and FUSAG, according to the ADSEC historian, “…it soon became 
apparent that this was an unnecessary and unduly burdensome multiplicity of headquarters, and 
that a proper coordination of plans between the many echelons was virtually impossible… 
[contributing to] a paucity of coordination between FECZ and COMZ on the one hand, and 
 
13 Operational History of the ADSEC, ETOUSA, August 1945 RG 407, Entry 427, Box 190.   
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between FECZ and ADSEC on the other.”14  As is clear in the official history of the 
organization, ADSEC did the majority of the detailed planning for logistical support up to D+41 
and, really, for the entire lodgment phase running out to D+90.  Adding FECZ and 
ETOUSA/SOS to the mix just increased the chance for miscommunication between the 
ETOUSA community and the maneuver commands (SHAEF, 21st AG, and FUSAG).  ADSEC 
worked on operational planning full-time, as their only duty, and had mastery of the latest facts 
and figures from both the sustainment and maneuver realm.  Because FECZ and SOS were not 
collocated with the maneuver headquarters they supported and had other duties beyond 
operational planning, they could not provide the up-to-date and nuanced answers to detailed 
questions from SHAEF or ASF about Overlord.15  FECZ or SOS might provide the right answer 
but stumble with the details that supported it, thus coming across to the office asking the 
questions as uninformed.  This is precisely what happened during the argument over truck 
companies in April and May among ASF, SHAEF, and ETOUSA.  The result was a loss of 
confidence in ETOUSA/SOS with no corresponding increase in resources to support the invasion 
that might have justified the additional staff work and interpersonal friction the incident 
produced.   
 The second major problem addressed by the official history was that ADSEC needed 
additional intermediate combined-service staff organizations between themselves and the group, 
regiment, and battalion headquarters of the various service units assigned to the command in 
 
14 Appendix 3: An Examination of Some Problems Encountered by ADSEC and their Solution before and during the 
European Operations” to the Operational History of the ADSEC, ETOUSA, Aug 45, 3.  RG 407, Entry 427, Box 
190.   
15 ADSEC was in Bristol with 1st Army.  FECZ remained in London while 21st AG and its FUSAG cell relocated to 
Portsmouth.  ETOUSA/SOS was split up between London and Cheltenham, but Lee and Lord admitted that the 
London portion of the command was overwhelmed with Bolero and the Overlord mounting plan well into July. 
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order to coordinate complex activities.16  The command was forced to create provisional 
battalion and group headquarters and to shift senior staff officers over to command ports, depots, 
and regulating stations to supervise activity requiring more than one service to work closely 
together.  Typically, the largest single-service command at a location formed the core of the 
combined staff, but it required augmentation from other sources.  It also needed a director with 
some experience merging the actions of three to six services.17  This was not a problem unique to 
ADSEC, but it was exacerbated by the massive scope of responsibility of the command relative 
to its size, its traditional doctrinal role, and the rank structure of staff section leaders.  Ground 
combat forces learned during the war the value of combined arms at the lowest levels, and 
logistical tasks were no different in this regard.  Most missions were best accomplished by a mix 
of various technical experts coordinated by one commander.  Unlike the combat command in an 
armored division or the pairing of artillery and infantry in a standard division, the U.S. Army did 
not create standing combined-service logistical formations below the base section level.18    
 ADSEC backed into a realization that the U.S. Army had to think differently about 
logistics.  Months of intensive experience had taught them that most support missions required 
the coordinated effort of a range of technical experts.  A weakness of the Army was its lack of 
standing combined-service battalions and regiments or groups.  Because of this, base sections 
and COMZ found themselves constantly in the business of breaking up organizations and 
reassigning companies and battalions to form mission-specific teams.  Leadership was furnished 
 
16 Appendix 3, Official History of ADSEC, 5.   
17 Men with experience running an area or district command in the U.K. were an excellent source of such leaders, as 
were senior officers on the ADSEC and FECZ staff.  Plank had been a base section commander in the U.K. for 
almost two years, which gave him a ready mental database of men to draw upon. 
18 The ASF consisted of companies, battalions, and groups/regiments provided by each service.  Multi-service staffs 
or organizations did not exist in the peacetime or state-side army.  Creating an SOS, base section, or constituent 
district and area commands was an ad hoc process each time one was established. 
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by a core element provided by one service, augmented by technical advisors from other 
specialties or by completely ad hoc organizations.  Plank’s ADSEC was a victim of this lack of 
combined-service headquarters itself.  Placed in charge of an organization called an ADSEC, 
Plank did not perform the doctrinally defined mission of an advanced section until approximately 
November 1944.  During the first half of its existence, ADSEC carried much of the burden of 
planning logistical support during Overlord, a task that according to U.S. doctrine should have 
been performed by SOS (or its designated subordinate, FECZ).  In Normandy the command 
functioned simultaneously as an advanced section and as a base section, and it took on some of 
the synchronization role that should have been filled by ETOUSA/COMZ.  Despite being 
resourced as if he were running a base section, Plank managed to accomplish all these missions 
reasonably well while retaining the trust and respect of both COMZ and 12th AG.  It speaks 
volumes about the professionalism of his team and the advantages offered by proximity to the 
maneuver command and a sole focus and purpose.  It was also a win for SOS, even if the 
organization was originally forced upon Lee and established too late in the process.  Plank’s 
performance in France was impress; the problems eventually experienced centered around the 
timing and quality of the transfer of authority to COMZ in August. 
 
 COMZ Is Overwhelmed When Committed to Combat in August and September 
In his original concept for how transitions would occur, Lee assumed that FECZ would 
take over a zone to the rear of 1st Army at some point in July and then be replaced by COMZ at 
about the same time SHAEF took over from 21st AG.  But Bradley delayed his designation of a 
rear boundary until 2 August, and the rationale behind some intermediate stage between ADSEC 
and COMZ control made less and less sense.  Lee visited FECZ in France for the first time on 28 
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July, and the change in plans accelerated after that point.  Vaughan was recalled to take over the 
U.K. Base Section in early August, and on 7 August Lee activated COMZ on the continent.  
After less than three weeks at Valognes, Lord supervised the displacement of the forward 
command post to Paris, phased in over a two-week period, where they were joined by the last 
elements of the SOS staff arriving from Cheltenham and London.       
It is difficult to evaluate the efforts, much less the effectiveness, of the activities 
conducted by LTG Lee and COMZ during this time from the command’s written records.  The 
command did not seem to have a daily operations log or diary and did not leave behind orders or 
decision papers that could provide insight into command priorities.  It is often easier to gain 
insight on what COMZ was doing by looking at records from SHAEF or 12th Army Group.  But 
some clues are offered by the travel itineraries of Lee and Stratton, cables into and out of COMZ, 
notes from recurring meetings, and daily summaries submitted by each staff section.  Lee’s 
ability to influence events on the continent was complicated by the need to bounce back and 
forth between Cheltenham and Normandy throughout August.19   
What the accessible written record does suggest is that COMZ remained aware of what 
was occurring in France and that the various chiefs of services played an active role in problem-
solving in August and September.  There are records that suggest the command was on top of 
combat shortages and losses and coordinated the delivery of replacement material from the U.S., 
U.K., and other theaters.  The general staff at Cheltenham maintained functional lines of 
communication with the combat elements in France, other theaters, and departments and 
ministries in both Allied countries.  SOS continued to manage the deployment system out of the 
 
19 SOS C&S, 6 Aug 44.  Lee informed the audience he would move to the continental headquarters the next day but 
return in a week for the next command and staff meeting.  Lee continued to bounce back and forth between France 
and the UK for the next month. 
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U.K. while coordinating all the details associated with pulling supplies out of depots and loading 
them onto transportation for delivery to France.  These sorts of tasks played to the strength of the 
ETOUSA/SOS staff and accounted for a good deal of their available time and energy between 
June and September.  The tasks resembled what the command had done in support of Torch and 
Bolero for years.  But the planning and synchronization of logistical support on the continent 
continued to be a vacuum COMZ was uncomfortable filling.    
The key operational node for ETOUSA was the element collocated with SHAEF that fell 
under the direction of MG Lord, but any sort of records capturing the results of important 
meetings, decisions made, or the ongoing priorities of work are exceedingly difficult to find if 
they exist at all.  Minutes exist for only three of the command and staff meetings hosted by Lord 
with his element in London in August.  The records of the August meetings show that Lord and 
the SOS team in London had a lot on their plate.  The meeting on 1 August was dominated by 
deployment planning.   Seventy soldiers were due to depart on 7 August, followed by 300 a day 
beginning on 10 August.20  Some personnel traveled by plane, while others went by ship, which 
typically required five or more days from departure to arrival at the final command post.  The 
headquarters would eventually number 1,500 soldiers in France, and their coordination was 
complicated by the simultaneous deployment of Base Sections No. 2, quickly followed by No. 1, 
and the advanced headquarters for SHAEF.  
 The complexity associated with moving the headquarters consumed much of Lord’s 
attention; this subsection of COMZ did not conduct another formal meeting until 11 August.  
The meeting was short, and it focused exclusively on redeployment and administrative issues in 
the U.K.  The meeting on 18 August saw the first meaningful comments about the operational 
 
20 SOS/COMZ Command and Staff Notes, 1 Aug 44.  RG 498, UD 578, Box 3883. 
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situation in France; Lord’s response to an overview of the situation was direct: “I don’t think we 
can be too happy about the logistical effort.  We have to get the trains back again.”21  COMZ 
was also confronted by three new significant distractions – turning over support in Britain to the 
new U.K. Base Section, complying with a directed ten per cent manpower reduction and 
bouncing the forward headquarters from Valognes to Paris as quickly as possible.22  The relative 
importance of these various missions cannot be gauged, but Lord opened the meeting talking 
about the manpower reduction, saving a review of the logistical situation in France for the last 
item on the agenda.  Regardless how much he wanted to contribute to the solution, then, Lord 
was distracted with a number of other priorities in August and the first week of September.   
Although they had a much larger range of responsibilities than just logistics in France, 
the main SOS headquarters at Cheltenham was engaged in supporting Overlord.  Details of staff 
activities in July and August are difficult to find, but clues about major concerns exist.  Through 
the end of August 1944, Lee received a daily summary from each of his staff sections, who 
outlined ongoing issues and recent decisions.  Along with the transcript from the weekly 
command and staff meeting, these summaries provide some insight on the priorities of the 
organization at a decisive point in the campaign.  Routine administrative comments far 
outnumbered weighty decisions from late July to the end of August, but the command was 
involved in sustaining the fight in France.  The G-4 was aware of what types of supplies were 
 
21 Ibid, 18 Aug 44.   
22 The notes from the meeting indicated that this was Lord’s decision, and it was something that took the staff by 
surprise.  In his interview with Pogue for The Supreme Command, Lee confirmed that Lord made the decision when 
to displace from Normandy to Paris, and in hindsight the command might have benefitted by waiting an additional 
week.  The interview was conducted on 21 March 1947 and the transcript is in Pogue’s notes for The Supreme 
Command at AHEC.  To provide some perspective on the transportation cost associated with this move, it required 
four truck companies to move the SOS from London and Cheltenham to the Southern Base Section for deployment 
to France.  The shift from Normandy to Paris probably required the same resources, and it tied those trucks down for 
two to four days, depending on how many trips were required.  See 14 Aug 44 daily report from COMZ G-4, RG 
498, UD 389, Box 2573 and UD 578, Box 3887.    
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being delivered to the continent by emergency air transport, although they had nothing to do with 
actually selecting those items or establishing priorities for the combat zone.  Just by sharing this 
information with the rest of the COMZ staff, the G-4 helped ensure that the technical services 
understood shortages as they emerged.  This in turn helped COMZ and the special staff pinpoint 
where to watch the requisition and planning processes more carefully to determine why 
emergency shortages were developing in the first place.  On 28 July air transportation moved 
about a ton of repair parts for various weapons, and on 31 July it was five tons of tank parts and 
an additional ton of signal equipment.23  Somervell and Lutes would not have been surprised that 
one of the first minor breakdowns within the ETOUSA logistics system involved repair parts for 
guns and tracked vehicles.24 
COMZ was also involved in hunting down weapons that were in high demand on the 
continent, looking to transfer them from other theaters or draw them from local depots.  On 23 
August the command noted a problem with the quantity and quality of Allied tanks.  Losses to 
that point in the campaign had averaged twenty percent, and the Allied tanks and guns had 
problems knocking out Panthers and Tigers at moderate to long range.  Part of the British 
solution to this penetration problem was to ask COMZ for any extra 90mm anti-aircraft guns the 
U.S. might be willing to transfer.  A few days later COMZ facilitated the movement of 76,000 
rounds of excess 155 mm ammunition from the British inventory to 12th AG; in late August 
SHAEF asked Lee to coordinate the transfer of 300 60 mm mortars and 300,000 rounds of 
ammunition from the Middle East.25  COMZ received indirect confirmation that, in general, the 
 
23 SOS daily staff summaries, 28 and 31 Jul 44.  RG 498, UD 389, Box 2573 and UD 578, Box 3887.   
24 Lutes pointed out major concerns with ETOUSA’s management of repair parts in his report at the end of his 
investigation of the command in May 1944.  Repair parts was a problem area for the U.S. Army in every theater 
throughout the war.  
25 25 August Daily Report from the G-4.   
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ammunition supply chain was working when on 19 August 12th AG asked to increase the theater 
reserve objectives up to seven units of fire at the army level with seven more in COMZ reserves, 
an increase of two units of fire.  Included with the request was a confirmation that sufficient 
rounds existed on the continent to make this adjustment for all types of ammunition other than 81 
mm and 155 mm.  
In addition to managing weapons and ammunition, COMZ was also heavily involved in 
restoring units that had been depleted in combat, or had arrived from the United States with 
equipment shortages.  The COMZ G1 and G4 spent a good amount of time managing the 
rebuilding of the 82nd and 101st and bringing the newly established 1st Allied Airborne Army up 
to strength.  The pending arrival of the 94th and 95th Infantry Divisions also required special 
attention from the chain of command.26   
The COMZ element still working out of Cheltenham throughout August was aware of the 
major challenges faced by organizations in France, even if they did not have all of the details 
associated with the problems readily available.  The engineers were worried about moving 
Bailey bridges and other heavy equipment to the continent on 13 August; the equipment already 
in France had been consumed with the rapid expansion of bridge repair since the breakout.  On 
19 August the G-4 outlined how the transportation crunch was starting to impact the theater, 
reporting how work on the POL pipelines had stopped because construction materials could not 
be shuttled to the engineers.  No one at the headquarters was sure exactly how far the pipelines 
had been advanced, but they understood how important the capability was to maintaining the 
pursuit.27  The section also reported that, because all of the heavy POL trucks had been 
 
26 SOS C&S, 13 Aug 44.  RG 498, UD 578, ADM 458. 
27 SOS C&S, 13 Aug 44. 
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committed to supporting the armies, not enough aviation gasoline (avgas) was reaching 9th AF.  
The recommended solution was to ship it to the continent in 55-gallon drums and use standard 
trucks to deliver the barrels to the forward airfields.  By the last week of August, it was obvious 
at COMZ headquarters that the anticipated transportation crunch had started to develop.28  
Littlejohn was working primarily on the continent by 20 August, and he brought up how the 
shortage of transportation was hampering his efforts to move supplies forward.29  Fixing the rail 
lines would help. Progress was being made, but not quickly enough to satisfy the attendees at the 
weekly command and staff meeting.  The intensified need for telephone poles and coal had come 
as nasty surprises. 
Overwhelmed by the pending move to Paris and by their duties as the COMZ on the 
continent, the staff received permission to discontinue the daily report after 31 August.  COMZ 
held its last command and staff meeting at Cheltenham on 3 September, turning over 
responsibility for coordination with the British ministries to Vaughan’s U.K. Base Section that 
same day.  The next set of notes for a command and staff meeting did not appear until 29 
September.  The daily staff summary stopped being of any help in revealing the priorities at 
COMZ at the beginning of September, and the month-long gap in transcripts from the command 
and staff obscured what the organization was working on for this critical period. 
 Ruppenthal’s account of ETOUSA’s performance in August and September supports the 
contention that at best COMZ was irrelevant in the effort to improve the flow of material to the 
 
28 Despite anticipating the problem with insufficient transportation, and recognizing its arrival, COMZ seemed 
incapable of making tough decisions in the allocation of transportation.  During the COMZ command and staff 
meeting on 12 August Lee approved the shipment of 5,000 tons of beer and soda supplies a month to the continent 
for disbursement by the Army Exchange.  The goal was to have soda and beer at the exchanges by 1 October.  A 
minor issue when seen in isolation, this decision illustrated how COMZ seemed almost incapable of ruthlessly 
enforcing Spartan conditions in order to deliver only the essentials necessary to drive the Allied armies forward. 
29 SOS C&S, 20 Aug 44. 
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combat divisions.  The first references to involvement in operational decision making by Lee, 
Stratton, or COMZ occurred in late August and early September.  Lee and Stratton were present 
for the periodic huddles hosted by Bradley, and the meeting on 30 August was noted by 
Ruppenthal as a pivotal moment in the deterioration in the relationship between COMZ and 12th 
AG.  Before and after this meeting Moses rejected in writing that Stratton would come through 
on the delivery figures he promised at the meeting; Moses went on to record his overall 
disappointment with COMZ’s performance to date and shared that assessment with his deputy.30  
At this stage of the campaign Moses’ major complaint was the contradiction between what the 
COMZ promised to deliver and what actually arrived at the front that was of any use.  
A much nastier problem was brewing around the same time between VIII Corps and 
COMZ over the adequate provision of artillery ammunition for the siege of Brest.  It was the first 
time COMZ was asked to provide better logistical support in order to overcome a major tactical 
problem holding up progress with the overall ground campaign.  Coming so soon after Lee 
assumed control of the zone of communications, it exposed the flaws within the organization.  It 
took almost three weeks to set up a system to routinely deliver artillery ammunition to VIII 
Corps that LTG Middleton considered sufficient to support his assault on Brest.  In the process, 
COMZ learned that it did not have the systems in place to issue clear orders to base sections, 
acknowledge those orders had been received, and monitor completion of the directed task.  
Stratton promised ammunition that was not available on the continent, committed the 
transportation service to deliver an impossible quantity of supplies with the time provided to do 
so, and showed that the G-4 section could not synchronize the two base sections and OCOT to 
 
30 Ruppenthal, Vol. I, 491, note 12 and 13. 
575 
 
conduct a major logistical operation.31  At one point confusion and frustration reached a level at 
which LTC Edwin N. Clark, a liaison officer dispatched from SHAEF to try to solve the 
problem, radioed MG Lord and BG Stratton and asked: “What in the name of Pete is wrong with 
Com Zone?”32 
What was wrong was that this was the COMZ general staff’s first attempt to coordinate 
support involving two base sections and two technical services under combat conditions.  
Stratton made the mistake of assuming that, because he had ordered something, it would actually 
happen.  He also believed the estimates provided by OCOT that outlined the tonnage that a 
combination of trains, LSTs, and trucks could move to Brest on the timeline directed.  Finally, he 
believed the imprecise inventory records COMZ had inherited from ADSEC and FECZ, which in 
this case proved to be incorrect.  Before the situation was resolved it had pulled in 
representatives from SHAEF, 12th AG, and 3rd Army to join the main players of COMZ, Brittany 
and Normandy Base Sections, and VIII Corps.  In what seemed to be an overreaction, SHAEF 
G-4 pushed the issue relentlessly between 6 and 12 September, resulting in a flood of 
ammunition to VIII Corps that consumed precious transportation resources.  By 12 September 
the corps had 13,000 tons of ammunition under its control, and more was on the away.  By 18 
September, after the capture of Brest, the corps had 25,000 tons of artillery ammunition in its 
local storage points.33  This overreaction that tied down so much ammunition and transportation 
at the same time SHAEF was trying to break through German defenses in front of 1st and 3rd 
Army was probably more harmful than the initial breakdown in communication and supply in 
August.  And all of this was for an objective that almost everyone realized was insignificant 
 
31 Ruppenthal, Vol. I, 530-537.   
32 Radio message, Clark to Lord and Stratton, 6 Sep 44, SHAEF G-3 O&E Ammo, in Ruppenthal, Vol. I, 534. 
33 Ruppenthal, Vol. I, 535.   
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above the most basic tactical level.34  Near the end of this incident, LTC Leander H. Harrison, an 
officer from the 12th AG ordnance section, summed up why the situation had been such a mess.  
He mentioned insufficient planning by all agencies involved, a lack of coordination among the 
various supply nodes, absence of any follow up by COMZ, vastly inflated demands from VIII 
Corps, overoptimistic promises of deliveries by COMZ, and involvement by too many parties in 
trying to run the show.35  This list of shortcomings at ETOUSA/COMZ and in two base sections 
is not surprising based on the experience levels of these organizations.  It was unfortunate for the 
Allies that COMZ had been invested with so much authority with so little oversight and that the 
command was so woefully unprepared for any task that did not resemble the skill set perfected to 
run Bolero.  SHAEF and COMZ learned from these mistakes, but in the process they missed key 
opportunities that presented themselves in August and September.    
 It had not taken Gale long to realize that Lee and his staff at COMZ were in over their 
heads as the pursuit picked up momentum near the end of August.  At the same time 21st Army 
Group and the British War Office were discussing voluntarily cutting back imports to the 
continent by half, ETOUSA reported that they hoped to increase their discharge rate by 150% in 
September.  These projections drove Gale to send a message to Lee asking him to explain how 
he hoped to unload 45,000 tons a day and 112,000 personnel by the end of September when the 
U.S. Army had struggled to reach 30,000 tons a day in August.36  Concern over COMZ was not 
restricted to Gale and the professional logisticians.  On 6 September at his daily meeting at 
SHAEF “The CoS [Smith] expressed himself forcibly…on the general administrative set up, 
 
34 Ruppenthal, Vol. I, 535.  Ruppenthal suggests that some of the early friction within COMZ was caused by their 
realization that Brest was an unnecessary diversion that would consume resources without providing a return.  See 
chapter five of this study for details on the discussion of the Brittany Ports occurring at SHAEF and ETOUSA.   
35 Memo, Harrison for Nisley, 10 Sep 44, in Ruppenthal, Vol. I, 537. 
36 Gale to Lee, 28 Aug 44, Gale Papers, I/3, Secretary/CAO/5, File No. 2, 1 Aug 44 – 15 Jan 45, Liddell Hart 
Center, King’s College. 
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especially on the U.S. side.  He has the same views as I [Gale] have and seems unable to effect 
any change in the set up.  As a result it looks to me as if we shall get more control of the C.Z. 
which is badly in need of it.” 37  As supply problems slowed and then ended the pursuit, knowing 
that Eisenhower was not interested in firing Lee or reorganizing ETOUSA, Smith and Gale 
realized the only remaining solution was to exert more direct control over the execution of 
theater logistics.   
There was a strange and short-lived interlude from around 12 to 18 September where 
Bradley and Lee managed to convince SHAEF that the U.S. supply situation was not as bad as 
suspected, and was on the rapid mend.  As a result, Smith passed along this assessment of the 
overall U.S. logistics situation to Montgomery on 15 September:   
Hodges Army has sufficient reserve of petrol to take it to the Rhine and it has 
enough ammunition for 5 days of fighting.  Patton’s Army has enough petrol to establish 
it across the Moselle and enough reserve ammunition for from 3 to 4 days fighting.  
Truck supply on a basis of 500 tons per day was scheduled to start this morning to 21 AG 
as per our conversation.  In addition, SPAATZ bombers are going to be able to airlift 
about 1,000 tons per day, principally petrol and ammunition, of which about 500 tons 
will go into 21 AG Area….On the whole our supply situation is now healthy and will 
improve daily.38   
 
 Doubtlessly Smith believed this to be true, and Bradley and Lee were the most likely 
sources of this information, which was completely inaccurate in almost every detail.   
Gale, already suspicious, continued to probe below the surface of COMZ’s reports for the 
truth.  Gale, frustrated with his lack of progress in reducing the backlog of ships awaiting 
discharge, wrote in his diary on 16 September that the problem was “unfixable, despite his 
repeated efforts to work through the issues, and a string of promises that a solution was just 
 
37 Gale’s Official Diary, 6 Sep 44. 
38 Smith to Montgomery, 15 Sep 44, Gale Papers, I/5, Cables Received and Dispatched, Liddell Hart Center, King’s 
College. 
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around the corner emanating from ETOUSA.  Three days later Gale recorded that he “Saw 
Eisenhower and talked to him about COMZ and its capabilities.  He does not appear inclined to 
exert any more control over Lee and let us hope the fact that we are going to have our HQ near 
his will make things easier.”39  On the 22nd Gale huddled with Crawford, Bond, and Whipple, 
trying to iron out a comprehensive assessment of the theater logistics situation before taking his 
appraisal to Eisenhower.  The group consensus was that sporadic delivery of fuel continued to be 
the critical issue for Bradley, and that SHAEF did not have enough reliable information about 
supplies on which to base its recommendations to the commander.  COMZ was either keeping 
secrets, was oblivious themselves, or a combination of the two.40  By 4 October this suspicion 
had hardened into a conclusion; Gale and Crawford told Eisenhower that all the numbers 
provided by ETOUSA never added up – subjected to any real scrutiny, they tended to collapse – 
calling into question all the data about what had been moved and delivered to the various front-
line units.  SHAEF was planning in the dark, and it seemed that the only way to get better data 
was to take over management of the communications zone themselves. 
 This timing associated with this loss in confidence in COMZ’s capabilities by the senior 
leaders at SHAEF was unfortunate.  The first five weeks of work on the continent were hard on 
COMZ, but the organization began to get a grip on things once the entire staff was consolidated 
in Paris by mid-September.  By 29 September Lee was comfortable enough that the supply crisis 
had passed to call for the first full-scale COMZ command and staff meeting to be held on the 
continent.  The meeting was held in Paris, with Lee, Lord, and Stratton present at the event.41  
 
39 Gale Official Diary, 19 Sep 44. 
40 Gale Official Diary, 22 Sep 44. 
41 COMZ C&S, 29 Sep 44.  Transcripts for the SOS weekly command and staff meeting can be found in at least 
three separate locations in RG 498, none of which include any record of a meeting between 3 and 29 September.  It 
is possible that a full command and staff meeting occurred during this gap and the notes were misplaced.     
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Larkin, now acting at the commander of the Southern LoC (SOLOC) supporting Devers’ 6th 
Army Group, had flown up from southern France, and Plank represented the ADSEC.  The 
difference in the tone of the transcripts between early and late September is remarkable.  The 
conversation was dominated by logistical concerns that were emerging from ongoing operations.  
The chief of engineers talked about finding and moving construction material to extend the POL 
pipelines as his primary concern.  The ordnance representative confirmed that he was aware of 
and working to fix the shortage of tires and tanks engines, and to improve repair work in the field 
in general.  Obviously, complaints from the combat zone had reached Lee, who asked the team 
to ensure that they were not shipping uncalled for items to the front.  For the first time ever, most 
of the discussion at Lee’s command and staff meeting focused on operational issues, and the staff 
demonstrated that they were aware of problems impacting the fighters and was taking actions 
designed to solve those problems.  By early October COMZ seemed to have turned the corner 
and had begun to function as an experienced and combat-focused command.  Unfortunately for 
Lee, this development occurred too late to hold off SHAEF’s assumption of many of the critical 
functions originally reserved for COMZ.     
 
 Insights from the General Board Reports on Sustainment in ETOUSA 
Obviously the COMZ staff learned in the crucible of combat, and they demonstrated 
increased proficiency through the fall of 1944.  SHAEF and 12th AG had dismissed COMZ as 
irrelevant or obstructionists in September and October, an assessment reinforced by Stratton’s 
poor support of VIII Corps during the siege of Brest.  And yet by late October COMZ thought 
that the theater supply and transportation system was in great shape.  In November COMZ 
managed to bury the armies under a mountain of supplies while shifting all the material left 
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behind in Normandy to appropriate storage locations and beginning to amass reserves in the 
ADSEC zone.  External inspection teams led by Lutes and Somervell gave COMZ a moderate 
level of validation in December and January, although they were pressed to fix a few issues that 
had challenged the command since its inception. This time SHAEF ruthlessly tracked 
ETOUSA’s work until the problems were fixed.  By the end of the war COMZ believed it had 
improved its performance as much as possible, although there might still have been a few areas 
of logistical support that would have benefited from changes to organization and procedures that 
were beyond Lee’s control to implement.  
The General Board process, launched by Eisenhower in the late summer of 1945, 
provided an opportunity for ETOUSA to assess their performance, identify what got fixed, when, 
and how, and what changes needed to occur across the Army to institutionalize these 
improvements.  Ross, Littlejohn, and Lord were faced by a delicate task when Lee solicited their 
input on the topics that should be addressed in the reports COMZ would prepare.  It would be 
important to capture important tasks and skills that COMZ and ETOUSA had struggled to get 
right and to address problem areas that the command was still struggling with at the end of the 
war.  But if Lee’s subordinates tried to tackle any major procedural shortfalls with COMZ, such 
criticism would immediately reflect poorly on Lee’s leadership.  It might also call into question 
decisions taken by SHAEF and the ASF, or even the War Department.  Big problems were likely 
to track back to big mistakes, which might lead one to conclude that the War Department and 
SHAEF had failed to properly prepare for or to react to logistical challenges on the continent.  
Confronting such ugly truths out in the open would be a critical test of the professionalism of the 
U.S. Army, a test USFET seemingly decided to avoid.  
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There were a number of similarities in the topics recommended for review by Ross and 
Lord.42  Lord tended to focus on the big picture of theater and COMZ organization and 
ETOUSA’s interaction with all service troops and sections, while Ross was more concerned with 
the details within transportation.   But both officers recommended thorough reviews of six 
common topics.  Many items on the two lists suggested that the theater had dropped the ball in 
their efforts to be ready to perform the right tasks before the start of the campaign and, even 
worse, that solutions had not been universally implemented before the war’s end.  The topics 
included depot management, air transport and resupply, maintenance systems, the supply 
requisition process, the best configuration of the Transportation Service, and an evaluation of the 
service troop basis.  In some cases, Ross and Lord realized that ETOUSA had developed 
excellent organizations and procedures that needed to be comprehensively captured for inclusion 
in doctrine and education curricula, but in other cases the causes of friction lay beyond theater 
logisticians’ control and would have to be forwarded to more senior officers to fix at their level. 
Ross’s submission provided a bit more detail for each suggested topic, outlining the key 
aspects of the subject on which his six-man team should focus their research and writing.43  Ross 
though his team had mastered about half a dozen complex processes that deserved to be 
meticulously studied for the lessons, procedures, organizational diagrams, and manning 
documents they would yield to future doctrine and education.  The developments that needed to 
be captured included the decision to centralize the integration of rail, motor, water, and air 
transport under OCOT control; the establishment of TC sections at the army group and army 
 
42 Reply from Ross to Lee, 11 Aug 45.   Response from Lord to Lee, 17 Aug 45.  RG 498, UD 1089, Box 5122.   
43 Ross to Lee, 11 Aug 45.  RG 498, UD 1089, Box 5122.  Attached to Ross’s overview was a seventeen-page 
outline introducing each topic, its critical components, and guidance on specific aspects he wanted his writing team 
to tackle.  Ross also identified by name the six-man team he was allocating to the project, which would be led by 
now COL Ayers.  
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level with LNOs down to the division level; ETOUSA’s management of air transport at the end 
of the war; highway/traffic control and centralized management of motor transport assets; and 
documentation associated with getting supplies to the correct destination.  These were all areas 
that Ross implied had been fixed, or sufficiently developed by the end of the war to standardize 
and consider for Army-wide implementation.     
But a few areas had not been adequately addressed by the end of the war and required 
further study and refinement.  Lord recognized the importance of synchronizing and integrating 
joint logistics, projecting the need for more cooperation in the future and asserting that there had 
been too much autonomy and inefficiency between Army, Army Air Force, and Navy 
sustainment efforts in the ETO.  Problems with maintaining vehicles once they were in the field 
had never been solved.   They solution would require improved operator training, having enough 
repair specialists at the division level and above, but, most critically, figuring out how to stock, 
manage, and requisition repair parts across the theater.  Spares was one example of the problem 
with stock control that had plagued the theater since the fall of 1942.  Because so many services 
and branches were involved in running their own depots, Lee could never standardize their 
operating and reporting procedures.  Even under relatively static conditions in the UK or on the 
continent, the base sections and SOS could never consolidate a clear picture of what items were 
available where.  Once the complexity associated with mobile combat operations, transfer of 
depots from one organization to another, and a theater-wide transportation network that received 
and distributed thousands of tons of supplies daily was introduced, the task became impossible.  
Nothing short of a revolution in communications technology or a much greater comfort level 
with redundant safety valves and emergency stocks located with forward units could fix this 
problem.   
583 
 
Littlejohn, Ross, and Moses all understood and stressed the importance of capturing 
ETOUSA’s practical experience in the next updates to U.S. doctrine, professional education 
programs, and training.  Ross specifically mentioned a series of FMs, TMs, regulations, and 
theater SOPs should be referenced when writing future doctrine.  Ross knew (but could not 
openly say) that QM truck units had problems with their manning, equipment, and training, and 
he wanted to conduct a complete study of the same issues across the entire force structure of the 
Transportation Corps.  Lord and Ross realized that doctrine had been a major cause of the 
problems in the theater requisition system and required a top-to-bottom review and overhaul.  
ETOUSA had learned the hard way that the system had to project requirements out across a 90-
day window, account for limitations to communications methodology under certain combat 
conditions, reconcile time and procedures to validate and prioritize requirements against means 
of transportation, and control the process by which transportation was directed to pick and 
deliver supplies from one location to the final destination.  Both leaders understood and 
addressed the added complexity introduced by the need to coordinate with the War Department 
and other theaters to justify medium- and long-range requirements and to manage local surpluses 
and shortages.  Ross and Lord stressed that official guidance had to account for how long these 
steps took.  Realistic systems also had to account for the limits to communication imposed 
during mobile operations, uncertainty introduced by combat conditions and human frailty, and 
the importance of lateral and horizontal staff coordination in this process.     
Not mentioned in the discussion of topics that should be taken up by the General Board 
was the division of authority between a regional general staff and the technical service sections.  
By May 1945 the special staff at ETOUSA had largely won out over their general staff 
counterparts at COMZ.  Somervell’s initiative to pull the services under his tight control within 
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the ASF did not survive the immediate aftermath of the war, just as the ETOUSA special staff 
had reemerged as the key players in synchronizing logistical support for the field armies with 
very little direct supervision by COMZ.  SHAEF, the ETOUSA special staff, base sections, and 
12th AG/ADSEC emerged as the dominant forces in planning and synchronizing logistical 
support.  ETOUSA/COMZ had learned what their unique role was in coordinating sustainment at 
the theater level, but that role was very different from the one espoused by Lee and Somervell 
during the first two-a-half years of the war.  
Lord understood this was an important topic and recommended it to the General Board, 
but he had nothing original to add to the system that had already been tried in the U.K. during the 
first half of Devers’ time in command of ETOUSA.  Lord had adopted the argument that the 
supreme commander needed two deputy commanders -- one for operations, one for 
administration.  Lord chose not to address how this U.S. structure would mesh with a joint-
combined headquarters served by component commands.  Finally, Lord acknowledged that 
highly mobile operations such as the pursuit after Cobra and the overrunning of Nazi Germany in 
spring 1945 required special management.  Under these conditions, combat units needed to have 
more say over priorities and control over service units.  In general, the COMZ needed the ability 
to emphasize decentralized operations in some areas under special conditions without generating 
a free-for-all at the theater level.  How exactly to pull this off Lord left to the General Board.   
 
 Problems at ETOUSA/COMZ G-4 
We have seen how ETOUSA/COMZ struggled to prepare for operations in France and 
then for the challenges the command faced while trying control logistical support to the armies 
during its first two months on the continent.  Overarching problems with COMZ command and 
control were suggested by dissatisfaction at 12th AG and SHAEF and by the critical self-
585 
 
assessment that emerged from within ETOUSA at the end of the war.  The two most important 
general staff sections within SOS and COMZ were the G-1 and G-4.  The G-1 supervised the 
special staff sections associated with technical support to individuals, provision of manpower to 
the command, and the health and morale of assigned soldiers.  It was a difficult job, but in 
general, few faulted COMZ for the quality of support it provided to the individual soldier.  
Adequate provision of replacements was a problem area, but is not a focus for this work.  The G-
3, normally the most important and powerful general staff section in a combat formation, had a 
much-reduced roll at ETOUSA and then COMZ, which we will examine in more detail below.   
In COMZ, the G-4 displaced the G-3 as the nerve center of the command.  Lord, 
followed by Stratton in November 1943, controlled the most important general staff section in 
the organization.  Lee expected his G-4 to supervise and coordinate the half of the special staff 
that managed its own stock of supplies and equipment, built and maintained the various methods 
of bulk distribution, and provided direct logistical support to the combat forces.  This included 
the theater engineer, chief of medical services, ordnance, transportation, quartermaster, chemical 
warfare section, and signal section.  G-3 assigned service units to the armies and base sections, 
but the G-4 translated missions and projects into the specific number of units to be allocated, and 
it recommended what work got cut or delayed when there were not enough troops to go around.  
Each service was supposed to figure out what it needed to stock, where to store these materials 
throughout the depth of the communications zone, and how to employ its forces to accomplish 
the dozens of missions assigned, but only the G-4 could synchronize these disparate efforts, or 
delegate responsibility for coordination to a base section or ad hoc combined-service command.  
ETOUSA could cooperate, both internally and externally, and attempt to get the job done, but 
only the G-4, acting on behalf of the commander, could order the execution of support activities 
586 
 
and decide who received resources and who went without.  Finally, the G-4 had the final say on 
what operations were considered logistically feasible and what the ETOUSA/COMZ position 
was on logistical priorities and requirements to ASF, the War Department, and SHAEF.  It was a 
massive amount of responsibility for a small section headed by a man who had joined the SOS 
seven months before the start of Overlord wearing the rank of a colonel.  It was a difficult 
enough job when Stratton was only the SOS G-4, but the job became even more difficult after 
the merger with ETOUSA in mid-January.  It did not help matters that none of the senior officers 
within the ETOUSA/SOS G-4 had any meaningful combat experience in a senior logistics 
command prior to August 1944.      
There were strong indicators that the ETOUSA G-4 struggled to adjust to their new role 
immediately after the merger with the SOS.  Stratton stepped up to fill the position, one that had 
been empty since Crawford’s transfer to COSSAC and then to SHAEF back in the late fall.  
Initially the section tried to take charge of operational planning for Overlord, publishing a 
planning directive on 7 February 1944 laying out a vision of how to tackle the numerous 
functions COMZ would have to master.44  The document provided a tentative troop flow to the 
continent, covering the period from D-Day to D-plus-270 in 30-day increments broken down 
between the three major subordinate commands and divided between the U.K. and the continent.  
It included bulk daily tonnage estimates in 30-day increments starting on D-plus-90 and running 
through D-plus-270 and eventually added phase line projections on a map of France for the same 
time period.45  This planning directive was primarily concerned with new installation 
requirements once on the continent, but it also asked the engineers to address new railroad and 
 
44 COL Whipple, “ETO Planning Directive A-2”, 7 Feb 44.  RG 498, UD 346 (ETOUSA G-4 Operational Planning), 
Box 1489. 
45 Planning Directive Series H-2, 24 May 44.  This document updated A-2, pushed projections out to D+360, and 
included the latest phase-line estimates from SHAEF. 
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POL construction.  The directive provided three pages of questions for the technical services and 
other general staff sections to focus their research, asking they feed the results back to the G-4.  
The surgeon, quartermaster, ordnance, and engineer sections were asked specific questions while 
all the other technical services were asked four generic questions about hardstand, covered, and 
uncovered depot requirements and shop installations. 
 
Figure 6.2: SHAEF projected force disposition at D+12046 
 
Planning Directive A-1 was not preserved in the ETOUSA G-4 records, so there is no 
way to gauge what topics it addressed or the quality of the product.  A-2 is underwhelming.  The 
document seemed to reduce the complexity of running a communications zone stretching from 
Cherbourg to the Seine to a matter of building installations and linking them with some new 
 
46 “ETO Planning Directive A-2”, 7 Feb 44.   
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railroads and a POL pipeline.  There were no specific questions whatsoever for the transportation 
section, and the questions uniquely called out for the surgeon, ordnance, quartermaster, and 
engineer sections added no clarity or insight beyond the four generic questions that headed the 
document.  Physical locations for command and control nodes and coordination centers were not 
addressed – who would select and resource these sites was not covered.  This was one task that 
the SOS was uniquely qualified to tackle that would give useful information for everyone, but it 
remained unidentified.  The author also made the rookie mistake of assuming that everyone 
could make these decisions and recommendations in a vacuum, without coordination with the 
field forces and air component, divorced from any projection of the state of the transportation 
network and service troop basis, and in isolation rather than during a collaborative and iterative 
process led by a key player on the SOS/ETOUSA staff.   
Planning directive A-2 was an admirable attempt to kick off operational planning at the 
ETOUSA level, and achieving something now is always better than waiting for the perfect 
product at some undetermined future date.  But the flaws in the document demonstrated just how 
little serious work had been done prior to its publication and how far the key players needed to 
develop before they understood what was difficult and therefore important to plan.  Based solely 
on the questions listed in this directive, Whipple understood neither the critical functions each 
service needed to provide nor how ETOUSA/COMZ might synchronize those areas in which 
half a dozen agencies needed to interact in order to accomplish the mission.  This was not a 
question of professional competence – COL Whipple would move over to SHAEF G-4 plans a 
few days after the publication of Planning Directive A-2 and would excel in that job once he was 
surrounded by experienced and operationally focused teammates.  It did illuminate the 
inexperience within the ETOUSA G-4 with theater sustainment planning, and it showed their 
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overemphasis on service-specific installations at the expense of nodes where three or four 
services needed to coordinate their activities.  It also illustrated the fact that SOS had no idea 
how to supervise and manage these interactions.  It was a good, if late, start that would need to 
be vigorously refined in the coming months.      
But early February also saw the creation of the ADSEC and FECZ, which were soon 
busy developing the plan for logistical support during the first 90 days of Overlord.  Comfortable 
with the fact that ADSEC and FECZ were working on the problem, ETOUSA G-4 turned their 
focus to other priorities.  SHAEF started detailed staff assessment on what would follow 
Overlord in mid-March, which quickly pulled them into the work completed earlier by COSSAC 
and ETOUSA, and the process just kicking off at ADSEC and FECZ.  The final result of this 
staff work on operational logistics between March and May was the FECZ COMZ plan 
published on 14 May.  The core of document was largely produced by the ADSEC staff and then 
fleshed out by FECZ and the special staff at ETOUSA.  It was a thorough, professional, and 
well-written document that covered every aspect of administrative support the team could 
imagine might be needed, but it had been developed with very little input from the general staff 
at SOS.  The document reinforced a vision of logistics as stove piped activity by technical 
branches, base sections, and service units attached to field armies.  What was missing was a 
concept for how COMZ would orchestrate this system and how information would flow to and 
from COMZ to determine critical requirements and to validate the delivery of supplies.  Also 
missing was any intent to drive meaningful conversation among the various elements of 
ETOUSA and between ETOUSA and SHAEF to balance operational objectives with logistical 
capabilities to achieve them.  The 14 May COMZ plan was a great document to drive 
sustainment in the U.K., but it did not anticipate new actions that would be critical in France, and 
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thus it did not establish procedures to accomplish those actions.  Greater involvement by the 
ETOUSA general staff in the planning process would not have guaranteed a better published 
plan, but it would have ensured that the G-4 knew what the plan was.  
The official history of the ETOUSA G-4 captures how woefully unprepared Stratton’s 
organization was to help plan and synchronize sustainment for Overlord.  The section was 
improperly organized to put the right level of attention on critical tasks that only the G-4 could 
solve, and thus the organization and division of labor within the section changed constantly 
during its first year of existence.47  The system that Lee, Lord, and Stratton wanted to use to 
control the requisition and delivery of supplies was impossible to implement under combat 
conditions, and thus it failed and was radically overhauled between August and October 1944.  
Finally, detailed planning and execution on the continent exposed the discrepancy between what 
ETOUSA claimed it was responsible for and what the headquarters could competently handle 
and produce.  Almost immediately ETOUSA surrendered their authority to lead sustainment 
planning for campaigns to 21st Army Group and then to SHAEF, and later the COMZ staff 
stopped trying to supervise task execution, a function better handled by the theater special staff 
and the base commands.  The realization that the most important staff section within the COMZ 
could not do the job it had fought so hard to retain happened at the worst possible time, directly 
contributing to the Allies stopping short of the German western defenses.   
 ETOUSA G-4 published their first memorandum outlining their internal structure on 28 
February 1944.  This document addressed the recent changes in the relationship with SHAEF 
and the organizational consolidation with the SOS.  The document listed the three primary 
 
47 In military terms, these were the wire diagram and summary of duties and responsibilities for each division, 
branch, and section.  The wire diagram depicts the sub-division of the organization into a number of every smaller 
functional agencies.  The duties, responsibilities, and assets available to each of these elements are listed. 
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functions of the section: supply, transportation, and evacuation.  In principle it acknowledged the 
administrative and operational mission of the organization, emphasizing the requirement to 
provide “advice as to the extent of the administrative support that can be given for any proposed 
strategic or tactical line of action and evacuation….supervision of admin planning of operations, 
the development of those details of the admin plan which pertain to his functions, the preparation 
of the necessary orders and the supervision of their execution.”48  The SOP described a staff 
section that could plan and execute campaign and theater-level sustainment in keeping with 
Somervell’s and Lee’s vision of the proper role of a theater SOS. 
 Determining the initial internal structure that the ETOUSA G-4 adopted in order to 
accomplish Lee’s vision and the associated functions from its organic history is difficult.  It 
quickly becomes apparent that the authors were confused about the organization and function of 
the section, largely because of imprecise language within official documentation, near constant 
changes over the first year of the existence of the merged ETOUSA and SOS G-4, and the 
disparity between how ETOUSA wanted things to run compared with how they actually 
functioned during planning for and execution of Overlord.   
The G-4 section seemingly used imprecise language when describing divisions, branches, 
and sections, adding to the potential for confusion by referring to major sub-units within the G-3 
section as branches, whereas SHAEF and NATOUSA called them divisions.  The SOP implied 
that the G-4 consisted of two major divisions, but then really explained only the structure and 
responsibilities of the supply and evacuation division.   Over time, the second operational 
division was alternatively referred to as the plans, installations and communications, or plant and 
 
48 “History of the G-4 Organization.”  RG 498, UD 578, ADM 553C.  Large portions of the 28 Feb 44 memo are 
reproduced in the first eight pages of the history. 
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communications division.49  More important than any internal and external confusion about who 
was responsible for what, the ETOUSA G-4 tried to take on a number of functions that clearly 
belonged to the special staff sections, all the while not addressing exactly how the components of 
the tasks were to be divided or coordinated.     
Branch Role Aligned Special 
Staff 
Equipment and Maint. Maintenance systems and facilities, new 
equipment requirements, and salvage operations 
ORD / QM 
Installations Selection, construction, and maintenance of 
facilities 
ENG/QM/TC 
Movements Functions of OCOT minus motor transport TC 
Service Troops  G-3 / All 
Storage and Distribution Depot, requisition, and dispatching procedures QM 
Supply Requirements Determine, coordinate, and procure 
requirements, shipping priorities and tonnage 
allocations, recommend supply levels, oversee 
stock control, and manage intra-theater 
priorities. 
Other G-4 branches 
and all services / 
branches 
Table 6.3: ETOUSA G-4 supply and evacuation division branches, Feb 44 
 
  The division of labor shown in the table above shows a system almost purpose-built to 
introduce friction among the G-4’s branches, the COMZ staff, and the ETOUSA special staff.  
Already hard enough, this task was complicated by the additional challenge of trying to 
synchronize a staff working in three locations.  By March ETOUSA occupied three footprints, 
each with its own general and special staff: the SOS main headquarters at Cheltenham, ETOUSA 
 
49 Ibid, 11, 17.  These two divisions largely corresponded to the Cheltenham and London wings of SOS/ETOUSA 
headquarters.  Cheltenham was the heart of supply and evacuation, while London controlled planning and 
communications. 
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in London, and the FECZ in a second location in London.  FECZ faced the additional burden of 
coordinating with 21st AG/FUSAG across town (until they moved to Portsmouth in May) and the 
ADSEC/FUSA located in Bristol.  Lee attempted to simplify the division of labor among these 
three command nodes by making Cheltenham responsible for coordination with the War 
Department and supervision of the base sections in the U.K.; making his team in London the 
primary interface with SHAEF, charged with oversight of future operations on the continent; and 
assigning the FECZ to supervise the ADSEC and to synchronize near-term operational logistics 
planning.50  In reality ADSEC and FECZ did all the operational planning while the staff in 
Cheltenham and London were consumed with final preparations for the invasion. 
 By carefully studying the evolution of the internal structure of the ETOUSA G-4 from 
August 1944 to February 1945, one can see what role the section eventually decided would be 
their unique contribution to the logistics effort.  It provided a map to the functions that 
experience suggested only the G-4 could fill, and it charted the move away from those areas that 
properly belonged to the technical sections, SHAEF, or the army groups.  This final structure 
was not right or wrong; it was just the approach that seemed to have worked best in Europe 
during the last seven months of the war.  In its final form ETOUSA G-4 incorporated elements 
from how NATOUSA, Larkin’s SOS and Southern Line of Communications (SOLOC), and 
AFHQ organized and ran their logistics staffs.   In many ways the original organizational model 
for the ETOUSA G-4 was progressive and ahead of its time, but Lee and Stratton could not turn 
their vision of a highly centralized synchronizing agency into reality on the continent.  SOS did 
not have the operational experience, senior officers, and communications technology to run 
COMZ the way Lee and Somervell believed would produce the best results.  The result was a 
 
50 Ibid, 10. 
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steady progression towards structure and function that had more in common with NATOUSA 
than the set up at the ASF or a smoothly functioning base section.  
Branches Sections / Role 
Supply Requirements  Supply, shipping requirements, solid fuels, movement - eliminated Jan 45 
Equipment of Troops Finalize equipping of newly arrived (primarily combat) formations 
Storage  Depot planning and ops, analysis, supply movements, packing and marking, 
stock control 
Equipment Disposal 
and Local Procurement 
Policy, scrap/salvage, captured enemy equipment, excess and surplus 
property 
Civil Affairs  
Troops Troop basis, movements and ships, evacuation, POW and labor, troop 
assignments 
POL Distribution and plans, supply requirements, statistics 
Port, Roads, and 
Railroads 
Roads and railroads, ports and canals, planning and control group.  This 
was about constructing and maintaining distribution networks, not 
managing them. 
Installations and Signal 
Communications 
Accommodations, real estate, hospitalization, construction, and signal 
communications and utilities) 
Plans  
Maintenance Equipment maintenance, repair, and spare parts management.   
Table 6.4: ETOUSA G-4 internal organization by winter 44/45 
 
 What jumps out is the radical change in branch and section structure between February 
and November 1944.  It is obvious that ETOUSA G-4 had figured out how to avoid stepping on 
the toes of competent subordinates and peers, what SHAEF was going to handle on the their 
own, and the big problems that the command was uniquely situated to address.  Consolidating 
information, establishing policy, and supervising its enforcement displaced the earlier emphasis 
on synchronizing service forces and integrating logistics with maneuver.  There remained a few 
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gaps and areas of overlap with the technical services, but these would be addressed in the final 
reorganization triggered by the consolidation of COMZ with SOLOC in February 1945.  
 
 ETOUSA G-4’s Search for Solutions 
 Obviously, the changes in the structure and process within the ETOUSA G-4 between 
February and late fall were driven by the discovery of shortcomings in their ability to execute the 
sustainment mission in France and by the consequent search for solutions.  Officers from the 
storage branch conducted a staff visit to Normandy in July and found that the ADSEC was 
struggling to do their job.  The inspection team found “…too many storage installations and too-
scattered installations, with no cohesion in the storage plans.”51  There were logical reasons, 
many beyond the control of the ADSEC, why this was the case.  More importantly, however, the 
ETOUSA G-4 was progressively learning how they could add value to the Allied efforts in 
France.  From August to October the storage branch realized that they had to exert more positive 
control from the moment supplies were unloaded from ships onto the docks.   
Despite the lessons and solutions implemented after the loadout for Torch, the SOS had 
slipped back into bad habits in marking cargo and filling out manifests.  Various factors 
“impeded attempts to create a smooth flowing supply pipeline.  These resulted largely from the 
failure to [enforce]…all…SOP’s and other regulations relative to the requisitioning and 
movement of supplies.”52  It did not help when the SOPs were discovered to be a part of the 
problem.  In mid-August, the COMZ learned and pointed out that the army regulating stations 
and ADSEC were not following ETOUSA SOPs 7 and 33, and a lively discussion ensued.  Upon 
 
51 Ibid, 14. 
52 Section IV, 72. 
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further examination it was agreed that 12th Army – not the regulating stations and ADSEC – 
needed to prioritize requirements and deliveries, and the COMZ agreed to modify and republish 
the two SOPs.53  In addition to theater instructions that had been outdated by organizational 
developments, there were too many small depots scattered across Normandy.  Training 
deficiencies combined with a lack of oversight by the chain of command resulted in wildly 
different procedures and paperwork across these facilities; some depots would only receive or 
disperse supplies between 0800 and 1700 each day.54  If trucks arrived before or after these 
business hours, they sat and waited until the depots resumed external work. 
Improperly marked boxes and the desire to clear the ports quickly compounded the 
problems at these depots.  In the rush to clear supplies out of the immediate area of the port and 
squeeze every ounce of capability from transportation assets, items were scrambled up by 
administering service, class of supply, and intended destination.  Misplaced cargo from other 
services ended up in the wrong depots, poorly labeled, lost from theater inventories, and mixed 
in with material that was supposed to be handled by that unit.  The ADSEC and then the 
Normandy Base Section were overwhelmed just unloading ships and then forwarding supplies to 
the armies and did not have the personnel or facilities to establish sorting sheds and relabel all 
these containers, and there were no intermediate depots that could pick up the slack.  Under these 
conditions, it dawned on the storage branch and transportation service that they could provide a 
critical service by ensuring that supplies were never scrambled up at the docks or in the loading 
of trucks and trains.  
 
53 Section IV, 74.   
54 Ibid, 74. 
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The branch tackled the problem from two directions.  The first priority was to reestablish 
discipline within the marking and documentation system.  Next, the branch hammered home the 
importance of transportation and storage by commodity type.  Within each service, it was 
important to try to separate boxes by class of supply.  More importantly, the items managed by 
each service needed to remain physically separated at the dock, in trucks and rail cars, and in 
separate areas within each depot.55  ETOUSA put pressure on the base section staffs to supervise 
the unloading of ships with a team with a small number of members from each technical service 
to ensure that items were not mixed up during the process.  This might result in partially filled 
trucks or cars, thus wasting transportation tonnage, but it also drastically improved ETOUSA’s 
understanding of what was where within the theater and cut down on unnecessary and 
unrequested deliveries to the combat area.56  The real art in turning this realization into changed 
behavior was getting the word out to subordinate leaders, retraining tens of thousands of service 
troops running the system, and figuring out how to spot-check such a massive undertaking and 
feed course corrections back into the chain of command.  
In the course of this reorientation, it dawned on the storage branch that their critical 
partner was the plans division in order to influence the selection of sites for depots and to meter 
the flow of supply by service and class.57  Later in the campaign, when the Americans were 
using more major ports than just Cherbourg, the branch realized that it needed to coordinate 
closely with the transportation office to gauge this traffic through specific port of entry and then 
 
55 “History of ETOUSA G4: Section II”, 34. 
56 “History of ETOUSA G4: Section IV: Supply Systems and Procedures”, 77.  RG 498, UD 578, Box 3931, ADM 
553A &B.  In order to clear out storage space in Normandy and top off trucks and trains, service personnel loaded 
unmarked or unrequested boxes and sent them off to the armies.  This caused extreme frustration at the front in 
September and October, when the armies were only receiving a portion of the tonnage needed to sustain operations 
and a large portion of that tonnage consisted of items that had not been asked for and were considered frivolous at 
the time. 
57 Ibid, 14. 
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forward the shipments to their final locations using the most appropriate line of communication.  
Because the G-4 had not practiced these skills in the United Kingdom, or anticipated them based 
on operations in NATOUSA, it took three or four months implement an effective system.  
The plans branch under COL H. Hansen, aligned under the newly renamed plants 
(an engineering term that referred to facilities and bases) and communications division, 
discovered that it initially had very little to do beyond collecting the host of component 
plans that were originating in the technical services and base sections and emanating 
from SHAEF and then ensuring that they were all consistent and cross-pollinated.  
Eventually Hansen gravitated towards focusing on procedures to rationalize and explain 
the function of the various COMZ sections, post-hostility planning, helping SHAEF 
validate and resource outline plans in support of future tactical operations, and the 
reception and staging of newly arrived troops.58 The plants and communications division 
was also given supervisory authority over the POL branch charged with coordinating the 
movement of bulk supplies to the continent.  This included supervision over POL 
pipeline construction and distribution of bulk fuels by rail and truck.  It was a short-lived 
decision.  By early November ETOUSA was beginning to figure out what was and was 
not in their lane, and the various aspects of POL distribution were shifted over to the 
theater quartermaster, the military pipeline service, and the transportation corps.   
 
 Conflict Between ETOUSA G-4 and the OCOT 
The short experiment with managing bulk POL delivery to France was part of an 
overall trend that saw the G-4 try to come to grips with their role in coordinating the 
 
58 Ibid, 18-21. 
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various means of transportation on the continent.  The official history of ETOUSA G-4 
noted that “Immediately after the arrival of the HQ on the Continent, Supply 
Requirements was faced for the first time with the problem of priorities for movement by 
road and rail….To meet this problem, the section…was redesignated the Supply 
Requirements and Movements Section.”59  At some point in September or October this 
branch was split in two when a separate movements branch was created and aligned 
under plant and communications division.   This was an odd development that ETOUSA 
would rescind a few weeks later.  The Office of the Chief of Transportation (OCOT) had 
handled this responsibility in the U.K., and why the G-4 wanted to add this mission to 
their portfolio rather than rely on Ross and his team was not adequately addressed in the 
official history of the section.  Stratton did admit that he was frustrated with the OCOT 
because of the unreliability of their periodic transportation estimates, which made it 
difficult to maintain the trust of the combat units.  Stratton realized that they used 
projections as a motivational tool, and he admitted that they were following the example 
and guidance of Somervell in doing so.60  Since OCOT could never achieve the haul 
capacity and discharge rates that they had projected for the next two-week cycle, Stratton 
was inadvertently overpromising deliveries to the armies.  Stratton eventually learned to 
reduce the estimates provided by OCOT by a certain percentage in order to arrive at more 
realistic numbers.  This was not why the G-4 tried to take over the functions of the 
transportation service, but it illustrates one source of friction between the two sections.      
 
59 Ibid, 13. 
60 Section II, 44.   
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In November the ETOUSA G-4 Movements Branch was absorbed by the Ports, 
Roads, and Railroads Branch.  ETOUSA’s involvement with transportation had evolved 
from a focus on operational integration of the various nodes and networks, replicating the 
function of the OCOT, towards a focus on transportation infrastructure repair and 
expansion.  After November, the Ports, Roads, and Railroads Branch oriented its efforts 
on developing, expanding, and maintaining bridges, ferries, tunnels, ports, roads, canals, 
railroads, and the facilities necessary to operate and service them.  The wild 
organizational changes between August and November discussed above illustrated the 
conflict that existed between ETOUSA G-4 and the OCOT over control and direction of 
transportation between August and November.  After November a logical division of 
labor began to emerge, culminating in January 1945 with the elimination of any 
references to movement control in the duty description and organizational structure of the 
G-4.  The overlap emerged and was suppressed in less than six months, but it had caused 
a lot of friction and interpersonal animosity while it existed.  The OCOT division chiefs 
were still frustrated after the end of the war, including comments about the friction 
between themselves and the G-4 over depot procedures and Stratton’s attempts to 
micromanage the theater distribution plan from August to December.61 
 The official history of the G-4 section admitted that they did not have an effective 
handle on programing and controlling supply movements worked out until around late 
November or early December.  This system was officially codified in theater SOPs and 
instructions on 28 December, when the G-4 surrendered control over allocating berths for 
 
61 COL Hugh A. Murril, Control and Planning Division input to OCOT history, 10-12.  Traub added a short 
appendix to cover his time as the chief of plans and reiterated his disagreement with G-4 policies.  RG 498, UD 
1210, Box 5981. 
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ships at the major ports to the OCOT.62  In the same set of documents, G-4 also 
acknowledged that they would get out of the business of linking up transportation with 
cargo at the ports and base section depots for delivery to the ADSEC.  Under this new 
concept, the G-4 established goals for the delivery of goods by each service that managed 
its own inventories.  The G-4 also created a theater critical shortage list; this document 
identified theater priorities that would be used to fill up any left-over transportation 
capacity if specifically requested items were not immediately available for loading.  The 
OCOT would determine where to berth ships and how to move supplies around the 
theater, providing a short-term projection to COMZ.  COMZ would turn around and 
order the various base sections to provide the required equipment, units, and material at 
the assigned place and time to execute the mission.  Because the system was working in 
ten-day increments with a five-day lead period, everyone had time to identify and solve 
or mitigate hiccups.   
The ETOUSA G-4 concluded that in the fall of 1944, decentralization was not a strength 
of the COMZ operation in France but a weakness to be fixed. 63  It is debatable that different 
phases of the campaign in France and Germany required different approaches, but by the late fall 
of 1944 ETOUSA had decided that top-down direction was the most appropriate response.  
Unfocused initiative by the services and by base section staffs wasted time and transportation 
resources.  Working with the OCOT, ETOUSA began to investigate delays along the distribution 
chain at the loading and unloading points.  COMZ had the authority to address the problems they 
discovered at the ports and in the base sections, and they took steps to reassert central control 
 
62 History of ETOUSA G4: Section II, 46.   
63 Section II, 47. 
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while tightening compliance with newly revised SOPs.  By mid-December COMZ largely had 
their own house in order and expanded their view to include 12th Army Group and 9th Air Force 
depots and transportation hubs.64  Commanders were informed that they would be authorized one 
day’s worth of unloaded trucks or trains in the local area.  If they built up a larger backlog than 
this, no new supplies would be dispatched until they had complied with theater guidance.  Local 
hoarding of supplies and the retention of rolling magazines in the combat zone dropped off, and 
the armies learned to comply with theater directives or else face grave consequences.  SHAEF 
had learned some lessons as well, and they backed ETOUSA’s threats to turn off the flow of new 
supplies unless bottlenecks were eliminated.     
In hindsight, the G-4 section had realized that they had mismanaged the relationship with 
the transportation service between August 1944 and January 1945.  The official history justified 
what was done by saying that they faced new circumstances:    
transportation functions wholly new in nature, arising from the requirements of 
furnishing supplies to the armies on the Continent….[created an] urgent necessity 
for immediate action to expedite and insure efficient deliveries per the daily 
telegram, it was advisable to maintain the Supply Movements Section in G-4, 
where a close, direct watch could be maintained over supply transportation 
specifically.  Now that the transportation operations have become more 
systematized and the transportation problems are less subject to sudden 
emergency requirements and unexpected developments, the supply movements 
functions are being handled entirely by the TC, whose responsibility these 
functions rightfully are.65 
 
 The fact that the official history felt compelled to address the issue and that the 
explanation of what was behind the decision was so unsatisfactory is telling.  
Transportation functions were not wholly new in nature in August; these same functions 
 
64 Ibid.  Depot inspection teams were formed and directed to inspect problematic nodes in both the COMZ and 
combat zone. 
65 Ibid, 15-16. 
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had been in progress in the Mediterranean for almost two years, and in Normandy for two 
months, and they had been foreshadowed in France in 1918 and largely replicated during 
the last months of Bolero and during the mounting of Neptune in the U.K.   
There was nothing wrong with G-4 oversight over the transportation service; it 
was the standard within the British Army and the system employed effectively at AFHQ 
and SHAEF.  But it required coordination and cooperation with the movement and 
transportation team, not replication or competition.  What the G-4 and supply 
requirements branch did come to recognize as an essential function for themselves was 
the prioritization of what got moved when demand exceeded the ability to move 
everything, or what secondary priorities to shuttle forward when what the combat units 
had asked for was not immediately available.66  
Organizational changes within ETOUSA G-4 were the result of learning what was 
occurring within the section and in the COMZ overall.  Stratton dedicated resources to figuring 
out exactly what was causing breakdowns, and he had the courage to welcome bad news and 
then take swift action to fix problems.  Stratton learned from his embarrassments in August and 
September, and he took a systems approach to improving COMZ’s performance.  The 
information provided by two IG inspections of the COMZ supply system in the fall provided the 
focus Stratton needed to improve his organization.  The conclusions drawn from those two 
inspections and the resulting changes to how G-4 conducted it business help explain what went 
wrong in August and September.          
     
 
66 Ibid, 16. 
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 ETOUSA G-4 and COMZ Learn to Function in Combat 
The first challenge was to understand exactly why the lead corps were not receiving 
enough critical supplies to maintain pressure on the retreating Germans in early September.  
COMZ records in August and September indicated that they were delivering sufficient supplies 
to the ADSEC to cover daily consumption, but the ADSEC and 12th AG disagreed.  By mid-
September Stratton suspected that the ADSEC was overstating their requirements and that some 
elements within 12th Army Group were underreporting deliveries and inflating consumption 
figures in order to build up unauthorized reserves.67  Stratton admitted in his journal on 10 
September that he arbitrarily cut ADSEC requests for quartermaster class II and ordnance and 
chemical warfare service class IV requisitions from 2,275 to 1,750 tons as a result.68  In many 
ways the COMZ and 12th Army Group were talking past one another.  The 1st Army had largely 
converted to consumption planning figures based on experience in combat in North Africa and 
Italy, while the COMZ had no choice but to request support from the United States based on less 
generous War Department authorizations.69  This was a trend that had started in the U.K. while 
ETOUSA was preparing for the assault landing in Normandy but continued through June and 
July.  Eisenhower authorized Bradley to equip 1st Army as he saw fit, giving no restrictions 
based on tables of allowances.  As a result, the assault divisions landed overstrength in a wide 
range of equipment and supplies, followed by very generous stockage of reserves under 1st Army 
and ADSEC control.   As a result, the 1st Army ended up with more equipment and material in 
Normandy than it needed or could manage, much of it redistributed from equipment designated 
 
67 “History of the ETOUSA G4 Section, Section II: Problems of Supply and Distribution”, 18.  RG 498, UD 578, 
Box 3931, ADM 553A and B.  
68 Personal Journal of BG Stratton, 10 Sep 44, cited in “History of the ETOUSA G-4, Section II”, 18. 
69 “History of the ETOUSA G-4, Section II”, 19. 
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for 3rd Army.  The 3rd Army struggled to reach its authorized strength, much less the inflated 
level of equipment that 1st Army took to France.   
The process of overfilling 1st Army and finding replacement supplies to restore 3rd Army 
cleaned out or significantly reduced select portions of the theater reserves.  Much of this 
equipment was sent to France and placed under ADSEC control, but it was scattered in poorly 
located depots that were plagued with ill-disciplined record keeping.  After the breakout, these 
supplies remained behind in Normandy, improperly marked and insufficiently accounted for on 
any theater-level inventory.  Tens of thousands of tons of desperately needed supplies basically 
disappeared from the ledger.  The only fix was to direct a massive inspection of the inventory 
and move the worst-sited depots out of those locations that had turned into bogs.  Both tasks 
required manpower, time, and transportation assets that were desperately needed to fuel the 
advance.  In many cases it was easier to ignore the depots in Normandy and draw supplies 
directly from the docks, or to pull a ship with needed cargo into a berth, download it, and send 
the material on to the front.70    
COMZ tried to overcome the transportation shortage in late August by asking the armies 
to show self-discipline and identify critical items that were absolutely necessary at the front.  The 
initiative collapsed in the face of distrust, poor dissemination of instructions of how to run the 
process, and the definition of “critical” equipment.  Stratton tried to break down communication 
barriers and restore trust in the supply system within ETOUSA through a series of visits to the 
army headquarters in September and October, but by then it was too late. 71  Relations between 
 
70 Allied cargo ship manifests were very accurate and very detailed by this stage of the war.  In contrast, technical 
service and ADSEC record keeping ashore collapsed in June.   
71 History of ETOUSA G-4, Section II, 19. 
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COMZ and 12th Army Group hit rock bottom in September and October and this lack of trust 
undermined the efforts to make systemic improvements.   
The first major attempt to reconcile the supply crisis with the goal of returning to the 
offensive had occurred on 12 September, when 12th Army Group hosted an emergency logistics 
conference that was attended by Bradley, Hodges, Patton, Moses, Stratton, and Plank.72   The 
purpose was to find solutions to the ongoing supply difficulties and therefore maintain the 
pursuit up to and hopefully across the German western border.  Everyone agreed that air 
transport of supplies had to continue, and Stratton pressed Bradley to use his influence at SHAEF 
to get Antwerp opened as soon as possible by forcing Montgomery to commit more forces and 
make it his top priority.  The discrepancies among the various delivery estimates were discussed; 
everyone agreed that the breakdown seemed to be especially pronounced in 1st Army, which 
acknowledged receiving 1,500 tons less per day for the last ten days than COMZ and ADSEC 
records indicated.73  Stratton’s personal notes from the conference ended with this notation:  
“Each Army Commander reported himself in sufficiently good shape with respect to supplies to 
launch forthcoming attacks with would take them to the Rhine.”74  He also recorded a comment 
made by Bradley that Antwerp would not be open to shipping for another month.  Stratton left 
the meeting disappointed that the distribution problem was not going to be magically solved by 
the early opening of a major Dutch port, but he was reassured that the two army commanders did 
not feel that they had a logistics crisis on their hands that would keep them from reaching the 
Rhine. 
 
72 Ibid, 25.  There had been other sustainment and maneuver conferences throughout August and early September, 
but the meeting on 12 September was the first to acknowledge that supply difficulties had temporarily halted the 
pursuit, and the session was focused on finding solutions to the logistical side of the equation. 
73 Ibid, 27. 
74 Personal Journal of BG Stratton, 12 Sep 44, cited in “History of the ETOUSA G-4, Section II”, 27. 
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As the pursuit slowed and stopped during the second half of September, COMZ began to 
get a handle on some of the deeper causes of the friction slowing down the logistics system.  The 
COMZ completed an internal assessment on 22 September that pointed out a number of concrete 
items to address.  The report stated that the command was routinely delivering 3,500 tons daily 
to 1st and 3rd Army as agreed in the September meetings, but it also noted that some unidentified 
percentage of that tonnage consisted of unrequested and unnecessary items.   The armies 
continued to live hand-to-mouth on classes I, III, and V.75  But by focusing almost exclusively 
on those three classes of supply in August and September, the COMZ was creating a second 
crisis involving cold weather gear, replacement machine gun and automatic rifle barrels, and 
ordnance class II and IV items associated with armored fighting vehicles that would crest soon.  
Another lesson learned was that by overemphasizing the delivery of bulk fuel, units were getting 
none of the secondary products necessary to keep gasoline engines and tracked vehicles running, 
such as oil, grease, and filters.76   
The first priority Stratton addressed was closing the gap between the critical items 
requested by the armies and the non-essential items that were delivered.  Unfortunately for 
ETOUSA, this “simple” problem showed just how complicated the supply requisition and 
distribution process was and how much energy was needed to correct the most glaring 
deficiencies.  The first challenge was to discover what was already on the continent but lost as a 
result of poor record keeping.  The second challenge was to keep any newly landing cargo from 
disappearing into the same black holes.   
 
75 “History of ETOUSA G-4, Section II”, 29.   
76 Ibid, 34.  This is not to say that COMZ should not have anticipated these requirements based on experience from 
the Mediterranean and particularly from North Africa. 
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 Stratton conceded that no one within the system really understood exactly what was 
going wrong along the complex path between requisition and delivery.  His solution was to 
assign a small team to follow the daily telegram provided by 1st Army on 28 September from 
submission to final delivery of the requested items, a process that occurred on a continuing 24-
hour cycle.77  It was the start of a lengthy process that would culminate in a complete revamping 
of supply procedures within ETOUSA over the coming two months. 
 The G-4 at 1st Army submitted his requests to the ADSEC, which divided the order into 
three categories: items on hand in dumps and forward depots in the combat zone, those in 
theater, and items that would have to be shipped from the U.K. or U.S.  The second and third 
categories of items were then passed back to the ETOUSA/COMZ G-4.  At COMZ the list was 
broken out among the technical services, who were given a few hours to determine which depots 
would be used to fill which requisitions.  The team would reassemble and link up transportation 
assets to the various pick-up locations.  Anything not available in theater would be send back to 
the Port of New York or U.K. Base Section for future delivery.   
 Recent operations exposed a few critical problems.  The COMZ used weight, rather than 
weight and volume, to allocate transportation, which often produced a shortfall.  All agencies 
within the chain had different appreciations of what items and quantities were available in the 
various zones and depots.  The ETOUSA signal section might think there was plenty of 
telephone wire in two depots in the Normandy Base Section and direct their release, but in reality 
the depots did not have that material.  There was not enough time during the 24-hour cycle to 
call and confirm all this data or for the depots to report every mismatch.  If the depot did not 
have the directed items, they would pull items they assumed would be necessary in the combat 
 
77 “History of ETOUSA G-4, Section IV”, 76 
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zone in the coming days, or even just items that were taking up a lot of storage space, in order to 
fill the trucks and railcars assigned to the upcoming mission.  The technical service staffs at the 
base section and theater levels would do the same thing in order to use all the transportation 
available.  Surprisingly, the G-4 did not centrally manage or direct the services to maintain lists 
of prioritized items for the combat zone to absorb unused transportation but also to ensure that it 
was used to deliver items everyone agreed were important. 
 All this information was invaluable in focusing the G-4 on high-payoff efforts to improve 
the system.  Everyone needed to understand and follow the same theater SOPs and to have the 
communications devices needed to place requisitions and to stay abreast of what was already on 
the continent in which depot.  Consolidation into a few large general depots would be more 
efficient than keeping the large number of service depots scattered across Normandy, but in the 
short term the COMZ could not divert the trains and trucks to move everything around.  The 
most problematic cases arose when a service had access to its own transportation, like the 
engineers, who were running their own requisition and distribution system while largely ignoring 
directions from the COMZ.78 
Lee’s SOS had always been obsessed with operational security, overclassifying 
documents, leaving data out of reports and the notes from meetings, and restricting access to 
plans and planning sessions to help prevent leaks.  This sensitivity eventually penetrated down to 
the level where it interfered with the proper completion of manifests and waybills attached to 
equipment and supplies.79  Initially service troops were taught to leave some data fields vague or 
even blank, especially when it came to the final destination and anticipated end user of the item.  
 
78 Section IV, 79-82. 
79 Section II, 38. 
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But the crisis of September and October finally convinced the COMZ that the importance of 
successful delivery outweighed concerns that the Germans might piece together Allied locations, 
critical nodes along the LOC, and a detailed order of battle by reading the shipping labels 
attached to crates and rail cars.  Eventually the COMZ internalized the idea that there was no 
such thing as too much information on a manifest or waybill, nor too many required copies of a 
document.  By 5 October every package had its own waybill, and each provided the name of the 
ship that had delivered it to France, the service managing the item, the class of supply, and the 
last known geographical destination, including the date of requisition, customer, weight, 
description of items, and consignee handling the item during each stage of movement.80  Other 
changes approved in October included a directive to shift over to commodity storage and loading 
whenever possible along with new guidance on how to estimate consumption rates and 
requisition artillery ammunition.81 
The biggest breakthrough came in late November and was partly the result of an 
ingenious use of the theater inspector general.  Stratton directed a follow-up investigation in late 
October to see how well the theater had responded to the information and instructions published 
since late September and to discover other problems with the system.  Unfortunately for 
ETOUSA, the two-week process showed just how far the COMZ still had to travel to create an 
efficient process.82  No new aspects of the problems were discovered, only a failure to 
conclusively fix the ones already discovered in August and September.  The problem was three-
fold – it was a big theater that was busy fighting a war and not retraining everyone on the 
 
80 Ibid, 38. 
81 Ibid, 33, 40.  “Commodity storage” or “loading” was the term used to describe the effort to avoid mixing up 
supplies.  The goal was to ship or store items grouped by the managing technical service and class of supply, even 
though this tended to require more storage and transportation space. 
82 Section IV, 83-84. 
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requisition process, communications technology was not up to the complexity of the task, and the 
requisition process turned on too tight a schedule for effective human intervention when reality 
on the ground did not match directives based on centralized inventory documents.  Solving the 
first problem was a matter of time and effort by the chain of command, combined with 
simplification of theater procedures.  An associated task was to centralize control over all 
transportation assets, including air and motor transport organic to technical services and peer 
organizations such as the field armies and the Army Air Forces.  The second problem might be 
mitigated with simpler forms and increased reliance on push-based resupply based on revised 
consumption figures.  The third aspect was the easiest to address: shifting from a 24-hour 
requisition cycle to something that gave the various organizations in the chain a bit more time to 
confirm assumptions and react to unanticipated surprises.  This would also make it easier to 
maintain a common picture across the theater of what was on hand and where it was stored and 
might create some free time to reeducate everyone on the procedures they should be using.       
On 22 November Stratton announced that the theater would transition to such a system on 
2 December.83  Units were directed to shift to ten-day requests submitted five days before the 
beginning of the period.  Consumables would be estimated based on what was now a 
considerable body of combat experience, with repair parts and class II items controlled using a 
blend of predicted wastage and the specific shortages provided during the last reporting window.  
The real breakthrough was creating a five-day grace period in which to find the location of 
requested items or to concede that the item was not available and to use the allocated 
transportation to move something else.  Perhaps COMZ picked up the idea from 21st AG, who 
used a five-day delivery cycle submitted five days in advance from the beginning of the 
 
83 Section II, 30. 
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campaign, or from 12th AG, who transitioned from daily to weekly logistics reports in late 
August.84  Regardless of the source of the idea, it was a key step on the path to increasing 
efficiency at COMZ.   
 Internally, COMZ believed that it had turned a corner by mid-October and that it was 
running a tight ship by early December.  Unfortunately for Lee, the lag between identifying the 
problems from September and October and confirming that the underlying causes had been fixed 
was significant.  In the meantime, word had reached SHAEF and ASF that COMZ had problems 
with a number of its systems, and a wave of technical experts was dispatched to try to help.  The 
immediate crisis revolved around artillery ammunition available at the front in October, but in 
the process of fixing that shortfall outside exposure inevitably expanded to touch on every aspect 
of the requisition and distribution process managed by COMZ.  ETOUSA hosted a wave of 
trouble shooters and investigators through the fall and winter, such as MG Lucius Clay, MG 
Henry Aurand, Lutes, and eventually Somervell himself. 
 Eisenhower had asked for him by name, and, as a result, MG Clay was given a warm 
welcome at SHAEF before being sent over to Normandy to speed up the flow of supplies 
through Cherbourg.  By late October the backlog of unloaded ships in the ETO was reaching 
critical proportions, and Cherbourg was only unloading about half of the tonnage that COMZ has 
set as the daily target.  Clay discovered that the bottleneck was really caused by a lack of 
motorized and rail transportation to first shift the supplies from dockside to local depots and then 
to move large quantities of material out of Normandy on trains bound for the front.  From Clay’s 
 
84 Monthly AAR, G-4, 12 AG, 6 Sep 44.  RG 407, Entry 427, Box 1346.  Moses realized there was no way the 
divisions, corps, and armies could accurately track daily consumption and receipts during mobile operations.  By 
shifting to a weekly report, units could take advantages of momentary lulls in the advance to get a semi-accurate 
count of supplies on hand and shortages down in tactical units.  The report was far from perfect, but at least leaders 
acknowledged the limitations of the information at their disposal.    
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perspective, Ross was mismanaging the distribution of rolling stock throughout the theater; it did 
no good to increase the discharge rate at Cherbourg if the supplies could not be forwarded on to 
users east of the Seine.  By the end of November Clay had managed to almost double the volume 
of supplies flowing through Normandy Base Section while simultaneously consolidating and 
cataloguing all the material that had been left behind by 1st Army and ADSEC.   
In hindsight, Clay attributed his success to his ability to analyze what the base section 
team required and then to extract those resources from COMZ and ETOUSA. 85  Clay did not 
explicitly acknowledge it, but those measures were only possible because of the authority and 
independence his rank and close relationship with Eisenhower conveyed.  Clay was an outsider 
with excellent connections back to SHAEF and the ASF, and he was not afraid to ruffle feathers 
to get the job done.  He demanded control over the technical staff section representatives posted 
in Normandy, insisting that they follow his instructions and priorities rather than those coming 
from Paris.  Clay found and empowered the technical experts within his own organization, 
demanded internal coordination and synchronization at the base section level, and then exploited 
the access conveyed by his connections to get what he wanted from ETOUSA.86  Officers like 
MG Clay were rare, and the U.S. Army did not have another half a dozen men with similar 
talents to man all the base sections in the U.K. and France.  Clay’s approach focused on 
reinforcing his own authority to synchronize his staff and on collaborating with the ETOUSA 
staff to mesh his priorities with those of the theater.87  COMZ would have been better served if 
they had had a few more officers with the right personality and similar authority to adopt some 
of these methods.  
 
85 Crosswell, 756. 
86 MG Lucius D. Clay, interviewed by Jean Smith, 14 January 1971, interview 13, transcript, OH-285, Dwight D. 
Eisenhower Presidential Library (DDE PL), Abilene, KS, 437.   
81 Crosswell, 756. 
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 Another observer of the inner workings of logistics in the theater was MG Henry Aurand, 
who was dispatched from the ASF staff in early November to help ETOUSA get to the bottom of 
their problems with ammunition for the heavy artillery.  Aurand’s preliminary conclusions help 
illustrate the intellectual distance between the ASF and ETOUSA as well as the internal fissures 
between the combat and communications zone.  Aurand quickly developed a hunch that the 
stockpiles of artillery shells in the forward areas were much larger than Moses and 12th AG were 
letting on, perhaps out of ignorance, but more likely as a ploy to gather more ammunition than 
they were authorized, and perhaps even to discredit Lee and COMZ.88  This conspiracy theory 
was taking things too far, but obviously 12th Army Group did not trust COMZ and the War 
Department to deliver enough artillery ammunition to allow the command to use its preferred 
tactics and to maintain the tempo of operations desired by army commanders.  The real issue 
seemed to boil down to a disagreement between 12th AG and the ASF over what the official rate 
of consumption should be, and COMZ was stuck in the middle.  COMZ did not dispute what the 
armies were telling them was the required rate, but the command could not seem to convince the 
ASF that these estimates were adequately justified.   
Aurand suggested that ETOUSA had even larger problems.  During a long dinner 
conversation on 18 November with Hughes, Sayler, and Maxwell (WD G-4), Aurand mulled 
whether logistical problems in the theater might actually be the result of questionable command 
and control arrangements.  Echoing a theme raised previously by senior leaders within the War 
Department, Aurand suggested that Eisenhower might to be trying to handle too much on his 
own.  As a result, he had insufficient time to manage the relationship between 12th AG and 
 
88 Crosswell, 755, 761-762.  
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COMZ.89  Aurand added that the best solution was the appointment of a full-time ETOUSA 
commander with his own staff to supervise the interaction among Lee, USSTAF, and the two 
army groups.  Trust in the logisticians needed to be restored by the empowerment of a superior 
authority who openly balanced the demands of the combat and rear areas in a number of public 
fora.  Aurand thought that COMZ seemed to be doing the best it could under the circumstances, 
but he thought that its leaders had been written off by 12th AG and that a healthy relationship 
could not be easily reestablished.   
What Aurand did not know was that the same distrust had emerged in 21st AG and among 
the sustainment team at SHAEF, which supported the argument that perhaps COMZ did have 
major internal issues and 12th AG was right.  Aurand was vague on the details of who could 
command his proposed autonomous ETOUSA, and he did not seem to consider how hard it 
would be to find an officer who could supervise Lee, Bradley, and Spaatz, or who would backfill 
Bradley if Eisenhower’s most trusted subordinate was moved up a level in the chain of 
command.  Regardless, under the current circumstances, Aurand seemed to have thought that 
COMZ was stuck trying to accomplish impossible tasks directed by maneuver commanders who 
had only a weak grasp on logistics. A failure to continuously produce miracles resulted in 
unrelenting criticism of COMZ, criticism that was not refuted or addressed by Eisenhower and 
the team at SHAEF.  Aurand did admit that some of the senior officers at ETOUSA needed to be 
fired, and his list included Sayler (the chief of ordnance), Littlejohn, and Rumbough (the chief of 
signal).  Aurand’s assessment of Sayler was in tune with what Eisenhower himself thought at the 
end of October.  Hughes recorded in his diary a sentiment voiced by Eisenhower that many other 
 
89 Letters, Aurand to Sayler, Nov and Dec 44, Hughes Diary, 18 Nov 44, in Crosswell 761.     
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officers seem to have shared, both during and after the war: “Ike says Cliff [Lee] has great 
faculty of picking poor men and poor organizations.”90 
Aurand is helpful because he articulated a view shared by many participants in the 
European theater, but he missed the boat on two major issues.  First, COMZ had major problems 
with their internal procedures.  Not only had 12th AG given up on Lee by early November (a 
process that had started in August at the latest), but Gale and 21st Army group had reached the 
same conclusion in early September.  Most of those glaring faults had been fixed by the time 
Aurand arrived; he did not realize how much COMZ had grown over the last three months.  
Second, most of the ordnance experts who were involved in the controversy over artillery 
ammunition missed a few key aspects of the complaint coming from the combat units.  It was 
largely irrelevant to the maneuver commanders that the U.S. Army only used 30% of the 408,000 
rounds of 240mm ammunition that reached combat theaters or that the production figures so 
stoutly defended by the War Department were in the end sufficient to win the war.91  What 
mattered was that combat commanders had enough ammunition, at the right time, place, and 
with the right mix of types and quantities, to sustain the tempo of operations they desired.  It was 
not a simple matter of production but a complex issue involving production, transportation, trust, 
and realistic expectations.  Bradley’s 12th AG fought differently from September to December 
because of localized ammunition shortages.  These shortages might have been caused 
predominantly by transportation problems, but in the end the concerns about availability were 
legitimate.  As a result, Bradley imposed restrictions on the daily rate of fire that forced the U.S. 
army to fight differently and advance at a slower pace.  SHAEF conducted a series of tactical 
 
90 Hughes Diary, 30 Oct 44 in Crosswell, 757.   
91 SHAEF and ETOUSA won the argument and convinced the War Department to ramp up production in December, 
but the results were never felt before Germany and Japan surrendered.   
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attacks during the fall of 1944 in pulses, their frequency being dictated by the amount of time 
required to amass enough ammunition to launch the next push.  Although perhaps frustrating to 
the maneuver commanders, it was nothing different from the dynamic that had controlled 
offensive operations in the Great War on the Western Front.   
Lutes was the third key troubleshooter sent to ETOUSA to help over the fall, arriving in 
Paris on 5 December 1944.  Lutes submitted a preliminary written report outlining his first 
impressions of ETOUSA and COMZ on 25 December.  After two weeks of digging, Lutes 
concluded that COMZ still had massive problems in a number of key areas.92  But Stratton 
disputed Lutes’ technical conclusions, questioning all fourteen of his major problem areas in a 
written rebuttal and progress report to SHAEF in late January 1945.93  Stratton did not deny that 
these problems had existed in the past, he did believe that ETOUSA had identified them 
internally over the last few months and had already devised and implemented solutions that 
would ensure that the command was ready for the spring offensive.  SHAEF disagreed, ordering 
a weekly progress report from ETOUSA that tracked their efforts to solve the fourteen problem 
areas identified by Lutes during his extended visit.  It was a new low point in the professional 
relationship between the logisticians and senior leaders in both SHAEF and ETOUSA. 
The official history of the ETOUSA G-4 section provides a convincing argument that the 
command and Lutes identified the same technical shortcomings, that ETOUSA implemented a 
host of new SOPs and instructions before the publication of Lutes’ report on 25 December, and 
that it did nothing fundamentally different after implementing a few minor organizational and 
procedural changes in early January.  The major changes had occurred between mid-October and 
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early December.  Combined with the opening of Antwerp, these procedural changes 
implemented by ETOUSA before Lutes’ arrival ensured the command was already well on the 
road to recovery.  The truth is probably somewhere in the middle.  Lutes could and did help with 
problems back in the ASF and in the zone of the interior to expedite the delivery of artillery 
ammunition, medium tanks, tires, trucks, and signal equipment that were in short supply 
globally.94  Lutes correctly pointed out the personality conflicts between the COMZ and some 
combat units, particularly with 1st Army, 9th Air Force, and 12th Army Group staff; somehow 
Plank and the ADSEC avoided any negative association with the larger COMZ.95  Lutes and 
Somervell attributed the positive reputation of ADSEC and the negative reputation of COMZ to 
a “spirit of urgency” or passion for accomplishing the sustainment mission.96  In the eyes of the 
fighters, Plank’s organization had it and Lee’s outfit did not. 
The first area on which Lutes focused was speeding up the delivery of supplies to 
ETOUSA and their distribution once in theater.  Lutes knew that the ASF could not quickly 
increase the flow of production items coming from the factories in the United States.  But it 
could deliver those critical supplies that were already in the system awaiting transportation more 
quickly and efficiently.  Delays along the chain of delivery from factory to ASPs consumed most 
of the 100 days required to complete the cycle.  If ETOUSA could get ships into berth and 
download them faster, it would produce the same result as increasing production.  That fall the 
average ship loitered 23 days in continental waters waiting to begin the download process, while 
distribution from the port to the user only took about 23 additional days.97  Lutes also 
recommended that ETOUSA resurrect express delivery trains and convoys, systems they had 
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relied on in the U.K. that had fallen out of use on the continent.  Stratton created the rapid 
express service (REX) for truck convoys out of Marseilles and Antwerp and the Toot Sweet 
Express for rail traffic in early January.  Both systems used a very small percentage of the 
transportation resources available, but they could cut delivery times in half or even by two-thirds 
to rush critical items to the front under special conditions.  
The second area that Lutes tackled was one in which he had hit hard back in May during 
his first extended inspection of ETOUSA: record keeping and management of the theater 
inventory of supplies and equipment.  COMZ had failed to implement a uniform system for 
reporting and accounting what was on hand, due in, and due out, despite the requirement to 
provide this data to the ASF monthly.98  Lutes also discovered a wide range of estimates and 
consumption planning figures in use across the command.  Each section seemed to have its own 
projections for how long it took to order and ship items, how quickly supplies and equipment 
were consumed in combat, and how many service troops each sustainment task required.  The 
command did not have a planning rulebook to ensure that everyone was using the same basic sets 
of assumptions and therefore justifying requests to the ASF using similar logic.  Lutes’ response 
to some in ETOUSA who disagreed with the standard planning factors employed by ASF was to 
challenge the command to do the hard work necessary to justify changes.  Lee took these points 
to heart and launched comprehensive programs to fix both accountability and requisitioning 
procedures and to revise the factors used to project the replacement of material in early February.  
The SOP covering accountability was published on 1 April, and ASF began to accept and 
 
98 Ruppenthal, Vol. II, 352-355.  Lutes started his criticism of logistical planning and forecasting at ETOUSA by 
pointing out that, if you did not know what you had on hand in theater (to include items already shipped from the 
U.S. and promised out to the armies), it was impossible to proceed to higher-level tasks. 
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implement new planning figures provided by ETOUSA in late April.99  These changes, which 
were based on Allied combat and logistical performance from December to May 1945, 
represented refinements to a generally functional system rather than major revisions. 
As a direct part of the struggle to determine what was already in the theater and then to 
move this material along to the divisions, Lutes dug into depot management, record keeping, and 
transfers into and out of the facilities.  As COMZ had gotten a handle on the depots it controlled, 
it had cleared up problems caused by vague instructions, confronted the need for retraining, and 
ensured the chain of command enforced the new rules.  But when the transportation log jam 
began to break up in late October and burst apart with the opening of Antwerp, COMZ 
overwhelmed the depots in the advanced section zone in the first half of December.100  Each of 
the 27 divisions in 12th AG was receiving 650 tons of supplies a day, and tonnage allocated to 
create reserve stocks jumped from 3,400 tons daily in the first half of November to 10,250 tons a 
day in the second half.101  In the mad scramble to download and store this flood of material, 
accurate record keeping became a secondary priority.  Many of the advantages secured by 
commodity loading and storage, improved waybills, and exploding transportation capacity were 
lost when this material was scrambled and misplaced in the combat zone.   
The solution adopted by COMZ was to establish intermediate depots as called for by U.S. 
doctrine and to turn over fine-tuning of the distribution system to OCOT.  By establishing 
 
99 Ibid, 354-355.  ETOUSA won the war before these new procedures were fully implemented, so obviously COMZ 
had developed a system that was good enough to meet basic sustainment requirements by early 1945.  Development 
of a perfect system (according to ASF standards) took too long, but one could easily argue that NATOUSA and 
ETOUSA had to do ASF’s job for them.  A thorough SOP on how to run theater accountability and requisitions 
should have been centralized by ASF, just as an Army-wide effort to produce more realistic consumption planning 
figures.  ETOUSA could only complete this work between February and April 1945 because of their increased 
efficiency, vast combat experience, and routine functioning of a number of tasks that required constant monitoring 
in the past.  ETOUSA did not have the time or experience necessary to fully develop these systems on their own 
before fall 1944.   
100 Ibid, 355-56. 
101 History of ETOUSA G-4, 43.   
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intermediate depots, COMZ slowed the flood of material into the combat area, but still moved 
the material up closer to the front should it be needed.102  OCOT was best positioned to eliminate 
backlogs throughout the entire system, and it gained control over where a ship would download 
for the first time in January.  From there OCOT could match cargo with trains and trucks for 
delivery to the full range of theater depots, dispersing movement to ensure that no facility was 
overwhelmed.  Inspection teams from ETOUSA still prowled the battlefield looking into 
regulating stations or depots that consistently held on to transportation assets too long or seemed 
to take too long downloading supplies, looking for manpower or procedural solutions to 
accelerate the flow. 
The last category of problems that Lutes tackled was a catch-all politely referred to as 
“expedients” by Ruppenthal.  As trust in the supply system eroded, units found work-arounds to 
increase the chance that critical supplies would be on hand when called for.  Units asked for 
more supplies than they needed or were authorized, hoarded material they could not move with 
organic assets, sent liaisons back to COMZ and base section headquarters to hand deliver 
requisitions and hunt down sources of supply, and escorted trucks and trains to the front to 
ensure that they were not diverted.103  Combat formations also sent their own trucks back as far 
as Normandy on fishing expeditions, looking for equipment and material that might have fallen 
through the cracks or that someone remembered seeing back before the breakout.  Apart from the 
issues with inflated requisitions and hoarding, the various agents floating around in the 
 
102 There were logical reasons why COMZ decided not to establish intermediate depots between October and 
January, and the process was complicated by the location of Antwerp and Marseilles at the northern and southern 
ends of the combat zone.  The logic against establishing intermediate depots had largely disappeared by early 
January.   
103 Ruppenthal, Vol. II, 360-361.   
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communications zone looking for supplies and then expediting their delivery did no real harm, 
but their presence spoke volumes about the breakdown in trust between the two communities.   
The overall conclusion offered by Lutes and Somervell at the end of their back-to-back 
inspections was that COMZ lacked drive and vision.  COMZ seemed to be constantly in crisis 
management mode, largely because it could not anticipate requirements and take proactive steps 
to manage the implications of Allied decisions and changes to the operating environment.  Lee 
described the results of the visit as exposing “several small deficiencies in supply methods” but 
also as validating “the basic soundness” of the COMZ.104   Senior leaders at ASF and SHAEF 
did not necessarily agree that these were small deficiencies, and Eisenhower directed Lee to 
develop detailed programs to fix each noted deficiency and to report his progress weekly.  
Somervell ordered Lee to reestablish a control division at COMZ, provided BG Clinton F. 
Robinson from his own staff to lead it, and expected this new element to standardize reporting 
with in the command and track the progress of directed improvements.  Between 23 January and 
early March Lord passed along a weekly progress report to Smith and Eisenhower until they 
agreed ETOUSA had adequately complied with the recommendations provided by the ASF. 
 
 Consolidation with the SOLOC, 8 February 1945 
The results of Lutes’ and Somervell’s inspections were presented two weeks 
before Larkin’s SOLOC was merged with the COMZ.  The infusion of new personnel 
and the different operational experiences they brought with them made adopting the 
suggested changes easier to swallow.  The ETOUSA G-4 assumed a simplified divisional 
 
104 Ibid, 362.   
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structure, took up a new approach with a number of its historical functions, and saw a lot 
of turnover among branch, division, and section leaders.   
Division Associated Branches or Sub-Sections 
Admin Office services, Procedures, Reports 
Operations Maint., Installations, Programs and Priorities [rail, road, port, canal], POL, 
Storage 
Plans Current plans, Long-range plans, Redeployment 
Supply Allied, Civil, Distribution, Equipment of Troops, Requirements, Salvage 
Table 6.5: ETOUSA G-4 internal organization after the merger with SOLOC, Feb 45105 
 
 The new structure consolidated power under four division chiefs, cutting the number of 
elements the G-4 needed to supervise in half.  Plans branch was retained and upgraded to full 
division.  LTC HC Barber, the old G-4 plans branch chief, became the deputy to COL Carter 
Page, who had been the plans chief at SOLOC.106  Almost all of the sub elements were 
reassigned to new divisions, and the distribution branch was reestablished under the control of 
the supply division.  The most important changes involved the integration of new personnel from 
SOLOC.  BG Stratton was moved down to become BG Morris W. Gilland’s deputy and then 
transferred out of ETOUSA entirely.  COL W.E. Potter, the old plant and communications chief 
was moved to the operations division, and COL D.R. Neil was retained as chief of the supply 
division.  About two-thirds of the original section and branch chiefs were retained, the balance 
being replaced by their counterparts from SOLOC.  This sent a clear message.  The majority of 
the men and officers within the G-4 were fine, but Stratton had lost the confidence of his peers 
and superiors, and so he had to go.  The new structure established three powerful operations 
divisions led by full colonels, and it balanced and logically distributed the branches among them 
 
105 History of the ETOUSA G-4, 29. 
106 Ruppenthal, Vol. II, 363. 
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to add a level of supervision between those lieutenant colonels and the G-4 himself.  It was 
hoped that giving more authority to the division chiefs would result in more responsive support 
to the combat zone.  The last round of reorganization in March looked to reduce as many 
personnel slots as possible by eliminating redundancy in the section and across the staff and by 
transferring as much responsibility to the technical services as they could realistically handle.  
The major result was the elimination of the POL branch, which added nothing that the MPS and 
quartermaster service were not already doing.107    
 Despite almost two years of practical experience with running theater-level logistics in a 
variety of environments, there was no expectation that the ETOUSA G-4 would be perfectly 
organized at the start of the campaign.  Moderate organizational adjustments are normal and 
healthy; as conditions, missions, and priorities change the staff needs to evolve to better manage 
them.  But it seems fair to say that Stratton’s section required drastic overhaul once it assumed 
control from the ADSEC over the communications zone.  Because the COMZ did not really 
understand where they fit within the sustainment system on the continent, the G-4 contained a 
number of branches that did not know what their unique and critical tasks were, included 
unnecessary branches, was missing a few branches they should have anticipated, and envisioned 
supervising a series of tasks already entrusted to technical staff sections.  ETOUSA’s role in 
planning, storage, and stock control and their relationship with the OCOT were particularly 
problematic and would see some of the most dramatic changes.  In isolation these developments 
would have been considered part of the normal process of transitioning from a garrison to 
combat environment.  But by August 1944 Stratton’s team had had at least 22 months of nearby 
combat experience to draw from.  The organization, duties, and responsibilities of the section 
 
107 Ibid, 31. 
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should not have come as such a surprise nor required so many major adjustments to become 
relevant. 
 The ETOUSA G3, COMZ Priorities, and Staff Coordination 
A major shortfall of COMZ’s concept for operations in France was a clear understanding 
of exactly how the half dozen geographically aligned sections would be synchronized.  Someone 
needed to assign forces, boundaries, and missions to these commands and then adjust them over 
time.  A similar process needed to occur at the COMZ level between the commander, enabled by 
his general staff, and the various chiefs of service, and then be replicated in the procedures and 
relationships with the field and air tactical commands.  The most important and difficult task was 
to integrate activities at connecting points, where missions that unfolded across a number of 
geographic and functional boundaries were handed off from one command to another.  The Red 
Ball Express was a perfect example.  Motor transport was controlled by the MTB and OCOT, 
missions were prioritized by the ETOUSA G-4, and the convoys of trucks were assisted by 
service troops from each base section that the route traveled through.  What staff section would 
be responsible for issuing detailed coordinating instructions to a dozen supporting agencies and 
commands and then tracking compliance?   
Traditionally this function was performed by the G-3 in tactical organizations of the U.S 
Army, and the G-4 performed a similar role in integrating the different service and branch units 
executing the sustainment mission in the rear area.  Applying the same method SOS had used in 
the U.K., Stratton’s G-4 section had the responsibility to synchronize and integrate the services 
and sections in France.  Complicating this role was the fact that the ETOUSA G-4 had no 
practical operational experience prior to August.  Writing operations orders, managing an 
operations center, and supervising execution in the field were not commonly emphasized in 
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support organizations.  In contrast, the special staff sections were familiar with coordination 
among themselves and across base section boundaries, a skill set important to and trained at their 
service and branch schools.  In consultation with the more experienced technical services, the G-
4 would have been well served to work out a system for controlling operations before deploying 
to the continent. 
If manned by a few of the right officers, the ETOUSA G-3 might have helped solve some 
of the burden placed on the G-4.  As their mission evolved once they reached France, the G-3 did 
find a useful role that helped free up the G-4 and Lee for other tasks.  The major function of the 
G-3 section was to assign units to the major U.S. subordinate commands, from corps 
headquarters and combat divisions to independent battalions and companies.  As the command 
structure stabilized, this became relatively straight forward, but early in the campaign and during 
the creation of a few new major commands the work load spiked.  Written instructions running 
to a dozen pages involving almost a thousand units bounced back and forth between almost a 
dozen headquarters with the activation of 3rd, 9th, and 1st Allied Airborne Armies.  Activation of 
12th Army Group and the transfer of operational control of 6th Army Group from AFHQ to 
SHAEF simplified some aspects of the problem, but it mostly just raised them one level higher.  
Once ETOUSA accurately captured exactly which units were assigned to an army or army 
group, any further changes were typically internal to the controlling organization.  Occasionally 
new units would arrive and be assigned, or units transferred between army or army group, but 
this was relatively easy compared with the initial battle to get the blend of divisions, combat, 
combat support, and combat service support units about right across a new corps or army.108 
 
108 See ETOUSA G-3 messages on 18 Aug 44 and 10 Sep 44 to various commands associated with the formation of 
9th Army and 1st Allied Airborne Army.  RG 498, UD 324, Box 1435.  The back and forth would typically last for 
about a week as dozens if not hundreds of changes were made to nomenclature and assignment of companies, 
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This function was complicated by the dual nature of the staff section, which was both the 
ETOUSA and COMZ G-3.  Assigning service units was the most complex and frequent duty, 
and it consumed a disproportionate amount of time.  Service units tended to be deployed as 
independent companies or battalions, so there were a lot of them.  They were first assigned to 
12th Army Group or COMZ based on detailed troop deployment schedules projected through 
D+90 linked to the Overlord plans.  Later a theater formula was used to guide the assignment 
process; the goal was to maintain a fixed ratio of service capabilities in each air, field, and 
service command.  Once a unit was assigned to USSTAF or one of the army groups, it largely 
disappeared from ETOUSA’s radar, but units assigned to COMZ had to be further assigned 
down to the regional section level or else retained for direct employment by the COMZ or one of 
the special staff sections.  Units were traded across base sections as new commands were 
established, ports opened, and transportation networks restored and put into operation.  It was a 
crushing amount of work that required a lot of resources to keep accurate.  The G-3 did not issue 
mission instructions to base sections or centrally managed unit pools; they only assigned them to 
superior commands.  Early in the campaign, employment of these units was delegated to a 
complex blend of base, technical section, and COMZ control.  
The assignment of combat and combat service support units to the armies and army 
groups was relatively straightforward.  Eisenhower decided where the corps and divisions went, 
and each had an associated pool of tank, tank destroyer, engineer, cavalry, artillery, and anti-
aircraft battalions and groups.  The commanders might not like the distribution of forces, but 
once the army group or SAC made his decision, they knew they had to live with it.  Early in the 
 
battalions, groups, and divisions.  SHAEF was the final arbiter if one of the armies or army groups believed it was 
not receiving its fair share of associated support units for each division or combat group. 
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campaign there was no similar consensus or central direction covering the distribution of service 
troops.  The 1st Army was given operational control over the ADSEC with all its attached service 
units; by late July these accounted for between 50 and 75% of the total COMZ D+90 troop basis.  
Because 1st Army remembered a day when they controlled a massive pool of service troops, they 
could never mentally adjust to the reduction to traditional manning levels, and initially 3rd Army 
and 12th Army Group wanted the same support ratios they had witnessed for 1st Army.109 
 ETOUSA G-3 was very busy filling an important function for the theater, and they had 
no spare organizational energy to help Lee or the G-4 synchronize support activities within the 
COMZ.  To do so would have required a larger G-3 section and a different vision as to their 
critical role.  Their message traffic from August and September helps illustrate just how 
important the armies considered their service troop augmentees and suggests their level of 
dissatisfaction with the units available from late July through September.  There are scores of 
pages of repeated appeals between the armies and COMZ trying to secure more service troops, 
but there was almost no mention of combat or combat support units.    
 
 Base section assignments and role and their interaction with COMZ 
 The leader of any organization exercises command and control through two means: his 
staff and his subordinate elements.  We have already seen how the staff at COMZ learned how to 
overcome early deficiencies and evolve to fill a role that meshed well with the roles eventually 
assumed by SHAEF and the three army groups.  Lee also had between four and six base sections 
 
109 Cable, ETOUSA/COMZ AG to 12th Army Group, 4 Sep 44.  RG 498, UD 324, Box 1435.  This was a three-page 
document explaining why 9th Army would not have the same level of service troops 1st Army first deployed to 
France with.  12th Army Group had asked COMZ (Fwd) a similar question back in August, inquiring if two newly 
assigned infantry divisions and an armor division would come with any extra service units beyond their organic 
assets.  12th Army Group was particularly interested in any information about quartermaster truck companies and 
ordnance maintenance units. 
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helping to manage the communications zone at the height of the campaign in France in 1944.  
The activities of each base section in France were very similar to those that they had practiced in 
the U.K.  The only notable difference was the need to coordinate and support the passage of 
trucks, trains, and units across their territory.  The pace of operations was more intense, and the 
infrastructure was in bad shape initially, but in general each base had much the same array of 
service units and tasks as they had seen in Britain.  Confusion and friction between base section 
commanders and the chiefs of technical services that had existed in the U.K. were not solved by 
deploying to the continent, but in general the bases performed all of their assigned tasks well 
once the staffs had settled in and established effective communications with COMZ.  Problems 
that arose involving the base sections were not the result of internal failures but the product of 
miscommunication by the COMZ or the service chiefs, or what some witnesses believed was a 
poor geographic distribution of the commands across the zone of communication. 
General Aurand, an officer with over twenty years’ experience as an ordnance officer, 
believed that Lee and the engineers with whom he surrounded himself did not understand how to 
allocate his area and functional commands to perform the communication zone mission.  In a 
written analysis prepared about a year after the end of the war, Aurand argued that the staff at 
COMZ had never completely understood how to integrate the tools at their disposal to make 
logistics work during the first six months of the campaign in France.  It was a complex and 
interlocking argument with a number of glaring flaws, but it also gave insight into what Lee 
could have done differently to be more effective.  It is difficult to sort through Aurand’s biases 
against “Beetle” Smith, the Office of the Chief of Transportation, and some of the staff at 
COMZ, and it must be remembered that he arrived in theater after the mistakes on which he 
focused had already happened.  Finally, as the commander of the Normandy Base Section from 
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November to the end of the war, he was in no position to speak authoritatively about some of the 
decisions and procedures followed in the armies and at SHAEF. 
 Aurand believed that the COMZ had made three interlocking mistakes in how they 
employed their base sections.  First, they deployed various sustainment headquarters to France 
out of sequence.  Second, the COMZ staff tried to centralize a number of functional missions at 
their level that he felt should have been delegated to the base section commanders.  Third, the 
base sections were poorly aligned, with bad boundaries and overlapping missions.  Aurand 
believed that Lee treated base sections as interchangeable pieces and missed the nature and 
importance of the fundamental differences among base, intermediate, and advanced sections.  
His arguments got a bit technical, but the key point was that, by following service doctrine on 
how to distribute supplies, the COMZ could have relied on decentralized execution to eliminate 
friction before it resulted in a crisis.  Aurand also believed that Lee mishandled the phased 
deployment of command elements into France, jumbling up the logical sequence that should 
have been followed.  Aurand thought that Lee could have created two unencumbered base 
sections much sooner than May and June and then deployed the first base section to Normandy 
with ADSEC.110  From the first week of the invasion this would have allowed the two commands 
to focus on their doctrinal mission and prevented the need for ADSEC to eventually turn its 
depots over to another organization.  Aurand also believed it was a major mistake to deploy the 
main command post of COMZ to the continent in early August.  SHAEF would have been better 
served if COMZ had waited until the first three or four base, intermediate, and advanced sections 
were functional and their communications’ networks well established.   The other benefit of 
 
110 MG Henry Aurand, “SHAEF-ETOUSA-COMZ: A Lesson in Organization for National Defense,” 17 July 1946, 
18-19.  Henry Aurand Papers, DDE Presidential Library. 
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waiting was that the command could occupy its final location (somewhere near Paris) with only 
one move rather than jumping to Normandy facing the prospect of displacing again in the near 
future. 
 The first requirement to make phased deployment to the continent work was to break the 
SOS staff into two independent elements.  One element would remain in Britain while the other 
displaced to France.  Lee also needed unencumbered but experienced base, intermediate, and 
advanced sections ready to deploy as soon as conditions called for them.111  In theory COMZ 
had done this by forming a FECZ and an ADSEC and assigning them to help 1st Army and 
FUSAG plan and prepare for Overlord, and by creating Base Section No. 1 on 1 May 1944, 
employing the commander, COL Roy W. Grower, and staff from the old Eastern Base Section in 
the U.K.112  As part of Reverse Bolero, Eastern Base section had been notified of these plans 
several months prior to the original invasion date, and reorganization and planning had 
intensified in March based on the assumption that the organization would take over eastern 
Brittany as soon as it could displace ADSEC.113  Base Section No. 1 was quickly followed by 
Base Second No. 2 in late May, which formed around the old Northern Ireland command under 
General Collins, and it was slated to replace the ADSEC in the Cotentin area.  Tentative plans to 
create an intermediate section using the Central Base Section staff were also made.  Aurand was 
either unaware that these steps had been taken or considered early May and June too late for the 
formation of the first two base sections.   
 COMZ needed three or four base sections ready to deploy quickly to the continent once 
the invasion started, but it also needed to sequence those commands into Normandy in a logical 
 
111 Aurand, 18. 
112 Ruppenthal, Vol. I, 216-217. 
113 Ibid, 217. 
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fashion.  Aurand believed that the first base section should have gone into France accompanied 
by ADSEC right on the heels of 1st Army.  This would have allowed the base section to run what 
would become the Normandy regional command from day one, with ADSEC assigned its 
doctrinal role of maintaining a small reserve of supplies and issuing them in a combat 
configuration directly to 1st Army.114  Instead of this more elegant solution, Plank’s ADSEC was 
forced to shoulder both burdens, while also serving as the operational logistics planners for 
FUSA and the U.S. element at 21st AG.  Aurand also would have brought in an intermediate 
section as the third major command element on the continent once the gap between Normandy 
base and ADSEC was too large for two sections to communicate easily with one another.  Under 
Aurand’s plan, COMZ would have been one of the last units to displace to the continent, going 
straight into well-resourced facilities around Paris. 
 As we have seen, what actually happened was that the FECZ was disbanded before it was 
in charge of anything and COMZ deployed to Normandy in early August, working at Valognes 
for about three weeks before moving again to Paris.  Any detailed study of the terrain and 
infrastructure of their potential operating area was rendered worthless when Base Sections 1, 2, 
and 3 were assigned to different locations than the ones they had been told they would occupy 
while still in the U.K.115  Normandy Base Section was not built from any of the teams assembled 
in the U.K., instead evolving from an area command first established by Plank on 11 July to run 
Cherbourg.  The core of the command was the 4th Major Port, commanded by COL Cleveland 
Sibley, an old hand from Ross’s OCOT who had accompanied Plank to North Africa in January 
1944 during the ADSEC observation tour.  Ten days later the port command was upgraded to the 
 
114 Aurand, 18. 
115 Ruppenthal, Vol. II, 32.  Section 1 was told they would assume Brittany.  Section 2 would run the Cotentin 
Peninsula.  Section 3 was told to focus on the Seine ports.   
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Cherbourg Command under Colonel Wyman and reinforced with elements that had been 
earmarked for Base Section No. 3.116  This left Base Section No. 2, originally slated to take over 
the area around Cherbourg, in limbo, and  its deployment to the continent was postponed twice 
during the second half of July.  Cherbourg Base Section was formally established on 16 August 
and absorbed the remainder of the personnel aligned with Base Section No. 3.117   
 
Figure 6.3: Projected base section assignments and boundaries by D+90118  
 
 
116 Ruppenthal, Vol II., 33.   
117 Ibid, 34.  It would later be renamed the Normandy Base Section.   
118 From the 14 May COMZ Plan developed by FECZ. 
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Base Section No. 1 was employed to run the Brittany Base Section as originally planned, 
arriving at Utah Beach on 3 August with instructions to proceed to Rennes as soon as practical.  
Base Section No. 2 was initially reoriented from Cherbourg to Brest, but on 5 September BG 
Collins was told he would establish the Loire Base Section (LBS) operating out of Le Mans 
instead.119  Throughout September LBS acted as both an intermediate base and provided direct 
support to Third Army.  BG Rogers activated the Seine Base Section about a week and a half 
earlier, reaching Paris on 24 August.  Colonel Jacobs, originally the commander of Base Section 
No. 3, was moved over to Base Section No. 4 when his staff was absorbed by Cherbourg Base 
Command.  On 3 September Jacobs was directed to Fontainebleau where he activated the Oise 
Base Section.  BG Thrasher was told at the same time that he would activate the Channel Base 
Section the following week.120  But on 15 September the COMZ decided to flip flop the 
assignments, aligning Jacobs and Section 4 to the Channel command and Thrasher to run Oise 
Base Section.  Jacobs took over the management of Le Havre in early October, and Thrasher 
occupied a small sliver of land between the Seine Base and Plank’s ADSEC.121   
 
119 Ibid, 34-35. 
120 Ibid, 36.   
121 Ibid, 37. 
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Figure 6.4: COMZ base area boundaries on 7 Oct 44 
 
 If it is difficult for the reader to keep up with all of these changes, imagine the effect on 
the base section staff and assigned service troops.  Flexibility is a virtue in military 
organizations, and it was commendable that COMZ was willing to change plans in order to 
exploit opportunities when they presented themselves.  But there are also advantages to assigning 
a unit a mission and giving them time to study the operating area in detail.  Aurand would have 
argued that running a base section was very different from running an intermediate section and 
that the personnel originally earmarked against Base Section No. 3, which formed under the 
assumption that it would serve as an intermediate section, should have formed Oise Section 
rather than augmenting Normandy.  Out of six section commands, only one ended up in the 
geographical area against which it was first aligned, and every command experienced significant 
changes to its primary mission.  It is hard to imagine how the COMZ could have produced a 
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more jumbled array of base section assignments in France.  Perhaps Lee believed that all of his 
base section teams were interchangeable, or that there was no practical benefit to be had from a 
detailed study of the geography of a region prior to working there.  It is more likely that Lee was 
never invested in the original guidance governing which staff would go into what region in 
France, planning to retain flexibility as the situation developed.  Once the campaign began to 
unfold, leaders at COMZ ignored or were perhaps even unaware of what earlier plans had 
directed.     
 In addition to a jumbled-up deployment schedule and to endless change in assigned 
missions, the base sections also had to contend with what Aurand believed was 
micromanagement or over-centralization on the part of the ETOUSA staff.  He was particularly 
upset with Ross’s OCOT and what he considered its poor management of trucks and trains.  
Aurand believed that decentralization of power from ETOUSA/COMZ to the base sections 
would have helped solve some of the problems with transportation and stock control.  To really 
make this work, Aurand thought that COMZ needed fewer, larger base sections.  One large 
Channel command would have controlled all of the northern ports, base depots, and 
transportation up to the Seine.  One intermediate section would have supervised transloading 
across the Seine and run the intermediate depots.  The ADSEC would have controlled everything 
north and east of Reims until Antwerp was opened.122  All transportation and service troops 
would have been distributed among these three commands, which would have enforced routine 
maintenance on the truck fleet, demanded the exchange of empty rail cars before handing over 
loaded ones on the journey to the east, and established Red Ball transfer points to exchange 
 
122 Aurand, 13, 20.   
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drivers and service vehicles.123  Aurand’s argument was that base and district commanders could 
have enforced discipline and synchronized multi-service projects better than the ETOUSA 
special staff or COMZ general staff could.  Aurand was correct that some of the base section 
leaders had experience with these sorts of tasks based on their time in the U.K., but Aurand also 
ignored the fact that nothing prevented the base section commanders from taking these steps 
using their own initiative under the construct established by ETOUSA and COMZ.  He implied 
that Ross convinced Lee to exclude base commanders from managing the truck routes, rail lines, 
and service troops who manned them, but nothing stood in the way of centralized planning and 
decentralized supervision of the motorized and rail distribution networks.  Aurand also ignored 
the fact that at the height of the pursuit most of the base sections had not yet been established.  
His alternative approach might have helped in October and November but not in August and 
September.     
 Clay’s perspective on what was wrong in the relationship between the base sections and 
COMZ was that the officers in the command knew what needed to be done but lacked the 
authority to override directions coming from the technical service chiefs in Paris.124  The colonel 
in charge of port clearance had run the port of Philadelphia before the war, and he really knew 
his business, but he had no authority over transportation assets once the supplies were unloaded 
from the ships.  Clay decided to stop discharging supplies over the beaches, to place mud-locked 
depots off limits for the storage of new supplies, and to focus his energy on moving supplies 
from the docks to temporary storage facilities adjacent to the rail network.  Next he visited Ross 
in Paris and convinced the chief of transportation to surrender local control of trains around 
 
123 Ibid, 15-16.   
124 MG Lucius. D Clay, interviewed by Jean Smith, 14 January 1971, interview 13, transcript, OH-285, Dwight D. 
Eisenhower Presidential Library (DDE PL), Abilene, KS, 437.           
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Cherbourg to the port commander.  Soon 10,000 tons of supplies a day were being shipped out of 
Normandy base section and the old beach depots had been eliminated, with the material stored 
there hauled out, catalogued, and integrated with the new depots along the rail line.  Clay was 
credited with “fixing” Cherbourg in less than a month.  The reality was that bad weather had 
largely put an end to beach unloading and Cherbourg had been replaced by Antwerp as the most 
important port for material destined for the combat divisions.  Clay credited the turn-around to 
his ability to empower the staff and free them from micromanagement from Paris.  There were 
advantages to being a major general with friends at SHAEF; Clay had direct access to the service 
chiefs of which a colonel could only dream.  In late November Clay was replaced by MG Aurand 
and returned to the ASF.  He took back with him the impression that skilled officers who knew 
exactly what they needed to do were being held back by a COMZ committed to over-
centralization.   
 
 Conclusion 
 The easiest way to master a new task is by doing it – day in and day out with as few 
distractions as possible.  The best way to prepare for a future task is similar, made easier by 
lessons and tips offered by friends and peers with practical experience.  Lee’s SOS had two 
disadvantages precluding these measures.  First, the command was wise enough to create 
ADSEC and FECZ and to resource them with quality people.   ADSEC and FECZ were absolved 
of distractions and placed close to the combat units they would support in France.  The natural 
temptation for SOS was to leave them alone so they could get on with the work they had been 
directed to accomplish.  Second, SOS had plenty of work on its plate.  The heaviest flow of U.S. 
personnel and equipment occurred in 1944; the staff at Cheltenham and its five base sections 
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were overwhelmed receiving and integrating this avalanche of material.  SOS also had 
responsibility for Reverse Bolero, or the mounting plan for Overlord, and this consumed the 
special staff and base sections during the period when ADSEC gained its first practical 
experience in supporting combat operations.   
Seen in perfect hindsight, COMZ’s failure to sustain the pace of the pursuit and keep the 
Germans on the run could be attributed to one factor; the command was incapable of managing a 
theater requisition system based on prioritized demands from combat units.  U.S. logistics 
doctrine and the systems used for Bolero and the initial plan for Overlord relied on push-based 
resupply regulated by consumption projections based upon validated historical data.  There were 
obvious advantages to using such an approach.  First, it mitigated the limitations imposed by the 
signal equipment available at the time; and, second, it did not demand perfect accuracy when it 
came to collating and prioritizing often-changing demand signals from a large group of 
competing sources.  It also had the advantage of working without the need for perfectly accurate 
theater inventory lists of the supplies already downloaded and stashed across the countryside.  
But this preferred method for deciding what to ship to the front broke down in the fall of 1944 
for two major reasons.  A shortage of transportation forced COMZ to get directly involved in 
deciding what would be pulled off a ship or depot shelf and delivered to the armies and air 
forces, which exposed the absence of effective two-way dialogue between 12th AG and COMZ, 
robust and well-known systems, and designated organizations to perform this role.  Second, 
ADSEC had allowed, or was forced to accept, the non-traditional methods employed by 1st Army 
to requisition supplies and, more importantly, shortcuts in inventory management adopted by the 
various service depots scattered across Normandy.  When COMZ took over responsibility for the 
rear area from ADSEC in early August, they had almost no idea where all the supplies were that 
640 
 
had been unloaded from ships over the last two months.  There were no well-organized lists to 
help COMZ determine what was already on the continent and where that material was located, 
nor were there consolidated lists of what the armies were missing that had been placed on 
backorder with the command that ran the port of New York.  Even if COMZ had enough trains 
and trucks to move everything desired and perfectly accurate inventory and requisition records to 
inform the process, the theater quickly discovered that some of the historical consumption 
estimates used as gospel by the ASF, especially those designed to regulate artillery ammunition, 
repair parts, and vehicle replacement, were too low.  COMZ was forced to develop ways to 
overcome all three linked problems under the most complex conditions imaginable and, 
unsurprisingly, struggled to do so.   
COMZ had to completely revamp the theater requisition program, the process used to 
allocate the different types of transportation assets, and the internal organization of the ETOUSA 
G-4 section in order to survive under the conditions they inherited in France.  The requisition and 
inventory management systems were overhauled and generally functional by early November, 
but they were not completely fixed when the Germans surrendered in May 1945.  COMZ 
eventually decided that the best solution to the transportation crisis was to gradually surrender 
control over the network -- and the associated coordination with SHAEF, the armies, and the 
base sections -- back to OCOT during the winter of 1944-1945.  OCOT found this easier to 
manage because they had always maintained a theater-wide, operational perspective and U.S. 
doctrine allocated this role to the quartermaster and transportation special staffs.  Furthermore, 
Ross’s officers were educated and trained, and had enough practical experience, to direct the 
flow of theater transportation assets under combat conditions.  COMZ would eventually force the 
ASF to accept their more accurate consumption estimates, but not until very late in the war.  In 
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the meantime, U.S. armies found unorthodox methods to ensure that they had enough of those 
supplies that were rapidly consumed to survive during the spring campaign. 
These systematic difficulties with the theater supply system were amplified, not 
mitigated, by friction and personal animosity that existed between COMZ and FUSAG and 
between the combat and support communities in general.  There was a long history of poor 
communication and bad blood between SOS and the operational units they supported, a problem 
repeatedly commented upon by various external observers, including Lutes and Gale.  Lee and 
his staff did not attend SHAEF meetings unless ordered to do so, did not have effective liaison 
officers down at the army and army group level, and struggled to communicate effectively with 
12th AG and 21st AG.125  ADSEC should have been the mechanism for effective coordination 
with 12th Army Group.  Moses and Bradley trusted Plank, but for some reason ADSEC’s positive 
reputation did not seem to transfer to COMZ.  Lord and Stratton’s visits to combat units could 
not overcome the historical animosity, and in some instances they made it worse.126  It seems 
that by the time the logistical crisis emerged, it was too late for Lee and COMZ to salvage their 
reputation with the other headquarters with which they were supposed to work closely.     
The impact of COMZ’s struggles on the campaign was significant and avoidable.  The 
most significant manifestation of a breakdown in theater logistics was the culmination of the 
 
125 Letter Gale to Lee, 18 Apr 44.  Gale Papers, Section 1, Entry 2, Secretary of the CAO, SHAEF.  Gale was writing 
Lee to inform him that Eisenhower expected him to attend his weekly CINC meetings in the future.  On 5 October 
Gale wrote in his diary that he and Hughes had agreed one of the most important reasons COMZ was struggling was 
because they did not understand the operational situation, avoided meetings at SHAEF held to share that 
information, and did not have an open line of communication with the army groups.  12th Army Group dismissed 
COMZ as irrelevant in August, followed by 21st AG in mid-September.  Gale came to the same conclusion himself 
in early September.      
126 COL Poole, Memo for Record, meeting with BG Stratton, 21 Sep 44, WO 171/ 146 Q Plans, National Archives, 
Kew.  Poole met with the Americans, who were accompanied by MG Napier from SHAEF, as the senior 
administrative officer present at the 21st AG main headquarters.  The meeting was not productive, and it disturbed 
COL Poole, who felt Stratton’s suggestions about sharing rolling stock, ports, and beaches were unreasonable and 
likely to interfere with British attempts to get their supply system back on its feet.   
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Allied pursuit that occurred between 5 and 26 September and the failure to win the race to build 
up combat power along the Westwall that would have permitted Eisenhower to mount a major 
offensive designed to allow a return to a war of movement.  This is not to say that logistics was 
the sole, or even primary, reason for the end of the pursuit phase.  It is also far-fetched to suggest 
that the Allies could have crossed the Rhine and held on to a bridgehead in October or November 
in the face of German counterattacks.  It is beyond the scope of this work to examine in any 
detail what might have happened if the Allies had gotten another 50 to 100 miles further to the 
east in September.  It seems reasonable that a direct Allied threat to parts of the Ruhr or Saar 
would have negatively impacted the production of weapons and supplies, undermined German 
morale, and quite possibly ended the war a few months sooner.  Any speculation that an Allied 
crossing of the Rhine in the fall of 1944 would have triggered a German internal revolt against 
Hitler leading to an immediate surrender seems highly unlikely. 
  When COMZ established shop at Valognes on 7 August, members of the command had 
a wide range of combat experience.  Old hands from ETOUSA and officers that had been 
detached to FECZ had months and, in some cases, years of familiarity with the details associated 
with the sustainment plan, and FECZ had already been on the continent shadowing ADSEC for 
about a month.  But the COMZ general staff came directly from London and Cheltenham, where 
they had been consumed with daily administrative operations in the U.K. and the work of 
equipping U.S. units and establishing theater reserve stocks through meticulous coordination 
with the ASF and its technical service sections.  For many of the officers at COMZ, arrival in 
France triggered their first thoughts about how their roles would change in combat.  Surrounded 
by organizations with more practical experience, COMZ’s early performance reinforced the 
impression that the command did not know what it was doing.  But Lee had created a disciplined 
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outfit that was committed to learning and getting better, and by late October they had worked 
through most of the bugs and established effective procedures to manage the zone of 
communications and support the combat units.  However, COMZ grew into its role too late to 
allow Lee to make a positive impact on extending the reach of the pursuit into western Germany.  
If COMZ did not trigger the end of the pursuit, they slowed Allied recovery afterwards, clearly 
contributing to the failure to return to mobile operations in late September and October.   
In the next chapter, we will examine how COMZ executed the sustainment mission 
during the pursuit across France, especially its efforts to harness the fleet of supply trucks and 
cargo aircraft at SHAEF’s disposal, and the early operations of the military pipeline service 
charged with running the bulk POL distribution lines.  Finally, it is helpful to see how 21st Army 
Group managed logistics at their level and to see the problems their system seemed to avoid, and 
the challenges that seemed to be universal among all the large Allied organizations.   The 
experiences of the British 21st AG suggest that adequate resources existed to accomplish more 
that fall, but that COMZ lacked the expertise to use those assets effectively.  The way in which 
an inexperienced COMZ impeded SHAEF and 12th AG reinforces the point of just how complex 
and interconnected joint theater level warfare is.  Despite years and years of practical experience 
in the Allied camp, there were still so many unknowns when it came to running a theater of war 
by the end of the summer of 1944.  SHAEF had largely figured out how to function as a joint-
combined headquarters, but it struggled to figure out how to take over and manage the ground 
campaign.  COMZ was largely lost when they first took over, their inexperience frustrating 
Moses, Plank, and 21st AG, who all believed that they better understood the job that COMZ 
could not master.  In the resulting scramble to fill the gaps left by an inexperienced COMZ, 
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SHAEF ended up taking over the most fundamental aspects of the theater sustainment mission, 
including integrating and synchronizing the ETOUSA special staff.
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Chapter 7 - Trucks, Planes, and Pipelines 
This chapter examines how ETOUSA tried to manage the backbone of its transportation  
system during the pursuit in August and September and how the inability to exploit the full 
potential of trucks and cargo aircraft contributed to the Allies stopping before they could 
penetrate the Westwall.  Despite a series of decisions formulated above their level that made the 
sustainment challenge at the theater level much harder to successfully execute, COMZ 
compounded the situation with poor innal management of the resources that were available.   
Working hand in hand with their superiors at SHAEF, Lee and Ross failed to mass and focus the 
only relevant transportation assets that might have sustained an Allied push up to the Rhine 
before the German Army could recover.  Despite two years of practical experience supervising 
logistics at the theater level and the support of highly qualified organizations beneath them, 
COMZ proved themselves incapable of making hard choices and ruthlessly controlling how the 
truck and cargo aircraft fleet were employed in order to enforce priorities within the theater.  As 
was the case with so many other tasks assigned to the COMZ that summer, the organization was 
incapable of accomplishing the mission.  Lee and his subordinates were once again incapable of 
building and empowering subordinate commands resourced with an array of capabilities from all 
of the technical services.  Since Lee refused to create combined-service organizations with 
permission to operate freely across base section boundaries, it was incumbent upon COMZ to 
synchronize these interactions.  This was the case with the Motor Transport Brigade (MTB), 
Military Pipeline Service (MPS), and, to a lesser extent, large-scale aerial resupply.  
Unfortunately for SHAEF, COMZ was not capable of performing this role. 
The historical record has generally obscured these internal failures, covering them up by 
emphasizing conditions beyond the control of ETOUSA, the enormity of the task faced by the 
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command, and the scope of the work that was successfully carried out.  But the bottom line was 
that COMZ and its Office of the Chief of Transportation (OCOT) could not adjust to the 
demands of mobile warfare quickly enough and thus wasted motorized transportation capacity by 
delivering non-essentials to the front while combat commanders were pleading for fuel and 
ammunition.  In COMZ’s defense, massed, long-ranged motor and aerial transport operations 
were new and untested concepts within the U.S. Army at the end of July 1944, at least in the 
ETO.  Perhaps Lee and Ross could have picked up a few more tips from the methods perfected 
by AFHQ and NATOSA in North Africa and Italy, but the lateness in organizing both the MTB 
and Combined Air Transport Operations Room (CATOR) made this extremely difficult.  
Logisticians at SHAEF and COMZ and in the two army groups could not convince their 
superiors to use the 1,300 cargo planes at their disposal to relentlessly support sustainment 
operations at the expense of preparing for airborne drops, and they had not worked out the 
detailed procedures to control this effort even if they had been authorized to pursue it.  Finally, 
ETOUSA grappled with the problem of how to best organize and operate a POL pipeline service 
in France, taking until mid-October to build a multi-service command with the resources and 
know-how to shoulder the burden of moving bulk fuel over great distances without needing 
resources or staff support from base sections or COMZ.   
One area where COMZ succeeded beyond any reasonable expectation was the repair 
work done on the transportation infrastructure in August and September.  The preparation for the 
varied challenges presented by the port at Cherbourg were thorough and ingenious.  This 
combined-service repair team went on to help restore all of the major ports used by SHAEF in 
1944.  COMZ put in a similarly effective performance in rebuilding the rail lines between 
Normandy and the western bank of the Seine, which included fixing or constructing dozens of 
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bridges along the way.  The U.S. Army had anticipated these challenges, resourced enough units 
with adequate supplies, and had well-established headquarters to synchronize the activity of the 
various engineer battalions, regiments, and groups.  It helped that these were engineer tasks, run 
by long-service and professional officers employing well-trained units equipped with organic 
motor transportation companies.  In hindsight, this capability provided an excellent model for 
how to accomplish other complex tasks in the rear areas of the theater.  
One source of insight into the logistical challenges confronting SHAEF and COMZ that 
has been generally ignored was the comparative experience of 21st Army Group and its efforts to 
sustain their advancing units.  By looking at the British approach to running a line of 
communications, one gains a better appreciation of what the U.S. Army did well and areas where 
improvement might have been possible.  Similarities in the two national approaches to managing 
logistics seemed to outnumber the differences, but in general 21st Army Group seemed better 
able to manage their large fleet of general transport (GT) truck companies and scope operational 
objectives based on supply constraints.  Montgomery took action at the end of August to free up 
over half of his pool of truck companies tied down around Bayeux and reorient them on long-
distance hauling along the line of communications.  The British commander was very deliberate 
about matching maneuver objectives to the supplies and transportation assets required to 
accomplish them, embracing sequential thrusts if necessary, and using the minimal number of 
troops he believed could get the job done.  Senior leaders at 21st Army demanded constant and 
effective communications between the maneuver and sustainment communities, and was more 
successful in maintaining tight command and control along the entire line of communications 
throughout the dash across France than Lee.  To some extent this was because the British were 
responsible for a much smaller portion of the theater logistics mission, but it also revealed the 
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greater level of practical experience among their logistical headquarters and units as well as the 
close relationship between the 21st HQ staff and their associates in the L of C command. 
It is easy to claim that COMZ was ineffective when it came to controlling motorized 
resupply during the pursuit, but what exactly did the organization fail to do that resulted in 
Bradley not accomplishing his objectives before the German Army recovered?    The first and 
simplest answer is that COMZ could not deliver enough fuel to the vanguard corps of 1st and 3rd 
Armies to maintain a steady rate of advance during the last week of August and the first week of 
September.  These fuel shortages had been accurately predicted well in advance, and they 
resulted in what could be considered relatively minor disruptions to the pace of Allied 
operations.  But the dozen times that a U.S. division was forced to remain stationary for 24 to 48 
hours awaiting fuel during those crucial two weeks had a disproportionate effect on the Allied 
fall campaign.  Patton and Hodges could not maintain steady pressure with enough weight of 
forces to keep the Germans on the run.  Each successful rearguard action that bought the 
Germans a day or two to scrape together reinforcements to man the Westwall and the line of the 
Moselle was critical to their chances of successfully shielding the factories of the Saar and Ruhr 
from Allied occupation.  The rearguards in front of 1st and 3rd Army would have been easily 
bypassed, encircled, and overrun if the U.S. could have kept the front-line divisions on the move 
without having to stop for days at a time awaiting fuel.  Options existed by which SHAEF and 
ETOUSA could have moved more fuel to the front or else better focused the use of the fuel that 
did make it forward.  The margin between success and failure was so narrow in early September 
that a very small increase in delivery tonnages would have made a major difference in the 
outcome of the fall campaign.   
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It is true that internal issues hurt COMZ’s efficiency during the pursuit, but these 
problems were compounded by external distractions beyond Lee’s control.  The civilian 
population of Paris required immediate support after the city’s liberation in late August.  The 
U.S. Army exhibited a strange pre-occupation with reducing the German garrison of Brest in 
mid-September, an activity that ended up competing for the attention of staff officers, 
transportation assets, and artillery ammunition desperately needed elsewhere in the theater.  
Once the 1st Allied Airborne Army was created, it seemingly generated a powerful gravitational 
pull on senior leaders to use it, freezing almost 1,200 C47 air transport aircraft capable of 
moving 3,000 tons of supplies a day while an argument raged over the relative merits of aerial 
resupply versus airborne envelopment.  Montgomery put more energy into seizing a few channel 
ports and getting ready for Market Garden than he did into executing Eisenhower’s order to clear 
the approaches to Antwerp.  Finally, Bradley ignored Montgomery’s repeated calls to prioritize 
1st Army and continued to split his supplies between Hodges and Patton.  Lee did not try, or 
could not, to convince Eisenhower to change his mind on each of these issues – and he even 
encouraged Eisenhower to green light 12th AG again on 12 September.  This made COMZ’s 
mission that much harder. 
 The result was the near-simultaneous end of pursuit operations in all three advancing 
armies at the end of the first week of September, forcing COMZ to confront a very different 
sustainment challenge.  Theater logistics no longer revolved principally around keeping half-a-
dozen corps supplied with fuel, expanding to a much wider range of critical categories of items.  
Furthermore, when Eisenhower agreed to get behind Market Garden, SHAEF was forced to shift 
resources from COMZ and 12th Army Group to 21st Army Group, finally supporting the main 
effort in the theater as Montgomery had been demanding since the crossing of the Seine.  When 
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the operation failed, Allied material requirements in the combat zone skyrocketed.  Now 
everyone called for the immediate delivery of the full range of supplies needed to break through 
a new defensive crust while simultaneously replacing worn out and discarded equipment.  Yet 
more transportation assets were required to move left behind combat formations up to the front 
lines and sustain them once they arrived.  Even as the transportation infrastructure of France was 
being repaired and augmented by using imported resources, soaring demands at the front 
overwhelmed any increase in carrying capacity.  If the Allies hoped to get the Germans on the 
run again in mid-September and October in the U.S. sector, COMZ would have to quickly 
overcome the difficulties that had hobbled their efforts in August and in the first half of 
September.  Fortunately for the Germans, SHAEF and COMZ could not restore sufficient rail 
service to the front, rebuild the truck fleet, or overcome their inability to find what was already 
on the continent and deliver essentials to the combat formations in time to restore mobility 
before bad weather and a hardening defense made the challenge much more difficult.  Logistical 
recovery demanded above all other things time -- time put to good use by the Germans to 
solidify the defense of their western border.  
 
 ETOUSA’s OCOT and Theater Distribution During the Pursuit 
 It is safe to assume that U.S. officers in SHAEF and ETOUSA knew that the Office of 
the Chief of Transportation, under the direction of MG Frank S. Ross, was going to play a 
critical role after the breakout from the lodgment area.  Although the engineers had responsibility 
for repairing damaged ports, bridges, roads, and rail lines, Ross would manage the theater 
transportation network once it was back in operation.  Everyone who had studied the problem 
knew that distributing Allied supplies over continental distances was going to be a tough task, 
and a few knowledgeable officers suspected it would be impossible until the rail network began 
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to pick up some of the slack starting around D+60 to D+90.  Until then, the Allies would have to 
rely exclusively on motor transport, and the experts worried that COMZ did not have enough 
truck companies with the right equipment to keep significant forces supplied beyond the Seine.  
If asked in May 1944, the logisticians at SHAEF and ETOUSA would have pointed to 
transportation shortages as their primary concern for the coming campaign.      
 Ross’s OCOT had responsibility for all possible bottlenecks in the distribution system.  
Transportation troops ran the ports, were responsible for managing the inland waterways, and 
manned the units that formed the Military Rail Service (MRS).  The Transportation Corps of the 
U.S. Army did not generate and supervise truck units (this responsibility belonged to the 
Quartermaster Corps), but Ross was responsible for their performance and had technical control 
of the fleet on the continent.  Aerial transport was scattered through the numbered, tactical air 
forces, USSTAF, and 1st Allied Airborne Army once it was formed, and the massed hauling 
capacity of these cargo aircraft was managed by AEAF and SHAEF G-3.  Ross knew aerial 
resupply was another method his staff could call on to distribute supplies, but at first the U.S 
Army looked to aircraft for emergency, small-scale deliveries only.   
An advantage held by OCOT was the similarity between their role in the U.K. and their 
role in France.  Major differences included the fact that, at least initially, the French network 
would be in bad shape as a result of both friendly and enemy combat action, that the Allies 
would eventually have to rely on French civilian labor to maintain and run the railroad, and that 
cross-boundary coordination among various base sections would be a critical task for OCOT or 
COMZ if the system was to function efficiently.  After two years’ experience working with 
British civilians, Ross’s officers had learned how to unload ships and manage port operations, 
control truck and rail convoys, and disperse supplies into widely scattered depots and then 
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retrieve that material on short notice when required.  The pace, scope, and complexity of 
operations in France would be more intense, but OCOT had hands-on experience in the 
procedures associated with their mission and had practiced under some of the conditions they 
would find in France.  It is not surprising that OCOT grew frustrated with COMZ efforts to 
control or supervise their work in the fall, viewing the command as inexperienced newcomers 
that only got in their way. 
 Ross had monitored and contributed to operational planning for Roundup/Overlord since 
July 1943, and he remained heavily engaged with SHAEF and FUSAG during the spring of 
1944.  But he was also wise enough to realize that he would need good people engaged in 
operational planning at the levels below COMZ and on the ground in France during the earliest 
days of the campaign.  Ross assigned high-quality officers to head the transportation sections 
within ADSEC and FECZ, and he monitored their progress closely.  His plan to weather the 
early disruption of command and control associated with the phased deployment of headquarters 
to the continent was to deploy strong transportation staff sections with both ADSEC and FECZ 
and then to centralize COMZ long-haul truck operations under the Motor Transport Brigade until 
he could bring the rest of OCOT to France and get the rail system up and running.   
Ross anticipated a couple of critical transition points during the campaign linked to the 
transfer of authority among headquarters or a change in the primary means of long-distance 
transportation.  At some point the Allies would break out of their lodgment in the Cotentin 
Peninsula and advance into Brittany and towards Paris, relying exclusively on trucks until the 
pace of the exploitation slowed down enough for engineers to restore rail service to the army and 
service to corps depots west of the Seine.  The official story was that at this point the Allies 
would halt until the line of communications was restored right up to the Seine, but Ross had 
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planned for the most demanding scenario while crafting his request for forces and equipment in 
the summer of 1943.  Perhaps remembering the sudden change of plans implemented in North 
Africa, Ross understood that he needed options in case SHAEF directed a continuation of the 
pursuit beyond the Seine before sorting out the railroads.  Ross also worried about a drift in 
centralized control over transportation assets while he displaced his main headquarters between 
the U.K. and France, and he relied on trusted subordinates who understood his methods and 
philosophy in order to weather the surprises he knew would develop once they were in contact 
with the enemy.  
Ross’ foresight in putting in place measures to manage friction was impressive, but 
ultimately insufficient.  Any system that relies on centralized control needs an accurate appraisal 
of current conditions.  It must be able to determine where transportation resources are and to 
direct their movement through the use of a robust communications network fed by disciplined 
units employing well-understood reporting procedures.  Unfortunately for OCOT, too many of 
these variables were beyond Ross’s control that summer.  Allied command and control broke 
down across many echelons during the second half of August, outrunning the range of radios and 
the speed of signal units laying new wire.  At the height of the pursuit, couriers mounted on 
motorcycles or jeeps became the most reliable means of long-range communication.  The Motor 
Transport Brigade (MTB), tailor-built to manage the consolidated efforts of scores of truck 
companies over hundreds of miles of roads, was stymied by limitations in communications 
technology and problematic lines of authority among themselves, three base sections, and COMZ 
headquarters.  None of these U.S. organizations could figure out how to position control nodes 
along the Red Ball to maintain situational awareness and orchestrate the service units involved. 
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Providing fuel at the front had always been a matter of concern during mobile operations, 
both because of the massive amount required and the need for specialized equipment to move it 
efficiently.  One of the easiest logistical estimates to explain to senior leaders was the linkage 
between the amount of fuel that nine heavy and five light POL truck companies could shuttle 200 
miles every 24 hours and the daily consumption rate of a corps containing three divisions.  This 
simple arithmetic dictated that the U.S. Army could sustain five corps at the end of a line of 
communication that was 200 miles long, with about 300 surplus tons that could be used to 
support fighter groups or critical units assigned at the army or army group level.  Each block of 
200 C47s committed to aerial resupply would fuel another corps, if there were enough barrels or 
jerry cans to hold the gas.  Extending this system beyond 200 miles or asking it to maintain a 
steady flow for weeks on end was problematic; pressure on the truck companies could only be 
relieved by shifting some of the volume over to the POL pipelines, opening a bulk POL port 
closer to the front, or using trains to cover some of the distance.   
Bradley was quickly forced to modify his scheme of maneuver to deal with these 
limitations; on the day he crossed the Seine he was already operating at the maximum range to 
which five corps could be steadily supplied with fuel.  The advance dropped from five to four 
corps almost immediately, and even these twelve divisions could not be resupplied on a 
consistent basis.  On some days entire corps were immobilized awaiting the delivery of fuel, and 
by late August direct pressure was maintained on the Germans by as little as a single division or 
combat command in front of each U.S corps.  Realistically COMZ only had enough POL trucks 
to sustain six divisions covered by some close air support between the Seine and the 
Meuse/Moselle without significant assistance from aerial or rail transport, and, even then, this 
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would have required the ruthless massing of every specialized truck company, hundreds of C47s, 
and the service units required to maintain this force.   
But the special staff at ETOUSA seemed incapable of convincing senior leaders, 
including LTG Lee, that these limitations could not be wished away.  Planners at 21st AG and 1st 
Allied Airborne Army repeatedly found excuses to shield the C47 fleet from getting tied down 
with routine resupply missions at the same time theater logisticians repeatedly emphasized that 
the only way to sustain a drive beyond the Seine was by committing at least 800 aircraft daily.  
Eisenhower and Bradley refused to acknowledge the simple math that showed that the 
Americans could sustain only two to three corps between Paris and the northern half of the 
Westwall if they relied exclusively on motor transport.  In order to sustain a drive over the 
Moselle between Metz and Nancy (almost 500 driving miles from Cherbourg) by one U.S. corps 
required the commitment of every bulk fuel company in ETOUSA.  Patton’s thrust was the 
hardest to resupply using only trucks while offering the most remote operational payoff.  
Montgomery understood these logistical realities and the hard choices they should have forced 
Eisenhower and Bradley to make, but he could not convince his U.S. partners to act consistently 
according to these facts. 
 Under trying conditions OCOT did the best it could.  The fact that four U.S. corps 
continued to advance in fits and starts all the way to the Meuse and Moselle by the first week of 
September speaks favorably to the feats of improvisation accomplished throughout COMZ.  It is 
difficult to determine exactly what was going on from mid-August to early-October because of 
the collapse of what had been excellent reporting up until that point and because of OCOT’s 
refusal to try to extract accurate operational readiness figures from the QM truck units.  It does 
seem that COMZ was caught off balance by the rapid transition in priorities from the end of the 
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battle of Falaise to the pursuit across eastern France.  Unlike 21st AG, COMZ did not anticipate 
the criticality of a steady supply of fuel to 1st and 3rd Armies, nor, more importantly, did it take 
decisive steps to push POL forward and generate more lift assets before a crisis developed at the 
front.  It seems that OCOT anticipated the demands the pursuit would place on the truck 
companies and tried to organize the Red Ball Express accordingly, but it refused to take 
measures to meet the first critical requirement, for bulk fuel, even at the expense of other critical 
supplies. 
During the second phase of the Allied attempt to break through the Germans’ western 
defensive frontier, OCOT was forced to make major changes in the composition of the 
transportation network.  The U.S. truck fleet seems to have been largely worn out by mid-
September and was withdrawn for recovery and replacement; serviceable trucks were reoriented 
to Normandy where they resumed port discharge and depot support.1  ETOUSA relied on the 
slowly recovering rail system to pick up the slack during the second half of September and 
throughout October, but shortages in rolling stock and coal prevented them from providing the 
haul capacity required to meet all demands from the front.  COMZ had still not developed a 
process to extract the critical requirements from the armies and deliver only those items, and 
some of the already inadequate delivery capacity was wasted as a result.  SHAEF and 12th Army 
Group kept trying to conduct major offensive operations in three army sectors simultaneously, 
making it difficult to mass the troops and supplies essential to achieving a clean breakthrough 
anywhere. 
 
1 Determining the accurate ORR of ETOUSA’s truck fleet is impossible.  OCOT reported theoretical strengths based 
on an assumed 83% ORR and made no effort to find out if that assumption remained valid throughout the campaign.  
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By the end of the first week of October Eisenhower was forced to admit that his theater 
offensive was in limbo until he could open a major port closer to the front and sort out his 
requisition and distribution system.  Throughout the fall COMZ and OCOT made steady 
improvements in how they employed the resources at their disposal; ABC ran smoother and was 
more effective than Red Ball, and XYZ produced truly incredible results during the final 
offensive across the Rhine into central Germany and beyond.2  OCOT portrayed these positive 
results as a natural result of COMZ getting out of their business and letting them get on with the 
job they way they knew how to do it, but this is not completely accurate.  Both ABC and XYZ 
showed what OCOT could have accomplished, not only with more motorized transport 
resources, but, perhaps more importantly, with better coordination and synchronization among 
the service and combat organizations.  Any of these procedural changes could have been 
implemented in August with the proper base of knowledge and motivation to embrace a different 
approach.  But it took time to recognize the limitations of the system OCOT tried to put in place 
in July and August to manage long-distance truck operations, develop alternatives, deploy 
additional command and control nodes, and retrain everyone on the new procedures.  The only 
way to accelerate that learning would have required either mass transfer of more experienced 
personnel from North Africa and Italy or the wholesale transfer of technical procedures and the 
organizational approach employed by 21st Army Group.  Based on the personnel and time 
constraints throughout the Allied armies, this was unrealistic.  It was always going to be easier to 
learn by doing rather than by observing or reading, and this took time and, unfortunately for 
Ross, intermediate failures. 
 
2 ABC was the operation, similar to Red Ball, designed to control traffic running from the Chanel ports to the two 
northern army groups during the fall of 1944.  XYZ was the traffic control plan for the invasion of western Germany 
in the spring of 1945. 
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 The ETOUSA Transportation Section as the Distribution Synchronizer for COMZ 
 Ross understood that the most important function of his section was to coordinate the 
distribution of supplies across widely dispersed locations using an eclectic mix of vehicles.  
OCOT managed to practice these tasks for almost two years in the U.K., relying predominantly 
on ships and trains to move cargo, but adding trucks to the mix in the last six months of Bolero.  
These experiences drove home the importance of reliable methods of communication among the 
control nodes all over the U.K., a carefully orchestrated but constantly refined master plan for 
distribution at the theater level, and subordinate staffs that could monitor execution and iron out 
wrinkles as they developed and before they could get out of hand.   Lee’s SOS staff claimed they 
would synchronize the interaction between the various base sections and service troops assigned 
to each region, but Ross saw little in the nine months before the invasion to convince him that 
they took the job seriously or that they were developing the skills required to turn intent into 
capability.  OCOT realized that at least at first they would be largely on their own and that early 
mistakes in planning or establishing procedures would be hard to overcome as the campaign 
progressed.  Ross looked back on his personal experience with Torch to provide a good model 
for overcoming the teething problems of the COMZ headquarters on the continent.  OCOT 
would need strong representation on the ADSEC and FECZ staff, both to drive planning and to 
supervise operations until Ross could arrive.  The theater also needed a command node that 
could pull together dozens or even hundreds of truck companies (with their associated battalion 
and regimental headquarters) that might operate across three or four base section boundaries 
providing a theater-wide long-range distribution network.        
 As Lee’s SOS created new headquarters in February 1944 to plan logistical support for 
Overlord, Ross ensured that both the ADSEC and FECZ each had strong transportation sections 
659 
 
assigned to them.  Colonels Sibley, Koenig, and Gould were assigned to the ADSEC team, 
which was established at the Selfridges Annex on 7 February 1944.3  As with any new 
organization, the first month was a bit hectic.  The group moved twice and transitioned through 
three new chiefs in its first five weeks of existence, ending up at Bristol by 20 March under the 
direction of COL Beeler.  The motor transport officer for the section was COL Harold Gould, 
who started developing the concept for a theater motor transport brigade immediately upon his 
arrival on 2 March.  Sibley was a well-known and trusted agent among the combined operational 
planning community.  He had over a year at OCOT and plenty of connections at COSSAC and 
among the old ETOUSA staff.   The units charged with running Cherbourg and conducting 
traffic control in Normandy immediately after the invasion, 4th Port and 3rd Regulating Station, 
provided the core of the new section.  A similar team was established under Ross’ deputy and 
operational planner, COL Traub, to work for the FECZ, which was also formed in mid-February. 
The creation of a provisional motor transport brigade had to wait a few more months.  On 
1 May the unit was established and assigned to the ADSEC.  LTG Lee himself called COL 
Richmond, the commander of Depot G-25, that day and directed him to take eighteen men and 
form the nucleus of a motor transport brigade.4  This was a provisional unit with no formal 
authorization or structure in the organizational tables of the U.S. Army, but similar to a 
command that had proven useful in the First World War.  Ross and Lee envisioned the brigade 
supervising a number of QM Truck Groups in order to synchronize the activities of 90 to 140 
truck companies during the advance to the Seine, to coordinate the support they would receive 
 
3CPT Charles R. DeArman, “Historical Report” 11 Feb 45, HQ ADSEC COMZ Transportation Section, RG 498, 
UD 1304, Box 6399, NARA II. 
4 Captain Gordon CP Landon “Part III: The MTB, Transportation Corps in the Battle of France, Vol IV, July-
September 1944” RG 498, UD 578, Box 3956, NARA II, 1.  The brigade staff would grow to 43 officers and 169 
men.  Depot G-25 was something of a Potemkin Village that was always shown off to visiting dignitaries from the 
United States or British ministries.  
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from the base sections they transited through, and to work closely with the transportation section 
at the ADSEC and FECZ.  Richmond had long-term experience as a cavalry, quartermaster, and 
ordnance officer under both combat and peacetime conditions.5  He had a reputation as a motor 
transport expert and the background and relationships needed to tackle what everyone knew 
would be a demanding job.   
The motor transport brigade was unique because it was one of the few support units that 
was not assigned to or answerable to a base section commander, nor was it another technical 
staff entity with no authority to direct operations.  Richmond would exercise command authority 
over his assigned units, coordinate with base section commanders and their staff as a peer, and be 
expected to see the entire theater as his zone of operation.  But if this scope of authority seemed 
clear enough to senior leaders at ETOUSA and COMZ, it was never adequately conveyed to all 
the base section commanders in waiting, which would cause problems in France in August and 
September.  In hindsight, it would have been more effective to directly assign supporting units to 
Richmond so he could arrange his own rest and service camps and send recover and repair 
patrols along the major routes rather than relying on five to seven base sections and technical 
service sections to meet his needs.       
In addition to placing trusted agents within ADSEC and FECZ and coaching Lee to stand 
up the MTB, Ross also took steps to ensure that the support plan for Overlord contained a 
detailed but useful transportation annex.  The final version of the FECZ COMZ plan that was 
published on 14 May 1944 was a massive product that had been written primarily by the ADSEC 
staff and included a wide range of useful information applicable to the conditions the command 
 
5 Ibid.  Richmond enlisted in the cavalry in 1914, moved to QM in 1934, and then ordnance in 1942.  He was 
promoted to COL on 1 February 1944.   
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thought would exist in France for the first few months.  The plan consisted of a 73-page base 
order with seventeen appendices and twenty-four annexes – the risk was not that something 
important had been left out but that no one could read and integrate all the component pieces of 
the plan.6  The transportation annex contained a distribution estimate for the first three phases of 
the operation, and enclosure 2A diagramed tentative supply circuits linking Cherbourg, Le Mans, 
and Quiberon; ETOUSA hoped that the two ports would be functional by D+60.  These traffic 
circuits were intellectual precursors of the Red Ball Express and other express routes used by 
ETOUSA; Ross’s team had clearly foreseen the need for a tightly managed motorized traffic 
control effort and had put the organization and plan together to start one on short notice.    
 
6 One of the few sections “to be announced” in the base order was the procedures to be followed when troops from 
one nation were serving in the administrate zone of the other.  This oversight would come back to haunt SHAEF at 
the beginning of Market Garden and will be addressed below.   
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Figure 7.1: Controlled traffic circuits, precursor to the Red Ball Express7  
 
The transportation estimate divided the first 90 days of operations in France into three 
periods or phases, listing the major motor transport and rail units that would be ashore by the end 
 
7 HQ, FECZ, “COMZ Plan” 14 May 44, Transportation Annex (13), Enclosure 2A, RG 407, Entry 427, Box 215, 
NARA II. 
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of each period and the priority of work for that phase.  Phase one ran up to D+25 and would see 
the deployment of most of the truck companies, 84, with their associated battalion and group 
headquarters.  Seven truck companies would support the engineer special brigades at Utah and 
Omaha with beach clearance, while the balance worked directly for the MTB.  By the second 
period, running from D+26 to D+41, the ADSEC would need to open Port Saint-Malo and begin 
to move large quantities of supplies through Cherbourg, calling for 39 more truck companies to 
work for Base Section No. 1.  The third phase would be dominated by the opening of the ports in 
Brittany and by activation of Base Section No. 2, and it also called for 30 more truck companies 
to outfit that command.  By the end of these first three phases, or D+90, ETOUSA would have 
153 QM truck companies ashore (of the 160 requested in block one of the Overload troop basis), 
not including dump trucks and hauling capacity organic to the engineers.  These were not just 
generalized projections; all 9,433 individual units that would be deployed were listed in time 
sequence in Appendix I of the COMZ Plan, including the number of personnel, vehicles, and 
arrival date.8 
Impressed with the briefing on the COMZ plan that FECZ had delivered a week earlier, 
Lee had BG Vaughn walk SHAEF through it again, staging a major presentation at Selfridges on 
30 May.  The event was attended by Gale, Brownjohn, Crawford, Napier, Ravenhill, Vissering, 
and Whipple from SHAEF, plus key sustainment leaders from 21st, 12th Army Group, 3rd Army, 
and HQ L of C, 21st AG.9  COL Sibley was there from the ADSEC transportation section as 
well.  No comments were captured on the impact of the briefing or on any follow-up work 
 
8 This deployment list was not followed; Bradley ensured that he had an alternative list prepared for contingencies, 
and he ended up landing more combat units through D+60 than originally projected.  Ruppenthal makes a big deal 
out of the fact that the COMZ had only 94 truck companies ashore by the end up July, but,  by the time the Red Ball 
Express was activated, all of the missing truck companies were ashore.  By the end of August (D+90), all 160 
companies had been landed. 
9 “History of the FECZ” ADM 511, 35. 
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directed as a result of it, but at least the FECZ had laid out what they considered to be the hardest 
tasks they would face in Normandy and the tentative plan to tackle them.  Lee had also shared 
that plan with SHAEF and the two army groups, giving them the opportunity to bring up any 
concerns and ensuring that they knew his intentions.   
 
Figure 7.2: Anticipated maneuver and sustainment organization by D+9010 
 
Anyone who reads the base plan, scans through the list of 40 attachments, and examines 
in detail a few of the annexes of the sustainment plan is likely to arrive at a few conclusions.  
The challenge facing COMZ was presented as a series of discrete, compartmentalized problem 
sets, each of which was supposed to be tackled by a technical service or special staff section, or 
perhaps by one of the base sections as they multiplied and expanded as the Allies liberated an 
ever-greater portion of western France.  Exactly how staff elements or base sections would 
 
10 HQ FECZ, “COMZ Plan”, Appendix F. 
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coordinate with one another or how COMZ was to supervise and direct this activity remained 
nebulous.  Missing were a short list of COMZ decision points, reporting and meeting 
requirements, and concept of theater logistical support to outline how the various service units 
would interact with one another to overcome what Lee anticipated would be the sticky issues.  
Confronted by a lack of instructions about how the command would operate differently on the 
continent, it seems logical to assume, senior leaders did not envision a need to make any 
significant changes.  The idea that the tempo of operations, less reliable communications, 
damaged infrastructure, and enemy activity might force COMZ to have a secondary method of 
coordinating its activities did not penetrate into the formal plan. 
Regardless of any overarching problems with the overall theater concept of support and 
various methods of exercising command and control, transportation planners realized that 
friendly and enemy destruction of rail facilities and equipment would place a premium on motor 
transport early on.   The earliest the Americans assumed they could count on any rail support 
beyond local port clearance was between D+50 and D+60; the British thought D+90 was more 
realistic.11  This remained a hot-button topic at SHAEF and ETOUSA.  Just four days prior to 
the publication of the COMZ plan there had been a meeting hosted by 21st Army Group at St. 
Paul’s School on the south bank of the Thames near Hammersmith focused on finding ways to 
accelerate the restoration of rail service in France.  The outcome of the meeting was a decision to 
allocate more LSTs to move engines and rolling stock to the continent once Cherbourg was 
open.12   Restricting attacks by the French resistance or by Allied bombers against rail targets 
was not considered a realistic option among the army group staff.  The prevailing thought was 
 
11 HQ, FECZ, “COMZ Plan” 14 May 44, RG 407, Entry 427, Box 215, NARA II, 34.  21st AG refused to follow 
SHAEF and change their rail repair timeline after truck battle between ETOUSA and the ASF.  See chapter four.  
12 “History of the FECZ”, RG 498, UD 578, Box 3928, ADM 549, NARA II, 28. 
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that the Germans would use the local French rail system until the last possible moment and then 
pull back while taking everything that was mobile with them, destroying the rest.13  There was 
no way around it; ETOUSA would have to resupply the forward divisions using only motorized 
transport for at least the first two months of the campaign, and three months was more realistic. 
 
 ADSEC and FECZ Run the Communications Zone 
 The ADSEC and FECZ staffs were essential to controlling logistical support on the 
continent for the first 90 days of Overlord; ETOUSA and SOS would be tied down in London 
and Cheltenham by other duties.  Even if Lee and Ross had wanted to try to synchronize their 
organizations from the U.K., they did not have the signal equipment required to do so, or reliable 
means to get back and forth into Normandy for a more hands-on approach.  Vaughn realized that 
one of the keys to success for FECZ was establishing a good working relationship with 21st 
Army Group and the American staff liaison element collocated with them.  To this end he 
established an LNO group with the 21st Army Group headquarters element located at Portsmouth 
on 29 May, which also gave them easy access to the advanced headquarters of SHAEF which 
was positioned nearby.  FECZ had spent the last four months cementing personal connections, 
seeking formal recognition of the scope of their duties, and developing planning expertise in 
order to be a key player in Normandy.  Vaughn’s authority to coordinate logistics on the 
continent was bolstered when Lee told him that he would have official supervisory authority over 
Base Section No. 1 as it was established at the beginning of May and over Base No. 2 on 1 June, 
at least until COMZ arrived to assume control.  After D-Day, it became apparent to everyone that 
 
13 The first recorded instances of appeals to stop blowing up bridges and rolling stock appears around mid-August, 
initiated by 12th AG.  Of the many reasons offered in argument against the transportation plan, preserving the rail 
network for Allied use was never considered a realistic possibility. 
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the command would soon assume a major role in synchronizing logistical operations; the 
command began to maintain an updated war map at the main headquarters on 7 June.14   
About a week later the lead elements of ADSEC were up and running in Normandy, 
collocated with the 1st Army headquarters, first at Grandcamp Les Bains, then shifting to Catz 
(near Carentan) on 20 June.  Ross relied on Colonels Sibley and Richmond to manage the small 
fleet of trucks engaged in clearing out the beach landing areas and docks and supporting the field 
dumps.  By the end of the month ETOUSA had 36 truck companies and two QM groups ashore 
in addition to the organic companies within the special engineer brigades.  FECZ monitored 
ADSEC’s efforts from afar, seeking to learn effective procedures as they emerged and gain an 
understanding of the tasks that proved to be particularly difficult.  At a FECZ command and staff 
meeting held on 9 June, the chiefs for each special and general staff element were directed to 
visit the ADSEC and Base Section No. 1 in Normandy and bring back their insights to share with 
the group.15  Over the coming weeks the headquarters transferred a growing number of men to 
reinforce and work side by side with the ADSEC.  The first reconnaissance party from FECZ 
landed at Utah on 18 June, followed by the quartering party on 9 July.  Meanwhile the FECZ had 
been disbanded as a separate command and realigned as just a forward piece of Lee’s COMZ, 
with BG Vaughan transferred to command what would become the U.K. Base Section.16  COL 
Albrecht, the FECZ chief of staff, moved over to become a deputy chief of staff at COMZ, but 
this had little practical impact to the deployment timeline or scope of responsibilities of the 
 
14 “History of the FECZ”, RG 498, UD 578, Box 3914, ADM 511, 39.  This document was written in two 
installments.  The first portion (549) covered from creation to 1 June, while the second portion (511) ran from early 
June to mid-August.   
15 Ibid, 43. 
16 This decision was linked to a bureaucratic battle between Bradley and Lee aimed at clarifying and simplifying 
administrative relationships in Normandy.  Bradley was not about to turn over control of a rear area to anyone with 
less than three stars.  Lee decided to accelerate his own displacement to France to remove this obstacle to the earliest 
possible activation of a theater COMZ.   
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officers transferred to France.  By 15 July Albrecht was conducting regular FECZ meetings in 
Normandy, but the staff struggled to identify a unique and meaningful role distinct from what the 
ADSEC was already accomplishing.17  Not sure exactly how his team might contribute, Albrecht 
instructed the section chiefs to help the ADSEC and 1st Army by any means possible and 
continued to prepare the facilities at Chateau Pont Rilly for the arrival of the main body of the 
COMZ staff. 
Ross detached some of his best officers to work with FECZ.  LTC Ayers, the chief of his 
motor transport division, arrived in France on 14 July, followed by COL Traub three days later 
and by COL Tripp on the 21st.  Traub and Tripp bounced back and forth between London and 
Normandy for the next three weeks trying to keep both headquarters abreast of the situation on 
the continent.  Traub was Ross’s longest serving and most trusted deputy, a member of the first 
handful of transportation officers sent to help Chaney run Bolero back in May 1942, a team 
subsequently rolled into the core of the SOS staff that traveled with Lee from Washington.  
Traub had been a field artillery officer for the first twelve years of his career before transferring 
to quartermaster, and he served as Ross’s operational planner until he was moved up to the 
deputy position and then transferred to act as the chief of the transportation section at FECZ.18  It 
was logical to assign the officer who best understood the challenges that field conditions would 
impose, and he was the most familiar with how Ross thought and wanted things organized.   
Ross repeatedly visited the battlefield in Normandy before moving to Valognes for good 
on 17 August, and he found ways to contribute to the campaign’s success from London.  In July 
he convinced Sayler and Lee to release 700 2.5-ton trucks from theater stocks and to turn them 
 
17 “History of the FECZ” ADM 511, 52. 
18 “History of Transportation Service, ETOUSA, 1942-1945”, RG 498, UD 578, Box 3956, NARA II, 1. 
669 
 
over to his port operating battalions at Cherbourg, generating the equivalent of fourteen new QM 
truck companies. 19  Ross provided drivers to man these trucks from port units assigned to his 
own service, and he then ensured that they were backfilled by enemy prisoners of war and 
French civilian volunteers.  By the end of July, the MTB was supervising about 90 truck 
companies and their associated battalion and group headquarters, or over 18,000 men.20  Ross 
had done everything within his power to position the right leaders at the right locations to do 
their job, and he provided what resources he could to achieve success.  His team, distributed in 
three locations, was directly involved managing operational support to the campaign from day 
one.  At the same time, Lee had delegated all operational tasks to a subordinate organization 
while keeping the majority of the COMZ staff focused on work occurring in the U.K.  Lee did 
not dispatch any of his primary staff with the authority and skill to correspond to Sibley, Traub, 
Tripp, and Ayers.  Vaughn, Plank, and Albrecht were strong officers with years of experience at 
the base-section level and on the ETOUSA planning staff, but none of them were SOS insiders 
or particularly well known at SHAEF.  Frankly, Lee had a tiny inner circle; the two officers he 
deeply trusted, Weaver and Lord, were kept close by.  Lord spent a lot of time in London 
working with SHAEF and trying to supervise the technical service chiefs, but Lee considered 
Weaver, the most suitable choice to run the FECZ forward element, irreplaceable; thus he 
remained at Cheltenham until the last possible moment.  The differences in how Lee and Ross 
approached the issue and their early results were significant, providing insight as to why OCOT 
seemed to have a handle on their duties from the beginning of the campaign while the staff at 
COMZ struggled.          
 
 
19 Landon, Part III, 6.   
20 Landon, 2. 
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 Synchronizing the Transportation Battle in August and September 
 The truth of the matter is that the logistics mission in Normandy was relatively easy until 
after the breakout achieved in Operation Cobra.  Not only was it a simpler problem in a relatively 
small area, but most of the work was accomplished by Plank’s ADSEC with assistance from the 
technical staff sections assigned to FECZ, and the organization that would soon become the 
Cherbourg and then Normandy Base Section.  Yes, Ross assisted these efforts by putting good 
people into the transportation section at ADSEC and FECZ, and by convincing Lee to stand up 
the MTB, but the bottom line was that the distribution mission was straightforward and largely 
conducted by tactical service units following the original concept of sustainment.  By the end of 
the first week of August this was no longer the case, and the scope and complexity of the 
transportation effect exploded at precisely the same time when there were massive changes to the 
Allied command structure and a corresponding rush to set up headquarters in Normandy.     
 One can get a sense of how drastically the mission changed at the ADSEC transportation 
section between the two phases by comparing the volume of convoys in the first few days 
immediately after Cobra and then throughout the first half of August.  The official figures on 
tonnage carried and distance travelled that were maintained by the section are problematic and 
internally inconsistent, but the rate of exploding requirements and performance is illuminating.  
On 26 July the MTB supposedly moved 3,829 tons of cargo a distance of 366 miles, and 2,311 
personnel 147 miles.21  During the first few days after the breakout, the priority was to move 
supplies up from the beaches to dumps and depots around Carentan and Saint-Lô, taking 
advantage of the new elbow room to clear out the areas immediately around the discharge 
centers and closer to what would eventually be a major rail hub.  Starting on 1 August the daily 
 
21 TS ADSEC Daily Activity Log, 26 Jul 44, RG 498, UD 1304, Box 6399. 
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tonnage and mileage figures began their steady climb; that day 13,604 tons were moved forward, 
including large quantities of POL pipeline construction materials.  On 2 August the ADSEC 
transportation section logged the start of a major effort to move up fuel for 3rd Army -- 1,250,000 
gallons or 5,000 tons; 80 trucks were dispatched over a six-day window to complete the task.  
These fuel deliveries were in addition to the convoys already moving up ammunition and class 
two and four supplies to the area around Saint-Lô.  The lift figures for 4 August clearly signaled 
to anyone watching that the long-awaited strain on U.S. motor transport was finally at hand -- the 
MTB and motor transport section claimed to have moved 22,371 tons over 647,720 ton-miles.22  
Eighty trucks were committed to moving POL that day, while 700 were shifting ammunition 
dumps closer to the front lines.23  At this stage only a small percentage of the Allied army was 
moving more than a few miles a day while almost everyone was still engaged in heavy combat 
with stubborn German defenders.  Furthermore, it was hard to use standard trucks to shift bulk 
fuel; as long as there was not overwhelming demand for gas, ADSEC was comfortable with a 
measured approach that matched the most logical equipment to each job.       
 By the end of the first week in August, deliveries continued to expand at a staggering 
pace, with 1.2 million gallons of MT 80 and 17,000 tons of ammunition handled on 7 August 
alone.  On 11 August the section recorded the delivery of 53,796 tons across 1.36 million ton-
 
22 There was a disconnect in how the MTB and MT division of the ADSEC transportation section calculated figures 
in comparison to the movements division, with both organizations reporting wildly different numbers for the same 
day.  MTB/MT numbers were consistently higher than movements estimates.  It is likely that the MT division was 
reporting port clearance, static, and long-haul tonnage while movements only reported LoC deliveries.  The 
disconnect was noticed on 17 August and brought into alignment two days later.  The MT numbers are provided 
here only to gauge the relative daily effort. 
23 This was largely a function of the efficiency associated with using 2,000- or 750-gallon POL trucks, of which 
there were a relatively small number, to move fuel, while any cargo truck could move ammunition.  An Allied corps 
of three divisions burned about 120,000 gallons of fuel a day, equating to 500 tons of cargo, or four light or 1.5 
heavy U.S. POL companies.  Fuel could be loaded in 55-gallon drums or 5-gallon jerry cans, but these were time 
consuming to fill and load onto trucks, and eventually were in short supply. 
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miles, in addition to moving 10,000 personnel up to the front.24  The section diary also noted the 
assignment of two M-19 tank transporter companies to the fleet that day, units Ross had 
managed to get temporarily reassigned to the MTB the day before.  The M-19 was designed to 
carry a 45-ton tank -- when fitted with improvised retaining walls, they could move huge 
amounts of heavy material, but only on good roads.  One company of M-19s could carry almost 
2,000 tons of ammunition, or about fifteen times the capacity of a standard 2.5-ton company.  
ADSEC accomplished a similar performance on 12 August, and the section diary noted the 
delivery of about 500 new 2.5-ton trucks and 1,400 personnel to the MTB, resources released 
from theater reserves as a result of Ross’ engagements with Sayler and Lee.   
Demands from the combat divisions had skyrocketed, but through mid-August ADSEC 
felt they were keeping their end of the bargain while maintaining sufficient strength in the truck 
companies.  August 14 was a day that witnessed a peak delivery performance, with 64,392 tons 
moved 2.19 million ton-miles, including 2,000 tons of CLS 1, 9,000 tons of ammunition, and 
4,300 tons of POL.  Wheeled lift capacity was tight throughout the theater, but this did not 
prevent the allocation of 400 tons of lift to move chemical warfare service ammunition on 13 
August.25  On 18 August the MTB delivered somewhere between 20,000 and 25,000 tons to 
army depots before dropping off to about half that quantity the next day.26  The drop in 
performance and irregularity with reporting was due to the fact that the MTB was focused on 
 
24 Movements division recorded the delivery of only 10, 678 tons of cargo that day.  The ratio of the difference 
between motor transport and movement division daily claims are inconsistent – it is impossible to establish a 
conversation rate between the two. 
25 This might have been smoke rounds for the 120mm mortar platoons manned by the CWS.  Regardless, it pointed 
to the fact that Allied supply requirements, approved by senior leaders, went beyond food, fuel, and (traditional) 
ammunition. 
26 The drop-off in tonnage delivered between 14 August and 18 August was probably not as bad as it seemed based 
on the reported figures.  It seems that someone had taken notice of the internal reporting discrepancies and fantastic 
figures claimed throughout the first half of August and tightened up standards.  Tonnage delivered by truck did not 
fall off a cliff, it was just reported more accurately.  After 18 August the truck companies were repositioned in 
preparation for the Red Ball Express. 
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repositioning its assets in order to start the Red Ball Express, the ADSEC had just moved its 
headquarters twice in the last week, and the COMZ had taken over many of their functions in the 
last ten days.  The last reliable report from the motor transport division was on 25 August, which 
logged the delivery of about 14,000 tons of cargo.  The transportation section had recognized and 
responded to the first phase of the distribution crisis, but by late August major coordination and 
reporting responsibilities were shifting to the COMZ at the same time that the delivery distances 
were growing longer and longer.   
  
 Shifting Gears to the Red Ball Express 
The primary focus of the ADSEC transportation division after the Cobra breakout was to 
maximize the potential of the MTB.  The decision was made to divide the MTB and ADSEC 
motor transport service on 15 August, allowing the brigade staff to move independently and 
where the mission dictated.  After ADSEC relocated to Le Mans on 18 August, “all sections 
concentrated on the development of the Red Ball Express Operation.”27  By 23 August the 
COMZ was confident that the plan was well-understood and that all of the necessary resources 
were in place, and they gave the go ahead for the operation to begin the next day.28  There was 
nothing particularly original about the idea of establishing a long-range express route, but the 
scale of the Red Ball was unprecedented.  It combined the idea of centrally managed traffic 
circuits from the COMZ support plan published on 14 May with the massing of over half of the 
theater truck companies under MTB control.  Supposedly, on 25 August 3,358 trucks from 67 
companies were working the route, carrying 5,000 tons of supplies for the forward divisions and 
 
27 LTC J.C. Doyle “Comments on Motor Transport” 26 Jun 45, RG 498, UD 1304 (Historical Reports of the TS at 
ADSEC), Box 6399, NARA II.  Doyle was the operations officer of the transportation element at ADSEC. 
28 History of ETOUSA G-4, 3. 
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air groups.29  These numbers are a bit odd, with too many trucks assigned to each company and 
too little cargo carried by each truck, but it was early in the process and reporting accuracy and 
procedures were probably still being worked out.   
There is something of a misconception that the MTB and ETOUSA truck fleet was 
dedicated exclusively on line of communication deliveries to the front, but this is incorrect.  At 
no time did long-haul distribution consume even half of the U.S. trucks available, much less a 
preponderance of the companies on the continent.  Between 1 September and 11 October, COMZ 
distributed their truck companies across three critical mission sets – 43% were assigned to port 
clearance, 26% to static operations, and only 31% to the line of communications.30  These 
allocations shifted over the course of the pursuit and first attempts to break through the 
Westwall.  The Red Ball Express received an increasing share of the resources from mid-August 
to mid-September, but at no point could the Allies completely ignore the requirement to clear the 
ports and beaches, keep depots organized, and support various service units working in each base 
section.  How priorities shifted over time is illustrated by the unit records of the 470th QM Group 
(TC), which listed the primary mission for its seventeen assigned companies as port clearance at 
Cherbourg up until 12 August.31  On 13 August the group was shifted to Le Mans, reinforced to 
twenty U.S. and three British companies, and directed to move supplies forward from the rail 
terminus to army dumps as part of the Red Ball Express.  The maximum focus on long-haul 
work within the MTB probably occurred during the last few days of August and the first week of 
 
29 Ruppenthal, Vol. I, 560. 
30 Landon, Part I, 6.   
31 CPT Harrold Hemenway, Jr., “Resume of Ops of 470th QM Group (TC) from 13 Jul 44 to 7 Feb 45” RG 498, UD 
1304, Box 6399, NARA II.   
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September.  On 29 August COMZ G-4 reported that 132 companies were assigned to the MTB, 
with 5,958 operational trucks moving 13,542 tons of material that day.32     
The report for 5 September added a bit more detail, giving additional insight on the 
distribution of companies among the major mission sets.  Seventy-two truck companies were 
assigned to the ADSEC, 41 to Normandy Base, and three in direct support of 21st AG, equating 
to 185 2.5-ton companies.33  Almost all of the 41 companies in Normandy were performing port 
clearance and static operations, while about a quarter of the ADSEC units were probably tied 
down at the forward dumps.  It is reasonable to assume that, in the aggregate, at the height of the 
pursuit somewhere between half and two-thirds of the available truck companies were assigned 
to long-haul missions sustaining the forward advance.  More tonnage was handled by the 
companies keeping the docks clear, but it took the line of communications companies days to 
move what the port units could shift in a few hours.  
Month Total Port Clear Static LoC # Trk Co End of 
Month 
July 178,207 178,207 - - 32 
Aug 1,249,809 705,174 116,238 428,397 (34%) 139 
Sep 1,555,614 698,914 380,579 476,121 (31%) 190 
Oct 2,007,469 625,350 901,193 480,926 (24%) 226 
Nov 1,983,930 630,570 1,124,478 228,882 (12%) 218 
Dec 1,831,819 583,822 1,051,822 196,175 (11%) 244 
 
32 History of the ETOUSA G-4, 3.  The accuracy of these figures is highly suspect, and should be regarded with 
healthy skepticism.  The quality of signal support and reporting discipline by the end of August was a mess, and not 
aided by the frequent relocation of the majority of the command and control nodes tracking the effort.  These 
numbers equate to a 94% ORR in each truck company with each truck carrying 2.3 tons.  By this stage in the 
campaign a 2.5-ton truck with trailer was authorized to carry 4.5 tons of cargo.  Some companies were probably 
over-strength after the issue of extra 2.5-tons from theater replacement stocks, but it is reasonable to assume some 
portion of these 132 companies were actually assigned to port clearance and static operations.  The ETOUSA 
records are also frustrating because they alternate between short and long tons, and gallons, sometimes without 
noting which unit of measure they are using.   
33 History of the ETOUSA G-4, 3.   
676 
 
Table 7.1: Tonnage moved by motor transport by type of mission34 
 
Once the Red Ball was up and running, the system required a three-part division of labor 
to function effectively.  The COMZ G-4 was in charge of prioritizing what got moved, the 
transportation section divided the tonnage between the air, rail, and motor distribution networks, 
and the MTB generated and supervised all of the necessary truck convoys.  The various base 
sections, including the ADSEC, were responsible for loading and unloading the trucks at the 
depots and dumps, and running support facilities and patrols along the Red Ball.  The motor 
transport division at the ADSEC marked the route and produced strip maps for operators and 
headquarters.  The original plan developed by ADSEC called for traffic control points manned 
by military police (MP) units equipped with radios, regulating control points at major holding 
areas and divergence points along the routes, MP and ordnance roving patrols, decentralized 
engineer maintenance of the road, and elaborate support centers where drivers could rest, eat, 
and make minor repairs to their trucks.  Convoy operations and traffic control were to be 
conducted under the guidance contained in ETOUSA SOP 31, published in July 1944, and the 
various instructions flowing from the ADSEC, MTB, and COMZ.35  It was a thorough plan, but 
it was also unrealistic and not very well understood by the services and base sections required to 
make it all come together.   
 
 
34 History of the TS, ETOUSA, RG 498, UD 578, Container 3881.  It is worth noting that it took a lot more effort to 
move each ton along a 200-300-mile line of communications than to shift material from the docks to a depot within 
a 50-mile radius of the port. 
35 ETOUSA G-4 History, 16.  RG 498, UD 578, Box 3931, ADM 553A and B. 
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 Establishing the Necessary C2 Nodes 
 One of the toughest challenges in managing the Red Ball effort was centrally directing 
the linkage of depots, transportation, and delivery locations.  COMZ and OCOT were 
responsible for figuring out what the armies wanted and if those items were already on, near, or 
heading towards the continent.  If they were within easy reach, COMZ needed to determine the 
exact ship or depot in order to pair the load with some means of transportation.   At first, the 
truck fleet accounted for virtually all Allied hauling capacity, and MTB was charged with 
managing the forward and return movement of hundreds of convoys every day.  Like the British 
logisticians working for 21st Army Group, the Americans quickly discovered that travel distances 
combined with inadequate communications technology was the first critical hurdle the command 
had to overcome.  But unlike the British, COMZ could not reposition competent command nodes 
quickly enough to retain control over the system.  To be fair, the Americans were dealing with 
much greater distances, particularly along the outer arc of the advance, and with a progressively 
larger number of troops relative to 21st Army Group’s strength. 
 COMZ tried to maintain control over all the elements operating west of the Seine during 
the early stages of the breakout by shifting headquarters to the east.  Soon after the Red Ball 
Express started running, MTB moved its headquarters from near Cherbourg to Alençon, or about 
halfway to Paris.  The new site was the first the command had occupied in France that was 
equipped with reliable electricity, permitting continuous and efficient work.36  COL Richmond 
was replaced by COL Ross Warren, a field artillery officer, on 3 September, and the MTB 
headquarters moved to collocate with SHAEF and its ETOUSA liaison element at Versailles on 
 
36 Landon, 13.  This is not to imply that the MTB closed up shop at night before 27 August, just that the 
headquarters was much more efficient with real lighting. 
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the 11th.37  No official history mentions why this change was made, but based on the timing, 
Richmond was either exhausted or proving ineffective in running such a large organization.  
Richmond may have made mistakes, but he was not helped much by the COMZ staff, which had 
issued incomplete and late instructions to the base sections that were supposed to support the 
Red Ball Express and which had also failed to follow up on suggestions made by the brigade to 
better maintain the strength of the companies working the route.  COMZ had moved from 
Valognes to Paris at about the same time the MTB shifted to Alençon, slowly transferring 
personnel over a three-week window between 29 August and 10 September.  The transportation 
section assigned to ADSEC moved repeatedly throughout August, finally ending up at Reims by 
9 September.   
It seems as if COMZ generally had the right nodes at the right locations in order to 
coordinate with supported units and stitch together radio and telephone networks, but they had 
not mastered the techniques that would allow the system to function under the conditions of a 
mobile campaign.  The similarity between how the British and Americans arrayed command 
nodes and when they displaced them forward is striking; the major difference was that the 
system seemed to work at 21st AG while it broke down between 12th AG and COMZ.  In the end, 
senior leaders within 21st AG’s logistics staff and L of C command had practical combat 
experience and well-developed procedures for both static and mobile operations, while COMZ 
and its follow-on base section commands did not.  The British had their share of inexperienced 
units and officers, as we will see below, but they also had a sufficient safety net to overcome 
these deficiencies.  This was not the case with their American counterparts.  In the early days of 
the pursuit, COMZ seemed to be unable to think and communicate with its subordinates faster 
 
37 Landon, Part III, 17. 
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than the MTB and OCOT decided to make changes to the roads the Red Ball was using.  On 10 
September portions of the express route were shifted over to new roads, but COMZ did not get 
out notification of the changes until that same day.38  Obviously it would take a few days for the 
base sections to move their stationary and mobile support posted along the route to the new 
locations.  Determining if this late notification was the result of COMZ functioning too slowly or 
OCOT and MTB demonstrating too much independence by changing the route without 
informing their controlling headquarters until the last minute is hard to discern.  Other evidence 
suggests that the friction was the result of internal procedural problems at COMZ.  On 5 
September when the command first published a comprehensive collection of instructions 
associated with Red Ball operations, it only distributed the document to the Normandy Base 
Section and ADSEC. 39  When COMZ realized that they had left out a number of key 
subordinates, they sent a supplemental telex to the Loire, Seine, and Oise base sections over the 
next few days.  Under these conditions it is easy to see why various service units were not in 
position when directed.   
 
38 Ibid, 18-22. 
39 Ibid, 23.  Even if all of these sections were not actively managing sections by 5 September, they soon would be, 
and any advanced notice that allowed them to plan accordingly would have been useful.  Seine was activated on 24 
August, Loire on 5 September.  Oise began operations on 3 September, but changed roles with the Channel Section 
twelve days later.  See Ruppenthal, Vol. II, 35-36.   
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Figure 7.3: The Red Ball Express as of 10 Sep 4440 
 
An area of particular concern to the motor transport community was the failure by COMZ 
and its base sections to integrate ordnance repair and recover teams into the Red Ball system.  
After about ten days of executing the mission, the MTB suggested to the ordnance special staff at 
COMZ that they should establish central service stations at a few key points along the route.41  
The idea was to create fully-resourced inspection and repair centers in good facilities at logical 
locations in France, such as the massive motor pool and cantonment centers around Cherbourg, 
Paris, and the army delivery locations in what would become the Oise Base Section and in the 
combat zone dumps administered by ADSEC.  It took five days for the recommendation to reach 
the COMZ G-4 and for Stratton to approve the idea, but the bureaucratic follow up was 
 
40 History of the TS, ETOUSA, RG 498, UD 1210, Box 5981.  
41 History of ETOUSA G-4, 41. 
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lackluster and the plan was never properly implemented.  The end result was a lot of broken 
trucks.  There were reported instances of truck companies returning to their parent organizations 
after service with the MTB with only 25% of their vehicles still in working order.42  Many of the 
mechanical problems were easy to fix, given the right repair parts, time, and mechanics needed 
to make repairs, but this tended to get the unit back up to only a 60% readiness rate.  Reaching an 
acceptable level of 80% or better was most efficiently accomplished by drawing replacement 
trucks rather than trying to fix the most seriously damaged ones.43    
Stationary maintenance support was only half of the problem.  COMZ had directed the 
base sections and the chief of ordnance to assign mobile patrols along the route, to repair 
vehicles that were broken down at the side of the road if possible, or to tow them to the closest 
collection point otherwise.  With the expansion of the Red Ball Express up to and across the 
Seine, which went into effect on 10 September, mobile support broke down along the gap 
between the old dumps at Mortagne-au-Perche and Chartres and the terminus at the river.44  The 
same letter sent by the MTB to report the problems along the newly extended route also noted 
that the 27th QM Group had raised similar complaints while using the route between Chartres and 
the Saint-Lô – Alençon area between 10 and 12 September.  A control point manned by MTB 
personnel at the St. Cyr diversion area reported seeing no stationary or mobile ordnance teams 
during a 36-hour period from 10 to 11 September.  The OIC had taken note because he had 
received fifteen requests for maintenance assistance since occupying the position.  The last bit of 
evidence that there were major problems with support on the Red Ball came in on 14 September, 
 
42 “History of TS, ETOUSA”, 30. 
43 Ibid, 41.  The document is specifically referring to provisional companies formed by stripping divisions of trucks 
and drivers, and their condition upon return to the parent unit.  Unlike the COMZ and OCOT, these organizations 
had an incentive to report (or slightly exaggerate) bad news about the truck fleet. 
44 COL R.B. Warren “Lack of Ordnance Service” 15 Sep 44.  This was a letter for BG Plank, prepared by the MTB.  
RG 498, UD 1210, Box 5981. 
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when LTC W.H. Taylor reported seeing 81 broken-down trucks on the 200 kilometers of road 
between Vire and Dreux awaiting recovery or repair.  This was the same portion of the Red Ball 
that was supposedly left uncovered between 10 and 12 September as noted by the 27th QM 
Group.  Warren ended his letter to Plank by pointing out that an informal poll conducted by his 
maintenance officer led him to conclude that trucks that broke down on the Red Ball Express 
were waiting on average between three to five days for recovery or repair.   
To its credit, COMZ collected all of this input and on 18 September published a set of 
supplemental instructions designed to improve support along the Red Ball Express.  The directed 
changes would take effect on 24 September (subsequently postponed to 27 September), a delay 
designed to allow units time to distribute these new instructions and prepare appropriately.45  
Throughout COMZ leaders were slowly learning how long it took to disseminate orders, align 
forces to requirements, and then check that everything was in position before switching to new 
procedures.  The base sections were discovering how hard it was to collect one comprehensive 
list of everything they had been instructed to do by COMZ and the special staff at ETOUSA, 
determine if troops were available to accomplish those tasks, and centrally validate the priorities 
if excess capacity was not available.  In some cases, the base section had to refer the problem to 
COMZ, to get their input on which absolutely critical tasks to accomplish and which less 
essential ones to let slide.  Unfortunately for COMZ, this learning was happening precisely when 
a supply crisis emerged that brought the pursuit to a halt and slowed the preparation for new 
offensives designed to break the short-term stalemate. 
 
 
45 History of ETOUSA G-4, 24.  
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 The Performance of the Red Ball Express in Phase One 
 It is difficult to nail down exactly what resources the MTB had under its control and what 
the hard data were on their performance during the first phase of the Red Ball effort.  The 
brigade had control over a constantly changing number of companies; the average during the 81 
days of the operation, from mid-August to early November, was 83, but the number hit a one-
time peak of 133.46  At the critical phase of the pursuit at the end of August, the MTB controlled 
about 5,700 trucks in those 133 companies, which equates to a 90% readiness rate if each 
company had its authorized 48 vehicles.47  The average daily tonnage delivered was 5,088 tons 
and the average round trip from Normandy to army depots was 606 miles; a round trip in support 
of 3rd Army in early September could cover over 700 miles.48  From 25 August to 5 September, 
or the most critical period of the pursuit, ETOUSA thought motorized transport had delivered the 
following quantities of supplies to the forward combat formations: 
CL I CLS II CLS III CLS IV CLS V Total Daily Avg 
15,000 27,232 19,047 2,559 25,061 88,900 7,408 
Table 7.2: Tonnage delivered to the ADSEC by motor transpo between 25 Aug and 5 Sep49 
 
 
46 “History of TS, ETOUSA 1942-1945”, RG 498, UD 1210, Box 5981, 12. 
47 DeArman, 6-8.  DeArman states the MTB controlled 5,700 trucks.  My research has demonstrated that truck 
strength was based upon assumptions rather than detailed reporting from the MTB and its associated QM Groups.  
All figures provided by ETOUSA sources for August to October should be considered the highest possible strength, 
and in reality, probably only 50 to 75% of the claimed number of trucks were operational, manned, and on the road 
performing missions. 
48 “History of TS, ETOUSA 1942-1945”, 12.  This number seems low until one realizes that the average number of 
trucks assigned to the MTB throughout the duration of the operation was 3,300, not all of which were committed to 
long-haul LoC work.  In some cases, it took well over 24 hours for a truck to make the run from Cherbourg to 3rd 
Army and back. 
49 History of ETOUSA G-4, 3.  It is interesting to note that if they received fuel from no other source, this was 
enough fuel to steadily supply three U.S. corps between 25 August and 5 September.  12th Army Group had four 
corps in its vanguard during these two weeks, with other corps on reduced levels of supply protecting its flanks and 
fighting in Brittany. 
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In addition to the 89,000 tons delivered to the armies, an additional 47,912 tons were 
shifted from Normandy to intermediate depots around Le Mans, Chartres, and Dreux.50   
Raw delivery figures are meaningless taken out of their operational context.  Were 
20,000 tons of POL and 25,000 tons of ammunition sufficient to sustain the pursuit between 25 
August and 5 September?  Even if these delivery figures were generally accurate, we know that 
3rd Army ran out of fuel repeatedly between 28 August and 4 September, despite aerial resupply, 
the use of captured enemy stocks, and the voluntary decision to halt one corps and then elements 
of XX and XII Corps.51  The U.S. 1st Army had the same problems on 2 and 3 September and 6 
to 9 September, stopping XIX Corps on 3 September to allow the continued advance of V and 
VII Corps.52  This action was still insufficient, since fuel shortages stopped the 5th, 7th, and 3rd 
Armored Divisions at critical points during the drive on Tournai and during the effort to cross the 
Meuse around Dinant.  Every day spent waiting for the delivery of fuel meant the loss of 70 
miles of unopposed advance, or 50 miles against light enemy resistance.53   
Obviously, in theory, the Allies could have delivered more fuel to the front line; POL 
deliveries accounted for about 21% of the tonnage that reached the armies between 25 August 
and 5 September.  This assumes COMZ could have found containers to put the gas in, and it 
discounts any new problems that might have emerged as a result of the leading four corps getting 
hundreds of tons less food, ammunition, repair parts, or replacement equipment in order to 
 
50 Ibid, 3.   
51 See Blumenson Breakout and Pursuit, 666-669 and Hugh M. Cole The Lorraine Campaign, 21-23, 24-25. 
52 Blumenson, 681, 692, 694-695. 
53 XX Corps of the 3rd Army moved 70 miles from Reims to Verdun on 30/31 Aug.  VII Corps of 1st Army moved 
100 miles from the Somme to Tournai 1 - 2 September.  Attacking with three full-strength divisions allowed any 
significant resistance to be encircled and bypassed.  It took VII Corps so long to get across the Meuse at Dinant 
because it hit a major German strongpoint manned by splinters of the I SS Panzer Corps, and because the flanking 
maneuver initiated by 3rd Armored Division had to stop from 3 to 6 September until more fuel could be delivered.  It 
took Collins three days to eliminate the enemy in Dinant as a result. 
685 
 
ensure a more regular delivery of fuel.  But one reaches the conclusion that OCOT and COMZ 
did not even try to increase the regularity or quantity of fuel reaching 12th AG; it seems as if the 
command assumed that the bulk POL companies were sufficient or that augmenting them with 
2.5-ton trucks carrying barrels or jerry cans was not worth the hassle and resulting inefficiency.   
But in the end, Patton and Hodges failed to reach their operational objectives because 
divisions sat motionless for days at a time during the critical phase of the pursuit, but not because 
their soldiers were starving, missing construction material, or replacement equipment.  Finally, 
during these frantic two weeks at the end of August and into September, OCOT and COMZ 
probably had almost no idea how much fuel was actually leaving Cherbourg, how much was 
reaching army and corps dumps, how long the round trip took, or what the actual daily 
requirements of the divisions were.  In order to slap together an emergency surge of fuel, COMZ 
would have needed to realize that they were in the midst of a crisis before the first time a 
division had to sit idle for a day, which was a capability beyond the reach of Lee’s organization 
at the end of August. 
The operational impact of what was admittedly a small oversight was profound.  If Patton 
could have relied on a steady arrival of essential supplies for his six lead divisions between 3 and 
5 September, it is realistic to believe he would have reached the Westwall and Saar at Trier and 
Saarbrücken and perhaps established bridgeheads on the far side.  Fifty additional miles of 
progress by 1st Army before 11 September would have placed VII Corps across the Roer east of 
Aachen and perhaps seen V Corps reach Bitburg, well to the east of the Westwall.  Seventy-five 
miles of additional progress would have seen VII Corps’ arrival just west of Köln.  Any Allied 
attempt to maintain a bridgehead on the east side of the Rhine was probably an invitation to 
disaster, but by penetrating the Westwall and disrupting heavy industry in the Ruhr or Saar 
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regions in September and October, 12th AG would have significantly impaired the recovery of 
the German Army on both the Eastern and Western Fronts that fall. 
We know that, other than in the case of fuel, 1st and 3rd Army were in generally good 
logistical shape at the beginning of September.  The army group’s monthly after-action report 
submitted by the G-4 for August sounded no alarm bells.  The document mentioned a shortage 
among a few specific service units; of particular concern were tank maintenance units, ordnance 
depot companies, engineer dump truck and maintenance companies, and QM truck companies.54  
Moses was well aware of the transportation crisis facing SHAEF and COMZ, but hoped they 
would be solved by increasing the performance of air transports, borrowing truck companies 
from 21st AG, drafting German POWs and French civilians to work on rail repair, and having the 
U.S. share ports and roads in the British communications zone to support 1st Army where logical.  
The only supply shortage mentioned in the report was a lack of spare parts for both the Sherman 
tank and the M12 self-propelled 155mm artillery piece.55  In stark contrast to the report that 
would follow in early October, Moses indicated that at the beginning of September the supply 
situation was adequate and that the steps being taken at SHAEF and COMZ to relieve some of 
the pressure from the current distribution system might keep the advance rolling.  Similar 
conclusions were reached after a high-level theater logistics meeting hosted by Bradley on 12 
September.  BG Stratton, the ETOUSA and COMZ G-4, recorded in his diary after the meeting: 
“Each Army Commander reported himself in sufficiently good shape with respect to supplies to 
launch forthcoming attacks with would take them to the Rhine.”56   
 
54 12 AG G-4 After Action Report, 6 Sep 44, 1.  RG 407, Entry 427, Box 1346. 
55 Ibid, 4. 
56 History of the ETOUSA G-4, RG 498, UD 578, Box 3931, ADM 553A and B, 27.  Stratton might have been 
guilty of a bit of selective hearing, but it is reasonable to believe that any concerns about supplies had not yet 
reached the army level with enough force to cause any serious concerns.  Everything depended upon how much fight 
the Germans still had in them, and this was unclear in mid-September. 
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We know now that a lack of fuel was the most significant factor that limited the gains 
achieved in the last two weeks of the pursuit.  Could SHAEF and ETOUSA done more to 
provide fuel to the two U.S. armies during the last week of August and first week of September?  
The MTB had nine 2,000-gallon heavy POL truck companies and five 750-gallon light 
companies on the continent at the end of July.  A U.S. three-division corps needed 140,000 
gallons, or 560 tons, of fuel every twenty-four hours under normal combat conditions.  A heavy 
POL company at 83% strength could move 80,000 gallons of fuel over 200 miles of good roads 
in eight hours driving at 25 MPH.  All five light companies could move 150,000 gallons under 
the same conditions, but they also had the ability to operate on secondary roads if called upon to 
do so.  About 200 C47 cargo aircraft could move 560 tons of fuel in barrels, jerry cans, or 
hardened fuel blivits.  By committing all fourteen specialized truck companies and 200 aircraft, 
the U.S. Army could have sustained six corps out to a range of about 250 miles, with some fuel 
left over for fighter groups, C2 elements, and essential service units assigned to the army and 
army group headquarters.57   
Additional capacity could be squeezed out of the system by using other truck companies 
to move fuel in barrels or cans, driving faster or longer hours during the long days of August and 
September, or employing more C47s to carry gas.  But these expedients could not be maintained 
for very long.  A 200-mile range equated to the distance from Cherbourg to Paris, or from the 
end of the POL pipeline at Alençon to Laon and Châlons, but it was still another 100 miles to 
Nancy and 200 to Liège.  It might just be possible to move 300 miles in daylight during the 
summer, but that did not account for the hours lost to loading, unloading, rest and maintenance 
 
57 USSTAF and 9th AF had organic bulk POL and C47 aircraft not included in the ETOUSA capacity outlined 
above.  To some extent 9th AF was self-sustaining and could move material to repair and operate tactical airfields on 
their own. 
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breaks, and the return journey.  Even if a convoy could pull off a 600-mile round-trip in under 24 
hours, the drivers and trucks would be worn out in the process and would not be available for the 
next mission until after a lengthy recovery period.  Under near-optimal conditions, the U.S. 
Army might have fueled three or four corps as far as Trier-Saarbrücken and Aachen-Bitburg 
during the first week of September, with half the bulk POL companies headed east fully loaded 
and the other half returning to Normandy every twenty-four hours.58  But only a few days of 
such intense operations would have begun to wear out drivers, tires, and trucks.  Transport 
aircraft had much longer legs, but they were also at the mercy of weather at both the pick-up and 
drop-off airfields.  At the very time the COMZ most needed C47s to augment their lift capacity, 
the planes were withdrawn to prepare for an airborne drop at Tournai slated to occur on 2 or 3 
September.  The only reason Patton and Hodges managed to make their final lunges towards the 
German border on 5 and 6 September was that the Tournai drop was cancelled on 2 September, 
leading to the return of large numbers of C47s for COMZ use starting on the 3rd.     
This detailed examination of fuel requirements and lift capacity illustrates that 12th AG 
and COMZ actually did a remarkable job of sustaining the pursuit from 27 August to 6 
September.  Through the evening of 2 September COMZ managed to keep elements of five U.S. 
corps moving in fits and starts while delivering enough fuel to fully meet the requirements of 
three corps.  On 3 September the Americans dropped down to four corps and kept them mobile 
and attacking until around 11 September.  In the south Patton ran into German units that had just 
been reinforced and were defending on good ground, and Collins and Gerow hit the Westwall at 
exactly the time that the U.S. fuel delivery system could stretch no farther.  The challenge had 
 
58 This assumes that significant numbers of C47s were dedicated to aerial resupply and that the divisions grounded 
everything but the most essential combat vehicles. 
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been exacerbated by the withdrawal of all air support between 29 August and 3 September, 
which corresponded to the most important and difficult phase of the pursuit based on enemy 
recovery and Allied logistical problems.   
Sustaining the pursuit an additional 50 to 75 miles would have required one or two 
maneuver decisions that SHAEF seemed very reluctant to make, and it would also have needed a 
level of efficiency and drive at COMZ that was probably too much to ask of such an 
inexperienced organization.  One must remember that COMZ had just moved to the continent on 
7 August, was trying to manage the critical phase of the pursuit while displacing Normandy to 
Paris, and was confronted by massive limitations in its ability to communicate with all the 
required agencies.  To reach the Ruhr in the fall, SHAEF would have needed to call off 
preparations for any future airborne operations and put the full weight of air transport behind 
fueling the three advancing armies, prioritizing the movement of between two to four U.S. corps 
and one to two British corps at the expense of every other priority.  With 600 to 800 C47s 
carrying fuel and fourteen mixed POL companies running a four-day round-trip shuttle from 
Cherbourg/Alençon to Liège and the Meuse near Verdun, SHAEF could have comfortably 
reached one operational objective beyond the Westwall -- perhaps two.  But this would have 
required not only disciplined prioritization and massing of transportation resources but also very 
precise orchestration of support by COMZ.  Fuel drawn at Cherbourg and at the end of the 
pipeline at Alençon would have had to be ferried across the Seine and transferred to carriers on 
the east bank.  Trains would have had to pick up the slack where motor or air transport could not 
meet a critical requirement.  Ordnance units would have needed to find the spares and position 
themselves accordingly to keep C47 and 2,000-gallon tankers running full out for about three 
weeks.  Tactical airfields reserved for administrative (logistical) work would have had to 
690 
 
leapfrog behind the armies, and service manpower would have had to be allocated at every 
transfer point along the chain.  Finally, COMZ would have needed to get their hands on enough 
barrels and jerry cans to account for the massive increase in demand and wastage associated with 
combat operations.  The Allied advance in April 1945 demonstrated that all of these conditions 
could be met, but this level of performance was asking too much of COM in August 1944.  
SHAEF was not prepared to make the tough maneuver decisions required, and COMZ and 
OCOT were not capable of driving such a complex operation. 
Pressed in an interview in 1947 by the historian writing the official volume covering 
SHAEF and the overall campaign against Germany, Lee admitted: “Of course we should have 
foreseen the need for twice as many trucks.”  He went on to suggest that had the resources 
diverted to support Market Garden been allocated to Patton instead he might have reached the 
Rhine before the end of September.59  This was a rare public admission by Lee that the command 
had failed to get enough or the right type of trucks and that different decisions at SHAEF might 
have produced more fruitful results in the fall of 1944.  Lee refused to go into any details about 
how these two decisions were made and his role in them, but it was obvious that Lee either did 
not understand the importance of these two issues at the time or did not have the influence to 
drive a different outcome. It also avoided another conclusion, specifically, that COMZ had 
sufficient trucks to do more in September and just failed to properly prioritize and control them 
in line with a better sense of what the Allied spearhead needed and where those supplies were 
located on the continent.    
 
 
59 Lee, interview by Forrest Pogue, 21 Mar 47, author’s notes while preparing The Supreme Command, AHEC, 
Carlisle, PN. 
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 Transportation After the End of the Pursuit Across France 
While the American advance was grinding to a halt between 5 and 11 September, 
SHAEF decided to shift their priority for logistical support to 21st Army Group, betting on 
operation Market Garden as the best hope for getting the Germans on the run again.  But Bradley 
trusted that given the chance for a short refit, 3rd and 1st Army might return to the attack and 
punch through the German line around Aachen and along the Moselle.  This goal drove 
ETOUSA to seek ways to extend the Red Ball Express well beyond its original end date and 
maximum range.  This second phase of the Red Ball Express lasted from 6 September to 16 
November, but it used a different mix of transportation assets to try to tackle the theater 
distribution mission in a different way.  The distance from continental ports under Allied control 
to the front line had generally stabilized between 5 and 12 September on both the 1st and 3rd 
Army fronts at a road and rail distance of between 300 and 400 miles.  New transportation assets 
became available to conquer some of this distance because of the rapid repair of rail lines and the 
extension of the POL pipeline eastward (and to the north from Marseilles).  With the opening of 
Le Havre, a moderate quantity of supplies could be landed closer to the front lines and avoid the 
complications associated with trans-loading cargo over the Seine.  Le Havre was cleared for U.S. 
traffic on 25 September and was assigned six truck companies for port clearance duties. 60  By 4 
October this number had been raised to ten, then twenty, truck companies tasked with ferrying 
supplies from the port to 12th AG depots around Reims.  This was a one-way trip of 220 miles, 
about the same distance as the trip from Dieppe to Brussels faced by the British.  
By mid-September ETOUSA had already done just about everything possible to try to 
generate and feed more truck companies into the fight.  Upon their arrival on the continent, the 
 
60 Landon, Part I, 6.   
692 
 
26th, 94th, and 104th infantry divisions were held up in Normandy and surrendered 1,200 men 
each in order to create twenty-five new provisional truck companies.61  Largely composed of 
artillerymen, they turned in their organic 1.5-ton trucks, drew new 2.5-ton trucks from the theater 
reserve stocks, and then were temporarily assigned to the MTB.  Ten additional companies were 
created around the same period using personnel from anti-aircraft artillery units considered 
unnecessary based on the poor condition of the Luftwaffe.  But regardless how many companies 
were added to the pool, COMZ could not seem to keep up with the increasing demands from the 
front.  The need for more supplies at the front was fueled by the natural desire at 12th and 21st 
Army Groups to bring up forces that had been left behind during the pursuit, the arrival of new 
divisions on the continent, and soaring ammunition requirements linked to a more spirited 
German defense. 
But as demands coming from the front continued to increase, the level of performance 
achieved by the Red Ball Express dropped off precipitously.  The nine-week daily delivery 
average during phase two was 4,552 tons, with the peak day occurring on 18 September when 
8,882 tons were delivered to the front.62  In the aggregate, the Red Ball Express was only half as 
effective during phase two has it had been during phase one.  The drop-off was hard to explain.  
On 22-23 September COMZ believed that 5,178 trucks in 112 companies were assigned to the 
Red Ball mission, but they admitted that only 1,449 trucks were loaded and moving forward on 
any given day.  The balance were either empty on their way back to the closest port, being 
loaded for the next mission, or broken.  Ross summed up the ETOUSA strength in types of truck 
companies at the end of September as follows: 
Standard 2.5-ton   158 w/37 more due to arrive in October 
 
61 History of ETOUSA G-4, 25. 
62 History of ETOUSA G-4, 13. 
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Cab Over Engine 2.5-ton  22 
3 to 6-ton tractor and trailer varieties 7 
10-ton     13 
12.5-ton    8 
45-ton (M19 tank transport)  2 
750-gallon POL   5 
2,000-gallon POL   9 
5-ton refrigerated   2  
Total     22663 
 
Official readiness rates for this period are highly suspect, with OCOT assuming that units 
in the field were maintaining an 83% ORR or better.  Information bubbling up from the field 
painted a different picture, illuminating a growing maintenance crisis based on the reports 
coming from within the MTB and its major subordinates.64  The truth of the matter is that the 
OCOT and COMZ had only the most general outline of how many trucks were still with the 
companies, were capable of performing their mission, and were under load on any particular day.  
The risk inherent in this system was the overly-optimistic picture it painted for senior leaders 
trying to track distribution capacity on the continent.   The charts then circulating around 
ETOUSA that are reproduced below give the impression that every truck company had its full 
complement of 48 trucks, that there was a theater reserve of another thousand trucks, and that 
each company was maintaining an 83.4% ORR.     
 
63 RG 407 Box 216, Monthly Reports from the TS to COMZ/ETOUSA, September.  Note the explosion in the 
number of assigned truck companies by the end of September, when the number on hand were rapidly approaching 
the 240 companies Ross had estimated would be sufficient to reach the Rhine when he submitted his first troop basis 
in July 1943.  
64 The MTB and TS meticulously tracked the number of trucks on the continent, the number available for duty, and 
the number under load on a daily basis in September and October.  This seems to be an impressive accomplishment 
until one begins to dig into the numbers and consider the operating conditions prevalent at the time.  The aggregate 
daily ORR never changed from 83.4% from 1 September to 31 October.  It is obvious that the TS based their data on 
the number of cargo trucks landed in France and authorized by T&O multiplied by .834 to determine the number 
available.  There was no effort to validate the 83% ORR assumption with the field units.  RG 407, Box 216, 
Monthly Reports, TS, ETOUSA. 
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Table 7.3: OCOT, ETOUSA, MT availability for Oct 4465 
 
65 RG 407, Box 216.  Monthly reports from the TS, ETOUSA.   
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If the COMZ used these figures as ball-park estimates to guide broad operational 
planning then their level of accuracy was adequate.  But if anyone really believed that these 
numbers represented the accurate capabilities of the MTB and ETOUSA truck force, they were 
fooling themselves.  Based on data compiled on 28 September from a wide variety of sources,  
including  roving inspection teams, ETOUSA G-4 estimated that there were 200 motor vehicle 
accidents a day among the COMZ truck companies, resulting in 70 total write-offs every twenty-
four hours, or 2,100 a month.66  Another 1,500 a day were undergoing repairs, with 40% of these 
vehicles in such bad shape that it was easier to replace them than try to fix them.  Another 700-
800 were awaiting inspection by higher-level mechanics.  The ordnance service reported a spike 
in major repairs from 2,500 on 16 September to 5,750 on 30 September.  Many of these major 
issues emerged from small problems that had been ignored for too long by company-level 
operators.  Mud, untrained drivers, an ad hoc chain of command, and the absence of tools, 
technical manuals, and basic replacement items contributed to the collapse of preventive 
maintenance.  The theater knew that it was chewing up over 10,000 trucks during the pursuit by 
running them ragged, a calculated risk accepted in order to try to end the war before winter 
conditions set in.  COMZ missed its delivery objectives in October by a wide margin, not 
because of any drastic increase in distance that had to be overcome, but because the truck fleet 
wore out and could not be immediately replaced; nor could the slack be picked up by rail. 
By mid-September OCOT and COMZ knew they were losing trucks at an unsustainable 
rate, but they also understood that it was probably going to get worse before it got better.  The 
chief of the maintenance section on the MTB staff submitted a report on 19 September that 
 
66 History of ETOUSA G-4, 40.   
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warned of a coming tire crisis. 67  Over the first two weeks of September, inspection teams had 
randomly checked the wear on tires across the brigade’s fleet, which led to the conclusion that 
the theater would have to replace 18% (18,000) of the total number of tires in use on 9,000 trucks 
and 6,000 trailers by 1 October.  Furthermore, trucks were logging so many miles on a weekly 
basis that the maintenance section anticipated the need to replace the entire theater inventory of 
tires every six to eight weeks unless some fundamental variable changed.  This estimate was 
based on the optimistic assumption that the weather would remain about the same, roads could 
be kept in working order, and the average weight per lift did not increase.  By early October the 
theater long-distance hauling burden had primarily shifted to rail assets, but trucks were spending 
more time on minor roads and trails up at the front line, and the weather steadily deteriorated.  
ETOUSA was severely limited by the state of the truck fleet by early October, but unless 
extraordinary measures were taken, the spare part and mechanic problem was likely to be 
followed by a tire crisis in November and December.  In the end, the truck fleet that had landed 
in Normandy between June and August was largely written off, replaced by new 2.5-tons and 
heavy trucks landed at Antwerp and Marseilles in November and December.  This solved 
ETOUSA’s long-term problem, but it could not help with the transportation deficit gripping the 
Allies in October and November.   
 
 Inefficiencies 
Doubtlessly more trucks would have helped the Allies keep the front-line units better 
supplied, but limited resources were only one portion of the equation.  ETOUSA was initially 
incapable of overcoming the friction produced by immature procedures and techniques 
 
67 CPT L.E. Copple “Tire Report” 19 Sep 44.  RG 498, UD 1210, Box 5982.   
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regulating coordination among the various commands and services that formed the theater 
distribution system.  Traffic congestion at the forward bulk fuel points was so bad that trucks 
might waste half a day sitting on the side of the road awaiting their turn to load or unload cargo, 
a problem compounded by poor selection of depot sites in Normandy that saw low-lying fields 
turned into seas of mud by increased rainfall.68  Some depots chose not to receive or discharge 
supplies once it was dark; others either refused to load the cargo with assigned service units, or 
did not have enough manpower to do so as quickly as they would have liked.  Both problem sets 
might be repeated at the destination end of the journey as well.69  Large convoys might have to 
repeat this cumbersome loading process at a number of different depots scattered around 
Normandy before finding everything they had been ordered to deliver to the armies.  The 
ETOUSA G-4 estimated that the average convoy loading time for 20 to 40 trucks working in 
Normandy Base Section in late September was eleven and a half hours, with outliers of more 
than 30 hours.  The unloading time at ADSEC depots was worse; the average was seventeen 
hours and isolated examples reached 36 hours.70  Every hour lost to inefficient loading or 
unloading procedures added up, and, beyond the hour or two required to service the vehicles and 
switch out drivers, it produced the same result as not having that truck platoon at all.   
 
 Other Transportation Options 
ETOUSA knew that motor transport alone was insufficient to supply the U.S. Army in 
France beyond the Seine.  It was imperative to restore some rail service as quickly as possible 
 
68 DeArman, 71. “History of TS, ETOUSA”, 13.  In fairness to the ADSEC, they did the best they could based on 
the shallow depth and slow expansion of the lodgment up to 25 July.  
69 “History of TS, ETOUSA”, 16. 
70 History of ETOUSA G-4, 6. 
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between D+60 and D+90, to construct a POL pipeline from Cherbourg to the projected depot 
complex around Rennes, to use aerial resupply for small-scale emergencies, and eventually to 
open alternative ports in the south of France and along the channel.  It was extremely frustrating 
for the officers at OCOT and COMZ that they relied so much on the restoration and exploitation 
of these alternative distribution networks, but they had little say making it a top priority to use 
resources for this purpose.   
In the frenzy to sustain the pursuit from mid-August to mid-September, all the truck and 
rail capacity committed to moving construction material for the POL pipeline was redirected to 
supplying the armies.  Before this decision was made trains were delivering between 500 to 
1,500 tons of construction material daily into the Alençon - Chartres area.  But after these trains 
were diverted to support the two army groups and feed the civilian population of Paris around the 
middle of the month, the engineers had to rely on organic transportation, and it was not 
enough.71  In addition to dedicating trains to move pipeline construction material during the first 
half of August, COMZ had initially committed one of its precious 10-ton truck companies to 
moving POL pipeline material from 22 to 25 August, but this company was shifted over to line 
of communication duty on the Red Ball starting on the 26th.72  In early September the 12th AG 
G-4 implored COMZ to prioritize rail and pipeline construction over all other projects, but this 
could not be accomplished because there was insufficient lift to deliver building materials.73   
Expanding the theater rail service was complicated by similar resourcing challenges.  Initially 
ETOUSA had hoped to import new engines and cars from the UK to meet most of their needs, 
but the delivery schedule fell further and further behind due to the damage at Cherbourg and 
 
71 DeArman, 113.   
72 Landon, MTB, 15-16. 
73 12 AG G-4 AAR, 6 Sep 44, 2.  Moses and Bradley were never asked to pick among rail repair, POL pipeline 
construction, or the delivery of another 1,500 tons of supplies at the front. 
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because of conflicting discharge priorities at the other major ports.74  By the end of October, 
despite the opening of Dieppe and Marseilles as additional entry ports for rail equipment, 
imports had met only 33% of the engine requirement and 28% of the cars needed to maintain six 
main trunk lines.75  Through the end of October the Allies had landed 929 engines and over 
16,000 cars, which joined 399 engines and 25,648 cars liberated from the enemy.  Admittedly, 
142 of the captured engines were under repair as of 15 October.  If one adds together the figures 
for captured and liberated stock, the percentage of assets on-hand versus required rolling stock 
by mid-October, as gauged by ETOUSA’s transportation section, climbs to 47% of the engines 
and 72% of the rolling stock.  Despite the urgent need for more engines, ETOUSA could not 
import them quickly enough, nor could it force air and ground combat units to stop gleefully 
shooting them full of holes.76  Moses noted in the 12th AG AAR published on 6 September that 
“air forces have been requested not to destroy transportation facilities difficult to replace.”77  By 
the next month this had been strengthened to a directive to 9th AF to stop attacking rolling stock 
in the forward combat area.78  Obviously the logisticians understood the importance of capturing 
functional rail equipment, but it seemed easier to get people to start destroying things and much 
harder to convince them to stop.  
 
74 There was also a reluctance on the part of the British War Office to release engines and rolling stock earmarked 
for France but working in the U.K.  Their position was that the trains would only be released once the coastal ships 
on loan to 21st AG was returned and could take up the slack in hauling capacity.  21st AG’s position was that the 
ships were vital until more rail capacity was generated on the continent, or deep-water ports opened closer to the 
frontlines.   
75 RG 407, Box 216.  Periodic reports of the TC, ETOUSA. 
76 History of the ETOUSA G-4, Section III: Supply by Road, Air, and Water.  RG498, UD 578, Box 3931, ADM 
553A, 1.  Unit histories written in 1944 and 1945 fully acknowledged the role played by Allied air power and the 
French resistance in destroying the rail infrastructure west of the Rhine.  Stopping these attacks after they were no 
longer necessary proved almost as difficult as getting the transportation plan approved in the first place.   
77 12th AG G-4 AAR, 6 Sep 44, 2. 
78 12th AG G-4 AAR, 7 Oct 44, 2.   
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Table 7.4: Import of rail assets to the continent, Jul  - Oct 4479 
 
 
Table 7.5: Rail assets versus requirements (imports only)80 
 
79 RG 498, UD 578, Box 3881, OCOT Monthly Progress Reports. 
80 RG 498, UD 578, Box 3881.  These figures do not include material captured or liberated from the Germans. 
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Because of equipment shortages and destroyed lines, bridges, and maintenance facilities, 
only two or three trains a day were making it past Chartres by 1 September.  But despite these 
numerous challenges, rail began to contribute significantly to Allied lift capacity by the middle 
of September.  By then Paris was receiving 6,000-7,000 tons of supplies a day by rail and 
forwarding another 5,000-6,000 tons for the ADSEC and its supported combat units.  By 1 
October, 9,000-10,000 tons left Paris by train daily, headed east to support 12th Army Group.81  
As rail capacity increased in the 30 days between mid-September to mid-October, it allowed 
Ross to rely almost exclusively on trains for long-haul missions and redirect the quartermaster 
truck companies to support the armies and base sections over shorter stretches of road. 
One method of transportation whose exploitation might have made a difference in 
September and October was the river and canal network of central France.  SHAEF and 
ETOUSA were initially dismissive of the potential offered by inland waterways, but when Paris 
faced a civilian fuel crisis over the winter of 1944-1945, planners reconsidered this decision.  An 
inland waterways committee had been formed at COMZ in September, composed of 
representatives from the Office of the Chief of Engineers, Transportation, and the G-4 as its key 
members.82  Ross activated an inland waterways division within his office on 7 November and 
directed them to monitor and coordinate traffic along the Seine; the first coal barge had left the 
port at La Havre bound for Paris the day before.  For the duration of the month shipments up the 
river averaged 267 tons daily, rising to almost a thousand tons a day in December.  After clearing 
the water obstacles emplaced by the Germans around Le Havre, which allowed the port to open 
on 25 September, the major impediment to using the Seine as a highway was the wreckage from 
 
81 DeArman, 6. 
82 History of the ETOUSA G-4, 69, RG 498, UD 578, Box 3931, ADM 553. 
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bridges destroyed by Allied aircraft and the need to move or raise the tactical bridging erected by 
the British Army back in August and September.  With a bit more foresight, barges might have 
moved an additional 300 tons of supplies every day in October, climbing to 1,000 tons daily by 
early November.  This would not have helped with the pursuit and first attempts to crack the 
Westwall, but it would have sped the rehabilitation of 12th AG in November and the first half of 
December.     
Exploiting the huge fleet of cargo aircraft offered another partial solution to the Allied 
distribution shortfall.  After alleviating 3rd Army’s fuel and critical-item shortages on 25 and 26 
August, air transport was largely unavailable between 29 August and 3 September.  For this 
critical week SHAEF was paralyzed by the debate over the best way to use its fleet of 
transportation aircraft.  Marshall, Arnold, Montgomery, and the senior leaders within the 1st 
Allied Airborne Army were keen to test out the concept of aerial envelopment at the operational 
level, either to encircle a large pocket of retreating Germans or to unhinge the first coherent 
defensive line east of Paris.83  Meanwhile, it had slowly dawned on the joint and logistics 
planners at SHAEF, and among the key leaders in 12th AG, that air transport might best be used 
to move critical supplies, especially during mobile operations where trains could not keep up 
with the advancing armies.84  To the despair of the logisticians, Eisenhower felt compelled to use 
the Airborne Army in a major operation, and Montgomery obliged him by continuing to develop 
schemes to do so.  As a result, SHAEF lost access to a fleet that could have theoretically moved 
3,000 tons of supplies daily during a critical phase of the pursuit.      
 
83 Pogue, The Supreme Command, 279-281. 
84 Blumenson, 679-680.  12th AG G-4 AAR, 6 Sep 44, 6.  Blumenson argues that Bradley pushed to Tournai so 
quickly on 1 September to prove his point about the irrelevance of airborne operations during a pursuit.  Moses 
argued the same point in his AAR for operations during August.  See chapter five of this study for SHAEF joint 
planner assessments of various airborne schemes in Brittany.   
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 The October Collapse of the Distribution System and Allied Reaction 
 
Figure 7.4: The Allied LOC by mid-Oct 4485 
 
 The Problem 
As one reads ETOUSA documents written in October 1944, it appears that the supply 
situation within 12th Army Group actually got worse in comparison to September, which seems 
at first glance to be counterintuitive.  The length of the Allied line of communications stabilized 
or in some cases got shorter, the capacity of the rail system increased significantly, and the 
terminus of the POL pipelines reached the west bank of the Seine at Rouen and Versailles, 
simplifying the mission of getting fuel to the armies.  But these gains were offset by expanding 
demands in the combat zone with the arrival of new formations and the units that had been left 
 
85 The Transportation Corps in the Battle of France, Volume V, Part 1.  RG 498, UD 578, Box 3956. 
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behind during the pursuit and with the increasing ammunition expenditure in the face of 
stiffening German resistance.  But what remains inexplicable is that, in the aggregate, COMZ 
delivered about the same or a little less tonnage in October than they had in September.  This 
seems to have been the result of transitioning too quickly over to trains in order to meet long-
distance distribution demands in the theater, before ETOUSA had confirmed that rail could 
replicate the performance of the Red Ball Express during its most efficient and effective period.  
Regardless why it happened, COMZ could not deliver enough material to keep the armies 
satisfied, failed to meet their own projected transportation goals, and turned in a slightly less 
effective performance in October than they had managed in September. 
 One notes the rising frustration within 12th Army Group at COMZ’s performance in the 
difference in tone between the September and October G-4 monthly summary.  In September 
Moses had mentioned a concern about shortages of some types of service units and a lack of 
repair parts for the Sherman and M12 self-propelled howitzer, but these were posed as nothing 
the command could not work around.  He knew about the distribution problems that were 
causing headaches throughout SHAEF, but he believed that sufficient coping mechanisms could 
be put in place to keep the campaign on track.  But the change between the optimism of 
September and the frustration voiced in October and November was dramatic. 
 Obviously, all of the problems referenced in the 7 October report submitted by Moses 
had not just developed over the last four weeks.  Doubtlessly many small issues had been 
building up at the tactical level, but either they had not become apparent at the army and army 
group level or else could be dismissed as not pressing in the big picture.  But a month later the 
U.S. Army was engaged in some of the toughest combat it had yet witnessed in in Europe, and 
issues that had been considered minor irritants were now registering as big problems.  What was 
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worse, all the hard work happening at COMZ, the improved procedural systems, and expanded 
distribution capacity did not seem to be alleviating the supply problems of the front-line 
divisions and corps. 
 Moses acknowledged that deliveries to the combat zone for September were up across the 
board when compared to August, but they were still not keeping up with the increasing demands 
driven by more intensive combat and the larger number of troops in the forward area.  His most 
pressing concern near the end of September was just how much of his 10,000 daily tons 
consisted of material the army group had not asked for, material that was only marginally useful 
or outright worthless.86  Ammunition had displaced fuel as the critical commodity for the army 
group, and the situation was reported as dire in a few key types of munitions:   
Round Inventory Rnd Per Gun Per Day U/F per day 
Hvy 81mm HE 23,000 2.0 .178 
81mm WP Smoke 18,000 1.6 .105 
105mm How Smoke 1,170 .54 .010 
155mm How Smoke 1,400 .28 .004 
155mm How (M1) HE 70,000 14.3 .212 
155mm Gun WP Smoke 880 .40 .008 
8-inch How HE 9,000 7.8 .156 
8-inch Gun HE 600 3.1 .089 
240mm HE 1,800 3.8 .150 
Table 7.6: 12th AG artillery stocks, 26 Sep 44 and controlled fire rates for 27 Sep to 5 Oct87 
 
86 12th Army Group G-4 Monthly AAR, 7 Oct 44, 1. 
87 G-4 Weekly Report, 26 Sep 44, 12th Army Group Periodic Reports, RG 407, Entry 427, Box 1346.  Artillery 
ammunition availability to the U.S. Army in the fall of 1944 is a topic that has already been addressed in great detail 
by other authors.  Many of the shortages experienced that fall were caused by production shortfalls, not any 
requisition or delivery problems at COMZ.  The tactical impact of these shortages is debatable.  First, there was 
enough HE ammunition for the divisional artillery to guarantee adequate support to the infantry regiments. The most 
common models of 105mm and 155mm howitzers and the 4.5-inch gun were authorized to fire between 20 and 40 
rounds a day per gun.  In a defensive emergency or pre-planned attack, battalions could fire a lot more, either by 
stockpiling before the attack, or by blowing through up to a week’s worth of ammunition and figuring out how to 
cross-level or resupply after the crisis.  The one limitation of note was the lack of smoke.  This was a capability that 
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 Other supply shortages that made Moses’s weekly report of 26 September were food, 
fuel, Browning Automatic Rifles, 60mm mortars, M8 armored cars, tires, medium tanks 
(Shermans), and replacement tank engines.  The monthly consolidated report submitted about 
two weeks later reiterated the severity and impact of the shortage of tires and repair parts; the 
army group had no choice but to ask for replacement vehicles because it could not fix minor 
breakdowns in the existing fleet.88  A shortage of 5-gallon jerry cans was hampering fuel 
resupply and distribution down to the lowest levels, although Moses did acknowledge that a lack 
of supply discipline within the army group contributed to the loss of millions of these cans, the 
inefficient use of fuel and other supplies, and hoarding at every level within the U.S Army.  LTG 
Gale had himself noted in his diary back in February 1943, in extreme frustration, that the chief 
prerequisite to be considered a good logistics officer in the U.S. Army was the ability to “amass 
as great a quantity of supplies and stores as possible by any means whatsoever.  His value as an 
officer is judged by the magnitude of his ‘dump.’”89        
Frustrated by the supply situation at the front in October, Moses was forced to admit that 
the logistics community had started creating the current conundrum back in June and July.  There 
had been such a rush to unload and stash supplies in Normandy that it had overwhelmed Allied 
 
was particularly useful during an attack, especially when forced to cover long stretches of open ground.  Smoke 
helped block enemy long-range observation and direct fire.  These shortfalls at the army level might have been 
offset by smoke maintained for 60mm mortars and 75mm guns down at the infantry regiment or below.  Tanks and 
tank destroyers also fired smoke rounds, either 75 or 76mm, or 3-inch based on the main armament of the vehicle.  
Heavy artillery ammunition, useful against strong fortifications or against enemy guns, was in extremely short 
supply.  Luckily for the U.S. Army, the Germans did not have a lot of long-range artillery or shells for the guns they 
did possess.     
88 12th AG G-4 Monthly AAR, 7 Oct 44, 3. 
89 Gale War Diary, 18 Feb 43.  Collection II, Items 1-13, Liddell Hart Center, King’s College.  Pilfering had gotten 
so bad at Ouled Rahmoun that AFHQ dispatched a force of military police to guard supplies, arrest looters, and 
conduct courts martial.  Gale went on to provide five specific examples of U.S. hoarding and his explanation as to 
why this was an American vice, which did not but probably should have included a complete lack of confidence in 
NATOUSA, ETOUSA, SOS, and COMZ procedures.  It is also probable that pilfering and acts of indiscipline in II 
Corps had spiked as a result of the recent reverses.  Periods of intense stress always seemed to trigger more frank 
comments by Gale in his diary as well.   
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capacity to log and store the material for easy retrieval.  Non-essentials clogged the pipeline, in 
the holds of ships awaiting discharge, in the dumps across Normandy, and on the trucks and 
trains headed to the front.  COMZ had no choice but to continue to unload ships as quickly as 
they could, regardless the relative importance of the cargo, because the ASF and War Ministry 
needed them back on the global lanes.  It was the same story when it came to clearing out the 
depots in Normandy; items had to be pushed to the east in order to make room for the tens of 
thousands of tons of material coming off the ships every day.  Here was a theater logistical 
system that was virtually running on autopilot, with months and months of equipment in the 
pipeline and no alternative but to unload it and stash it somewhere on the continent as quickly as 
possible.90     
The logistics staff at 12th AG had tried to do everything they could to help COMZ and 
ETOUSA overcome their distribution backlog.  Moses’s extensive background as an operational 
planner in London and with 21st Army Group and then as the senior U.S. logistician ashore until 
7 August gave him a theater-level perspective on SHAEF’s supply challenges and on ways to 
overcome them.  In August and September, the army group had taken steps to ensure that VIII 
Corps, tied down outside of Brest, was supplied using coastal shipping to the maximum extent 
possible, freeing truck and rail assets for 1st and 3rd Armies.  In his summary of lessons learned 
covering the month of September, Moses shared with Bradley that the idea of using B-24s as 
substitutes for C47s was his suggestion, as was the push to completely revise the SHAEF SOP 
on air resupply.  Moses reported to Bradley that the army group had redirected every FA and 
AAA battalion possible into the business of forming provisional truck companies and that the 
 
90 In their defense, the ASF proposed turning off the flood of shipping to ETOUSA that fall, but backed down 
largely because of the appeals of MG Ross.  See Ruppenthal, Vol. 2, 126-130.   
ETOUSA did not begin to make a dent in the backlog of ships until December.   
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other service troop shortages noted in September had been resolved.  Offering his boss a longer-
term assessment of the distribution problem, Moses went into detail on the technical and 
procedural work ongoing at SHAEF and ETOUSA designed to increase deliveries, but he 
concluded that the only comprehensive solution to the logistics dilemma was a radical reduction 
in the length of the LOC.  Once Marseilles was opened to ocean-going vessels it would begin to 
take some of the pressure off of the distribution system, but getting Antwerp open was what 
really mattered. 
 
 The Discrepancy Between Promises and Deliveries by OCOT in October 
 Were Bradley and Moses justified in their frustration with COMZ’s performance in 
October and November?  Table 7.6 demonstrates that the total tonnage reaching 12th AG was 
almost exactly the same in the second half of September and the first half of October; the only 
noticeable difference is the method of transportation and the internal distribution of that tonnage.  
Deliveries to ADSEC increased by a factor of 2.5, from 15,640 to 38,178 tons, and there was a 
slight increase in the portion of supplies allocated to 9th AF.  The amount of supplies going to the 
armies decreased by about 26,000 tons; averaging out to 1,850 fewer tons per day, the decrease 
was largely confined to 3rd and 9th Armies.  Deliveries by truck and air transport dropped to 
about half their 16-30 September figures, while rail tonnage increased by a factor of 1.5.   
709 
 
 
Table 7.7: ADSEC recorded deliveries, II Sep vs I Oct 4491 
 
It is difficult to determine why deliveries by truck fell off through October or to 
completely trust the reports generated by OCOT, but ETOUSA figures indicate a slow decline 
during the first week of October followed by a catastrophic collapse after 8 October.  This cannot 
be attributed to a major reduction in the number of units assigned to ETOUSA or the operational 
readiness rate of the truck fleet; no reason was given for the drastic falloff in truck deliveries.  
Perhaps some provisional truck companies were disbanded and their personnel returned to their 
parent divisions, while other companies were redirected to port clearance and static operations or 
 
91 12th AG G-4 Periodic Reports, RG 407, Entry 427, Box 1346. 
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else sidelined for extensive maintenance.  Contemporary records and official histories do not 
offer any clues.   
92 
 
 
Table 7.9: OCT LOC deliveries using MT, Oct 44 
 
 
92 Assembled from various daily and weekly reports at 12th AG and ADSEC, 12th AG G-4 Periodic Reports, RG 
407, Entry 427, Box 1346. 
11 
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Table 7.8: Daily deliveries to 12th AG, Sep to Oct 44, all means of transportation 
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Regardless the reasons why, motor transport was only half as effective in October as it 
had been in September, despite assurances of maximum effort from ETOUSA and promises that 
they had turned the corner in working out problems with the transportation network.  The 
collapse of support by trucks was balanced out by an equal increase in rail service, but COMZ 
deliveries flat lined at precisely the time 12th AG was trying to recover from the exertions in 
August and September and mount one more attack north of Aachen designed to finally penetrate 
the Westwall.  It seems that in the second half of October two forces impacted ETOUSA’s 
ability to haul supplies with trucks.  First, the overall capacity collapsed after months of 
maximum exertion and deferred maintenance.  Second, the trucks that could be put back in the 
fight were shifted over to rail clearance and miscellaneous missions at the expense of long-
distance hauling.  Evidently 12th Army Group was not notified of this decision in advance, or if 
they were, Moses did not find the arguments for these changes convincing.  Perhaps COMZ had 
learned that, if given a choice, SHAEF and 12th AG would never prioritize the long-term health 
of the troops running the line of communications at the expense of accomplishing operational 
and tactical objectives, and COMZ just made the decision on their own.   
 Total 17 
Oct 
CLS I III II & IV V 18 Oct 
12th AG 9,178 2,906 3,792 950 2,667 8,406 
1st AR 4,668 1,096 1605 505 1462 4434 
3rd AR 3,531 1,153 1426 94 858 2845 
9th AR 2,116 657 761 351 347 1127 
Table 7.10: Tons of supplies delivered to 12th AG from evening 16 to 17 Oct 44 by type 
and 18 Oct total only. 93  Numbers reported by ADSEC, transported by air, rail, and truck   
 
 
93 BG Moses “Supplies to Armies” 19 Oct 44; daily G-4 report forwarded to General Bradley, RG 407, Entry 427, 
Box 1346. 
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 The reduction in average daily deliveries in October came as a surprise to 12th AG and 
SHAEF.  If anything, both organizations had been led to believe that significant relief to the 
transportation crunch was just around the corner.  At some point in September OCOT began to 
publish transportation forecasts on the 20th and 5th of each month; these forecasts established 
performance goals for the distribution network and provided official figures to drive planning 
within the army group.94  The transportation projection prepared by  OCOT for I October 
(covering 1-15 October) called for 11,800 tons to reach the three operational armies each day, 
with another 3,200 tons going to 9th AF.  Actual deliveries during this period reached about 80% 
of these projections, with about 12,000 tons reaching the three armies and 9th AF each day, 
resulting in a two-week deficit of 45,000-tons of promised but undelivered supplies.  
Furthermore, as we have already seen, Moses claimed that deliveries in September and October 
had still consisted of entirely too high a percentage of unrequested and unnecessary items. 
 In the second half of October the transportation network finally hit its stride; and both 
total deliveries and the percentage of useful material reaching the armies began a steady climb.  
By November most shortages at the tactical level had been filled, reserves had been established 
under ADSEC control, and the requisition and distribution system had been refined to the point 
where the theater knew what was available, where it was stored, and could deliver it to the 
combat zone quicker than ever before.  In November and December, the challenge of managing 
the most difficult aspects of the theater logistics system shifted over from COMZ and onto 12th 
Army Group.  By then COMZ was unloading a staggering amount of material at the ports and 
transferring it to the front, primarily by train.  So much material was reaching the ADSEC that 
 
94 COL D.W. Traub, “Control and Planning Division”.  Transportation Corps History, March 1944 – 9 May 1945, 
RG 498, UD 1210, Transportation Section, Box 5981.  It appears that the first forecast covered 1-15 October 1944.    
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the problems last experienced in Normandy in June and July began to resurface.  Plank could not 
unload trucks and trains quickly enough, and, in the rush to stay ahead of the flood, items were 
stashed in the wrong places, making efficient retrieval almost impossible.  This resulted in a 
mismatch between what was on inventory versus what could be quickly found and delivered to 
combat divisions.  It had come too late to rescue Eisenhower’s objectives for the fall campaign, 
but by 1 November OCOT was finally capable of successfully managing their portion of the 
theater distribution chain.    
 
Figure 7.5: OCOT transportation forecast, 1-15 Oct 44 
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Figure 7.6: Transportation forecast 15-30 Oct 44 
 
 Integrating the Lessons of the Pursuit into ABC and XYZ  
 COMZ and OCOT might not have been ready for the challenges of August and 
September, and slow to react to the changing nature of the distribution network in October, but 
they tended to learn from their mistakes.  The American-British-Canadian (ABC) operation was 
a logical continuation of the Red Ball Express, designed to synchronize the delivery of supplies 
flowing through Antwerp and other Channel ports down to the armies. The operation was 
conducted in November and early December.  By then ETOUSA had fielded a significant 
number of heavy tractor-trailer truck companies, which revolutionized the speed with which 
supplies could be shuttled to the armies.   With two trailers fielded for every tractor, the crew 
could drive into Antwerp, hook up to a trailer that had been loaded hours or even days earlier, 
drop the full trailer at the appropriate army dump, immediately connect to an empty that had 
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been unloaded the day prior, and head back north.  Turnaround times at the port and dump were 
shortened to a few hours, which included time for a meal or an exchange of drivers and for a 
quick inspection of and simple maintenance on the tractor.95  The size of the bulk POL fleet was 
increased by placing skid-mounted 750-gallon tanks up on trailers, potentially turning any 
standard 2.5-ton truck into a designated tanker.  Skid tanks were designed to make it easy for a 
crane or forklift to pick them up (empty) and put them on ships, trains, or trucks.  Up to four 
tanks fit on a 25-foot trailer pulled by a 10-ton tractor, turning each into a 3,000-gallon tanker.  It 
also increased flexibility because each truck could carry up to four different types of fuel if 
necessary. 
 By March 1945 all of these improvements had been honed to perfection.  OCOT’s XYZ 
transportation plan was designed to sustain the Allied drive over the Rhine and into the last 
corners of the Reich.  It married efficient and focused aerial resupply with a finely tuned motor 
transportation system.  Ross allocated 238 2.5-ton company equivalents to the long-distance 
hauling mission; another 200 truck companies were assigned to port clearance and static 
operations.96  The single MTB and transportation section at the ADSEC from the Overlord days 
was replaced by three highway transportation divisions, one being assigned to directly support 
each army.  These organizations combined the command-and-control function of the MTB with 
the staff coordination function of the motorized transportation section of the ADSEC or OCOT.  
Each highway transportation division command post was collocated with the army rear CP to 
ensure effective communication.  COMZ hoped to keep railheads no more than 200 miles behind 
the forward divisions, reducing the scope of truck resupply to 400 miles of round-trip distance 
 
95 History of TS, ETOUSA 1942-1945, 15.  RG 498, UD 1210, Transportation Section, Box 5981. 
96 Ibid, 17.   
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every 24 hours.  Transferring supplies at the army depots over to divisional trucks became the 
most time-consuming portion of the process under this system.   
 The entirely new fleet of heavy trucks that had been landed in theater over the winter 
allowed the U.S. Army to reorganize the QM Truck Groups.  Each group was assigned control 
over six to seven battalions, each comprised of five to eight companies.  At first battalions 
controlled a mix of various types of companies, but by 1 April ETOUSA was able to reorganize 
its truck battalions so they consisted of companies all equipped with the same models.  Groups 
controlled a mix of battalions, each of which was assigned a mission that exploited the strengths 
of their assigned equipment, with 10-ton tractors and trailers used exclusively for long-distance 
hauling.97  The best balance was found to be about 66% 10-ton, 33% 2.5-ton, and one heavy bulk 
POL battalion per group.98  Heavy 10-ton trucks were perfect for areas with well-maintained and 
wide roads, while 2.5-tons were necessary to reach widely dispersed army-level dumps.  
Standardization within the battalion was a force multiplier, simplifying the task of getting repair 
parts into the hands of mechanics at the lowest level possible to keep the fleet running.  By the 
end of the war the transportation section admitted that they still had not worked out two issues 
with efficient MT support at the theater to division level: the elimination of one unnecessary 
layer of the chain of command between the HTD, group, and battalion; and the creation of 
combined-service commands that could integrate MPs, mechanics, route repair engineers, and 
labor battalions along a named XYZ route to ensure the critical components were under the 
command of a single authority.     
 
97 HQ ADSEC COMZ Transportation Section “Historical Report” 11 Feb 45.  Series of T.O.s for 6957th Highway 
Transportation Division in March and April 1945.  RG 498, UD 1304, Box 6399.  
98 History of the TS, ETOUSA, 28-29. 
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 The window from late-July to mid-October was a critical period for OCOT and COMZ 
one that corresponded to the most challenging phase of the theater sustainment mission.  As 
projected, ETOUSA was forced to rely exclusively on motor transport, augmented by what 
proved to be a surprisingly capable air cargo fleet, for about six weeks.  Most logisticians 
suspected this would be unsustainable once large forces were operating east of the Seine, 
motivating COMZ to pick up as much of the slack with rail and POL pipeline service as quickly 
as possible.  Ross started the pursuit phase with 130 truck companies on the continent, despite 
the implication by Ruppenthal that ETOUSA was missing 34 of these units, and the number of 
companies rose to 240 by early September -- the total number Ross originally asked for back in 
July 1943 in order to reach the Rhine.  Admittedly the U.S. Army had subsequently learned that 
larger trucks with detachable trailers were much more efficient and would largely convert the 
COMZ long-haul battalions to this type over the winter and spring.  Regardless, by mid-
September ETOUSA had all the wheeled transport resources they had originally asked for, 
excluding truck companies organic to the service commands in each numbered air force and 
organic to 21st Army Group.  In theory this should have generated enough lift capacity to supply 
between two and four U.S. corps all the way to the Rhine. 
This did not happen for a couple of associated reasons.  First, OCOT relied exclusively 
on bulk POL companies to deliver fuel to five and then four vanguard formations operating at the 
end of a line of communication extending between 300 and 400 miles.  Simple arithmetic 
demonstrated that nine heavy and five medium POL companies working over such distances 
were insufficient, yet COMZ could not convince SHAEF to dedicate aerial transports to make up 
the difference or to prioritize one thrust while cutting off support to the second.  And when 
SHAEF failed to solve the problem for them with air assets, COMZ failed to come up with 
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expedient solutions of their own.  This resulted in all four leading corps intermittently running 
out of fuel during the last week of August and the first week of September, contributing to a 
successful German delaying action that eventually allowed them to cobble together a new line 
anchored on the Westwall and Moselle.  A bit more mental flexibility, or dedicated airlift, might 
have prevented the periodic halts to the Allied advance that allowed this to happen.  Other 
procedural snags added up; it took too long to load and unload trucks, and too often the cargo 
consisted of what was easily on hand and not what the armies had asked for.  Maintenance 
support was spotty, both along the Red Ball route and at the major support camps, and repair 
parts and spare tires were in short supply.  All of these problems were exacerbated by poor 
familiarity with the coordination procedures that did exist as well as by the unworkability of 
some of those systems in an intense combat environment.  Almost no one knew how to do his 
job within the context of a pursuit across France. ETOUSA/COMZ, OCOT, the base sections, 
and 12th Army Group all struggled to maintain effective communications among one another.  
What became obvious immediately was that COMZ was a rookie organization trying to operate 
in the most complex environment possible, and it showed. 
COMZ and OCOT got better, fast, but they also burned a lot of bridges, both with 
SHAEF and 12th AG, before they could get their act together.  Ross and his organization 
eventually emerged with their reputation largely intact, wrestled more and more control back 
from the COMZ G-4, and incorporated new equipment and new procedures to make the ABC 
operation run much smoother than the Red Ball.  Admittedly, ABC was an easier mission, but 
the same principles were applied to XYZ that spring, which finally demonstrated what ETOUSA 
was capable of when firing on all cylinders.  Aerial transport almost reached its theoretical 
capacity, and a complex array of different types of truck battalions provided exquisite support 
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over great distances and numerous river obstacles, aided by the improved procedures that had 
been worked out over six months of trial and error.  New organizations ensured tight 
coordination with the field armies, while old organizations functioned more effectively and 
efficiently.  These were impressive developments, but they could have been implemented much 
sooner if Lee and his staff had discovered some way to institutionalize the operational experience 
that existed in NATOUSA, its SOS, and the logistics and movement staff at 21st Army Group.  
Ross and OCOT were further along in this process than their peers among the special staff 
sections of ETOUSA, but they were far from perfect; and despite a solid start during the first 
weeks of August, they proved incapable of properly managing the transportation network at their 
disposal to help SHAEF achieve its operational objectives in the fall of 1944. 
 
 The Challenges Associated with Fueling a Motorized Army        
 The Allies understood that providing fuel for the air and ground units in France would be 
one of the most difficult, and most important, tasks faced by COMZ.  It was a complex mission 
that demanded COMZ and the stove-piped technical staff sections at ETOUSA carefully 
synchronize their activities.  It was a distribution nightmare that demanded special trucks, rail 
cars, and pipelines to reduce the problem to a manageable level.  SHAEF projected that by D+90 
there would be over a quarter million vehicles in France requiring 6,348 tons of bulk and 858 
tons of packaged POL products every day to keep moving.99  Establishing a system capable of 
delivering that volume of fuel to the front line was a monumental task.  
 
99 LTC F.W. Burford, “POL Plan” 21 Apr 44, POL Branch, ETOUSA G-4.  RG 407, Entry 427, Box 215. Included 
with other material associated with HQ, FECZ, “COMZ Plan” 14 May 44. 
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Just before Overlord ETOUSA had finalized an excellent plan to create such a fuel 
distribution network on the continent.  It had been a group effort overseen by LTC F.W. Burford 
of the POL Branch at ETOUSA G-4, but a wide range of experts from FECZ and 21st AG were 
essential to the work.  The first draft of the document was published on 21 April and the final 
version was appended to the FECZ COMZ plan in mid-May.  This was later than would have 
been optimal, but, because all of the organizations that would participate in the project had 
helped write the plan over the last six to eight weeks, they were already familiar with the detailed 
tasks, equipment, and construction material needed to do their part once in France. 
Anyone reading the POL annex to the COMZ plan would quickly notice that the first five 
pages of the document consisted of nothing but a detailed review of all the planning assumptions 
and consumption estimates that had been used to come up with the concept of how to build and 
operate the bulk fuel system.  It makes for a tedious read, but the ETOUSA logisticians had 
learned that these preliminary explanations were essential if they were going to use the document 
to coordinate with other agencies and to make modifications to the overall plan should a minor 
assumption or a consumption rate change.  In some ways, the lack of similar background 
material is what allowed the ASF to delay acknowledging the validity of Ross’s motor transport 
requests during the fall of 1943 and April and May of 1944.  The ETOUSA G-4 section seemed 
to have learned its lesson from those experiences and laid out everything the command would 
have to account for in painful detail at the front of the theater POL plan.   
Across the board the assumptions that informed the plan were very reasonable, neither 
wishing away problems nor overestimating what the command could achieve.  The first 
requirement was to figure out how much fuel was needed to move every Allied vehicle and 
airplane that would be ashore by D+90 50 miles a day or in the air during daylight hours.  After 
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determining the daily requirements of the different types of bulk fuel in the inventory and the 
even more complex array of packaged products, the planners tried to determine the troops and 
material necessary to build and operate the distribution network.  This distribution system 
extended beyond the POL pipelines themselves, and it included discharge and storage facilities at 
ports, special 10,000-gallon tanker cars for the rail system, four types of tanker and cargo trucks, 
barrels and cans for distribution to the user level, and the various facilities and service units to 
keep the system running.  Routes for the various pipelines were tentatively selected, and 
projected construction rates were plotted in daily or weekly increments across northwestern and 
central France.  All this data was finally consolidated on one large map; marginal data along the 
edges illustrated every aspect of the men and material associated with making the system work.  
The final product captured a truly impressive amount of staff work.   
In hindsight, the only two criticisms that could be leveled were that the plan focused too 
much on the what, and not enough on the how, and it covered only the period up to D+90, by 
which point the Allies assumed they would have reached the Seine.  Every task required to 
establish and maintain the network was broken down into micro-components that were then 
assigned to supervisory headquarters of one type or another, but the plan did not explain who 
would monitor and adjust these efforts if major changes were called for.  The implication was 
that the engineers would be the lead service and that ADSEC and then COMZ would 
synchronize support from the other technical services and the base sections.  In practice this 
project suffered from various setbacks, and COMZ decided to create the Military Pipeline 
Service at the end of September to centralize management of the most complicated aspects of the 
network.  
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Figure 7.7: POL pipeline construction status, 16 Sep 44 
    
Figure 7.8: POL pipelines, planned (dashed) vs actual (solid) by mid-Sep 44 
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 By creating the MPS, COMZ hoped to simplify the challenges MTB and ADSEC had 
found so difficult to overcome.  At first the construction and maintenance of the POL pipelines 
were treated as exclusively a Corps of Engineers matter, but as the lines extended further to the 
east COMZ realized that the engineers could not handle all the necessary coordination by 
themselves.  The engineer regiments needed help from the ETOUSA transportation section to 
move up construction material; organic dump truck companies were insufficient by themselves.  
Once the pipelines and pumping stations were built, the ordnance service was supposed to keep 
the equipment in working order, and quartermaster units were charged with issuing the fuel to 
users.  By August the pipelines ran across territory controlled by two different base sections, and 
by October this had expanded to four.  COMZ was the only organization with the formal 
authority to task base sections to provide service troops to support the engineers and to 
adjudicate when competing theater priorities all demanded the same resources.  It took a few 
months for COMZ to realize they did not have the capacity to manage logistics across the theater 
and simultaneously control the POL distribution system.  In September the command took the 
steps necessary to create an organization that could pick up the slack.   
 ETOUSA created the military pipeline service (MPS) on 23 September and used the 368th 
General Service Engineer Regiment (368th GS) to form the core of that organization.100  The 
368th Regiment had been in charge of building the U.S. pipeline system from day one and was 
well acquainted with what the organization needed to do better in order to improve service to the 
armies.  Support units from other services were then directly attached to the MPS, and the entire 
 
100 COL JL Person, “Military Pipe Line Service: Individual and Unit History” Aug 45.  RG 498, UD 578, Box 3923, 
ADM 547 (Historical Report USA Corps of Engineers, ETO).  COL Person was the commander of the military 
pipeline service.   
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organization operated using the procedures explained in the newly published ETO SOP 47.  The 
overall pipeline system was at first broken down into three districts; a fourth was added in 
October.  By the last week of September the POL line terminated at Coubert, on the east side of 
the Seine; the entire system consisted of 654 miles of 6” and 4” pipe.  Running MPS was a 
complex endeavor that included not only the pipe and pump stations but also had truck loading 
points and QM decanting stations at a dozen of locations along its length.   
 COL Person, the commander of MPS, recorded that one of the most significant problems 
he faced during the first month of operation was the absence of any sort of communications link 
among the various elements working along the pipelines.  Fuel leaks were one of the most 
frequent and bothersome concerns, and finding and reporting them was an almost impossible 
task until an information relay could be set up between the pumping stations.  Six days after its 
creation, the MPS instituted a courier service to conduct a round-trip inspection of the line 
between Cherbourg and Paris every 24 hours and deliver messages to the control stations along 
the route.101  Another early initiative taken by COL Person was to find, gather, and centrally 
manage the limited stock of repair parts for the highly specialized machinery on the lines and at 
the dispensing stations.  After a few weeks running the line the MPS realized that much of the 
damage inflicted on the pipes occurred when Red Ball trucks accidently ran off the road.  To 
make delivery of construction material easier, the major pipeline system had been built parallel 
to, and just off the shoulder of, well-used highways.  MPS shifted pipes further away from the 
 
101 If the team found significant damage or a leak, they had to drive back to the closest pumping station upstream, 
turn off the flow of fluid, wait for the line to empty out, and then coordinate with the closest ordnance or engineer 
detachment to make the repairs.  Once fixed, someone had to return to the pump station again, turn the flow back on, 
and then inspect the repair to make sure the leak was fixed.  It was a godsend when the MPS eventually fielded 
enough radios and telephone wire to link this system together.   
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road where that made sense, and it coordinated with OCOT to move the trucks to different 
stretches of good road where that was easier.    
The 368th Engineer Regiment had arrived in the U.K. late in the Bolero deployment 
process, and it had little time to familiarize itself with the special equipment the mission 
required.102  Person’s solution to this deficiency was to create a training program in mid-October 
within each of his four districts, where technical experts taught assigned service units how to 
operate and maintain their special equipment.  This retraining program ran through early 
December and gave instruction on how to run a pump station, the intricacies associated with the 
different gauges of pipe, how to maintain pump house engines and the pipeline itself, and how to 
dispense fuel from the pipeline into a motorized or rail-based bulk tanker.  MPS also completed a 
thorough inspection of the entire line, a process that took four months to complete.  The 
inspection team discovered that the worst stretch of pipe by far was the section located in district 
one, the portion of the line that ran from Saint-Lô to Domfront (about ten miles east of Mortain).  
Construction of this first stretch of the major line had been handicapped by poorly trained 
engineers and the sense of urgency associated with extending the reach of the system at the 
height of the pursuit, which emphasized speed over quality.   
At the same time that they were learning how to maintain and operate their equipment, 
the MPS was also working with COMZ to refine the division of labor for distributing the 
theater’s bulk petroleum and standardized procedures for operating the pipeline network.  In late 
October ETOUSA’s engineers turned over decanting and dispensing duties to the Seine Base 
Section, who then passed them along to the Office of the Chief of Quartermasters at COMZ.  
The last minor crisis to hit MPS was a theater-wide shortage of pipeline repair parts that surfaced 
 
102 Ruppenthal, Vol. 1, 319, 511. 
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in October and November.  Eventually COMZ worked with ASF to have 21,000 items flown in 
from the United States to rebuild the theater stocks.  COMZ learned from their experiences 
managing the theater-wide distribution of fuel between August and October, and when SOLOC 
was transferred to Lee’s command in February 1945, Larkin’s POL team was handed a thorough 
and succinct memo that explained exactly how they would run fuel distribution in order to 
comply with the ETOUSA standard.103 In less than three pages the memo explained the specific 
duties of the three technical services involved, the responsibilities of any base section that had a 
pipeline in its territory, and a list of who was involved in the bulk fuel process on the COMZ 
staff.  Harking back to Lord’s comment from General Board 128, COMZ had finally mastered 
the theater-wide distribution of bulk POL and maintenance of a network of pipelines.  MPS 
offered an excellent model for how to create a cross-service technical organization capable of 
removing a difficult mission off the hands of the COMZ staff that was resourced with the right 
people, authority, and training to get the job done, even if the measure was taken a few months 
later than would have been optimal. 
 
 Air Transport and Resupply -- A Missed Opportunity 
Contemporaries and official historians attached to Allied headquarters tended to overstate 
the effectiveness of Allied utilization of air transport to sustain the pursuit across France in 
August and September 1944.  They mentioned the fact that there were theater-wide growing 
pains in setting up a working system and a conflict between preparing for airborne operations 
and prioritizing aerial resupply and left it at that.  But the reality was a lot worse than anyone 
 
103 COMZ HQ, “Revision of Continental ADSEC and Delta Base Section of POL Supply Procedure” 22 Feb 45.  
ETOUSA Office of the Chief of Engineers Report No. 13, POL, Appendix 11 and 15.  RG 498, UD 578, Box 3923, 
ADM 547.    
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later admitted; SHAEF and ETOUSA failed to exploit a major advantage that might have 
generated a significant improvement to the Allied logistics situation that fall.  The Allies failed to 
test and then refine the system for routine and emergency resupply by air during the months 
leading up to D-Day, delaying until mid-August a reconciliation between widespread 
expectations and reality.  As a result of planners getting a late start on working out effective 
procedures, Allied cargo aircraft would only deliver about a fifth of their maximum potential as 
subsequently demonstrated throughout the month of April 1945, when 1,200 C47s delivered over 
50,000 short tons of fuel and other critical supplies to combat formations.104  In comparison, 
something between 8,500 and 16,000 short tons of supplies was moved by air in September 
1944, and much less than this was moved in August.105  The difference in performance between 
September 1944 and April 1945 was not the result of fielding more aircraft; SHAEF and 
ETOUSA finally figured out how to get the most out of the planes they had, and they decided to 
prioritize logistics over aerial envelopment.   As with so many other critical processes, ETOUSA 
failed to establish, enforce, and practice the steps necessary to maximize an existing capability 
before trying to use them in an operational environment in France. 
This problem was compounded by institutional resistance within the Army Air Force to 
dedicate “their” transport aircraft to supporting ground combat and service organizations and 
also by SHAEF’s reluctance to prioritize sustainment over airborne maneuver during the 
breakout.  If COMZ thought they were getting poor support from USSTAF, the British felt even 
more let down.  A senior officer serving in the War Office wrote Gale on 21 September to 
apologize for the recent poor support by the R.A.F. “I am afraid the use of bombers for the 
 
104 GB Raymond Moses, LTC Pierre Kleff, LTC Herbert Gagne, “Supply and Evacuation by Air” USFET General 
Board Report 26, 1945, 38.  This performance finally approached the promised potential of 2,000 tons of supplies a 
day that logistics planners had first forecast back in June 1944.   
105 Ibid, 30. History of ETOUSA G4, RG 498, UD 578, Box 3931, ADM 553A, 64.      
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supply of 21 Army Group has been rather a fiasco….the trouble is more deep-rooted than he 
[Watson] said in his notes.  We have never found the R.A.F. are really co-operative over this 
supply by air; even for transport aircraft we find U.S. Air Force easier to deal with.”106  For 
weeks senior leaders at SHAEF swung back and forth between insisting upon a minimal level of 
aerial support to the advancing armies and allowing Brereton, the commander of the First Allied 
Airborne Army, to focus all his energies on preparing for mass airborne operations.  Whenever 
he was boxed into a corner and forced to make a hard decision to resource either airborne 
operations or logistical support, Eisenhower would always cave in support of Brereton.  By early 
September Bradley had become dismissive of the relative value of airborne drops in the midst of 
mobile operations, but Eisenhower and Montgomery did not share his convictions.     
The massive Allied air transport fleet could have provided another means to deliver 
thousands of tons of supplies to rapidly advancing units in August and September, but it took too 
long for SHAEF to maximize its potential.  Despite senior logisticians’ efforts to develop and 
distribute detailed instructions on how to make the process run, it was not until late August that 
SHAEF worked out the kinks and began to reap the benefits of their massive fleet of cargo 
aircraft.  These efforts had been retarded by the tendency of both air forces to treat cargo aircraft 
as a service asset rather than a critical combined theater resource.  This was compounded by the 
tension between two communities, the logisticians and airborne commanders, who had very 
different views on what C47s should be used to for.  Leaders from the airborne community 
wanted to conduct large-scale aerial envelopment using the newly created 1st Allied Airborne 
Army; logisticians appreciated the flexibility offered by what amounted to flying deuce and a 
 
106 Unidentifiable Officer at War Office to Gale, 21 Sep 44.  Gale Papers, Section I, Folder 3, Liddell Hart Center, 
King’s College.  The author of the letter was on a first name basis with LTG Gale, but his signature is 
unrecognizable.   
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halfs that could deliver 2,000 tons of supplies per trip right up to the front-lines.  Because the 
senior logisticians at SHAEF failed to convince Eisenhower to prioritize the resupply mission 
over airborne drops, the Allies sacrificed what was probably the easiest solution to their fuel 
crisis during the last two weeks of the pursuit, while gaining no maneuver advantage to justify 
that choice.   
SHAEF had a massive fleet of transport aircraft at its disposal during the breakout across 
France, so large a fleet that the command probably could have accomplished both mission types 
simultaneously.  When the conflict over how to use the C47s first began to emerge, the command 
did not have a good feel for how many aircraft were available across the half-a-dozen commands 
under and aligned with the AEAF or for how much tonnage they could deliver.107  On 15 August 
9th AF reported that they had 800 C47 aircraft that were not already committed to a higher 
priority mission  -- SHAEF could rely on 600 of these being available for five consecutive days 
to move 5,000 tons of supplies; in addition to the 800 planes mentioned, another 480 transports 
were earmarked for Operation Transfigure and tied up with planning, training, and rehearsals.108  
Another 425 planes were on temporary loan to AFHQ to support Operation Dragoon.109  This 
report triggered a two-week struggle to determine better planning figures and realistic tonnage 
goals for the SHAEF C47 fleet.  By 5 September First Allied Airborne Army estimated that they 
could sustain a daily strength of 1,200 operational C47s, while the RAF’s 47th Group could 
 
107 Bull and Smith initially struggled to understand the opportunity costs associated with aerial resupply and the 
impact on preparing for mass airborne operations.  Eisenhower and Brereton tended to err on the side of training, 
preparations, and rehearsals, while Bull and Smith seemed more comfortable asking the Airborne Army to 
simultaneously manage both tasks.  It took SHAEF and the AEAF too long to look beyond IX Troop Carrier 
Command for other sources of C47s and air transport (reconfigured bombers). 
108 Cable, 1st AAA to SHAEF, 15 Aug 44.  RG 331, Entry 30B (Airborne Section of the SHAEF G3), Box 148.  
Operation Transfigure was aimed at the Orleans-Paris gap and designed to cut off the German retreat in that 
direction.   
109 Ruppenthal, Vol I, 576. 
730 
 
provide another 170.110  Throughout September AEAF and USSTAF figured out how to add 180 
British heavy bombers and 150 C47s organic to the 8th and 9th AF service commands to the aerial 
resupply fleet supporting SHAEF.  Another 100 C47s remained assigned to the service 
commands in 8th and 9th Air Forces focused on supporting their parent organizations.  The 
routine training needed to maintain pilot proficiency across all of these units tied up 350 planes a 
day, leaving 1350 transports available for other missions.  The staff at 9th AF was comfortable 
planning one sortie a day, with each trip delivering up to two and a half tons, but SHAEF 
believed that two sorties daily was possible under summer weather and light conditions.111  If the 
weather allowed it, the AEAF was capable of delivering 3,375 tons daily, as long as sufficient 
airfields and service troops were available to receive the supplies. 
Actual performance in August, September, and October was woefully less effective than 
this theoretical capacity.  Delivery figures must be treated with a measure of caution, but 
regardless which set of figures one uses, the Allied performance from August to November was 
disappointing.  In the two weeks from 15 to 31 August CATOR claimed they delivered 2,800 
long tons (or 3080 short tons) from the U.K. to forward areas, climbing to 8,509 long-tons for the 
month of September.112  November marked the peak performance of aerial resupply in 1944 with 
13,145 tons distributed to the armies, despite worsening weather; the increase is attributable to 
the lack of any conflicting projected airborne operations and their associated training 
 
110 Cable, 1st AAA to SHAEF, 5 Sep 44.  RG 331, Entry 30B (Airborne Section of the SHAEF G3), Box 148. 
111 Note, Bull to Smith, 24 Aug 44.  RG 331, Entry 30B, Box 148.  Assumptions about the carrying capacity of each 
plane had been validated by CATOR on 28 July, when 211 planes employed in routine and emergency resupply 
averaged 5,000 pounds each.  
112 History of ETOUSA G4, 64.  RG 498, UD 578, Box 3931, ADM 553A.  GB Report 26, which relied primarily 
on IX Troop Carrier and ADSEC reports, claims that 28,500 long tons were moved by air, and that the ADSEC 
distributed approximately 16,000 long tons to forward units in September.  Total tonnage and passengers for 
October were almost identical to September.  By November IX Troop Carrier Command, ADSEC, and ETOUSA G-
4 tonnage delivery numbers had generally come into alignment.  Even if one uses the numbers claimed by ADSEC 
rather than the more modest claims of CATOR, the Allies still averaged less than 1,000 tons a day in September. 
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requirements.  What the Allies might have accomplished with aerial resupply in 1944 was 
demonstrated in April 1945, when OCOT took over coordination responsibilities from the 
SHAEF air staff and delivered 55,170 short tons of MT 80 east of the Rhine using a fleet of 
1,200 C47s.113  Had the Allies been capable of employing the 1,350 aircraft reportedly available 
within 9th AF in August and September 1944 with anything approaching the efficiency achieved 
in April 1945, the campaign would have come to a more successful conclusion. 
 
 Early Challenges and Unrealistic Expectations 
Why couldn’t SHAEF manage to squeeze more performance out of their C47 fleet during 
the critical three months of the breakout, pursuit, and attempt to penetrate the Rhine?  Gale had 
tried to ensure that systems were in place to govern the process before the start of Overlord, 
approving “Employment of Air Transport” on 28 April and “Movement of Store/Supplies by 
Air” a month later.114  Evidently instructions from SHAEF did not contribute to smoother 
planning and effective coordination at lower levels in the chain of command.  In their official 
history written at the end of the war, ADSEC noted that it was extremely difficult to plan aerial 
resupply with 9th Air Force before D-Day.  ADSEC formally requested information about the 9th 
AF emergency evacuation and resupply plan twice in May and June 1944, citing SHAEF 
published guidance to justify their requests for support.115  The ADSEC G4 tried to schedule a 
meeting for 6 and 7 June to discuss the issue, but neither meeting occurred.  A tentative list of 
forward emergency fields was drawn up by the ADSEC and submitted to A-4 Plans Section at 9th 
Air Force, to no effect.  The ADSEC summary of the issue ends by stating “…no detailed or 
 
113 Ibid, 64. (History of ETOUSA G4). 
114 Log of SHAEF decisions maintained by the SGS, RG 331, Entry 1, Box 7. 
115 History of the ADSEC, paragraph 23.  RG 407, Entry 427, Box 190.   
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coordinated plans appear to have been made for supply by air during the planning period.  The 
Ninth Air Force ‘Neptune’ Plan was not received by ADSEC until 26 April 1944 and did not 
include a plan for supply by air.”116     
This behavior should not have created any surprises at SHAEF and ETOUSA.  The 
authors of General Board Report 26 and Ruppenthal both emphasized that Army Air Force 
doctrine lacked any mention of routine large-scale aerial resupply support to ground forces.117  
General Board Report 26 noted:  “Field Service Regulations specify that the supply of ground 
units by air is an emergency expedient only and that routine use of troop carrier aircraft for 
supply purposes is costly and is not contemplated.”118  But based on experience in the European 
theater by the summer of 1944, planners might have concluded that air superiority reduced the 
material cost of aerial resupply, and the challenges of mobile warfare combined with heavily 
damaged transportation infrastructure demanded the maximum exploitation of this resource.  
Other Army and Air Force doctrine contributed to confusion over this issue.  FM 100-15 stated 
that air transport was critical to the resupply and sustainment of air power, while having the 
secondary purpose of delivering aerial envelopment forces.119  No mention was made of how 
transport aircraft might help ground forces.  FM 100-20, Command and Employment of Air 
Power, which was published in July 1943, also largely ignored aerial supply.  The disparity 
between Air Force doctrine and the actions directed by SHAEF and the AEAF staff must have 
caused confusion and consternation within the air units directed to support the Allied ground 
offensive in 1944.  
 
116 Ibid, paragraph 23.   
117 Ruppenthal, Vol I., 572.  “Supply and Evacuation by Air”, 1-2.  Both documents cite FM 31-40, Supply of 
Ground Units by Air, 25 May 43.   
118 “Supply and Evacuation by Air”, 2. 
119 FM 100-15, 75-76. 
733 
 
Attempts to utilize emergency air supply and evacuation during the first two months of 
Overlord exposed flaws in the system.  The official postwar study noted: “In the early stages of 
operation of supply by air, the process underwent serious growing pains and considerable 
difficulties were involved.”120  Requests for air resupply were not screened by higher 
headquarters to determine their priority, to see if alternative sources of supply existed, and to 
eliminate duplicates; coordination between the depot and sending and receiving airfields to 
arrange transportation was spotty; and emergencies often cleared themselves up before supplies 
were delivered, but the request was never cancelled.  CATOR followed up on these reported 
deficiencies and attempted to correct gaps in their procedures and unit discipline in following 
them.  Unsurprisingly, one of the hardest sources of friction to solve was the interaction between 
supporting service troops and the air units flying the missions.  The AEAF examined all of the 
support missions conducted on 28 July and concluded that loading times remained a chronic 
problem, averaging almost five hours a mission, with a worst-case outlier of seven hours.121  
ADSEC eventually worked out what they believed was the best system of control, in which  the 
army regulating stations were responsible for picking an administrative airfield to which ADSEC 
would assign one truck battalion and two service companies to unload and distribute arriving 
supplies.122  The authors of “Resupply and Evacuation by Air” claimed that most of the bugs had 
been worked out of the system before the breakout, but the reality was that coordination between 
the various commands involved and service support during loading and unloading would 
severely limit Allied performance until November 1944.   
 
120 “Supply and Evacuation by Air”, 29.   
121 Note, CATOR to SHAEF, 2 Aug 44.  RG 331, Entry 30B, Box 148, Airborne Section, SHAEF G3.  
122 Operational History of the ADSEC, ETOUSA, Aug 1945, 79.  RG 407, Entry 427, Box 190.   
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Logisticians at SHAEF had realized early in the campaign in France that the large Allied 
air transport fleet offered the potential to provide a major advantage during mobile operations.  
On 17 June SHAEF directed the AEAF to study the idea and to determine what steps would be 
necessary to expand delivery to 1,500 tons daily by D+30 and 3,000 tons by D+45.123  The staff 
at the AEAF believed that the key to reaching these expanded goals was to maintain three to six 
airfields on the continent dedicated solely to handling cargo aircraft and to allocate highly trained 
control teams to run them.  On 11 July SHAEF endorsed a plan to set up six fields in Normandy 
to handle a total of 3,000 tons daily.  Both SHAEF and the AEAF failed to realize how intensely 
this system would have to be managed if the Allies hoped to realize its full potential.  It was 
casually assumed that CATOR and COMZ could handle mission request and validation 
procedures, the coordination of ground transportation in the U.K. and France, and that the full 
and enthusiastic support of the air units involved would follow.  It seemingly dawned on no one 
to establish a mechanism to determine the relative worth of competing demands for cargo planes.  
Gale and the G-4 section at AFHQ had figured out how to manage a complex distribution 
network and adjudicate conflicting priorities in North Africa by February 1943, but neither 
AEAF nor COMZ had anyone trained in the system AFHQ employed so effectively.  The Allies 
failed to exploit the potential offered by massed air transport in August and September because 
of a lack of foresight, training, and practice before the start of the campaign. 
Despite the fact that no one had validated the procedures required to make it work, by 
early August ETOUSA and SHAEF began to plan as if large-scale aerial resupply could be 
counted on and made operational forecasts that were only reliable if air and service units held up 
their end of the bargain.  At the 5 August CAO coordination meeting LTG Lee promised to 
 
123 Ruppenthal, Vol I., 574. 
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overcome 3rd Army supply difficulties with a combination of truck companies placed in direct 
support of Patton and the delivery of 1,000 tons of supplies a day by air.124  As was generally the 
case, Lee was promising a service which he had no way of confirming was physically possible at 
the time, and he was not alone in his optimism about the level of support air transport might 
provide.  COL Whipple, the head of logistics planning at SHAEF, based a number of feasibility 
assessments upon the assumption that the AEAF would be able to move up to 2,000 tons by air 
daily.  He explained to the group assembled for the CAO meeting on 12 August that in order to 
sustain two or three corps across the Seine the Allies would need to deliver a large quantity of 
fuel by aircraft until rail service was restored or a closer port opened up.125  These projections 
ignored the fact that the Allies had not yet conducted large-scale aerial resupply while in France, 
only emergency deliveries with a few dozen aircraft, and that monthly deliveries in June and July 
amounted to only 2,850 and 4,400 tons respectively.126  SHAEF leaders tended to gloss over the 
challenges and fix on the possibilities of air transport; in their defense they thought the AEAF 
and COMZ had worked out all the details required to manage an air bridge that could move 
between 1,500 and 3,000 tons daily on a reoccurring basis.  On 12 August SHAEF decided the 
day had come to exploit this capability and announced its intention to demand 1,000 tons of lift 
from the AEAF in the near future.127   
 
 
124 CAO Meeting Notes, 5 Aug 44.  RG 331, Entry 34, Box 24. 
125 Ibid, 12 Aug 44.  Leaders at SHAEF tended to assume that airplanes could provide 500 to 1,000 tons daily with 
little strain, or 2,000 tons with a concerted effort that constrained or even eliminated other maneuver options.   
126 “Resupply and Evacuation by Air”, 29.  These numbers were based upon reports from IX Troop Carrier 
Command consolidated and published in November 1944. 
127 Ruppenthal, Vol I., 575. 
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 The Crisis 
 The first call for large-scale routine air supply came on 14 August when 12th Army Group 
asked CATOR to start daily delivery of 2,000 tons and requested that COMZ help with 
unloading and delivering the supplies once planes had landed at the designated administrative 
strips.  The difference between what had been advertised by SHAEF and what could be achieved 
by AEAF and COMZ became immediately apparent.  Combined Airborne Forces Command,  
which soon became 1st Allied Airborne Army and was the higher headquarters for IX Troop 
Carrier Command, quickly burst everyone’s bubble about what could realistically be expected in 
the near future.  Delivering 1,000 tons per day under current conditions would be difficult if not 
impossible.128  About 400 C47s had been detached to support Dragoon, 480 were tied down 
preparing for airborne operations, and around 600 were available, at least until the command 
entered a lock down period just before airborne operations.  As an alternative, Combined 
Airborne Forces recommended that SHAEF look into the possibility of reconfiguring heavy 
bombers to deliver cargo.  Eisenhower acknowledged the concerns voiced by his senior airborne 
leaders, but he directed them to prioritize aerial resupply until 25 August.  Despite repeated 
warnings about the coming demand and endorsement by Eisenhower himself, large-scale aerial 
resupply did not get started until 19 August.129       
 Based on the success of the pursuit across France and repeated delays to planned airborne 
operations, SHAEF continued to extend the window in which First Allied Airborne Army had to 
support routine supply requests.  On 24 August MG Harold Bull, the SHAEF G3, questioned the 
 
128 Cable, Combined Airborne Forces Command to SHAEF, 15 Aug 44.  RG 331, Entry 30B, SHAEF G3 Airborne 
Section, Box 148.  The organization’s response and math doesn’t make much sense.  The 600 planes that by their 
own admission were available should have be able to deliver between 1,000 and 1,500 tons a day. 
129 Ruppenthal, Vol I., 575-576.   
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aircraft availability numbers and training timeline Brereton had presented as part of his argument 
for pulling back his C47s.  Bull pointed out to the SHAEF chief of staff that the Airborne Army 
was padding the number of planes necessary to support maneuver training and lowballing the 
total number of C47s available across the various air organizations.  Bull also suggested that if 
the Airborne Army embraced the mission rather than finding excuses and if it started flying two 
sorties per aircraft when weather allowed, 1,000 tons could be delivered almost indefinitely, 
rising to 2,000 tons daily once the aircraft supporting Dragoon returned.130  Bull was stubborn 
about this issue because at the same time he was pushing his boss to get tough with Brereton, 
Moses and Bradley were pushing him to keep the airlift going in order to sustain the pursuit.  
Eisenhower and Smith agreed with Bull and Moses, at least over the next few days.  Lord told 
Brereton on 25 August that he would have to continue to allocate 200 aircraft to the sustainment 
mission indefinitely and then have to increase the number to 400 once the C47s on loan to 
NATOUSA returned from the Mediterranean, instructions reinforced by Smith the following 
day.131  SHAEF did compromise by shifting twelve heavy bombers over to the Airborne Army 
on 26 August to allow IX Carrier Command to experiment with reconfiguring them as transport 
aircraft.132 
 Eisenhower’s resolve lasted three days; on 28 August SHAEF informed all parties 
involved that aerial resupply would end the next day.133 This announcement was followed by 
two weeks of indecision, a frantic searching for alternative airlift, and SHAEF playing the 
peacemaker rather than forcing the AEAF or USSTAF to do its job and come up with workable 
 
130 Memo, Bull to Smith, 24 Aug 44, RG 33, Entry 30B, Box 148. 
131 CAO Meeting Notes, 25 Aug 44, RG 331, Entry 34, Box 24.  Order from SHAEF to 1st AAA, 25 Aug 44, RG 33, 
Entry 30B, Box 148.  Cable Smith to Brereton, 26 Aug 44, Entry 30B, Box 148.   
132 Cable, Smith to Brereton, 26 Aug 44, RG 331, Entry 30B, Box 148. 
133 Cable, SHAEF to subordinate commands, 28 Aug 44.  Entry 30B, Box 148. 
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options.  One is left with the impression that Eisenhower and his staff did not want to give 
anyone bad news, that Eisenhower tended to support the last commander to whom he had 
spoken, and that no one at SHAEF really knew how they wanted to handle tough decisions 
revolving around air support.  The debate over air resupply at the end of August and the first half 
of September exposed how inexperienced and ineffective SHAEF was when it came to 
synchronizing a joint campaign, at least when it came to integrating what could be considered an 
untraditional use of one of the services.   
 When Eisenhower sided with Brereton and released his C47s to focus on future 
operations, SHAEF was forced to search frantically for an alternative source of air transport.  
Evidently dissatisfied with the AEAF’s progress to date, on 28 August Eisenhower asked Spaatz 
to transfer all the spare C47s from 8th and 9th Service Commands and 100 heavy bombers to 
Brereton to resource aerial resupply missions; USSTAF reported that no C47s were free but 
agreed to prepare bombers for this new assignment.134  Two days later Bradley poured gas on the 
fire, reporting a supply crisis at the front that could only be alleviated by the commitment of 
more air support, triggering SHAEF to reengage USSTAF about the possibility of them 
providing at least 500 tons of lift daily.  AEAF replied that 200 B24s were already moving 200 
tons daily, all of which was currently dedicated to the relief of Paris.  The 200 odd C47s in 8th 
and 9th Service Commands were tied up moving fuel for 9th Air force.  Not only was USSTAF 
blocking its C47s from supporting Bradley, but COMZ trucks assigned to 12th Army Group were 
tied down moving cargo and personnel for 9th Air Force.  In response to repeated requests for 
help issued by SHAEF, leaders at USSTAF, 9th Air Force, and the Airborne Army managed to 
 
134 Cable, SHAEF to USSTAF, 28 Aug 44.  Entry 30B, Box 148. 
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meet their own needs while ignoring the theater combined command, and for a week Eisenhower 
allowed it to happen. 
But on 2 September the wind began to shift direction; indicators emerged that SHAEF 
was tired of all the excuses and disappointing performance of USSTAF.  SHAEF received an 
extensive enquiry into air transport and resupply that day that had originated from the Army Air 
Force, which was passed along to the Airborne Army for response.135  The timing and nature of 
the questions suggested that someone at SHAEF had complained to the AAF about the lack of 
support they were getting from their air arm.136  The next day SHAEF issued instructions that 
half of all available C47s in USSTAF and the Airborne Army would be reallocated to 
resupply.137  USSTAF dragged their feet in complying with these instructions; Lee felt 
compelled to write Crawford on 4 September asking SHAEF to engage the Airborne Army and 
force them to cooperate with his efforts to coordinate aerial resupply.138  But the mood changed 
on 5 September when a new sense of cooperation could be detected in Brereton and his staff’s 
messages back to SHAEF.  That day the Airborne Army recommended shifting two groups of 
C47s belonging to IX Troop Carrier Command from the U.K. to airfields around Paris to exploit 
better weather on the continent, and the command reported that they had 630 aircraft ready to 
 
135 Cable, AGWAR (Arnold) to SHAEF, 2 Sep 44.  RG 331, Entry 30B, Box 148.   
136 The cable called for information on the number of troop carriers being used for resupply, the percentage of 
parachute vice air landing of supplies, the role of gliders, the tactical organization employed to control these 
operations, coordination measures between the air carrier and using agencies, new techniques that had been 
developed, any deficiencies in present equipment, if current types of a/c were completely adequate; if the troop 
carrier T/O and T/E were adequate, and finally, any recommendations to improve support and meet requirements of 
a similar nature of other theaters.  
137 Cable, SHAEF to various commands, 3 Sep 44.  Entry 30B, Box 148.  This decision corresponded to the 
cancellation the day before of the operation around Tournai, which was overrun by 1st Army before the airborne 
operation was ready. 
138 Cable, Lee to Crawford, 4 Sep 44. Entry 30B, Box 148.  
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support resupply missions immediately and that 1,200 C47s and 180 heavy bombers were 
projected to be available the next day.139   
SHAEF approved the recommendation to rebase C47s around Paris, and the transfer 
occurred on 7 September.  SHAEF allocated 200 aircraft to 21st Army Group and 400 to 12th 
Army Group on 9 September and accelerated efforts to convert the B24s that had been flying 
civil affairs supplies into bulk POL carriers.140  On 12 September SHAEF slightly modified their 
distribution guidance, allocating 40% of all lift to the 2nd Tactical Air Force, which supported 
21st Army Group, and the remaining 60% to 12th Army Group and the COMZ, not including 9th 
Air Force, which would be supported by planes from its organic service command.141  A 
message sent two days earlier had reminded everyone that the good times would not last forever; 
the last day of this maximum support in the air was projected for 12 September, subsequently 
extended to 14 September.  On 13 September Gale wrote 21st Army Group informing them that 
aerial resupply to support Market Garden would include converted heavy bombers and the next 
day SHAEF confirmed that most if not all C47 support would be suspended on 15 September 
and resume only after the completion of Market Garden.142  C47s continued to provide airlift to 
the armies during the operation, but large-scale aerial resupply did not resume until 29 
September. 
During the critical phase of the Allied pursuit, which saw an advance across the Seine 
and up to the German border, aerial resupply met the bare minimum level of performance that 
 
139 Cable, 1st AAA to SHAEF, 5 Sep 44.  This was the first comprehensive roll up from the command since 15 
August, and the change in tone is remarkable.  Excuses to limit support to the logistics mission were replaced by 
great recommendations and willingness to get the job done. 
140 Cable, SHAEF to subordinate commands, 9 Sep 44.  Entry 30B, Box 148. 
141 Cable, SHAEF to subordinate commands, 12 Sep 44.   
142 Cable, Gale to 21st AG and Cable, Eisenhower to Montgomery, 13 Sep 44.  Cable, SHAEF to subordinate 
commands, 14 Sep 44.  Entry 30B, Box 148.   
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was demanded by SHAEF and nothing more.  Up until around 2 or 3 September USSTAF and 
the Airborne Army sought to provide 500 tons a day while preserving as many aircraft for other 
duties as possible.  The 12th Army Group and the logisticians at SHAEF wanted more aerial 
support, but they could not convince Smith and Eisenhower to play hardball with Brereton to 
make this happen.  After SHAEF issued clear orders to the air agencies on 3 September, support 
increased to an average of a thousand tons a day until the aircraft were released to execute 
Market Garden.  Better results were possible.  Throughout the month of April 1945 the Allies 
averaged aerial delivery of 1,680 short tons of cargo daily, but they could never reach the 
theoretical capacity of 3,000 tons that 1,200 aircraft should have been able to provide.  Had IX 
Troop Carrier Command delivered 1,500, or even just 1,000, tons of cargo daily during the two 
weeks between 20 August and 2 September, it is conceivable that at the very least Patton would 
have reached the Rhine before culminating in the face of German reinforcements.  The 
requirement to deliver 1,500 tons or more by D+35 came as no surprise to the various agencies 
involved, but the transition from small emergency deliveries to mass routine resupply proved to 
be more difficult than anyone had imagined.  It did not help that air leaders tended to consider 
C47s a service rather than a joint asset and that they viewed airborne operations as more 
important than aerial resupply.    
 Week ending 26 Aug 2 Sep 9 Sep 16 Sep 
12th AG 4185 1877 3516 3221 
21st AG 350 917 2787 3712 
Paris 0 1676 975 0 
Total 4535 4470 7278 6933 
Daily Average 648 638 1040 990 
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Table 7.11: Weekly air cargo delivery tonnage 20 Aug to 16 Sep 44143  
 
When interviewed after the war, Air Chief Marshal Robb, Leigh-Mallory’s successor at 
AEAF and later the chief of the SHAEF air staff, was extremely proud of the decision to create 
CATOR and just as proud of its accomplishments.  He did not remember, or else chose not to 
address, the growing pains the organization experienced between June and October 1944.144  In a 
similar interview, Air Chief Marshal Coningham thought two sorties a day was a reasonable goal 
for the C47 fleet, which could have realistically delivered 4,000 tons a day in August and 
September if the AEAF had done more to refine their procedures in the months prior.145  Both 
leaders correctly identified the potential offered by the large fleet of C47s when paired with 
overwhelming Allied air superiority, but they conveniently forgot how unprepared the Allies 
were to exploit that capability. CATOR was a great innovation, but unfortunately for the Allies it 
did not function as advertised when it was first called to perform in early August, and it took too 
long to work out all the kinks after everyone got onboard with the concept.  Coningham’s vision 
for aerial resupply would have been more useful if he could have convinced Montgomery and his 
staff to stop planning airborne envelopments and rather insist that SHAEF use C47s to fuel the 
pursuit into western Germany. 
 
 
143 Ruppenthal, Vol I., 581.  Ruppenthal bases his numbers on CATOR weekly reports and SHAEF G-4 files.  It is 
unclear whether these figures are in long or short tons.  Ruppenthal acknowledges moderate discrepancies among 
reported figures for all of the organizations involved. 
144 Notes from interview by Pogue with Air Chief Marshal Sir James M. Robb, 3 Feb 47.  The Supreme Command 
file, AHEC. 
145 Notes from interview with Air Chief Marshal Coningham, 14 Feb 47, 3.  The Supreme Command file, AHEC.       
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 Postwar Assessment, Post-War Conclusions 
Differences in opinion about the relative importance of air resupply continued to emerge 
after the war.  The Army Air Forces tried to underplay the role of air transport during the 
campaign in France and Germany, barely mentioning the part played by C47s in the three reports 
they prepared for the USFET General Board.  Conversely, the sustainment community 
recognized that cargo aircraft had permanently joined ships, trains, and trucks as a core element 
of the modern transportation and distribution network.  Moses understood the fundamental 
conflict presented by a plane that could deliver either maneuver forces or supplies, and did not 
pretend to have a simple solution to that dilemma.  The writing teams Moses supervised were 
committed to capturing, preserving, and passing on the hard lessons learned through almost a 
year of trial, error, and continual refinement.   
Reading the three reports prepared by the USFET air staff -- General Board Reports 54, 
55, and 56 -- which covered air power, the tactical air force, and control of tactical aircraft in the 
ETO, one would be surprised to learn that aerial resupply was a major mission for the AEAF 
during the war.  Aerial resupply is mentioned exactly once in these three documents.  In “Air 
Power in the European Theater of Operations” the authors mention that IX Troop Carrier 
Command and two RAF groups were available for emergency resupply as a secondary mission 
under the direction of the Combined Air Transport Operations Room (CATOR), which worked 
for the SHAEF G-3.146  Successes, failures, and the scope of the effort were not addressed, and 
the accomplishments of airborne operations in Neptune, Dragoon, and Market Garden are also 
 
146 BG Ralph Stearley, BG Robert M. Lee, and COL James Gehee, “Air Power in the European Theater of 
Operations”, USFET General Board Report 56, 3.  Technically CATOR answered to AEAF and then the air staff.  
Only when demands exceeded resources was CATOR authorized to go to the SHAEF G3 for prioritization guidance.  
See General Board Report 26, page 3-5.   
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absent.  It is as if the Army Air Force hoped that by ignoring the contributions to victory made 
though aerial resupply and air transportation of ground troops they might make the mission and 
force requirement disappear.  In a service obsessed with air superiority and strategic bombing, 
delivering fuel and ammunition to armored columns was not a legacy they wanted to embrace.    
Unfortunately for the Army Air Forces, General Board Report 26, “Supply and 
Evacuation by Air,” tackled the potential value and teething challenges associated with air 
transport in the European theater head-on.  The document was prepared by BG Moses and the 
USFET G-4 section, and it showed just how difficult it had been to establish a working aerial 
resupply system in Europe.  The report carefully plotted the evolution of command and control 
of air transport in the ETO from the spring of 1944 through the end of the war, capturing what 
the authors considered to be the key difficulties that had hampered effective execution.  The 
report cited nine changes to the SHAEF chain of responsibility for air and the procedures 
associated with emergency and routine air supply, and publication of three supporting directives 
including two modifications to the 12th Army Group instructions during the course of the 
campaign in France and Germany.  SHAEF hosted a major revision conference in late March 
1945, and, in early April 1945, it made the last set of changes to their standing written directives 
covering aerial resupply.147 
The report reached strong conclusions about what had hampered effective aerial resupply 
during the pursuit, stalemate, and counteroffensive phases along the French-German border.  
Breakdowns in August and September, beyond the obvious one of getting the Airborne Army to 
release aircraft, were largely caused by units failing to fulfil their responsibilities in the 
established system and by poor coordination between air transportation units and COMZ truck 
 
147 “Supply and Evacuation by Air”, 22. 
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companies, both in the U.K. and France.  Ruppenthal notes the cancellation of about half-a-
dozen resupply flights on 22 August because CATOR could not get anyone to confirm that the 
administrative landing strips were ready to receive aircraft on the continent.148  “Supply and 
Evacuation by Air” mentions widespread breakdowns in coordination between 5 and 6 
September leaving C47 crews no option but to unload their own aircraft and leave the supplies 
along the runway.149   
After about three weeks of routine large-scale aerial resupply during pursuit operations, 
12th Army proposed a series of modifications to clear up recurring sources of friction.  The 9th 
Air Force would scout, select, and man its own forward administrative airfields; 12th AG would 
inform SHAEF and COMZ which airfields would be used to handle what tonnage during a 
period of time; CATOR and COMZ would control loading in the U.K., and ADSEC would 
arrange for unloading and forward movement in France.  SHAEF approved these new 
responsibilities in a directive published on 15 September 1944.150  As air resupply became just 
another means of transportation available within the theater, 12th Army Group tried to transition 
management of the system to the COMZ.151  Because of FUSAG’s deep involvement in the 
process since first landing in France, SHAEF, CATOR, and the COMZ seemed reluctant to step 
in and take charge when that started to make sense in early August. 
In the conclusion and recommendation chapter of their report, Moses and his coauthors 
tried to ensure aerial resupply and evacuation remained as a full-fledged capability within the 
U.S. Army.  The team speculated that all future operations would call for aerial resupply and 
evacuation by dedicated air cargo units.  Sharing transports between the resupply and troop 
 
148 Ruppenthal, Vol I., 576. 
149 “Supply and Evacuation by Air”, 15. 
150 “Supply and Evacuation by Air”, 16-17. 
151 Ibid, 18. 
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delivery missions was problematic; if there were not enough C47s to adequately equip two 
distinct organizations, then the commander would be forced to make tough decisions well in 
advance and then stick to those priorities.  It was essential that everyone in theater operate from 
one well-understood SOP that worked under realistic combat conditions.  Centralized control by 
a theater regulating agency (CATOR) integrated with the theater transportation section was 
validated as the best organizational approach.  Administrative airfields were just as important as 
forward tactical airfields, and the Army needed to retain the capability to repair and operate these 
facilities on short notice.  In the end the report provided seven pages of very detailed 
conclusions, observations, and recommendations covering evacuation and supply by air and 
general theater organization and procedures.  Moses had personally witnessed the initial misuse 
of a magnificent asset, worked hard to fine-tune the coordination of, and exploitation of, that 
resource, and did not want future generations to have to live through his pain again.   
 
 British Versus US Sustainment Performance and Friction with COMZ 
Surprisingly little has been written by American historians about the sustainment 
challenges faced by Montgomery and the 21st Army Group during the six weeks from mid-
August to the end of September.  In general, U.S. leaders at the time dismissed the relatively 
smooth functioning of British logistics, pointing to the smaller size of their forces, the proximity 
and availability of a handful of Channel ports, and the shorter length of the LOC in comparison 
with that of 3rd Army.152  By early October many aspects of this argument were correct, but at 
the beginning of September both armies faced very similar challenges.  At the end of August, the 
 
152 This was perhaps driven by the 13 Oct 44 message from Eisenhower to Montgomery, which pointed out the 
superior supply situation of the British relative to 12th AG.  See Pogue, 297.  21st AG was on solid footing and faced 
a simpler challenge than the Americans by mid-October, but this had not been the case at the beginning of 
September. 
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Commonwealth had about 870,000 men on the continent compared with  1.1 million for the 
U.S.153  Only a small fraction of Allied forces were in contact with the enemy and advancing 
towards Germany; 12th Army Group probably had two to four more divisions than 21st Army 
Group if one includes flank guards.154  British supply lines were shorter at the end of August and 
then again in early October when compared with the southernmost corps of 1st Army and all of 
3rd Army.  But throughout September most of 2nd Army was at least 375 miles away from the 
RMA back at Bayeux, comparable with 1st Army and only a bit better off than 3rd Army.155  The 
driving distance from Cherbourg to Metz, Nancy, or Aachen is about 450 miles.  During the 
critical ten days when the Allied pursuit came to a halt, both Army Groups faced almost identical 
distribution challenges from their base area to the three army-level forward supply centers.   
 16 Sep 
 Corps/Divisions in Contact Distance from Base  
2nd British VIII, XII, XXX (3A/5I: 8 - 10 total div) 375 miles (Brussels) 
1st Canadian II C, I (2A/4I) (east of Seine by 1 Sep) Various, but much shorter 
1st U.S. V (3), VII (3)  400 miles (Liège) 
3rd U.S. XII (3), XX (3) XIX had dropped out 450 m (Metz) / 470 m (Nancy) 
9th U.S. VIII (3)(Brittany)  
1st AAA 18 & Br Abn (3+) 450 m (Eindhoven) 
Table 7.12: Comparative strength and distance from base area, Allied ground armies156 
 
 
153 Pogue, 542-543.   
154 VIII Corps was generally stationary near Brest and supplied through means that could not have helped forces 
pursuing the Germany Army.  Three newly arrived U.S. divisions were grounded in Normandy, and the Airborne 
Army was organizing in the UK.  The Free French Army was not yet the resource drain on the COMZ that it would 
become in the coming months.  XV Corps was largely stationary protecting Patton’s southern flank. 
155 LTC J.A.H. Carter and Major D.N. Kann, The Second World War 1939-1945, Army, Maintenance in the Field, 
Volume II: 1943-1945 (London: The War Office), 302.  Copy accessed at the Imperial War Museum, London.  The 
authors confirmed that the British line of communication in the first week of September was 380 miles from RMA 
to around Brussels.   
156 Compiled from Pogue, Blumenson, Lorraine, MacDonald (Siegfried), and Ellis Vol. 1 and 2.  Allied divisional 
strength in early September included 20 US and 17 Commonwealth formations, plus one French armored division.  
These numbers exclude 6th AG and its associated U.S. and French divisions.  See Pogue, 248. 
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 Different Measures, Different Outcomes 
Did 21st Army Group manage to overcome their distribution dilemma and avoid the 
shortages that plagued the Americans, or did they just do a better job of constructing a postwar 
narrative?  Or can one argue that the British were successful only because critical resources were 
diverted from 12th Army Group to sustain their advance in mid-September?  If the British were 
successful, on a level playing field where the Americans failed, what might explain the two 
different outcomes?  In general, 21st Army Group and its L of C command did not do anything 
radically different than COMZ or 12th Army Group; they just did it a bit more efficiently.  British 
logistical doctrine and training, combined with a two-year head-start on the Americans in the 
realm of practical experience, resulted in a more capable organization.  The British had large, 
very capable truck companies with three varieties of vehicles, and compared to the U.S. ratio of 
trucks to combat troops, more trucks per combat soldier.157  It could also be argued that the 
British Army had internalized a culture of austerity and was better able to ruthlessly prioritize 
and control what was delivered to the front lines, which was shown in the deliberate decision to 
cut back the tonnage delivered to the continent from 16,000 to between 6,000 and 7,000 tons 
during the first two weeks of September in order to free up truck companies to support the 
advance.158  British logisticians had internalized a host of lessons from the desert that impacted 
their approach to logistics in France, and 21st AG was willing to ask for and accept help from 
Gale and his key technical advisors at SHAEF.  Finally, 21st AG produced at least equal results 
 
157 The standard vehicles had a capacity of 3, 6, or 10-tons. Companies had a very flexible structure, with anywhere 
between two and five platoons, which might be uniformly equipped with one type of trucks or a mixture.  In mid-
September 21st AG controlled 140 companies while the Americans had about double that number, but in the 
aggregate a GT company had about twice the number of trucks.  Excluding 7th Army, 12th AG was already larger 
than 21st AG by this point.   
158 COL H.W. Wilson, The Second World War 1939-1945 Army Administrative Planning (London: The War Office, 
1952), 162, 62, 157.  Carter and Kann, 285-286, 300, 308.  Both volumes consulted at the Imperial War Museum, 
London.     
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while getting almost none of the Allied rail capacity and very little of the air transport capacity 
until around 10 September. 
Despite a number of advantages that helped them prevent logistical challenges from 
dictating the pace of operations, the British ran out of momentum between 5 and 10 September, 
but this was for reasons different from those that stopped the U.S. Army.  Montgomery 
voluntarily halted along the Albert Canal in order to build up supplies and prepare his forces for 
Market Garden, an operation approved on 10 September and initiated a week later.  Patton and 
Hodges limped to the Moselle and Belgian-German border between 5 and 11 September with 
only a fraction of their available combat strength, having lost a number of days of potential 
progress waiting for the delivery of fuel.  Unlike the U.S. Army, 21st Army had recovered its 
logistical footing by early October while simultaneously closing up combat formations left 
behind during the pursuit and amassing a stockpile of artillery ammunition for the next major 
operation.  The recovery of the British army was simplified with the reduction of the length of 
the line of communications afforded by the opening of Dieppe and Ostend, but this advantage 
did not play a meaningful role until early October.   
In most cases, both militaries used similar steps to prepare for and then extend the reach 
of their advance across France.  Both grounded some portions of their combat forces to help the 
others advance.  Both released trucks from replacement depots and found additional drivers to 
man them.  More truck companies were rushed to the continent, air transport was pressed into 
service to deliver “routine” mass supply, and specialized vehicles were rerolled to haul material 
to the front.  New command and coordination organizations were established and positioned to 
synchronize the requisition and delivery system.  The U.K. and U.S. commands did a remarkable 
job restoring the infrastructure behind the advancing armies and worked to get trains back in 
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service and carrying a major portion of the supply burden.  The methods and techniques 
employed by the two nations to accelerate the delivery of supplies were almost identical.     
But the British took a number of mitigating steps earlier than the Americans, and even a 
few the U.S. never tried.  An overall manpower crunch hit the British military before Overlord 
even began, driving them to disband the Marine and three infantry divisions in order to properly 
resource the line of communications command for 21st Army Group.159  It would be hard to 
imagine the United States standing down four divisions to generate 100,000 men for the ASF, 
but the U.K. War Office understood the criticality of having the correct proportion of service to 
combat troops.  Even these drastic measures were not enough to meet all service troop 
requirements, and the British were forced to ask the U.S. for help manning their assault landing 
craft and for direct support from 1st Army engineer units.  More men were discharged from the 
Army to help build, emplace, and operate the Mulberry, and when this produced insufficient 
manpower, Irish labor was hired to cover the shortfall.  The United Kingdom was forced to make 
hard choices to generate enough support forces for Overlord, but they did what they believed was 
necessary.  The U.S. never had to make such tough decisions concerning the allocation of 
manpower, but ferocious political battles did occur among Lee’s SOS, ETOUSA, and the War 
Department over the service troop basis for the invasion of France. 
The British also had an advantage in that almost half of the truck companies supporting 
21st AG by early August consisted of 6- or 10-ton heavy trucks, the balance consisting of 3-ton 
lorries.  Over 5,000 of these heavy trucks were available to the British Army by 1 June, and the 
 
159 Interview by Pogue of LTG Fredrick Morgan, 8 Feb 47.  The Supreme Command background and notes files, 
AHEC. 
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21st AG motor transport estimate was based on having 1,064 6-ton and 728 ten-ton trucks.160  In 
addition, British companies were generally larger than their American counterparts, with 
anywhere from two to five platoons of 30 trucks each, or 60 to 150 versus 48 vehicles assigned, 
and two men were assigned to each vehicle in the standard tables of organization.161  SHAEF 
estimated that by D+90 21st AG would have 426 3-ton platoon equivalents ashore with a lift 
capacity of 18,000 tons under normal loads, or 36,000 tons under emergency conditions.162  
About half of this truck capacity would be tied down by port clearance, static operations, support 
to forward units, and ship-to-shore ferry runs (driving DUKWs rather than lorries), but this still 
left about 9,000 tons of long-haul capacity with a one-way range of at least 200 miles every 
twenty four hours.163 
One of the most radical adjustments made by the British that was designed to extend their 
operational reach was the decision to cut back shipments into Normandy from 16,000 to about 
7,000 tons per day during the first two weeks of September, releasing half of those trucks to 
support the line of communications.  Both armies tried to mitigate the scope of the logistics 
challenge by leaving behind non-essential units and prioritizing fuel and transportation for the 
advanced guard, but the British did so proactively, while the U.S. tended to do so only after 
confronted by a setback.  The impact of other advantages benefiting the British but not available 
 
160 There is a SHAEF G-4 progress report from 22 April that implies 21st AG would have, or might have access to, 
3,200 3-ton and 1770 10-ton trucks by 1 June.  A SHAEF G-4 staff study of the anticipated 21st AG motor transport 
situation by D+90 shows authorizations for only 1064 medium and 728 heavy trucks.   
161 COL D.W. Boileau, The Second World War 1939-1945, Army, Supplies and Transport, Volume II (London: The 
War Office, 1954), tables of organization appendix.  Consulted at the Imperial War Museum, London.  Each platoon 
had 30 trucks and 50 enlisted men.  Gale confirmed that a British GT company had the same carrying capacity as 2.5 
U.S. companies – see his diary entry for 2 Sep 44, Gale Papers, Section II, Entries 14-25, Liddell Hart Center, 
King’s College.  
162 Based upon an 80% ORR and 3 ton hauling capacity per truck.  By attaching a trailer and authorizing 
overloading, capacity increased to 6 tons.  The chief logistics planner at 21st AG confirmed that 140 GT companies 
were under their control in mid-September.  
163 As we will see below, the British took creative measures to free up GT companies from their DUKW and port 
clearance missions, releasing about half of those platoons to support the pursuit in August and September. 
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to 12th AG and ETOUSA are harder to gauge, but there seemed to be a closer and more positive 
relationship between the logisticians and the maneuver commanders, and British systems seemed 
to function under the most trying conditions while American procedures collapsed.  The 21st AG 
had mastered the techniques required to sustain mobile operations, transitioning very smoothly 
from the static conditions around Caen to the exploitation in the direction of Falaise and finally 
to the headlong chase across northern France.  The British faced the same communications and 
transportation difficulties bedeviling the U.S., but their relationships and procedures could 
handle the friction, while the American system sputtered in late August and September and 
collapsed in early October.  The balance of this section will examine the British system in detail 
and explain how and why that happened.                  
 
 Logistics During the Lodgment Phase 
The U.S. and U.K. sustainment experiences during the static portion of the campaign in 
Normandy were very similar.  Like the U.S. 1st Army, the British 2nd Army built the support plan 
and controlled all units involved in the logistics mission during the first fourteen to seventeen 
days of the campaign, which included forecasting and issuing all common use items required by 
the RAF and RN ashore.164  All common use supplies, petrol, oil and lubricants, ammunition, 
equipment, labor, and services for the RAF would be provided by RA service forces; unique 
equipment, aircraft, and spares would be delivered by air transport.165  Planners at 21st AG 
assumed rail would be of little practical assistance until D+90, meaning that motor transport 
 
164 “The Administrative History of the Operations of 21st AG on the Continent of Europe, 6 Jun 44 – 8 May 45,” 
(British Army of the Rhine, November 1945), 5.  Copy found in RG 407, Entry 427.   
165 Ibid, 6.  The British military had decided that the RAF did not require its own ground-based service force in the 
tactical combat area. 
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would have to suffice to reach the Seine and perhaps the Somme.  Headquarters, 11 L of C Area 
command, with HQ 4 L of C sub area and HQ 10 Garrison under its control, would work directly 
for 2nd Army until HQ L of C and the forward command post of 21st AG arrived between D+17 
and D+20.166  A small advanced section of the transportation section from 21st AG headquarters 
landed with 2nd Army and supported HQ 11th L of C Area and then HQ L of C until the 21st AG 
main command post arrived on the continent.167  This allowed the section to supervise the 
expansion of the distribution network and exert tight control over all means of transportation 
from the first days of the campaign.     
One area where the British system was projected to operate in a very different manner 
than the U.S. system was in the provision of repair parts, or spares, and replacement vehicles.  It 
also helps illustrate how technical issues that seemed minor could have a major impact on the 
success or failure of a complex system.  Each brigade group landed in Normandy with a small 
reserve of repair parts that had been selected based on historical consumption figures compiled 
from North Africa and Italy.168  These packs were designed to last for 30 days, but for Normandy 
the British counted on them for only fifteen.  After D+26 the British system would transition to 
bundles of repair parts, one configured for an armored and a second for an infantry division, each 
with all the spares necessary to support battalion and regimental repair shops.  These pre-built 
push packages were called “beach maintenance packs,” and 2nd Army wanted a two-week 
reserve for every division ashore by D+41.169  Units would surrender unserviceable vehicles for 
a replacement on the spot during the first 40  days of operations; battalion and regimental shops 
would then make minor repairs and return the vehicles to the reissue lot, or they would turn 
 
166 Ibid, 5. 
167 Ibid, 14. 
168 Ibid, 18. 
169 Ibid, 6.  These provided parts for battalion and regimental repair shops. 
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seriously damaged vehicles over to higher-echelon Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineer 
(REME) units for more extensive work.  After D+100, standard maintenance packs, designed to 
support a corps, would become the basic unit of supply for repair parts.  All of these standard 
brigade, division, and corps push-packages depended on the quality of historical consumption 
data from years of combat in a wide variety of operating environments, supplemented by a 
speedy request-and-delivery mechanism to cover outliers.  A lack of complaints is not concrete 
proof, but 21st AG seemed to avoid the wholesale breakdown of their truck fleet that plagued the 
Americans in October.      
The development of the British lodgment area and its associated transportation networks 
proceeded as planned leading up to the breakthrough at the end of July.  The Rear Maintenance 
Area (RMA) was established around Bayeux by 2nd British Army in accordance with the first 
key plan developed before the campaign.  A few small trains linked various ports with the 
general area of Bayeux by 4 July, and a few days later air transport began making special 
deliveries into the lodgment.170  In the first month ashore the British landed only 75% of their 
tonnage goal, but only ammunition shortages had any effect on the campaign.  Field artillery 
requirements were underestimated while tanks and anti-aircraft artillery were over-resourced; the 
easy fix was a slight modification of the delivery programs and some improvements in 
downloading and distribution techniques.  Because of the effective repair and replacement 
system that had established during these early weeks, British vehicle readiness rates in 
operational units remained high despite significant losses to combat.171  Bulk POL was unloaded 
 
170 Ibid, 11.   
171 Ibid, 12. 
755 
 
at Port en Bessin and the minor pipeline connected the port to Blary, Isigny, and Coulombs 
before the end of July, making fuel distribution an easy task.172   
The British tried to ensure that logistical command and control arrangements were set 
prior to the breakout and pursuit, activating a boundary behind 2nd Army on 23 July, and 
moving the 21st AG Rear HQ to Vaucelles (just west of Bayeux) on 11 August.  As the Allied 
advance to the east picked up steam in mid-August, the War Office offered to take over 
responsibility for the RMA and 21st AG rear area and to supervise the recovery of excess 
material from France, either to reintroduce on the continent through a Channel port or to put 
back in the general reserve in the U.K.  Gale handled the request, passed along to him by 21st 
AG, by ignoring it for two weeks and then declining the offer.173  Gale was also worried when 
Montgomery and Bradley resisted the activation of a theater communications zone; in the case of 
21st Army Group Gale was able to get his way by 23 July, but he had no such luck with the 
Americans.   After running the idea past Gale on 6 July, Lord recommended the activation of an 
ADSEC/COMZ area to Eisenhower on 13 July.  Bradley was against this idea, and, in the 
interest of showing unity, Lee supported his position, while Gale, Crawford, and Lord thought it 
was well past time to turn the rear area over to the experts.174  On 20 July Gale wrote in his diary 
“It is always difficult to get an L of C going when an Army has been tinkering about with it 
before the arrival of the expert L of C staff and in this case it is doubly difficult as the area is so 
limited and the staff are falling over each other.”175  Bradley’s foot dragging would cause Plank 
 
172 Ibid, 14. 
173 Gale to War Office, 16, 29 Aug 44, D.O. Letters GEN Gale, Gale Papers, Section I, Folder 3, File No. 2, Liddell 
Hart Center, King’s College.  Gale believed that War Office management of the rear area in France during the first 
two years of World War One had been a major mistake that he would not allow to happen again.   
174 Official War Diary, 6, 13 Jul 33, Gale Papers, Section II, Folders 14-25, Liddell Hart Center, King’s College.   
175 Ibid, 20 Jul 44.   
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and then Lee no end of trouble, but 21st Army Group seemed to have avoided passing along a 
mess to their L of C command. 
 
 The Pursuit Across France and Belgium 
Senior leaders in 21st AG had quickly realized that the U.S. breakthrough at Saint-Lô 
would likely dislodge the entire German line, and they reacted appropriately.  Like the 
Americans, they accelerated the deployment of truck units already in the pipeline, receiving six 
new GT companies by 1 August.  The logistics planner at 21st Army Group, COL Oliver Poole, 
published a series of evolving estimates in mid-August that painted a picture of how the next 
phase of the campaign might unfold, anticipating a rapid bounce across the Seine and deep into 
Belgium.  Poole recommended that Graham resist the impulse to establish any intermediate 
depots, waiting instead until a few Channel ports were open to then establish a new RMA around 
Rotterdam-Brussels.176  To help solve the transportation dilemma that this concept created, the 
logistics staff at 21st AG, working with their counterparts at the War Office, decided to cut the 
daily flow of supplies across Mulberry B and into the Bayeux area by a little more than half 
starting in early September.177  Fourteen days of reserves were already ashore by then, and the 
 
176 COL Oliver Poole for MG Graham, “Operations Across the Seine” 17 Aug 44, WO 171/146 Q Plans, National 
Archives, Kew, U.K.  Poole for Graham, “Admin Appreciation” 21 Aug 44, WO 205/671 Overlord Maintenance 
Appreciation G (Plans) 21 AG, National Archives, Kew.  Poole recommended the British use coastal shipping into 
Dieppe and then Le Havre and other Channel Ports until Rotterdam was open.  Rail might help a bit, but motor 
transport would have to cover most of the load between the RMA and Brussels.  Poole went on to say that if all the 
GT companies were massed to work on the LoC, the advance could be adequately supported until closer ports came 
on line.   
177 Cartier and Kann, 300.  Official War Diary Entry, 1 Sep 44, WO 171/720 Q Branch, L of C, 21st AG, National 
Archives, Kew.  WO 171/148, War Diary for 21st AG Q (Movement) July and August 1944, National Archives, 
Kew.  The British had been slowly cutting back imports to the continent since late July, from a high of 19,000 tons 
daily to an average of 13,000 during the period 19 to 28 August.  Cartier and Kann state that the decision to cut 
imports in half was made on 30 August and took a few days to take effect.  After 2 September deliveries dropped 
dramatically, with 4,662 tons unloaded on 3 September and 1,525 tons the next day.  The average for the next five 
days was 3,750 tons a day until deliveries began to climb again on 9 September.  Mulberry B never handled more 
than 10,000 tons a day after 1 September, as the British diverted ships to Dieppe and Ostend starting in mid-
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command decided it was comfortable living hand-to-mouth for the next few weeks.  Cutting 
imports freed eight DUKW companies that could be reequipped as GT units, allowing about half 
of the port discharge and static platoons to be added to the line of communications pool, the 
equivalent of adding twenty 3-ton truck companies to the army group.178 
In the end the decision to cut imports through Bayeux led to the British living off reserve 
stocks for about two weeks.179  The first British cargo ships docked at Dieppe on 17 September, 
and the port was handling 6,000 tons a day by 20 September, while Ostend was routinely 
receiving between 6,000-7,000 tons by 28 September.  The Americans never voluntarily cut back 
imports, continuing to pour supplies ashore at Cherbourg from early August to the end of 
November.  This decision resulted in a massive backlog of unloaded ships and tied down a lot of 
resources in the Normandy Base Section that might have been employed on the Red Ball or used 
to reinforce the ADSEC and help with final delivery to the armies.  It also created a supply dump 
around Cherbourg of such massive proportions that the scale overwhelmed COMZ’s ability to 
catalogue and store it for easy recovery.  It became so difficult to find some items in NBS that it 
was easier to download specific requests from a ship, where you could trust the manifest, than to 
sort through the mountains of boxes at the depots scattered across Normandy.  In hindsight, most 
British analysts realized how beneficial the self-imposed restriction on imports was in 
simplifying 21st Army Group’s sustainment and transportation challenge.  
 
September.  By 1 September the 21st AG daily requirement to sustain operations around Brussels was 15,000 tons 
per day.     
178 Administrative History of the Operations of 21st AG, 47.  SHAEF G-4 study of RASC transport requirements of 
21st AG by D+90, 5 Jun 44, reprinted as Appendix E and F in Wilson’s Administrative Planning. 
179 Tonnage reaching 2nd Army in early September hovered between 5,500 and 6,500 tons daily, much better than 
the situation faced by 1st and 3rd Armies to the south.  Daily tonnage deliveries by means of transportation, WO 
171/231 HQ 2nd Army Rear Q Branch 1944 (Oct-Nov), National Archives, Kew. 
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Like the Americans, the British began to run out of options to keep things moving in the 
first week of September.  By late August GT truck companies were traveling 200 miles from the 
RMA to army roadheads; the last 50 miles to the FMAs and combat divisions were covered by 
eight 3-ton company equivalents working for 1st Canadian Army and thirty-nine companies 
(combined this accounted for about 34% of the total British truck fleet) supporting 2nd Army.180  
All the remaining resources, especially the 6- and 10-ton platoons, were centrally pooled and 
controlled by the transportation section of the army group staff.  The entire pool of spare 3-ton 
trucks, numbering 1,700 vehicles, were released and pushed to operating companies on 1 
September to increase the size of the operational fleet.181  Like their American counterparts, the 
British found that moving information across the rear area was as difficult as overcoming 
transportation shortages.  It did not help matters when 21st AG was directed to assign three truck 
companies, to include one of the 6-ton variety, to the COMZ for what would eventually become 
a month, from 6 August to 4 September.182  The British were also directed to provide a DUKW 
company for six weeks at Utah beach around the same time.183  The 2nd Army lunge from the 
Somme to beyond the Albert Canal was only possible because Montgomery decided to ground 
one corps and concentrate on supplying the other two.184 
The British had a backup plan, if required, to establish an advanced base in the Dieppe-
Rouen-Le Havre area, but the rapid rate of advance combined with sufficient lift capacity drove 
 
180 Administrative History of the Operations of 21st AG, 39.   
181 Ibid, 34. 
182 Ibid, 46.  The original directive was for two companies for eight days.  21st AG records indicate four companies 
were assigned to the COMZ (one 10-, two 6-, and one 3-ton companies) that were supposed to be return between 2 
and 4 September.  See “Employment of Tpt and Labour” 1 Sep 44 HQ L of C, BLA, WO 171/720 Q Branch, L of C, 
21 AG, National Archives, Kew.     
183 DUKW and trucks were operated by the same drivers in both armies.  If not manning DUKWs at Utah, the 
British could have moved these personnel over to drive lorries between Caen and the front.   
184 Administrative History of the Operations of 21st AG, 34. 
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the British to hold off until one of the major Dutch ports could be opened.185  Like the 
Americans, the British thought themselves unbalanced by a logistical crisis from 5 to 17 
September that lingered at differing levels of intensity depending upon who one asked.186  By 
this stage of the campaign, the British trucks were covering between 350 to 400 miles between 
the RMA at Bayeux to stock 2nd Army dumps along the Dutch-Belgian border.187  By mid-
September 21st Army Group needed 4,000 tons of fuel and 11,700 tons of other supplies to meet 
its daily requirements; on top of this, British officials wanted an additional 8,000 tons delivered 
daily to establish reserves around Brussels. 188   The 1st Canadian Army estimated it would 
eventually need 29,000 tons of artillery ammunition for Operation Infatuate (to clear the 
approaches to Antwerp), and they wanted 8,000 on hand before starting combat.189  Port intake 
limitations and transportation shortages restricted daily deliveries to between 14,500 and 16,200 
tons, and Montgomery adjusted accordingly. 
The British realized they were entering a decisive stage of the campaign on 4 September 
and began to take steps to try to sustain the momentum of the advance.  Montgomery was acutely 
aware of the strain on his sustainment system, which triggered his string of cables to Eisenhower 
 
185 Ibid, 34.   
186 Ibid, 35.  Gale’s Diary from 31 August to 23 September.  Gale believed SHAEF and 21st Army Group had turned 
the corner by 23 September, but 21st AG remained convinced that they were not getting sufficient deliveries up to 
the front until around 7 October.  In the end, 21st Army Group “solved” their internal concerns about supply by 
cancelling 2nd Army’s attack towards Köln in order to focus on clearing the approaches to Antwerp.  See WO 
171/146 Q Plans entries from 24 September to 6 October 1944.   
187 Admittedly this was for only a portion of 21st AG, but the forward most three corps were generally as far away 
from their supply base in Normandy as their U.S. equivalents in 1st and 3rd Army, a fact many American historians 
tend to gloss over.   
188  Administrative History of the Operations of 21st AG, 48.  War Diary for 21 AG Q (Movements), entries from 
August and September, WO 171/148, National Archives, Kew.  The best detailed treatment of 21st Army Group 
requirements were presented in the Administrative Appreciation sent from BG Feilden (the DQMG) to MG Graham 
on 30 Sep 44, WO 171/146 Q Plans.  By 30 September British requirements had climbed to 15,700 tons to meet 
daily consumption and 8,000 tons for reserve stocks at the front; the two armies accounted for 13,700 of the daily 
maintenance requirement.   
189 Poole captured the Canadian ammunition requirements after a meeting with Brigadier Walford, the army’s chief 
of logistics, conducted on 19 Sep 44.  See WO 171/146 Q Plans.       
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during the first third of September.  On 7 September he laid out a gloomy forecast for 
Eisenhower, stating: “My maintenance is stretched to the limit”; he pointed out problems with 
rail, air, and motorized transportation deliveries and the length of his line of communications.190  
Montgomery explained in his cable that 21st AG would only be capable of reaching the Ruhr 
once a major Channel port was open, the army group had been reinforced by 2,500 trucks (about 
25 British companies or a 20% increase to his current strength), and he could count on 1,000 tons 
daily arriving by air.  He suspected that SHAEF could only resource perhaps one or two armies 
so extravagantly and obviously felt that the British 2nd Army had the mettle and terrain to 
constitute the main effort.  Without the use of a nearby port these requirements would be even 
larger. 
Despite an array of obstacles, the logisticians of 21st AG did everything within their 
power to keep the offensive going.  Step one was to address problems with long-range 
communications that were hindering control of the transportation network.  HQ 12th L of C 
relieved 11th L of C on 3 September, allowing the more experienced command to displace to 
Amiens and closely monitor the northern portion of the rear area.  On 9 September unbroken rail 
service between the RMA and British ferry sites on the west side of the Seine was established, 
which accelerated deliveries, but it also made detailed coordination among the trains, trucks, 
ferries, and service troops working the chain more critical than ever.  The solution was to create 
a temporary organization, TRANSCO, that was pulled from 21st AG headquarters to work 
alongside 11th L of C Area at Amiens. 191  Together the two organizations would closely manage 
 
190 Cable Montgomery to Eisenhower (M-175), 7 Sep 44, copy in Gale Papers I/5, Cables Received and Dispatched, 
Liddell Hart Center, King’s College.  Montgomery was following up to an early message he sent to Eisenhower on 4 
September.  Pogue, 253-254, 291.  Graham was sending the same message to Gale from 31 August through 10 
September, see Gale’s official war diary.       
191 Admin History of 21 AG, 36. 
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all road and rail traffic and synchronize cross-loading activities associated with getting material 
over the Seine.192  On 22 September the British finished their first bridge over the lower Seine 
speeding up turnaround times for trains and simplifying the command and control process.  
Another small advantage that helped 21st AG manage logistics more efficiently was that, unlike 
the Americans, the British used a multi-day requisition cycle, with each consolidated request 
projecting five days of requirements submitted five days prior to execution.  This gave 
logisticians time to hunt down requested supplies and confer with subordination organizations 
about substitutions if those items were not immediately available, cutting down on the delivery 
of material no one had asked for.  
 
 
Figure 7.9: 21st AG L of C, 1 Oct 44 
 
192 Like the Americans, the British discovered it was easier to conduct distinct operations on both sides of the river 
until more bridges over the Seine were repaired.  Trucks and rail delivered to the west bank, where ferries or trucks 
would shuttle to the east bank.  On the far side material was loaded on new trucks and rail cars for delivery to the 
front.   
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21st Army Group also took measures to find more trucks, more GT companies, and 
increase the hauling capacity of the equipment they already had.  At the beginning of the month 
nine anti-aircraft platoons were disbanded to provide additional truck drivers and heavy 10-ton 
trucks were issued a 5-ton trailer, increasing haul capacity by 50%.  The British convinced 
SHAEF to release the four GT companies on loan to the COMZ on 1 September, and they took 
delivery of an additional 154 800-gallon POL trucks around the same time.193  After SHAEF 
decided to restart air resupply, 21st AG received 1,900 tons during the period from 2 to 9 
September and another 2,200 tons the following week, including 2,308 tons of MT80 between 5 
and 10 September.194  After spending the first half of September shuttling tanks across France, 
the M19 fleet was reassigned to haul supplies on 14 September, moving 22,500 tons of supplies 
over the next eight weeks.195  Once Market Garden was approved Montgomery was promised 
four truck companies to support the two U.S. airborne divisions and a new express delivery, 
called Red Lion, to deliver 500 tons of fuel on a daily basis.  After a bit of friction with the 
COMZ, the last four (of nine total) companies arrived on 20 September and the first Red Lion 
deliveries left Cherbourg on 15 September.196  In mid-September 21st AG requested an additional 
 
193 Admin History of 21 AG, 47.  This equated to four U.S. 750-gallon POL companies.  These trucks could move 
500 tons of fuel from Bayeux to the front every 2-3 days.  This equated to the daily consumption of one mechanized 
corps with three divisions.  
194 Ibid, 36, 48. 
195 Ibid, 37. 
196 The number of U.S. truck companies working for the British during Market Garden, and their associated 
timelines, are a matter of disagreement among various sources.  All told, nine U.S. truck companies provided direct 
support to 21st AG, consisting of the organic company from the 101st, four companies put at the disposal of the 
British, and four companies assigned to the Red Lion route.  This was noted in the daily logs of the Q Branch 
(Movements) at HQ, L of C, 21st AG in their entry for 16 September.  See WO 171/721, National Archives, Kew.  
On 19 September the vehicle train for the 101st Airborne moved by road from Omaha to Bourg Leopold to tie in 
with the British resupply effort in Holland. 
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seventeen GT companies from the War Office, and by 3 October the units were operating on the 
continent. 
By mid-September the frustration felt by Montgomery and the staff of 21st Army Group 
with a perceived lack of support from COMZ had reached a boiling point.  A few minor issues 
very quickly escalated to the point where Montgomery engaged SHAEF to secure better support 
from Lee’s organization.  Official histories from the time do not address why 21st Army Group 
seemed to have such a short temper with COMZ, but delays in transferring truck and rail assets 
from U.S. to British control caused three nasty exchanges in as many days in the middle of the 
month.  Based upon the narrative from the official history of the ETOUSA G-4, it seemed as if 
Stratton was more concerned with defending his organization than identifying and fixing the 
problems reported to SHAEF.  Three incidents are noteworthy because they illustrated how 
difficult it was for the COMZ to synchronize logistical support for any new major operation and 
how precarious was the hold that COMZ had over the resources nominally under their control. 
A confrontation between the transportation team at 21st Army Group and their 
counterparts at SHAEF and ETOUSA had been building since late August. “Railway Power and 
Stock,” published on 1 September 1944 was based on the promise from SHAEF that 21st AG 
would receive priority for locomotives and rolling stock, that COMZ would comply with the 
transfer timeline from 3 to 12 September, and that this plan would allow the Army Group to 
move 5,000 tons a day from the RMA to the west bank of the Seine by mid-month.  “Rail 
Development, British Zone,” sent to SHAEF on 16 September, illustrated the distance between 
the plan and the reality confronting the British two weeks later.  COMZ had come nowhere close 
to sticking to the transfer timeline, and they had fallen 1,000 cars behind the goal of 3,300 to be 
surrendered by 12 September.  As a result, 21st AG was moving only 2,500 tons by rail a day 
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between the RMA and the transfer point at the Seine, or half the stated goal, with the balance 
being covered by long-haul motor transport.  Reports of this mix-up had reached the highest 
levels of command in 21st Army Group by 12 September, leading to the fireworks between 
Montgomery and Gale over the coming weeks.         
The last straw that caused the open break between 21st AG and COMZ was the 
agreement, captured in a directive issued by SHAEF on 13 September, which ordered COMZ to 
support the buildup for Market Garden by establishing a new express route, Red Lion, to deliver 
1,000 tons a day earmarked for participating forces.197  Less than 24 hours after the order was 
issued, SHAEF received a complaint from 21st Army Group that COMZ was ignoring the 
directive to provide four truck companies to support XVIII Airborne Corps.  In response, 
Stratton informed SHAEF that he was still awaiting detailed instructions on where the companies 
were needed and what dumps the 82nd and 101st divisions would draw their supplies from in 
Belgium.198  More problematically, Stratton complained that COMZ had not been briefed on or 
included in the planning for Market Garden and therefore could not make logical assumptions 
about how to support participating American formations.  Evidently Lord had not gotten word of 
the results of the 12 September meeting at 21st AG headquarters to Stratton in the subsequent 24 
 
197 Official War Diary, 12 Sep 44, Gale Papers, II/14-25, Liddell Hart Center, King’s College.  W.B. Smith visited 
21st AG HQ on 12 September and took Gale and Lord to work out exactly how to support the operation that 
Eisenhower and Montgomery had agreed to on 10 September.  The scale (1,000 tons daily) and means of delivery 
(eight or nine US truck companies) were not worked out until that afternoon.  Gale recorded his frustration with 
Graham, who did not know exactly what he wanted or needed from SHAEF and COMZ, leaving Gale and Lord to 
fill in the details.  
198 “History of the ETOUSA G-4”, 23.  The history concludes that after a short investigation, the G-4 discovered that 
a British officer, COL Oliver Poole, in the 21st AG Q section was supposed to have coordinated COMZ support to 
MG and had never done so.  Poole visited XVIII ABC at Moore Park on 12 September and passed his 
recommendations along to Graham that same day.  Graham responded to Poole, telling he would work out the 
details he had suggested in three days at the Friday CAO meeting.  See “Trip Report” 12 Sep 44, Poole to DQMG 
WO 171 / 146 Q Plans.  Major Wetzler, the ordnance liaison officer from XVIII ABC reached COMZ on 15 
September and gathered enough information from 21st AG to coordinate the details associated with resupplying the 
two airborne divisions.  Major Curtis Kimball, another liaison officer from the U.S. ABC, was attached to 2nd Army 
on 14 September to work the same issue.  See “On Operation Market” 9 Oct 44, Kimball to CG, XVIII Corps, WO 
171/231 HQ 2nd Army Rear Q Branch Oct-Nov 44.  
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hours, and XVIII ABC had not passed along the decisions reached with Poole during his visit to 
their headquarters, also on 12 September.  The idea that the COMZ G-4 knew next to nothing 
about Market Garden on 13 September, three days before its projected starting date and despite 
two high-level meetings on the subject, revealed the problems with internal communication in 
the organization.  It was unrealistic for 21st AG to expect execution of the sustainment plan the 
day after the details were worked out, but Stratton and COMZ should have been aware of the 
general concept by the afternoon of 13 September at the latest. 
The next day was not a good one for Stratton or the COMZ; that afternoon another 
complaint was lodged by 21st Army Group, this time over problems with initiating the Red Lion 
express route.  After a bit of digging, the G-4 was told by the Omaha district commander that he 
had talked to his British counterpart earlier, who had asked the Americans to hold off a few days 
until they were ready to integrate the four new companies into their convoys.199  Regardless what 
really happened, a second report of COMZ incompetence or intransigence bounced around 
between 21st AG and SHAEF that afternoon.  The problem was quickly fixed when the ETOUSA 
G-4 section coordinated directly with 21st AG, but by then the relationship between 21st AG and 
COMZ was poisonous.200  The final issue that Stratton felt compelled to capture in writing was a 
report that COMZ was holding on to rolling stock they had been ordered to turn over to the 
 
199 Admin History of 21 AG, 24.  Major Kimball, the US liaison officer at 2nd Army, believed the suspense for the 
arrival of U.S. service troops to support the two airborne divisions was 19 September and that the first ground 
convoy needed to reach the division support areas by 22 September.  It is entirely possible that the British logistics 
command had not figured out how to fold Red Lion into their overall transportation plan, or that officers were 
confusing the plan and timelines associated with direct support of XVIII ABC as opposed to the daily delivery of 
500 tons of fuel Eisenhower had promised Montgomery on 10 September.  Once again, it seemed unrealistic to 
demand that a plan that had only been worked out on 12 September would be running smoothly by 14 September.   
200 Gale records in his war diary that Montgomery grew increasingly frustrated with SHAEF and COMZ between 10 
and 21 September, blaming the failure of his push to reach the Rhine on poor logistical support from both 
commands.  Montgomery was correct that COMZ delay in transferring rolling stock on schedule had a major 
negative impact on his logistical situation by mid-September, but his complaints about motor support were unfair.  
Regardless, by 21 September the log staff at 21st AG were no longer interested in coordinating with, much less 
cooperating with, COMZ and SHAEF.     
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British.  This report was sent to SHAEF on 16 September; without providing any details, the 
ETOUSA G-4 history stated that upon further digging the information was determined to be 
incorrect.  In this particular incident Stratton might have been correct, but this ignored the 
disastrous failure by COMZ over the last two weeks to comply with the transfer order issued by 
SHAEF on 1 September.201  Friction of this nature was common under stressful conditions 
throughout the war, both between US and British organizations, and between combat and support 
echelons.  The fact that 21st AG felt compelled to lodge a formal complaint with SHAEF rather 
than just fix the gap in communications behind the scenes and that Stratton was so concerned 
about getting his rebuttal into an official document seems a bit odd.  Both parties shared some 
blame in these mix-ups, and the fact that fairly routine failures to coordinate were still happening 
two months into the campaign strongly suggested that all was not going well with sustainment at 
the theater-level.    
Despite the initial friction associated with getting Red Lion started, the mission proved to 
be a success story for ETOUSA once it was up and running.  Reacting to the order issued by 
SHAEF on 13 September, COMZ switched out veteran truck companies from the Red Ball with 
provisional companies recently created by stripping personnel from the 26th, 94th, and 106th 
infantry divisions.202  The eight companies tasked with running Red Lion were assigned to 
Normandy Base section and provided service to 21st AG from 16 September to 12 October, 
 
201 “Railway Power and Stock” 1 Sep 44, WO 171 / 148 War Diary for 21st AG Q (Movements) Aug to Dec 44.  
“Rail Developments, British Zone,” memo from BG MacKillop to Appleton, 16 Sep 44, WO 171 / 148.  MacKillop 
was the DQMG for Movement at 21st AG and Appleton was the director of military railroads for SHAEF.  By 16 
September COMZ was 1,000 cars (33% of those directed) behind in its transfer schedule to the British. 
202 “History of TS, ETOUSA, 1942-1945”, 15.  RG 498, UD 1210, Box 5981.  “History of ETOUSA G-4”, 25.  
General Thrasher, the commander of Oise Base Section ended up getting most of the 35 provisional truck companies 
manned by infantrymen, artillerymen, and anti-aircraft gunners from the three infantry divisions and separate AAA 
units.    Not surprisingly, Thrasher noted the high discipline and excellent performance of these provisional 
companies.  It was not because they were combat arms soldiers, but complete units with a functional chain of 
command.  In contrast, about a third of the QM truck companies were filled with drivers that Ross and Lee had 
scrounged up from across COMZ.    
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moving supplies for the two U.S. airborne divisions and fulfilling a pledge given by SHAEF that 
COMZ would deliver 500 tons of POL daily to sustain Market Garden. 203  Red Lion delivered 
an average of 651 tons a day during the operation, and, on the peak day of 20 September, 246 
trucks delivered 1,644 tons of supplies to dumps around Brussels.204  The route used was 306 
miles long, running from the RMA at Bayeux to the 2nd Army forward depots around Brussels.  
This month-long surge provided concrete proof of what COMZ and OCOT could accomplish 
when focused and challenged by SHAEF.  It also demonstrated the utmost limit of what eight 
truck companies may have been able to accomplish if given a similar focused mission in support 
of 3rd Army between mid-August and mid-September.  Despite the level of support provided by 
the Red Lion operation, friction between 21st AG and COMZ reached its peak intensity by the 
time Market Garden was winding down.  Graham continued to complain to Gale that COMZ had 
failed to adequately support the two airborne divisions, although the crux of the problem seemed 
to be a breakdown in communication and not a shortage of resources.205  The detailed after-
action report submitted by Major Kimball on 9 October seemed to confirm that interpretation.  
Kimball struggled to identify the best location from which to perform his duties, moving from 
2nd Army to First Allied Airborne Army to ETOUSA in the course of eight days.  Kimball 
concluded that logistical challenges in the corps were almost inevitable because of the 
complexity associated with trying to blend two national systems, insufficient long-distance 
communications equipment, and ignorance of and ill-discipline in following procedure within the 
two U.S. divisions.  Kimball was very appreciative of the support he and his command received 
 
203 “History of the ETOUSA G-4”, 52.  RG 498, UD 578, Box 3931, ADM 553A and B. 
204 “History of the ETOUSA G-4”, 52. “History of TS, ETOUSA, 1942-1945”, 15.  RG 498, UD 1210, Box 5981.   
205 Cable, Gale to Graham, 22 Sep 44, Gale Papers, I/5 Cables Received and Dispatched, Liddell Hart Center, King’s 
College. 
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from COMZ during the operation, once everyone had figured out how to effectively coordinate 
with one another.206   
Regardless of coordination problems with COMZ, the various British expedients to 
generate additional distribution tonnage directly contributed to the success of the advance in 
early September.  These measures allowed 2nd Army to reach the Dutch-Belgian border while 1st 
Canadian Army simultaneously seized two or three of the Channel ports, while at the same time 
the Army Group was able to amass the supplies and forces necessary to launch Market Garden.  
These successes were achieved despite the distraction presented by the need to use 800 6- and 
10-ton heavy lorries on a four-day mission to bring up bridging material from the RMA to east of 
Brussels and the discovery that 1,400 of the Austin 3-ton lorries had defective engines and would 
have to be withdrawn.207  But when Market Garden failed to secure a bridgehead on the far side 
of the Rhine, 21st AG reached the conclusion that it could not logistically support the two 
operational objectives Montgomery was pressing for.  Between 24 and 30 September COL Poole 
sent three appraisals designed to illustrate the impossibility of starting two army-level attacks on 
7 October, the objective date given by the operations staff.208  It had become obvious that 21st 
AG could no longer accomplish all of Montgomery’s goals and needed to make hard choices or 
else find new solutions to the logistical challenges faced by the command. 
 
206 Kimball, “On Operation Market”, 5, WO 171 / 231 HQ 2nd Army Rear Q Branch, National Archives, Kew. 
207 Admin History of 21 AG, 37, 47. 
208 WO 171 / 146 Q Plans.  Documents and war diary entries between 14 and 30 September.  On 14 September 
Poole published his transportation estimate, laying out what was required to move five corps across the Rhine.  On 
19 and 24 September he visited 1st CAN AR headquarters to confer with General Walford, the MGA, about his 
requirements for Infatuate.  On 24, 27, and 30 September sent an escalating series of notes trying to point out that 
the logistical challenge associated with launch two simultaneous attacks was impossible, recommending the AG 
focus on supporting 1st CAN Army.  On 30 September his immediate superior, BG Feilden, laid out how to 
distribute supplies if 2nd Army’s advance on Köln was given top billing, which was covered in more detail in an 
outline published on 3 October.  It is this information that leaked out of 21st AG and alerted SHAEF that 
Montgomery was ignoring instructions to focus on Antwerp.  Under the concept advanced on 30 September, 1st 
CAN AR would receive only half of what it thought necessary to clear the approaches to the port. 
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 Recovering from the Period of Frantic Supply 
 
Figure 7.10: Expansion of the 21st AG L of C operating area, Jun to Oct 44209 
 
In the end, the immediate solution was to prioritize 1st Canadian Army for supplies, 
cutting 2nd Army back to reduced, defensive scales.  But almost simultaneously, increased 
discharge rates at British-controlled Channel ports and rising rail capacity solved the crunch that 
had emerged at the end of September.  By the beginning of October about half of the army 
group’s supply requirements were flowing through Dieppe and Ostend (including  100% of the 
requirements for 1st CAN AR) with the other 8,000 tons still coming from Normandy, but much 
 
209 Carter and Kann, Maintenance in the Field, Volume II: 1943-1945. 
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of the distance was being covered by trains rather than trucks.210  Direct rail travel across the 
Seine resumed on 22 September, but shortages of rolling stock, engines, and coal remained acute 
well into October.211  Opened on 28 September, Ostend provided bulk POL discharge a quarter 
of the distance away compared with the terminus of the Minor System back in Normandy.  On 7 
and 8 October 2nd Army acknowledged receipt of 8,445 and 7,040 tons respectively, with 90% of 
the weight handled by trains and the balance traveling by a mix of truck and plane.212  The 
official administrative history of 21st Army Group proudly notes that there was no maintenance 
or ammunition crisis at any point from August to October.213  The British pointed out only two 
problem areas that hampered operations in the last quarter of 1944: a shortage of M19 or M25 
tank transporters in October and a minor tire crisis that emerged in December that grounded four 
GT companies.214  By 10 October SHAEF had an accurate appreciation of the relative logistical 
conditions between 21st and 12th Army Groups – supplying the British was no longer an item of 
concern.  “We are having very considerable worries at the present time and while the 21st AG 
situation… [is] fairly satisfactory…[the] U.S. picture is highly unsatisfactory owing to: naval 
difficulties in cleaning up Le Havre and Rouen and the delay in capture of Antwerp.  The railway 
situation, however, on both sides shows a steady improvement.”215    
 
210 About 2,300 tons of 2nd AR’s 7,700 would be carried by truck while 3,600 tons of 1st CAN AR’s 4,700 would be 
carried by truck because of the much shorter distance from ports to dumps.  21 AGp/5553/5/Q (Maint) 2, 2 Oct 44, 
WO 171/ 671 Overlord Maintenance Appreciation G (Plans), Rear HQ, 21 AG, B.L.A. 
211 Admin History of 21 AG, 44. 
212 HQ 2nd Army Rear Q Branch War Diary, 7 and 8 Oct 44, WO 171 / 231. Receipts for 3 and 4 October were 
comparable.  1 and 2 October receipts were 6,368 and 5,480.  The aggregate supply situation for fuel, rations, and 
ammunition in 2nd AR on 1 October was excellent, with receipts far outstripping issues and at least five days of 
reserve on hand.  Doubtlessly there were very specific items of concern, but at the army level the command was in 
good shape.   
213Admin History of 21 AG, 50. 
214 Ibid, 67.  There were insufficient transporters to move replacement and reserve tanks from the RMA at 
Normandy up to the new base east of Brussels.  This had no impact on tank strength within operational units or 
projected operations that fall.   
215 Gale to General Thomas S. Riddell-Webster (the QMG of the British Army), 10 Oct 44, Gale Papers, I/3, 
Sec/CAO/5, File No. 2, 1 Aug 44 – 15 Jan 45, Liddell Hart Center, King’s College. 
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Even if administrative tasks generally ran more smoothly at 21st Army Group, the 
command still had its share of problems.  The strength of the relationship between Gale and 
Graham allowed both men to be honest with one another, and Graham was not afraid to ask for 
help when he needed it.  Both men were in constant communication, talking at least daily during 
the logistics crisis of early September, and Gale and his key subordinates were frequent visitors 
at the various Army Group command nodes.  Gale noted on 16 September that Brigadier 
McKillop, the movement and transportation chief at 21st AG, was emerging as a weak link, an 
assessment that Graham seconded.216  Gale recorded that the perfect man for the job was Rhe 
Philipe, who was still at AFHQ; an immediate solution was to send technical experts from 
SHAEF to help MacKillop sort out his problems.  For the next couple of weeks MG Napier and 
COL Appleton, the American rail expert on the SHAEF staff, spent as much time at 21st Army 
Group as they did at Versailles.217  At a meeting on 21 September at 21st AG headquarters, 
Montgomery tried to pin his logistical problems on Gale in front of Eisenhower, but neither 
officer accepted the criticism; Montgomery’s recent operational failure could not be blamed on a 
lack of supplies or transportation.  Gale did admit that the U.S. sustainment status as managed by 
COMZ was a mystery to both SHAEF and 12th Army Group, but he said that this had no 
immediate impact on the British army group.218  Over the next few days Gale reached the 
conclusion that no headquarters really knew what was going on in the realm of logistics at the 
required level of detail because of poor communications and management practice, and he 
believed that reality on the ground was probably better than most senior officers suspected.219  
 
216 Gale’s Official War Diary, 16 Sep 44, II/14-25.  On 20 September Graham admitted to Gale that the army 
group’s management of its rail assets was a mess.  
217 Gale’s Official War Diary, 20, 21, 24, and 26 Sep and 1 Oct 44.  Gale and Napier visited the British Army Group 
almost daily during the last ten days of September, and Appleton stayed at 21st AG from 26 September to 1 October.   
218 Gale’s War Diary, 21 Sep 44.   
219 Gale’s War Diary, 22 and 23 Sep 44. 
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Another bit of good news arrived on 24 September, when the War Office agreed to replace 
MacKillop with Wansbrough-Jones, of whom Gale thought highly, while Napier and Appleton 
suggested that they had found a suitable officer to act as the director of military rail for 21st 
AG.220 The combination of new men, constant help from the experts assigned at SHAEF, and 
rising numbers of engines and cars helped 21st AG work out its rail transportation problem by 
early October, the direct result of honest communication between Graham and Gale and of the 
moral courage to quickly sack a brigadier general when he did not perform up to his duty.   
It was all the more painful then when General Nye, during a visit in France, accused Gale 
of allowing bad relations to fester between the British officers at SHAEF and those serving in the 
War Office and at 21st AG.221  Over the last four weeks Gale and his senior assistants at SHAEF 
had done everything within their power to help 21st AG overcome its transportation problems, 
replace weak leaders in key positions, and force COMZ to fulfill its promises and duties.  Nye’s 
accusation stung Gale deeply, driving him to report the incident, in separate letters, to both LTG 
Morgan and Smith.  One constantly reads about the grumbling among the Americans about how 
Eisenhower was too generous with his British counterparts, but there is almost nothing about 
similar infighting among senior officers in the British Army.  It is obvious from reading Gale’s 
official war diary and Poole’s notes to his superiors preserved in the 21st Army Group records 
that similar friction existed among British logisticians, but these divisions did not make it into 
the wider historical record in comparison with the infighting among Americans.  Regardless of 
any legitimate accusations of friction throughout the British officer corps, Gale’s and Graham’s 
professionalism and open communication, shared by their immediate subordinates, were one of 
 
220 Ibid, 24 September.  The military rank of Wansbrough-Jones and Bell, the rail man, were not mentioned. 
221 Gale’s War Diary, 29 Sep 44.   
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the major reasons 21st Army Group so quickly overcame its owns logistical crisis in the second 
half of September.      
 In hindsight the British Army thought that 21st Army Group entered the campaign in 
France well equipped to manage large-scale logistics in a complex and changing environment.  
The second half of the administrative history of the 21st Army Group transitions from a 
chronological narrative to a collection of lessons learned and recommendations broken down 
among the various services and subordinate organizations.  This section opens by stating that the 
campaign in Europe “confirmed that the established principles on which administration is based 
were sound,” but this was so only because they had been properly nested within an environment 
where flexibility and the ability to make sudden adjustments was valued.222  Furthermore, 
operations in 1944 “confirmed what had already been learned in the Desert and in other 
campaigns in this war that the previous system of maintenance was no longer applicable.”223  
Specifically, routine delivery of material based exclusively on historical consumption data, 
within a structure managed semi-autonomously by each service, was a recipe for disaster.  The 
first campaign in France and operations in the Mediterranean had driven home the need for 
different categories of consumption forecasts that accounted for the variation introduced by 
different types of operations, weather, and climate.  The expenditure of ammunition, fuel, and 
engineer and ordnance stores (repair parts) changed drastically if one was executing a deliberate 
attack, pursuit, active defense, or rear area duties, and planning data had to be accurate for each 
condition.  Second, the best organization for combat -- combined arms formations – tended to 
scramble the branches together without necessarily ensuring that their logistical support units 
 
222 Admin History of 21 AG, 142. 
223 Ibid, 142-143.  The previous system of maintenance referred to here was the one used in France in 1918 and 
attempted in 1939/1940 and early during the Desert War. 
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were transferred as well.224  To account for these two major variables (radical variations in 
consumption rates based on external factors and the superiority of combined-arms 
organizations), the British had learned to maintain a wide variety of supplies and equipment in 
small quantities in the corps Field Maintenance Center (FMC).  These FMCs, outfitted with 
organic transportation, were designed to sustain the corps through two to four days of combat 
even if communication to the rear was cut or the line of communications was disrupted by enemy 
action, and bridge the time-gap until the push system could adjust to a radical change in 
projected requirements.   
Operations during the pursuit and build up along the Rhine also validated the decision to 
centralize coordination for logistics under a general staff, rather than delegating the function to 
the technical service sections.  The administrative history of the 21st Army Group included the 
observation that “One of the most important lessons of the campaign was the vital necessity for 
the staff to exercise the closest control on the movement of material and equipment…. The 
allocation and control of transport and the major stores requirements are the responsibility of Q 
(Maint)…. The campaign established beyond all measure of doubt that all road transport must be 
regarded as a pool.”225  The British had faced the exact same problems seen by the U.S. Army in 
France during the Great War, come to similar conclusions on how to fix them, and had largely 
perfected its logistical systems before Overlord.  Technical service sections and special staff 
officers were vital, but their activities would be directed and synchronized by Q Maintenance 
and Q Movements, supervised by a powerful MG-Admin with control over the entire 
 
224 Meaning that a battalion, and in most cases regiments, tended to consist almost exclusively of one type of 
company rather than the mix that proved most effective in combat.  Therefore, a REME repair unit assigned or 
attached to a tank brigade was likely to only have tank mechanics and repair parts.  This was problematic when the 
division command reorganized his brigades to create balanced, combined-arms formations and did not similarly 
address the logistical side of the equation.     
225 Admin History of 21 AG, 143. 
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administrative apparatus and easy access to the commander and the maneuver portion of the 
staff.  The British did not have their version of a MG Frank Ross with his office of strong 
subordinates who were constantly at odds with BG Stratton and the ETOUSA G-4 section.  Not 
only had British practice established that Q Maintenance was in charge of driving the system, but 
everyone knew and acknowledged it, and the British Army had worked out the systems to make 
it function under a wide range of combat conditions.  Just as the requisition process was centrally 
managed by the G-4 (MGA), transportation was massed and synchronized within the same 
section.  Staff nodes positioned themselves alongside operational and subordinate staffs to plan 
and direct these activities, as noted in the example of TRANSCO and 11th LoC Area at Amiens 
in September.  The British and the Americans were trying to use the same concepts, but the 
difference was that 21st Army Group had a system in place that could handle the challenges 
presented by mobile warfare while the COMZ did not. 
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Figure 7.11: Organization of the 21st AG L of C as of 31 Dec 44226 
 
British superiority in administrative planning and management seemed to boil down to 
making more accurate and flexible consumption estimates, maintaining short-term reserves at the 
corps level, and having hands-on control by experienced, senior logisticians at the army group 
and joint-combined headquarters.  The British Army had learned how to be a bit more efficient 
after three years of mechanized combat in the desert, and they had figured out how to make 
economies of scale work in their favor in France, cutting down from a gross division of 65,000 to 
40,000.227  The official history of administrative planning in the British Army during the war 
 
226 Appendix J1, Administrative History of Operations of the 21st Army Group. 
227 Wilson, Administrative Planning, 62, 160.  The U.K. term “gross division” referred to the total number of men 
required in the field per combat division.  In France the number was 40,000, or 16,000 in the division plus 24,000 in 
the corps, army, army group, L of C, and RAF elements on the continent.  In France each gross division needed 675 
tons of supplies a day, with 520 tons required beyond the army railhead.  The number for Torch was 65,000, driven 
by the need to cover for initial U.S. deficiencies in service troops and strong air and navy continents in the forward 
area.   
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notes a major difference in national methodology: U.S. logisticians tended to over ensure, thus 
filling the sustainment pipeline with more material than could be unloaded and pushed forward; 
but in the sphere of improvisation, the Americans were brilliant, if they did not always count the 
cost.228  COL Wilson, the author of the volume on administrative planning who served in the 
office of the Quartermaster General in London during the war thought that the “British 
administrative planners [were better] prepared to look a year ahead than their American 
counterparts, and usually get more support from their commanders and general staff when doing 
so.”229   
Not only were senior British logisticians better at setting conditions for operational 
success (or better able to communicate limitations and influence the behavior of their 
commanders), but there is very little mention of infighting within 21st Army Group or between 
the army group and SHAEF.  We know there were breakdowns among the administrative staff at 
21st Army group and that there was friction between them and their counterparts at SHAEF and 
COMZ, but these issues generally stayed out of the historical record.  One reason for this was the 
small output of published material from the British War Office and Army immediately after the 
war.  In contrast to the British approach, the USFET General Board Reports, the Green Books, 
and a flood of memoirs written by American generals covered disagreements and shortfalls in 
extreme detail, often assigning blame to an individual or organization.  British experts cited in 
U.S. accounts provided muted feedback, generally taking the high road and keeping any friction 
and criticism that had emerged during the war to themselves.  In their accounts, the British never 
seem to blame their logisticians or COMZ for the halt along the Albert Canal on 5 September 
 
228 Ibid, 64. 
229 Ibid, 65. 
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and the failure of Market-Garden, emphasizing instead the argument between Montgomery and 
Eisenhower about how to run the ground campaign.   
The British had their share of logistical challenges in September, but after Market Garden 
Montgomery had a strong motive to cover up his prioritization of 2nd Army at the expense of 
Operation Infatuate.  Eisenhower was similarly motivated to dismiss British logistical successes 
by minimizing the scope of the problem and underplaying the ruthless prioritization and effective 
control exhibited by 21st Army Group, which made COMZ look bad in contrast.  Despite the 
very real challenges faced by 21st Army group during the second half of September, the official 
administrative history of 21st AG accurately pointed out that offensive operations continued in 
September and October, that the overall British logistical situation was very positive by early 
October, and that only two minor shortages impacted the British campaign that fall.  There is no 
historical record of conflict between fighting and sustaining generals, either during or 
immediately after the war.230  This is because the logisticians within 21st Army Group, ably 
assisted by Gale and his team, very quickly overcame the transportation crunch that limited 
British options in late September, and those same officers were not outsiders but valued 
members of the same organization.  The administrative staff at 21st Army Group and the L of C 
commands within its structure were under the complete control of one commander, responding to 
his priorities appropriately.  There was no “us versus them” within 21st Army Group, and the 
minor friction that emerged between Graham and Gale in September was quickly resolved and 
forgotten in the official record after the war.    
 
230 Gale’s War Diary mentioned cases were Montgomery had lost faith in Graham, and Gale had his own doubts 
about Graham, both in North Africa and France.  Gale took steps to have two brigadiers relieved for professional 
incompetence.  These opinions and actions were not recorded in any official histories published by the U.K.  
Nowhere in these histories are there references to outright arguments between the L of C command and the main 
staff within 21st Army Group, or a failure of the L of C to do its duty.   
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 Conclusion 
 The U.S. drive across France broke down in early September because the COMZ staff 
could not deliver enough fuel.  There were more than enough cargo planes and trucks to have 
done so, but COMZ did not know how to harness the incredible resources at their disposal.  Lee 
and his senior subordinates at ETOUSA struggled to overcome the transportation crisis experts 
had projected would emerge in that period of time when motorized forces were driving deep into 
the enemy rear before rail service could be restored.  This failure to execute was COMZ’s alone, 
but blame for other complicating factors was shared across the entire Allied operational chain of 
command.  SHAEF might have made different decisions that could have eased the obstacles 
faced by the logisticians, or it might have developed more insightful and better resourced plans.  
Various commanders and their staffs might have demonstrated improved technical competence 
and flexibility, or they might have started working on the continent sooner than early August, 
gaining practical experience and refining systems before the crisis hit.  In the end, the ability to 
blast through friction and accomplish tactical tasks can trump bad organization, planning, and 
mistakes beyond one’s control; but poor execution can also transform the best prepared concepts 
into abject failures in the field.  It surprised almost no one that some of the most critical 
capabilities required of ETOUSA during periods of mobile warfare were the ability to control 
massed motor transport, move bulk fuel over continental distances, supplement the primary 
transportation network with large-scale aerial resupply, and coordinate the interaction among air, 
rail, and motor delivery assets.  Sufficient resources existed to have accomplished more in 
August and early September, but COMZ and SHAEF did not have the technical skills and 
processes to do so.  That a greater level of efficiency was possible was demonstrated by the 
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accomplishments of 21st Army Group during the same time period, and by ETOUSA itself in the 
spring of 1945.    
COMZ realized too late that their routine, push-based system largely controlled them, 
rather than the command controlling exactly what was shifted to the front.  This resulted in the 
delivery of thousands of tons of non-critical supplies at the same time that the cutting edge of the 
Allied force ran out of fuel, ammunition, and replacement weapons.  Repeatedly the ETOUSA 
plan called for a technical staff section or single-capability service unit to solve what was a 
multi-echelon and multi-skill set problem.  Because COMZ lacked any standing mixed-service 
organizations below the base section level, long-haul motor transport, aerial resupply, and POL 
pipelines were less effective and efficient than they might have been.  COMZ built a system in 
the U.K. that demanded that they exercise centralized control over the base sections and 
technical services, and then they failed to provide that supervision once in France.  
Unaccustomed to and unequipped to fill that void, the OCOT, Motor Transport Brigade, 
CATOR, and Military Pipeline Service struggled to accomplish their missions during the pursuit.  
Eventually each one of these organizations learned how to do its job, or it was replaced by 
someone that could, but these changes came too late to maintain Bradley’s momentum.  That 
these shortcomings still existed almost two years after the United States had initiated theater-
level ground combat against the Germans might be perplexing to some. 
 The contrast between the U.S. and U.K. experience in confronting and overcoming the 
transportation crisis of September provides some insight as to what weaknesses still existed at 
COMZ.  In almost every case, it was not a case of the British demonstrating great originality but 
a case of the effectiveness of the measures taken, both in driving subsequent actions by 
subordinate headquarters and in fixing fundamental problems.  The only British advantages that 
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SHAEF and ETOUSA could not or would not duplicate were the integration of the L of C 
command under the authority of the army group and the higher concentration of well-trained 
light, medium, and heavy truck platoons relative to the number of combat divisions.  
Montgomery was more attuned to the limitations imposed by logistics and operated accordingly, 
driving his staff to develop proactive solutions and listening to the recommendations of his 
sustainment experts.  The 21st Army Group weathered the difficulties imposed by the rush across 
Belgium, managed to stitch together one last major offensive designed to get across the Rhine, 
and then consigned themselves to resourcing 1st Canadian Army’s bid to clear the Scheldt at the 
expense of one more push by 2nd Army.  Before the end of the first week in October 21st Army 
Group had completely recovered its logistical equilibrium while simultaneously preparing for a 
major offensive to the northwest.  This was the result of good staff work and impressive 
performances by the support units charged with opening new ports, restoring rail service, and 
maintaining and maximizing the value of the truck fleet until those other resources could fill the 
gap.  In the end, the superior ability of 21st Army Group to manage this tough period was largely 
attributable to two extra years of practical experience and to the infusion of experienced officers 
Montgomery brought along with him when he moved from 8th Army back to the U.K., a change 
replicated at SHAEF by Eisenhower and Gale, but largely missing in ETOUSA and FUSAG.  
And by August 1944, FUSAG had two months’ combat experience under the tutelage of 21st 
Army Group, while COMZ had focused on running Reverse Bolero.     
 It is important to acknowledge that providing a few extra hundred tons of fuel to 12th 
Army Group at the end of August was not a silver bullet for winning the war early.  The delivery 
of more fuel to Patton and Hodges might have exposed or produced some other supply or 
transportation shortfall.  A quicker U.S. advance in August might have triggered the Germans to 
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react faster or to send larger reinforcements to the Rhine.  It does not require a leap of fantasy to 
imagine a scenario where an overextended American corps was obliterated on the wrong side of 
the Moselle or Rhine River.  Decisions based upon the risk-reward calculus of all of these 
potential developments would have fallen on maneuver commanders at a couple of echelons, but 
more fuel at the front in the last week of August would not have automatically translated to 
earlier penetration of the Westwall and the reduction or elimination of the industrial potential of 
the Ruhr and Saar.  But getting through the Westwall sooner would have presented more options 
for the tactical and operational commanders trying to maintain pressure on the Germans that fall.  
COMZ showed that they did not have the technical skills and procedures to quickly identify and 
solve what would have proven to be the “crisis of the moment,” fully understanding that, once 
the current crisis was solved, a new crisis would have emerged behind it. 
 The lack of finesse demonstrated by COMZ during its first two months of operation 
under combat conditions is not surprising, even if its complete unpreparedness to function 
effectively was.  Lee and his organization struggled to transition from the skill set that had 
proven essential to executing Bolero to that called for by Overlord.  Despite concrete examples 
available from the study of AFHQ, NATOUSA, and the British Army over years of combat, 
COMZ proved incapable of taking over as an operational headquarters in early August, and had 
prepared no alternative organization capable of bridging the gap.  By May 1944 COMZ had a 
good general understanding of the key tasks associated with the theater sustainment concept, just 
not a detailed plan as to how it would synchronize the activities of a dozen base sections and 
technical service sections under mobile conditions.  Lee had not created current and future 
operations cells capable of synchronizing his base sections and special staff elements.  In this 
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vacuum, the U.S. sustainment system slowly ground to a halt by early October 1944, forcing 
SHAEF to step in and take over the last fundamental mission left to COMZ.
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Chapter 8 - Conclusion 
This project began as an examination of the decision made by the Western Allies to 
attempt to destroy the rail network of France and the Low Countries prior to the landing in, and 
break out from, Normandy.  It seemed odd that the United States and the United Kingdom put so 
much effort into bombing a means of transportation that would eventually be critical for them to 
have available in the later stages of the campaign.  This resulted in an entirely predictable, and 
perhaps avoidable, logistical crisis at the end of August and early September that eliminated any 
chance of defeating Germany in 1944 or early 1945.  Those results begged a series of questions.  
Did SHAEF realize the opportunity cost associated with the transportation plan, and was the 
issue openly debated?  Once committed to disabling the rail network, what did the logisticians do 
to mitigate its impact on the coming campaign?  But those questions led to a deeper and more 
intractable puzzle.  Late in the summer of 1944, a group of what one would assume to be 
experienced Allied leaders and organizations failed to match their operational goals to the 
logistical means at their disposal; and the official histories, General Board reports, and memoirs 
could not agree why that had been the case or what modifications might have produced a more 
favorable result.  Faulty organization among the senior headquarters on the continent factored 
into each narrative; but nailing down exactly what mistakes were made and what might have 
worked better seemed to elude the various commentators.  Something was wrong with the 
relationships among SHAEF, ETOUSA/COMZ, and the first two army groups operating on the 
continent, but there was no agreement on the particulars.  Regardless of why it happened, the 
breakdown suggested a second question: How had the Allies possibly made it to September 1944 
without figuring out how to organize and run a combined, joint campaign in a theater of war?  
By this point in the war, the British had four years of experience with expeditionary warfare in a 
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number of theaters; the U.S. Army two.  Why had these lessons and techniques not migrated 
over to the team in charge of Overlord? 
An initial effort designed to answer this second cluster of questions suggested that a 
series of loosely-structured comparisons might be helpful, and they did provide a number of 
fresh insights.  First, the operational military experience of the United States was very different 
from the journey taken that of the U.K.  By examining the different tactical and operational 
experiences, two national approaches to extracting and sharing lessons learned, and resulting 
organizational and procedural changes, began to give some clarity.  The different evolutionary 
paths that those national approaches encouraged are clear in the Allied preparation for and 
execution of Torch and what was both the same and different during Overlord.  AFHQ and 
SHAEF were very different entities, but they had similar operational problems; NATOUSA and 
ETOUSA (and their SOS/COMZs) shared many of the same challenges during the early months 
of their existence.  Third, relationships among the top-tier headquarters and their subordinate 
service commands mattered.  Almost no decision was made in a vacuum by one echelon of the 
chain of command and successful execution always required the cooperation of up to a half-a-
dozen large organizations.  Ground combat commands played similar roles in complicating life 
for the theater logisticians and joint-combined headquarters in both North Africa and western 
France.  The 1st British Army, II U.S. Corps, and 18th Army Group each ran things their way, 
complicating the lives of Gale, Hughes, and Larkin.  Similarly, FUSAG, 21st Army Group, and 
12th Army Group managed sustainment in a way that created a number of extremely difficult 
obstacles for COMZ and SHAEF from August to early November.   Examining how these three 
sets of headquarters interacted with one another in two similar campaigns lets new cracks in the 
accepted narrative emerge.  The final piece of the puzzle draws on a deep understanding of the 
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history of ETOUSA, both of the U.S. Army theater headquarters and its three functional 
components, especially its SOS under the command of J.C.H. Lee.  During the first few months 
of its existence, ETOUSA was consumed with the task of launching and sustaining Torch, and in 
its last six months in the U.K. it was dominated by Overlord.  But the middle twelve months 
centered around two equally demanding and only partly reinforcing activities – planning 
Roundup and executing Bolero.  The lack of attention to the operational history of ETOUSA and 
its SOS likely derived in part from the lack of well-organized records for either command.   
It should come as no surprise that the U.S. Army had no idea how to conduct 
expeditionary joint campaigns as of the fall of 1942, but what is puzzling is the uneven learning 
that occurred during the next two years of the war in Europe and Africa.  This varying rate of 
development came directly from the poor dissemination of higher-level and technical lessons 
learned, techniques, and organizational refinements extracted from active theaters.  ETOUSA 
and Lee’s SOS gained almost no practical benefit – even as late as August 1944 – from the 
eighteen months of combat experience amassed by NATOUSA and Larkin’s SOS.   Conversely, 
Bradley’s FUSAG and 12th AG staff were much better positioned to supervise U.S. operational-
level sustainment and to account for the limitations that logistics imposed on maneuver options 
between June and mid-August.  Finally, the British Army was even further down the path of 
learning than the U.S. Army, largely because of their two-year head start in the war but also 
because of their long history of launching expeditionary campaigns.  By early August 1944 the 
top tier of Allied headquarters with a critical role in Overlord had vastly different levels of 
experience and varying levels of competence within the several functional cells of their own 
organizations.  At the start, only 21st Army Group had a fully developed capability to fuse 
planning conducted by the sustainment and maneuver communities and to manage a campaign 
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that balanced the two perspectives.  In September 1944, SHAEF was hampered by the fact that it 
had not fully wrestled control of the ground campaign from 21st Army Group and by the 
assumption that Lee’s COMZ would effectively synchronize sustainment.  In practice Bradley, 
Moses, and Plank were better positioned to run an improvised tactical and operational 
sustainment system, but they did not have the authority or technical expertise to direct the special 
staff at ETOUSA and to coordinate with the War Department.  Only Montgomery’s 21st Army 
Group combined the optimal internal command structure and abundant motorized transportation 
with experienced, flexible, and disciplined staff and tactical units to overcome various logistical 
limitations that threatened to disrupt the desired scheme of maneuver.  By early October it was 
clear that SHAEF included a cluster of headquarters with widely different levels of competence 
where a few weak links were holding back the command.  Montgomery’s 21st Army Group was 
at one end of this spectrum and Lee’s ETOUSA/COMZ on the other, with SHAEF, 6th and 12th 
Army Groups, and USSTAF somewhere between them.     
This was the result of a number of factors.  First, there were significant differences in the 
way the two countries approached doctrine and in the conclusions they had reached after the 
Great War concerning theater-level command and control and logistics.  Capstone British 
doctrine was published much less frequently than was U.S. guidance; the British made no effort 
during the course of the war to update or replace The Manual of Movement (1933) or the 1935 
FSR Volume III: Higher Formations.  Furthermore, the two British manuals were dramatically 
and perhaps surprisingly different from one another.  Higher Formations was about half the 
length of The Manual of Movement and was written for experienced readers; the content was 
heavy on broad guidance and included no concrete examples or recommended processes or 
techniques.  The authors of this document refused to try to turn the art of command into a 
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checklist.  The Manual of Movement was its conceptual opposite.  Hundreds of years of practical 
experience in overseas expeditionary campaigns forced the British Army to take a deep interest 
in long-distance transportation and resupply in remote and austere environments.  The Manual of 
Movement was written to introduce new officers to the logical and detailed sequence of events 
needed to project ground forces and maintain their strength during lengthy operations.  Managing 
a transportation network, even under combat conditions, relied on science more that art.  The 
manual explained in great detail the sequence of events through each stage of deployment, 
providing concrete examples and specific methods of solving problems that young staff officers, 
lacking any operational experience of their own, would find useful.  Despite its age, The Manual 
of Movement remained relevant through 1945.   
Notwithstanding the fact that high-level U.S. doctrine consisted of more and longer 
manuals that were updated frequently, this mass of words could not completely obscure the 
reality that the U.S. Army had not reconciled its operational shortcomings from World War One 
with its vision of how to control theater-level war in the future.  FM 100-10, Administration 
occupied a pedagogical middle space between the Manual of Movement and Higher Formations, 
describing goals and desired outcomes with no practical explanation of steps to achieve them, or, 
perhaps more accurately, how to synchronize the activities of a number of agencies engaged in 
the same processes.  It left unexamined the relationship between the supply and transportation 
functions, technical services and the administrative coordinating staff, and the theater 
sustainment command (the service of supply or communications zone) and the general theater 
headquarters.  The U.S. Army had never reached consensus on why the SOS supporting the AEF 
in France had been forced to struggle so mightily, much less on how to fix those problems.  To a 
large extent the sustainment issue was displaced and obscured by the battle between Pershing 
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and March over the division of authority between the AEF and the War Department that was 
waged during the last six months of the war.  The empowerment of the theater commander at the 
expense of the War Department, which Pershing had desired, was partially undermined by 
Marshall’s reorganization of the U.S. Army in early 1942.   Disagreement over the authority of 
the theater commander relative to Washington showed itself in the battle over control of the 
special staff at ETOUSA that was waged between Somervell and Lee against Chaney in May and 
June 1942.  Subsequent updates to FM 100-10 published during the course of the war never 
tackled this fundamental issue, leaving it up each theater commander to negotiate his own unique 
relationship with the War Department, any existing joint-combined operational headquarters, and 
his two or three “subordinate” component headquarters.  Unlike British doctrine, which clearly 
defined the command relationship within the sustainment world and acknowledged that the 
logisticians worked for the senior maneuver commander, U.S. doctrine attempted to preserve 
more autonomy and authority for the SOS/COMZ.   
The debate over control of theater logistics, then, was complicated by uncertainty within 
the U.S. Army about how to delineate the role of four new and constantly evolving command 
echelons that all seemed to be in flux at the same time.  U.S. doctrine recognized the role of an 
Army GHQ for each theater that would in theory synchronize the activity of combat, support, 
and air elements, but it did not anticipate what would happen when coalition forces were added 
to the mix or when significant naval operations were called for.  Borrowing from British models, 
Eisenhower established AFHQ with three subordinate functional commands in August 1942.  
This action immediately called into question the relationship among Gale’s team, the U.S. War 
Department staff, ETOUSA, and Lee’s SOS.  Things grew even more complex when 
NATOUSA (with its own COMZ and SOS) and 18th Army Group were established a few months 
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later.  The roles, responsibilities, organization, and personnel strength of each of these 
organizations was in constant flux for about a year.  Until AFHQ and its air, sea, and land 
component commands settled into a steady routine, it was difficult for everyone else to define 
their niches.  Even when a localized consensus started to emerge, any change among the key 
players opened the possibility of having to return to old arguments.  Because the U.S. Army 
refused to take this on formally and rewrite its doctrine accordingly, each theater evolved 
independently.  Newly assigned staff officers had to adjust to inconsistencies among doctrine, 
past education, and experience gained while serving with other units with no recommended 
baseline to follow.  By the summer of 1943 AFHQ had worked out these various complexities, 
but this learning did not carry over to SHAEF and ETOUSA, who had to renegotiate this process 
over a seven-month window in 1944.  
In contrast, British doctrine did not call for a stand-alone army theater headquarters for 
each of the geographical combat zones.  The British already had joint headquarters for each 
theater to synchronize the three services and those sustainment elements assigned to the regional 
base infrastructure; and armies and army groups exercised control over the associated L of C 
headquarters and its subordinate service units.  The only new variable for the British was the 
introduction of a coalition partner, resulting in a few modifications to the organizational structure 
of the joint-combined headquarters and the need to figure out how to split up logistics between 
unique and common-use items.  As a result, there was relatively little confusion or argument 
among British forces assigned to AFHQ or SHAEF about their responsibilities and authority 
relative to one another.  The attachment of U.S. units to U.K. commands added the occasional 
wrinkle, but internally the British knew exactly who was responsible for what within each staff 
and at each echelon of the chain of command. 
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Neither the U.S. nor U.K. militaries had a perfect understanding of the best way to 
manage theater logistics and command and control in late 1942, especially while operating side 
by side.  This placed a premium value on the ability to extract, validate, and propagate lessons 
from ongoing operations to ensure that unengaged headquarters could refine their procedures 
before being committed to combat.  This goal proved to be much more complex and difficult to 
accomplish than the leaders involved had anticipated.  Both countries put a lot of effort and 
resources into the task, but with mixed results.  Combat units working at the tactical level 
seemed to learn quickly, as did operational headquarters serving in active theaters.  The British 
benefited from a historical tradition that demanded lessons-learned assessments be completed at 
the highest levels of the organization both during and immediately after a campaign.  The U.S. 
system prioritized the extraction of lessons that could be used to reorient the training base and 
had a parallel system designed to capture a historical perspective of campaigns; but it struggled 
to critically assess the performance of service units and higher-level headquarters.  Neither 
country felt compelled to expend the resources required to substantially update or expand the 
doctrine that covered these topics.  As a result of these trends, hard-won experience did not 
transfer easily to other, quieter theaters.  Despite the creation of the Joint Q-Course and the 
dispatch of numerous observation teams to North Africa throughout 1943, ETOUSA and SOS 
were still extremely inexperienced organizations by July 1944, poorly organized and prepared to 
manage their dwindling portfolio on the eve of activation of the COMZ in France.   
ETOUSA’s experience illustrated the difficulty associated with executing one mission 
while trying to prepare for a second role.  SOS and, to a lesser extent, ETOUSA found 
themselves overwhelmed executing Bolero, with little energy left to plan and prepare for 
Roundup, especially during the period when the projected date of the invasion remained in flux.  
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This was similar to the problem faced by AFHQ in the spring of 1943, when current operations 
interfered with the simultaneous preparation of the invasion of Sicily.  It suggested a pattern -- 
that only the most mature and well-resourced headquarters were capable of adequately managing 
one campaign while also planning and organizing for the next one.  In the case of ETOUSA and 
SOS, they were barely keeping their heads above water with Bolero in the early summer of 1943, 
which drove Devers to seek Marshall’s help in establishing new organizations to plan, prepare 
for, and create logistical programs to support the invasion of France.  Rather than taking 
ownership of the process and demonstrating that he was up to the challenge of the operational 
planning role that doctrine and Somervell’s construct demanded, Lee allowed others to encroach 
on the one activity that would have forced his command to think through the challenges linked to 
its projected role in combat.  Once Lee surrendered authority over planning for sustainment at 
the operational level, the associated task of integrating maneuver and logistics activities soon 
followed, first delegated to 21st Army Group and its attached liaison team from FUSAG, and 
then SHAEF by mid-fall 1944.  By D-Day, Lee’s role had been simplified to managing the 
communications zone, and senior leaders within the ASF, SHAEF, and FUSAG wondered if he 
was even capable of this reduced function.  It was suggested, both during and soon after the war, 
not only that Lee had the resources required to lead the operational logistical planning effort 
while running the base in the U.K., but also that he was either incapable of or not motivated to do 
so.  Whatever the reason, the coordinating staff at COMZ and the technical special staff at 
ETOUSA were not grounded in the technical and procedural details associated with the theater 
sustainment mission under combat conditions, and they struggled to adapt under the most 
challenging conditions imaginable during the breakout and pursuit across France. 
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Reaching an accurate historical consensus about exactly what drove Allied decision-
making and the influence of operational-level logistics on those choices, both in North Africa 
and France, had been subsequently complicated by the deliberate introduction of sanitized 
narratives and a whitewashing of some of the personal friction that developed during the war.  
Some of this process of sanitization was deliberate, and some was accidental.  Finer details got 
oversimplified as they transited up the chain of command, and some officers honestly forgot the 
sequence of events that occurred during particularly stressful stretches of time.  Some officers 
and organizations put little effort into capturing accurate records, or else they did not establish 
forcing functions to trigger the lessons-learned process.  Often the emotional element was 
deliberately filtered out of the narrative.  During exceptionally stressful times officers tended to 
record their frustrations and candid appraisals of their fellows, but the harsher comments tended 
to remain in personal diaries and not transfer over into official histories written after the war. 
Eisenhower had learned his lesson from the criticism he faced in January 1943 and took 
proactive measures to capture his version of events in January 1945, attempting to control the 
narrative in future historical surveys.  One detects a careful manipulation and presentation of the 
facts designed to justify decisions taken by SHAEF and to validate the performance of ETOUSA 
while avoiding the temptation to fault any external actors for perceived mistakes.  Eisenhower 
justified the various decisions he had made, and he took credit for a few decisions that he 
claimed time had shown to be the right calls (such as Anvil and the transportation plan). But he 
refrained from blaming Lee or Montgomery for his logistical problems.  SHAEF’s official 
position was that all had done their best under very trying conditions.  Eisenhower was not 
interested in anyone digging into the details surrounding Montgomery’s foot-dragging in 
opening Antwerp or Lee’s failure to provide better support, especially since Smith and Gale had 
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repeatedly pointed out problems with COMZ.  After the battle in the Ardennes everything had 
generally worked out in his favor, and Eisenhower did not want to air his dirty laundry with the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff and their political masters.  This careful shaping of the narrative 
emerging from SHAEF continued during the creation of the USFET General Board reports and 
the early versions of the Green Books focused on European operations.  
As time passed after the war, it became harder and harder for any one historian to piece 
together a holistic appreciation of exactly what had happened, much less figure out why some 
mistakes had been made and how similar mistakes were avoided by other organizations or in 
different campaigns.  The process used to create the General Board reports and the official Army 
history of World War Two compartmentalized a complex, interrelated web of activities into neat 
bins divided up by windows of time, geographical regions, and functional responsibilities.  
Witnesses intuitively sensed that SHAEF’s command structure virtually preordained that a series 
of problems would emerge in synchronization and coordination and that something had gone 
fundamentally wrong with the theater logistics system around October.  But no one seemed 
capable of convincingly describing what mistakes had occurred, why they had not been 
anticipated or fixed, and if realistic alternatives even existed.  The scope of the problem seemed 
to be too large for any one participant to piece together, and the early disinformation campaign 
orchestrated at SHAEF made it even more difficult to do so.  Poor record keeping at AFHQ, 
ETOUSA, and SOS during the first few months of their existence did not help matters.  Gale 
recorded in frustration in mid-February 1943: “The filing system in this office on the American 
side is paralytic.  You can never find [a] record of anything.”1  The passage of nearly eight 
 
1 Gale Official War Diary, 16 Feb 43, Gale Papers, II/1-13, Liddell Hart Center, King’s College.  The British 
eventually taught the Americans their system, and recording keeping at AFHQ and then SHAEF was excellent after 
around May 1943.  This was not the case with their U.S., administratively-focused, subordinate commands. 
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decades has not made the records maintained by AFHQ, ETOUSA, and Lee’s headquarters more 
complete or more accessible.  Only by piecing together bits and pieces pulled from the USFET 
General Board reports, the U.S. Army official history of the war, and similar volumes published 
by the British War Office can one reconstruct a narrative of the technical failures of COMZ, the 
entwined nature of logistics and maneuver, and comparative cases illustrating different methods 
that might have produced better results.   
What eventually emerges is an appreciation for just how long it took to realize that 
ETOUSA had fundamental weaknesses that placed the Allied effort in Europe at risk.  
Obviously, the logistical collapse that occurred between late August and October was not pre-
determined. Decisions were made across a two-year span that eventually created the almost 
insurmountable challenges faced by COMZ during the pursuit east of the Seine.  The real insight 
offered by examining this evolution over its entire history is the appreciation for the time-
sensitive nature of strategic decision-making it affords.  ETOUSA’s range of options with which 
to respond to the crisis in transportation and logistics in the theater had narrowed to a razor’s 
edge by early August 1944.  Relief could only be provided if someone convinced SHAEF to put 
all their effort into a few focused thrusts.  If the logisticians could not convince the fighting 
generals to narrow their objectives, then all that was left was maximizing the capacity of the 
transportation that was available, including the rapid restoration of rail service, and ruthlessly 
prioritizing what got shipped to the continent and passed along to the front.  There was no time 
to add more resources, reorganize the staff, or enact new procedures under the circumstances that 
COMZ faced in August 1944.  In the summer of 1943 Devers and Lee realized that they were 
running out of time to shape the strategic and operational range of options that would be 
available to solve the challenges in maneuver and logistics presented by Roundup.  If either 
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leader wanted to radically change the major variables that would frame what was physically 
possible in France in the summer of 1944, they had to act soon.  Working twelve months prior to 
the invasion, ETOUSA could conceivably have included a higher percentage of service and 
transportation troops relative to air and ground combat formations.  SOS might have been able to 
study, modify, and practice the British requisition and distribution system so that their methods 
could work under the structure favored by the U.S. Army.  The experiences of the 18th and 21st 
Army Groups strongly suggested that the British had figured out a system to provide logistical 
support across continental distances during a mobile campaign.  Lee might have updated and 
refined the consumption estimates that were used to inform long-range logistics planning, and he 
might have convinced the ASF to make them the universal standard for the U.S. Army.  This 
study has illuminated all of the different ways that the U.S. Army and SHAEF might have 
simplified the challenges faced by COMZ during the pursuit, some of which could have been 
transferred wholesale from the successful processes developed by similar commands already 
engaged in combat.  But almost all of those options demanded long lead times to be identified, to 
build a consensus for their implementation, and to introduce to the field through retraining, and 
finally allowing refinement under local conditions and in reaction to the operating preferences of 
key personalities.   
These conditions were in short supply because the day-to-day demands of the war got in 
the way and because extracting and sharing valid lessons learned is difficult under the best 
circumstances.  The U.S. and British armies learned and got better throughout the war, but they 
did so at different speeds.   The pace of the learning process varied across different units, 
functional specialties, and theaters.  As a result, SHAEF consisted of a group of subordinate 
organizations with a wide range of competencies and combat experience, an unevenness in 
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capabilities that was replicated at each level of the chain of command down to the smallest 
tactical units.  In August 1944 SHAEF was only as strong as its weakest link, and for about three 
months that was LTG John Lee’s COMZ.   
Smith and Gale suspected that it was the case by early August, and they knew it by mid-
September, but it was too late to fix the issue before it hobbled the pursuit.  Montgomery realized 
that one way to mitigate this problem was to prioritize one multi-army thrust while stopping the 
others, but he could not effectively communicate this idea to Eisenhower and SHAEF in the face 
of rosy logistical projections coming from Bradley and Lee in mid-September.  After he failed to 
convince Eisenhower to support his approach, Montgomery persisted in trying to breach the 
Rhine before the German Army could revive itself rather than follow Eisenhower’s orders to 
open Antwerp.  By the time COMZ had learned how to synchronize the delivery of logistical 
support it was too late.  The pursuit had culminated, and SHAEF had already decided to take 
over direct control of the special technical staff at ETOUSA.  This in turn led to the directive that 
COMZ desist trying to supervise the theater distribution network and turn the task over to Ross. 
The uneven experience base of the senior headquarters charged with supervising the war 
in France traced back to their operational histories, or those of their pre-cursors.  There was 
significant continuity between AFHQ and SHAEF, with many of the senior officers 
accompanying Eisenhower, bringing their systems and connections with them.  Even so, SHAEF 
had to integrate new personnel from the COSSAC planning team and forge relationships with a 
host of new subordinate headquarters.  By March Eisenhower had wrestled control over the air 
campaign from a number of competitors, but de facto direction over ground operations eluded 
his grasp until mid-October, and SHAEF found itself surprised by the incompetence shown by 
COMZ in September.  Despite having a core of highly experienced senior officers, SHAEF did 
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not master its full range of required functions until late October 1944 at the earliest.  NATOUSA 
and ETOUSA followed similar developmental arcs but with two major exceptions.  NATOUSA, 
including its COMZ and SOS, got an eighteen-month head start in amassing combat experience, 
and Hughes managed to figure out how to work effectively with Smith, Gale, Larkin, Patton, and 
Clark.  NATOUSA and Hughes suffered through the same growing pains as ETOUSA and Lee, 
but they did so from February to May 1943 under the watchful eye of Gale, Alexander, and the 
administrative staff at 18th Army Group during a pause in the North African campaign.  Both 21st 
and 6th Army Groups were built around a core of highly effective officers who had served in 
Africa and Italy, joined by less experienced staff officers, army and corps headquarters, and 
service units generated by the training base.  FUSAG, or 12th Army Group, included a mixed bag 
of staff officers and units, with less combat experience than the other two army groups and 
SHAEF, but more than ETOUSA/SOS.  Many of the key staff officers at FUSAG also benefited 
from their multi-month apprenticeship under 21st Army Group and their early introduction to the 
fight in Normandy.  By early August they had a two-month head start on COMZ.  The only 
complete rookies were the special staff at ETOUSA and COMZ, and at least the technical 
sections at ETOUSA had been deeply immersed in the operational planning for Roundup and 
Overlord.   
The indirect role of the ASF and AAF on the campaign in France during the fall of 1944 
should not be ignored.  Somervell was largely responsible for implementing a doctrinal model 
that centralized all logistical planning and control under the theater SOS, thereby partially 
undermining the authority of ETOUSA at its birth.  The ASF was also responsible for a nine-
month delay in acknowledging the need for heavy trucks and tractor-trailer combinations in the 
U.S. Army.  Finally, senior leaders from ASF formally inspected Lee’s organization twice, 
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identifying extensive internal and external problems in the process.  And yet Somervell and 
Lutes did very little to help ETOUSA solve the systemic and procedural framework they 
operated under.  Many of the problems Lee first faced in late 1942 could have been mitigated if 
not eliminated by spring 1944 through revised doctrine, officially endorsed consumption 
planning figures that integrated the experience gained in the Mediterranean, and improved 
training of service units and officers back in the United States.  General “Hap” Arnold also 
undermined the authority of ETOUSA at a critical stage in its development, and the AAF seemed 
determined to obscure the value of massed aerial resupply, both during and immediately after the 
war, emphasizing instead airborne maneuver and strategic bombing.2  ASF, SHAEF, and AEAF 
had incentives to obscure the facts behind the timeline associated with fielding heavy trucks and 
establishing reliable and efficient massed aerial resupply.  ASF wasted almost six months 
arguing about the obvious advantages of more capable tractor-trailer combinations rather than 
accelerating new production.  SHAEF and AEAF published two sets of instructions during the 
spring of 1944 that were designed to iron out exactly how to coordinate aerial resupply through 
CATOR.  But when the first call for massed support arrived in early August, SHAEF’s 
preliminary groundwork proved insufficient, and Moses and 12th Army Group had to step in and 
rewrite the SOP themselves. 
Similarly, Lee, Ross, and Stratton had incentives to obscure the inefficiency of the U.S. 
requisition and distribution system between August and October, blaming problems on external 
 
2 The value of both of these missions was validated by the U.S. Army after the war, as was air superiority, tactical 
air support, and battlefield interdiction. It is a not a question about the importance of bombing, aerial maneuver, et 
cetera, but the exclusion of regular aerial resupply from that list.  If the value of any of these roles was called into 
question by war-time experience, it was the practicality of airborne drops during mobile operations or throughout 
operational distances behind enemy lines.  Officers recognized the tactical advantages offered by aerial 
envelopment, but questioned the opportunity cost of diverting C47s and the risk of mass casualties to the airborne 
force.    
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factors and instead emphasizing the logistical resurgence achieved in November and December.  
COMZ’s operational failure is exposed by comparing it with the performance by 21st Army 
Group in September and October and also by noting SHAEF’s decision to assume a number of 
COMZ’s duties beginning in October.  Despite facing similar challenges and a distribution crisis 
of their own during the second half of September, 21st Army Group never ran out of critical 
supplies in the lead divisions and had completely recovered its logistical balance by the first days 
of October.  Notwithstanding assurances that a solution to the transportation problem was just 
around the corner, the situation within ETOUSA got progressively worse throughout the same 
month, and it was only sorted out by early December, just before the German counter-offensive 
in the Ardennes.  In mid-September Gale, Lee, and Ross honestly believed there were indicators 
that the supply and transportation situation in the U.S. sector was improving, but after the war 
there was a deliberate effort to cover up the scope of the break down that was slowly revealed in 
the second half of September and October.  By late October it was obvious that COMZ had let 
SHAEF and the army groups down. 
Despite expending a lot of energy on the topic in the eighteen months prior to landing in 
France, Lee and the staff at SOS were not prepared to run theater-level logistics under combat 
conditions, and this shortfall significantly restricted Allied options that fall.  But responsibility 
for the premature culmination of the Allied pursuit could hardly be laid exclusively at the feet of 
COMZ.  Based on rumblings detected in April and May, logisticians at SHAEF might have 
anticipated the problem and been better prepared to pick up some of the load, or tried to simplify 
the problem by convincing maneuver commanders to make tough decisions about priorities and 
then stick to them.  Luckily for SHAEF, they had already assumed much of the burden for 
planning logistical support at the operational level, and integrating sustainment with maneuver, 
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by early May.  MG Crawford, the SHAEF G-4, had mounted one last, and ultimately 
unsuccessful, attack to gain control over the special staff at ETOUSA and the associated 
responsibility to coordinate with the ASF in early May.  Crawford’s recommendation to move 
this responsibility to SHAEF was rejected by Eisenhower, who seemed uninterested in creating a 
fully resourced and independent ETOUSA or moving the duties handled by COMZ up to joint-
combined headquarters.  Montgomery and Gale tried to ensure that Eisenhower selected and 
sequenced his maneuver objectives cognizant of the limitations and requirements of the theater 
supply system.  But these two British officers ultimately failed when Bradley and Lee fed 
Eisenhower what he wanted to hear, overturning the hard-won decision of 10 September to give 
priority to Montgomery’s dual thrust to reach the Rhine.3   
A number of contemporary witnesses believed that one of the simplest solutions to the 
U.S. command and control dilemma that emerged in the fall would have been for Eisenhower to 
subordinate Lee and the COMZ to Bradley early in the preparation process for Overlord.  In the 
spring of 1944 Eisenhower did not consider this step necessary; in the fall he chose to address 
shortfalls in COMZ’s performance by shifting the last of their independent functions over to 
SHAEF.  By May 1944 Lee’s role had been greatly simplified when compared to the power he 
had held back in the fall of 1943.  During Overlord COMZ would supervise the requisition and 
distribution system in the theater rear area, coordinating with ASF as required to accomplish this 
reduced responsibility.  Direction over the operational aspects of logistics, to include planning 
the expansion of the transportation network, assigning service troops to subordinate commands, 
and integrating the flow of supplies with the overall campaign concept, had passed to Gale and 
 
3 Composed of the one-two punch of Market Garden a supporting attack by 1st U.S. Army designed to capture 
Aachen and then advance on Köln.   
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his team at SHAEF.  Eisenhower, in his role as both the SHAEF and ETOUSA commander, 
would supervise Lee personally, aided by Smith and Gale.  In hindsight this was perhaps a 
mistake, but it was a risk Eisenhower was comfortable taking for the duration of Overlord.  
Subordinating Lee to Bradley may or may not have provided the focus and incentive required to 
get COMZ ready for combat, but it was a technique that worked well to ensure effective 
synchronization of sustainment and maneuver operations in 21st and 6th Army Groups.  Without 
more direct supervision by a combat-centric commander, Lee consistently prioritized executing 
Bolero at the expense of planning and preparing for Roundup.  Despite repeated efforts meant to 
create a learning environment at SOS, Lee struggled to prepare his command to master the 
conditions they would confront in France during the pursuit.  Perhaps it was impossible to 
execute Bolero while simultaneously preparing for Roundup with the number and quality of 
officers assigned to ETOUSA and SOS throughout 1943, but one suspects Lee’s personality and 
priorities were major factors as well.  In early August SHAEF turned theater logistics over to a 
neophyte organization under the most trying conditions imaginable, and when COMZ failed it 
should have come as a surprise to no one.  
  
803 
 
Bibliography 
I. Primary Sources 
 
  A. National Archives and Records Administration II (NARA), College Park, MD   
RG 160, 331, 407, 492, 498 
 
  B. U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center (AHEC), Carlisle PN 
 Aurand, Devers, J.C.H. Lee, Littlejohn, Moses, Pogue, Papers 
 
  C. Library of Congress Manuscript Division (LoC), Washington, D.C.   
Hughes Papers 
 
  D. U.S. Forces European Theater (USFET) General Board Reports 
 
  E. Foyle Special Collections, King’s College, London 
Manual of Movement (War).  London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1933. 
 
  F. B. H. Liddell Hart Collection, King’s College, London, U.K.  
Gale Papers 
 
  G. Imperial War Museum, London, U.K.  
War Office’s official histories of the British Army in WW II 
 
  H. National Archives, Kew Garden, London, U.K. 
 WO 171, 175, 205, 219, 229, 234 
 
  I. Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library (DDE PL), Abilene, KS. 
 
Aurand, Henry S.  “SHAEF-ETOUSA-COMZ: A Lesson in Organization for National 
Defense,” Box 63, Henry S. Aurand Papers. 
 
Bull, Harold MG.  “Build Up from D to D+90” 9 Aug 1944.  Harold Bull Collection. 
 
Clay, Lucius.  Interview by Jean Smith, 14 January 1971, transcript, OH-285 No. 13.  
Interview by Richard D. McKinzie, 16 July 1974, transcript, Harry S. Truman PL, Independence, 
MS. 
 
 Lee, J.C.H.  Service Reminiscences.  Unpublished.  Copy in the Henry B. Saylor 
 Collection, Box 2. 
  
 Lutes, Leroy MG.  Papers. 
 
 Moses, Raymond G.  “Field Force Logistics” 12th Army Group, G-4 Section.  31 July 
1945.   Walter B. Smith Collection of World War II Documents, 1941-1945, Box 46.   
 
804 
 
-------.  “The Organization and Operation of Military Railways.”  Staff paper submitted 
by then Major Moses.  Fort Leavenworth: Command and General Staff School, 1931. 
 
 Saylor, Henry B.  Papers, Box 2. 
 
 Thirtieth and First Infantry Division G-4 Monthly After-Action Reports, Fall 1944.  U.S. 
Army  Unit Records 1940-1950, Box 872.   
 
 
II. Secondary Sources 
 
Allison, Graham.  Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis.  Boston: Little,  
Brown, 1971. 
 
Anderson, Richard.  “Special Observers: A History of SPOBS and USAFBI, 1941-1942.”   
PhD diss., University of Kansas, 2016. 
 
Atkinson, Rick.  An Army at Dawn: The War in North Africa, 1942-1943.  New York: Henry 
 Holt and Company, LLC, 2002.   
 
Aubin, Nicolas.  Trans. Lawrence Brown.  Liberty Roads: The American Logistics in France and  
Germany, 1944-45.  Paris: Histoire & Collections, 2014.     
 
Barbier, Mary Kathryn.  D-Day Deception: Operation Fortitude and the Normandy Invasion.   
Westport, CN: Praeger Security International, 2007. 
 
Barr, Niall.  Eisenhower’s Armies: The American-British Alliance During World War II.  New  
York: Pegasus Books, Ltd., 2015. 
 
Beaver, Daniel R.  “‘Deuce and a Half’: Selecting U.S. Army Trucks, 1920-1945.”  In Feeding  
Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present, edited by John  
A. Lynn, 251-270.  Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1993. 
 
Beevor, Anthony.  D-Day:  The Battle for Normandy.  New York:  Viking, 2009. 
 
Bekker, Cajus.  The Luftwaffe War Diaries: The German Air Force in World War II.  New York:  
Da Capo Press, 1964.     
 
Bennett, Ralph.  Ultra in the West: The Normandy Campaign 1944-45.  London: Hutchinson and  
Co., 1979. 
 
Blumenson, Martin.  Breakout and Pursuit. United States Army in World War II.  Washington 
DC:  Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1961. 
 
-------.  The Battle of the Generals:  The Untold Story of the Falaise Pocket.  New York:  
William Morrow, 1993. 
805 
 
 
Boff, Jonathan.  Winning and Losing on the Western Front: The British Third Army and the 
Defeat of Germany in 1918.  Cambridge: University Press, 2012. 
 
Boileau, COL D.W.  The Second World War 1939-1945, Army, Supplies and Transport, Volume 
II.  London: The War Office, 1954. 
 
Bonn, Keith E.  When the Odds Were Even:  The Vosges Mountains Campaign, October 1944-
January 1945.  Novato (CA):  Presidio, 1994. 
 
Borneman, Walter R.  The Admirals: Nimitz, Halsey, Leahy, and King – The Five-Star Admirals 
Who Won the War at Sea.  New York: Little, Brown, and Co., 2012.   
 
Bourque, Stephen Alan.  Beyond the Beach: The Allied War Against France.  Annapolis, MD:  
Naval Institute Press, 2018. 
 
Bradley, Omar N. & Blair, Clay.  1983.  A General’s Life:  An Autobiography.  New York:  
Simon & Schuster. 
 
-------.  A Soldier’s Story.  New York:  Holt, 1951. 
 
Buckley, John.  British Armour in the Normandy Campaign 1944.  London: Frank Cass, 2004. 
 
Bush, Everett.  “The Quartermaster Supply of Third Army: Part I” in Quartermaster Review 
 26 (Nov/Dec, 1946). 
 
Carter, LTC J.A.H. and Major D.N. Kann.  The Second World War 1939-1945, Army, 
Maintenance in the Field, Volume II: 1943-1945.  London: The War Office, 1961. 
 
Cashman, Greg. What Causes War? An Introduction to Theories of International Conflict, 2nd  
Edition.  Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2014. 
 
Chandler, Alfred D. and Louis Galambos, editors.  The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower  
 The War Years Volume I-IV.  Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970.   
 
Clarke, Jeffrey J., & Smith, Robert R.  1993.  Riviera to the Rhine.  United States Army in World 
War II.  Washington DC:  Center of Military History, United States Army. 
 
Coakley, Robert W. and Richard M. Leighton.  Global Logistics and Strategy, 1943-1945.   
 Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1967. 
 
Corrado, Giovanni.  “Tactical Enthusiasm, Operational Blindness, and Civilian Casualties:  
Questioning the Allied Air Campaign against Italy during the Second World War.”   
MMAS monograph, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2015. 
 
Cox, Hank H.  The General Who Wore Six Stars: The Inside Story of John C. H. Lee.  Lincoln,  
806 
 
NE: Potomac Books, 2018.   
 
Craven, Wesley F. and James L. Cate.  The Army Air Forces in World War II.  Volume Three: 
 Europe: Argument to V-E Day.  Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951. 
 
Creveld, Martin van.  Logistics in War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton.  Cambridge: 
 Cambridge University Press, 1977. 
 
Crosswell, D.K.R.  Beetle: the Life of General Walter Bedell Smith.  Lexington: The University 
 Press of Kentucky, 2010. 
 
Cyert, Richard M. and James G. March.  A Behavioral Theory of the Firm.  Englewood Cliffs,  
Prentice Hall, 1963. 
 
D’Este, Carlo.  Decision in Normandy.  New York:  Dutton, 1983. 
 
-------.  Patton: A Genius for War.  New York: Harper Perennial, 1995.    
 
Doubler, Michael D.  Closing with the Enemy: How G.I.s Fought the War in Europe, 1944-1945.   
Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1994.   
 
Erickson, John.  The Road to Berlin: Stalin’s War with Germany: Volume Two.  New Haven, 
 CN: Yale University Press, 1983. 
 
Eisenhower, David.  Eisenhower at War, 1939-1945.  New York:  Random House, 1986. 
 
Eisenhower, Dwight D.  Crusade in Europe.  Garden City (NY):  Doubleday, 1948. 
 
-------.  The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, The War Years:  III.  A.D. Chandler, ed.  
Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins, 1970. 
 
Ellis, Lionel F.  The Battle of Normandy.  Vol. 1 in Victory in the West.  London:  H.M. 
Stationery Office, 1962. 
 
-------.  The Defeat of Germany. Vol. 2 in Victory in the West.  London:  H.M. Stationery Office, 
1968. 
 
Fraser, David.  Knight’s Cross: A Life of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel.  New York: Harper  
Collins Publishers, 1993. 
 
Gordon, Edward E. and David Ramsay.  Divided on D-Day: How Conflicts and Rivalries  
Jeopardized the Allied Victory at Normandy.  Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2017.  
 
Greenwood, John T.  Normandy to Victory:  The War Diary of General Courtney H. Hodges and 
the First U.S. Army.  Lexington (KY):  University Press of Kentucky, 2008. 
 
807 
 
Guderian, Heinz Gunther.  From Normandy to the Ruhr: With the 116th Panzer Division in  
World War II.  Bedford, PN: Aberjona Press, 2001.       
 
Gudmundsson, Bruce I.  Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the Germany Army, 1914-1918.  
Westport, CN: Praeger, 1989.   
 
Harrison, Gordon A.  Cross-Channel Attack.  United States Army in World War II.  Washington 
DC:  Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1951. 
 
Hart, Russell A.  Learning Lessons: Military Adaptation and innovation in the American, British, 
Canadian, and German Armies during the 1944 Normandy Campaign.  Ohio State 
University, 1997. 
 
-------.  Clash of Arms: How the Allies Won in Normandy.  Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner 
Publishers, 2000. 
 
Hilsman, Roger.  To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John  
F. Kennedy.  New York, Doubleday, 1967.   
 
Hinsley, Francis H.  British Intelligence in the Second World War:  Its Influence on Strategy and 
Operations.  Volume Three Part II.  New York:  Cambridge, 1988. 
 
Hoiback, Harald.  Understanding Military Doctrine: A Multidisciplinary Approach.  New York: 
Routledge, 2013. 
 
Hughes, Thomas Alexander.  Overlord: General Pete Quesada and the Triumph of Tactical Air 
Power in World War II.  New York: The Free Press, 1995. 
 
Huntington, Sam.  “Strategic Planning and the Political Process,” Foreign Affairs 38 (1960):  
285-99.     
 
Kennedy, Paul.  Engineers of Victory: The Problem Solvers Who Turned the Tide in the Second  
World War.  New York: Random House, 2013    
 
Kretchik, Walter E.  U.S. Army Doctrine: From the American Revolution to the War on Terror.  
Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2011. 
 
Leigh, Randolph LTC.  48 Million Tons to Eisenhower: the Role of the SOS in the Defeat of  
 Germany.  Washington, D.C.: The Infantry Journal, 1945.     
 
Lupfer, Timothy T.  The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine  
During the First World War.  Leavenworth Papers No. 4.  Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S.  
Army Command and General Staff College, 1981. 
 
Mansoor, Peter R.  The GI Offensive in Europe:  The Triumph of American Infantry Divisions, 
1941-1945.  Lawrence (KS):  University Press of Kansas, 1999. 
808 
 
 
March, James G. and Herbert A. Simon.  Organizations.  New York, John Wiley, 1958.   
 
Millett, John D.  The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces.  Washington, D.C.:  
 Office of the Chief of Military History, 1954.   
 
Montgomery, Bernard.  21Army Group: Normandy to the Baltic.  British Army of the Rhine,  
 1946.     
 
-------.  The Memoirs of Field-Marshal The Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, KG.  London  
 and Glasgow: Fontana, 1960. 
 
Morgan, Sir Frederick LTG.  Overture to Overlord.  London: Hodder and Stoughton, Ltm., 
 1950.     
 
-------.  Peace and War: A Soldier’s Life.  London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1961. 
 
Murray, Williamson.  Luftwaffe.  Baltimore: The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of  
America, 1985. 
 
Murray, Williamson and Allan R. Millett, eds.  Military Innovation in the Interwar Period.   
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.   
 
Nagl, John A.  Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and  
Vietnam.  Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005. 
 
Odom, William O.  After the Trenches: The Transformation of U.S. Army Doctrine, 1918-1939.   
College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1999. 
 
Ohl, John Kennedy.  Supplying the Troops: General Somervell and American Logistics in  
 WWII.  DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1994. 
 
Osmanski, Frank.  Military Review 29, no. 8 (November 1949):31-40, no. 9 (December 1949): 
 40-49,  and no. 10 (January, 1950):50-62.  
 
Overy, Richard.  Why the Allies Won.  New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1995.  
 
Palmer, Robert R., Bell I Wiley, and William R. Keast.  The Procurement and Training of 
Ground Combat Troops.  United States Army in World War II.  Washington DC:  Chief 
of Military History, Department of the Army, 1948. 
 
Playfair, Ian Stanley Ord (MG).  British Fortunes Reach Their Lowest Ebb.  Vol. 3 of The  
Mediterranean and Middle East.  Edited by Sir James Butler.  London: H.M. Stationery  
Office, 1960. 
 
-------.  The Destruction of the Axis Forces in Africa.  Vol. 4 of The Mediterranean and Middle  
809 
 
East.  Edited by Sir James Butler.  London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1966.   
 
Pogue, Forrest C.  The Supreme Command.  United States Army in World War II.  Washington 
DC:  Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1954. 
 
Porch, Douglas.  The Path to Victory: The Mediterranean Theater in World War II.  New York: 
Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2004. 
 
Ravenhill, G.C. BG.  “Logistics in Northwestern Europe 1944-1945,” reprinted in Military 
 Review 27, no. 8 (Nov 1947): 73-79. 
 
Reese, John.  Supply Man: the Army Life of LTG Henry S. Aurand, 1915-1952.  PhD  
 diss., Kansas State University, 1984. 
 
Rittel, Horst W.J., and Melvin M. Webber.  “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning.”  Poly  
Sciences 4 (1973): 155-169. 
 
Rosenau, James N.  “Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy,” in Approaches to  
Comparative and International Politics, ed. R. Barry Farrell.  Evanston, IL: Northwestern  
University Press, 1966.  
 
Ross, Irwin. “Ross of ETO.”  Army Transportation Journal 1, no. 3 (April 1945): 32-36. 
 
Ruppenthal, Roland G.  Logistical Support of the Armies.  Volume I: May 1941-September  
 1944.  Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1953. 
 
-------.  Logistical Support of the Armies.  Volume II: September 1944-May  
 1945.  Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1959. 
 
Schifferle, Peter.  America’s School for War: Fort Leavenworth, Officer Education, and Victory  
in World War II.  Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010.    
 
Smith, Jean Edward.  Lucius D. Clay: An American Life.  New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1990.        
 
Smith, Walter Bedell.  Eisenhower’s Six Great Decisions: Europe, 1944-1945.  New York:  
 Longmans, Green, and Co., 1956. 
 
Snyder, Richard C., H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin.  Decision-Making as an Approach to the  
Study of International Politics, Foreign Policy Analysis Project Series 3.  Princeton:  
Princeton University Press, 1954.   
 
Stacey, C.P.  The Victory Campaign: Operations in North-West Europe 1944-1945.  Vol. 3,  
Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War.  Ottawa: Queen’s  
Printer and Controller of Stationery, 1960. 
 
Taaffe, Stephen R.  Marshall and His Generals: U.S. Army Commanders in World War II.   
810 
 
Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2011. 
 
Tedder, Arthur William.  With Prejudice: The War Memoirs of Marshal of the Royal Air Force  
Lord Tedder, G.C.B.  Boston: Little, Brown, 1966. 
 
Toll, Ian W.  The Conquering Tide: War in the Pacific Islands, 1942-1944.  New York: W.W.  
Norton & Company, 2015.   
 
Thompson, Harry C. and Lida Mayo.  The Ordnance Department: Procurement and Supply.   
Washington, D.C: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1960.  
 
Waddell, Steve R.  United States Army Logistics: The Normandy Campaign, 1944.  Westport,  
 CN: Greenwood Press, 1994.   
 
Wardlow, Chester.  The Transportation Corps: Movements, Training, and Supply.  Washington,  
D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1956.  
 
Warlimont, Walter.  Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, 1939-1945.  Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 
1962. 
 
Weigley, Russell F.  1981.  Eisenhower’s Lieutenants:  The Campaign of France and Germany 
1944-1945.  Bloomington (IN):  Indiana University, 1981. 
 
Welch, David A.  “The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms: Retrospect  
and Prospect,” International Security 17, No. 2 (Fall 1992): 112-146. 
 
Weller, Grant T.  “‘Come Hell, High Water or Nazis’: The US Army Quartermaster Corps 
Develops and Implements the First Motorized Logistics System, 1919-1945.”  PhD diss., 
Temple University, 2007.  
 
Wheeler, James Scott.  Jacob L. Devers: A General’s Life.  Lexington: The University Press of 
Kentucky, 2015.   
 
Wilson, COL H.W.  The Second World War 1939-1945, Army, Administrative Planning.  
London: The War Office, 1952. 
 
Zabecki, David T.  Steel Wind: Colonel Georg Bruchmüller and the Birth of Modern Artillery.  
Westport, CN: Praeger, 1994. 
  
811 
 
Chapter 9 - Abbreviations 
AAA   Anti-Aircraft Artillery 
AAF   Army Air Forces 
AAR   After Action Review 
ABS   Atlantic Base Section 
ADSEC  Advanced Section 
AEF   American Expeditionary Forces 
AF   Air Force 
AG   Army Group 
AGF   Army Group Forces 
ASF   Army Service Forces 
AEAF   Allied Expeditionary Air Force 
AFHQ   Allied Forces Headquarters 
AR   Army 
BR   British 
CAN   Canadian 
CAO   Chief Administrative Officer 
CATOR  Combined Air Transport Operations Room 
CCS   Combined Chiefs of Staff 
CGSC/S  Command and General Staff College/School 
COE   Cab Over Engine 
COMZ   Communications Zone 
COSSAC  Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander 
CP   Command Post 
CW   Chemical Warfare 
DQMG  Deputy Quartermaster General 
ENG   Engineer Corps 
ETOUSA  European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army 
FA   Field Artillery 
FECZ   Forward Echelon, Communications Zone 
FUSA / G  First U.S. Army / Group 
FM   Field Manual 
FMC   Field Maintenance Centres 
FSR   Field Service Regulations 
GHQ   General Headquarters 
GT / MT  General Transport / Motor Transport 
HE   High Explosive 
HQ   Headquarters 
HTD   Highway Transportation Division 
JPS   Joint Plans Section 
LOC/LoC/L of C Line of Communications 
LPS   Logistics Plans Section 
LNO   Liaison Officer 
LST   Landing Ship Tank 
MBS   Mediterranean Base Section 
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MG(A)  Major General, Administration 
MP   Military Police 
MPS   Military Pipeline Service 
MRS   Military Rail Service 
MTB   Motor Transport Brigade 
MTC   Motor Transport Corps 
MTS   Motor Transport Service 
MTOUSA  Mediterranean Theater of Operations, U.S. Army 
M&T   Movement and Transportation 
NATOUSA  North Africa Theater of Operations, U.S. Army 
OCOT   Office of the Chief of Transportation, SOS, ETOUSA 
ORD   Ordnance Service 
ORR   Operational Readiness Rate 
POL   Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants 
PROCO  Projects for a Continental Operation 
Q / QM (C)  Quartermaster (Corps) 
REME   Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers 
RAF   Royal Air Force 
RMA   Rear Maintenance Area 
SOP   Standing Operating Procedure 
SOS   Service of Supply 
SPOBS  U.S. Special Observer Mission 
TC   Transportation Corps 
TM   Technical Manual 
SHAEF  Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force 
USAFBI  U.S. Army Forces in the British Isles 
USAFIME  U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East 
USFET  U.S. Forces European Theater 
USSTAF   U.S. Strategic Air Force 
WD   War Department 
WO   War Office 
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Chapter 10 - Locations of Key Allied Headquarters 
Organization Location Date Arrived Date Departed 
ETOUSA Grosvenor Square (Embassy) 8 Jun 42 (from USAFBI)  
(COMZ) Valognes (SE of Cherbourg) 1 Sept 44  
(COMZ) Paris 14 Sep 44  
    
SOS Grosvenor then Cheltenham 
Norfolk House footprint 
  
SOS 2 #2 Mansfield Place – Hampstead 
London. well north most HQs 
  
ADSEC 1 Bristol (collocated w/ FUSA) Dec 43 (directed by 
COSSAC) 
 
 Normandy, Le Mans, Étampes, 
Reims  
  
FECZ John Lewis Bldg on Oxford Street 7 Feb 44 /   
    
AFHQ Norfolk House (St. James Square) 22 August 42  
 Algiers (St. George Hotel) 10 Nov 42  
    
SHAEF A Norfolk House 16 Jan 44 (from 
COSSAC) 
March? 
SHAEF 1 / 
Rear 
Bushy Park Kingston-on-Thames 
(between Heathrow and London, to 
the south) 
-Bryanston Square (London)(near 
Selfridges) 
March 44 
 
-10 Oct 
Elements Aug & 
Sep 
 
Sharpner 1 Portsmouth w/21 AG Apr/May?  (1 July up to 
1400) 
Starts 28 Aug 
“Shellburst” Tournières (12 miles SW Bayeux) 7 Aug 15 Sep 
Sharpner 2 Jullouville / Granville (Avranches)4 Before 28 Aug 15 Sep 
SHAEF 2 Versailles (Trianon Place Hotel) 15 Sep (opens 20 Sep) – 
5 Oct 
 
SHAEF Fwd Gueux (7m NW Reims) 19 Sep 17 Feb 45 
21 AG St. Paul’s School (London) Gen 
Bernard Paget, cdr Home Forces. 
Moved to ME cmd when Wilson 
took over AFHQ 
Jul 43  
21AG  Portsmouth May 44  
AEAF Stanmore June 43 (Aug L-M 
selected) 
 
Navy Portsmouth Aug 43 (Ramsey in Oct)  
 
4 At one-point SHAEF was split between Bushy Park, Bayeux, and Avranches.  All continental sections were united 
at Versailles by late September. 
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CATOR Stanmore (AEAF) Apr 44?  
FUSAG Bryanston Square (NE corner of 
Hyde Park, on a line with 
Grosvenor and then Norfolk House 
running NNW to SSE 
Sep 43?  
FUSA Bristol Sep 43?  
 
 
